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P R E C I S
This thesis is concerned with a formal problem 
which arises in the judicial review of laws limiting 
the range of governmental powers. Vast problems of a 
legal nature are posed in the observance of limitations 
imposed on governmental powers. Presumably the solu­
tion must be found in the working of judicial machinery - 
courts being the watchdog of constitutional provisions; 
no-one would deny the role played by courts in the 
growth and development of constitutionalism. The 
judicial practice involves a set of ‘’unwritten” rules 
for the guidance of courts in the understanding (or 
interpretation) of "written”laws, including written 
constitutions. One of such rules is the observance of 
"good faith” in the exercise of governmental powers, and 
it is implied in the maxim *What cannot be done directly 
cannot be done indirectly*.
This study is confined to English language systems, 
and to predominantly English common-law systems; South 
Africa is included, but the South African cases consid­
ered are also mainly English common-law in their
(vi)
(vii)
ideological background. Nevertheless, the range of 
constitutional and administrative systems is reasonably 
wide.
In casual conversation, even among lawyers, one 
often gets an impression that the maxim has not much 
force in limiting the acts or actions of governments, 
since so many schemes, which may be of great consequence 
politically or otherwise, have received the approval of 
courts even though they were designed to achieve some­
thing that was not permissible, or have been carried 
through without judicial challenge. Here an attempt is 
made to examine the implications and intricacies in the 
operation of the maxim and assess its importance or 
usefulness as a rule of constitutional interpretation.
It is a selective, not an exhaustive, study. The aim 
is to focus attention on the problems emphasised here 
and stimulate further detailed examination from a 
similar point of view. The discussion is mainly on the 
level of legal formalism, and no attempt is made to 
analyse the impact of social, economic or political 
factors on judicial practice.
(viii)
CHAPTER I. Introduction.
The origin of our maxim is not clearly traceable, 
though it has some resemblance to two of CokeTs 
Legal Maxims which primarily relate to the field 
of private law; however, one of them is occasion­
ally mentioned in the field of public law conveying 
the same sense as that of our maxim. But it is 
the doctrine of ultra vires that implies our maxim 
as one of the grounds of invalidation and estab­
lished its operation more specifically in the 
field of public law.
PART ORE. Operation of our Maxim in Constitutional Law - 
General.
Some features of the operation of our maxim are examined 
by reference to the constitutions of the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and South Africa.
CHAPTER II. United States of America.
The inquiry is confined to the powers to tax and 
to spend, as their use appears to be readily 
susceptible of achieving something not within the 
Congressional power. It would be an improper use 
of the power to tax if a tax imposed is of a
(ix)
confiscatory nature, or highly exhorbitant, or 
with the sole purpose of penalising certain 
conduct, and also if it is accompanied by an 
examption on condition requiring the surrender 
of guaranteed liberties. Similarly, it would be 
an improper use of the power to spend if govern­
mental aids or benefits were offered to citizens, 
or to states, on conditions (as instruments for 
the regulation of conduct) which have no relation 
to legitimate public interest, or operate in an 
arbitrary or unreasonable fashion, or tend to 
invade guaranteed liberties. The same is equally 
true in cases of States* powers although 
unenumerated.
CHAPTER III. Canada.
The double enumeration of legislative powers - 
one list for the Dominion Parliament and the other 
list for the provincial legislatures - creates a 
situation where some overlapping between the 
subject-matter of the two jurisdictions is bound 
to occur, and thus provides a fruitful area for 
the application of our maxim. It is all the more 
so because many powers, including the taxing power,
(x)
are defined by reference to purpose. Our maxim 
may also apply to a situation involving inter­
delegation of powers between the Dominion Parliament 
and provincial legislatures.
CHAPTER IV. Australia.
The possible occasions for invoking our maxim are 
many; most of the examples are from decided cases, 
but some well-known "devices’1 not the subject of 
judicial decision are mentioned. The most obvious 
case is that of the taxing power, Commonwealth or 
State, which may be used to achieve something that 
is prohibited or not within the powers of the 
legislature concerned. There is uncertainty as to 
the limits of the use of that power. One extreme 
is Barger*s Case^, which restrained the Commonwealth 
from using exemption from tax as a sanction from 
enforcing specified conduct in any field; the other 
extreme is OsborneTs Case ,^ which permitted the 
Commonwealth to tax a particular occupation or 
article as heavily as it pleases in order to achieve
1
R. v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41.
2
Osborne v. Commonwealth (1911) 12 C.L.R. 321.
(xi)
1 indirect1 purposes. The High Court appears to 
have been more favourably disposed towards the 
latter approach, although the former has never 
been overruled - in fact it is usually referred to 
in terms implying its correctness. Other examples 
are provided by the Commonwealth appropriation and 
defence powers; these powers involve the notion of 
purpose and are not without limits. On the other 
hand, s.96, the power to make grants to the States, 
being a non-coercive power, illustrates a situation 
where our maxim is likely to have limited (or no) 
application.
CHAPTER V . South Africa.
The Constitution formally contains no limitations 
or restrictions on the law- making powers of the 
Union Parliament. But before the passing of the 
South Africa Act Amendment Act, 1956, there were 
provisions which ‘'entrenched" the franchise of the 
coloureds in the Cape Colony. As to these provi­
sions, our maxim received a fairly extensive 
application in restricting the Union Parliament 
from achieving the prohibited purpose; it did not 
matter that the prohibition related only to
(xii)
procedure. However, after the Amendment Act courts 
were left with no jurisdiction to review Acts of 
Parliament in this context.
PART TWO. Operation of our Maxim in Administrative Law.
This part illustrates the operation of our maxim as 
implied in the judicial control of administrative author­
ities. The field of administrative law provides more 
varied aspects of our maxim1s application, and without 
such discussion this analysis would be incomplete. 
However, the present discussion is restricted, because 
fairly exhaustive studies have already been made in this 
regard, notably that of Professor S. A. de Smith. The 
bulk of administrative cases iS formidable, but for the 
most part they do not involve the analytical difficulties 
of constitutional cases, being more readily related to 
factual problems of good faith.
CHAPTER VI. Doctrine of Ultra Vires.
The underlying application of our maxim can be seen 
in the operation of the concepts of “unauthorised 
or improper purpose“, “extraneous or irrelevant 
considerations“, and “unreasonableness“: (a) “unau­
thorised or improper purpose“ implies an exercise
(xiii)
of discretionary power by reference to purpose not 
authorised under the Act; if the authorised purpose 
is vague or indefinite, courts try to define its 
scope by looking into the context and setting of 
the Act; even if there is no reference to purpose 
in the Act, courts do not assume the conferment of 
an unfettered discretion in absolute terms.
However, in the absence of any purpose being 
expressly mentioned, or if mentioned it being of 
vauge or indefinite description, courts are less 
likely to find a ready basis for preventing an 
abuse of statutory powers. There is a difference 
in approach between an ultra vires act done in good 
faith and an ultra vires act done in bad faith. In 
the latter case courts may permit the tendering of 
evidence as to the extraneous or ultenor motives 
which come into consideration, whereas in the 
former they may distinguish between purpose and 
motive and regard the presence of motive, authorised 
or unauthorised, as immaterial. In case of "author- 
ised" and “unauthorised" purposes inextricably 
mixed, it is suggested that an exercise of discretion 
by reference to them should be declared ultra vires
irrespective of which purpose is "dominant" or
(xiv)
’’substanthl”; (b) ’’Extraneous or irrelevant con­
siderations” imply an exercise of discretionary 
power by reference to irrelevant collateral matters, 
even though the authority may have acted in com­
plete good faith. What are, and what are not, 
legitimate considerations is open to wide differences 
of opinion. However, the wider the discretion the 
less possible it becomes to identify relevant 
considerations• Moreover, it is rather a matter of 
construction depending upon the nature and character 
of the Act. If an authority does not state its 
reasons, it is all the more difficult to challenge 
on grounds of irrelevant considerations; (c) ’’Un­
reasonableness” has in practice virtually come to 
embrace other grounds of invalidy.
CHAPTER VII. Supervisory Jurisdiction.
To the extent that judicial control is ousted, the 
operation of our maxim is restricted; but to the 
extent that courts resist or restrict the operation 
of such clauses, they may be said to be putting 
our maxim into effect. It may generally be said 
that these clauses do in some cases restrict the 
scope of judicial control, but there is a tendency
( X V )
f o r  the  c o u r t s  t o  f i n d  a way a round  them i n  what 
t h e y  r e g a r d  as  g r o s s  c a s e s  of abuse of power .  I n  
th e  A u s t r a l i a n  f e d e r a l  s p h e r e ,  the  High Court  i s  
g i v e n  s p e c i f i c  j u r i s d i c t i o n  by s . 7 5 ( v )  of  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  to  i s s u e  mandamus or  p r o h i b i t i o n  to  
f e d e r a l  t r i b u n a l s , and such  c l a u s e s  may be of  no 
e f f e c t  i n  so f a r  as  a f e d e r a l  t r i b u n a l  p u r p o r t s  to  
a c t  beyond the  powers of the  f e d e r a l  P a r l i a m e n t ,
PART THREE. Some S p e c i a l  Prob lems of  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law,
T h is  p a r t  d e a l s  w i t h  s p e c i a l  p ro b lem s  r e l a t i n g  to  
1p r o h i b i t i o n *  s i t u a t i o n s  and l e g i s l a t i v e  schemes.  P r o ­
h i b i t i o n 1 s i t u a t i o n s  a re  i l l u s t r a t e d  by s . 9 2 ,  s . 5 ‘1 ( i i ) 3 
s . 5 1 ( i i i ) j  s . 9 9 j  S . 1 1 6  and s . 1 1 7 of the  A u s t r a l i a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  However,  the  number of  r e l e v a n t  d e c id e d  
c a s e s  and even  j u d i c i a l  d i c t a  i s  v e r y  u n e v e n ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  
b e tw een  t h e s e  t o p i c s ;  as  t o  some a f a i r  body of  a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  g i v e n  b u t  as  t o  o t h e r s  we can  on ly  
s p e c u l a t e .  L e g i s l a t i v e  schemes r a i s e  p ro b lem s  d i f f e r e n t  
f rom th o s e  of  s i n g l e  s t a t u t e s ;  a number of  s t a t u t e s ,  e ach  
pr ima f a c i e  v a l i d ,  may be so d e s i g n e d  as  t o  a c h ie v e  by 
t h e i r  j o i n t  e f f e c t  som eth ing  t h a t  c o u ld  n o t  be a c h i e v e d  
by a s i n g l e  s t a t u t e .
(xvi)
CHAPTER VIII. S.92 of the Australian Constitution
(freedom of inter-State trade, 
commerce and intercourse).
There are not very many cases in which our maxim has 
found express application; however, the interpreta­
tion of s.92 has assumed a form which has the 
potential of providing an extraordinarily flexible 
judicial device for striking down legislation 
designed to infringe s.92 by 1 circuitous means1 or 
* concealed designs1. Some illustrations from 
decisions and dicta are given.
CHAPTER IX. Preference and Discrimination or Lack
of Uniformity in the Australian Consti­
tution (viz, s.51 (ii) , s.T'Hiii) and s.99.
Having regard to the eentral place our maxim has come 
to occupy in relation to s.92, one might reasonably 
have expected the courts likewise to be astute in 
recognising evasions of the substantial purpose of 
those sections. In fact, this has not happened. 
Occasional dissents, however, indicate the lines 
along which this part of the law might have developed.
CHAPTER X. S.116 of the Australian Constitution 
(religious toleration).
This guarantee, although in form merely a restriction
(xvii)
of legislative power, has a history giving it more 
the character of the American "civil liberties".
Paucity of authority makes confident opinion 
impossible, but both substantial and procedural 
difficulties expose this guarantee to comparatively 
easy evasion.
CHAPTER XI. S.117 of the Australian Constitution
(discrimination on ground of ^residence1).
Since there is only one decision, it is not safe to 
say to what extent our maxim would apply. However, 
this prohibition is capable of evasion by *devicest, 
and capable of protection by the ready application 
of our maxim.
CHAPTER XII. Legislative Schemes.
In general courts have not readily examined the 
validity of statutes constituting legislative schemes 
by reference to thier joint effect. In the United 
States, the tendency is to support a legislative 
scheme unless it is manifestly unjust or patently 
outside the ambit of legislative powers. In Austral­
ia, it is difficult to conceive circumstances in 
which a legislative scheme would be held invalid 
even when its existence is patent and designed to
(xviii)
evade a constitutional prohibition; still less so 
if the ultimate aim is to achieve some purpose only 
impliedly forbidden by the Constitution, or some 
purpose merely ultra vires, or if the interaction of 
the relevant statutes is not evident on inspection. 
Perhaps in Canada, there might be slighly better 
opportunity to strike down a legislative scheme 
because of the double enumeration of powers and the 
fact that many powers are defined by reference to 
purpose. However, in South Africa any reference to 
object or purpose of a legislative scheme was 
regarded as altogether irrelevant. To the extent 
that courts have permitted such schemes, they may 
be regarded as a limitation on the operation of our 
maxim.
PART FIVE. Logical Status, Meaning and Force of our Maxim.
In this part an attempt is made to understand and analyse 
the underlying idea of our maxim in the light of the above 
discussion.
CHAPTER XIII. Logical Status of our Maxim.
In the present study emphasis is put on the analysis 
of facts and situations and the approach is rather
(xix)
analytical than evaluative. One of the cardinal 
rules of interpretation in private law is the ob­
servance of "good faith", which is implied in our 
maxim, and this rule has been logically adopted in 
the field of constitutional law wherever there is 
provision for a limited governmental power. Even if 
our maxim is provided as part of positive law, one 
can imagine its having no more significance than it 
has in its present position as "unwritten" or 
"extra-positive" law,
CHAPTER XIV. Meaning of our Maxim.
The main difficulty with our maxim arises from the 
words "directly" and "indirectly"; it assumes that a 
government authority with limited powers, which has 
power to do something "directly", may also employ 
that power so as to do other things which may be 
described as "indirect". One possible explanation 
is that our maxim attributes one and only one charac­
terisation attribute to a law; in other words, the 
problem of characterisation is to distinguish 
"direct" characteristics of a law from "indirect" or 
"less direct" ones. The other explanation is that 
our maxim is concerned with’taala fides" or "disguises"
(xx)
the “indirection1 is in the dressing up. It is 
relatively simple to apply the latter distinction 
in private law and many administrative law contexts, 
hut relatively difficult in constitutional contexts.
CHAPTER XV. Force of our Maxim.
For the present purpose, the discussion is confined 
to seventy-four constitutional cases. An analysis 
of these cases show that our maxim has considerable 
force in exercising restraint on legislatures with 
limited powers both in the '’prohibition’1 and the 
“ultra vires” situations, although some specific 
areas provide more opportunities for the application 
of our maxim than others, e.g., a 1purposive1 power 
against a tnon-purposiveI power.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
In a federal constitution, the legislative jurisdic­
tion is divided between the federal and the regional gov­
ernments, and the courts have power to determine the valid­
ity of enactments by reference to power conferred on the 
legislature concerned. If a legislature is prohibited from 
violating any constitutional provision, it cannot do so even 
"under the guise, or the pretence, or in the form of an 
exercise of its own powers" . Though a legislature pur­
ports to act within the limits of its powers, yet is may *in 
substance and reality1 2 transgress those powers, the purport­
ed exercise being merely a *pretence or disguise1. Will 
such a transgression be permitted by the courts? In other 
words "the legislation must not under the guise of dealing
2with one matter in fact encroach upon the forbidden field" . 
All this is implied in the application of the maxim *what
1
Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada 
[1939J A • C• 117, at p. 130.
2
Gallagher v. Lynn [ 1937] A.C. 863, at. p. 870.
1
2 .
-i
c a n n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  c a n n o t  be done i n d i r e c t l y 1 . Th is  
maxim, a s  su c h ,  h a s  p l a y e d  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  i n  d e te rm ­
i n i n g  w h e th e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  p i e c e  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  i n  q u e s t i o n  
i s  w i t h i n  the  competence o f  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  e n a c t i n g  i t  -
a p ro b lem  of  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n ,  which  h as  become a c e n t r a l
2p rob lem  of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  a f e d e r a t i o n  .
These days  i n  o r d e r  t o  keep  pace  w i t h  th e  chang ing  
t im e s  i t  has  become a lm o s t  i n e v i t a b l e  f o r  the  governm ents  
i n  a f e d e r a t i o n  to  u n d e r t a k e  f u n c t i o n s  n o t  a n t i c i p a t e d  a t  
the  t ime of  making th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  e . g . ,  t o  conform to  
the  modern c o n c e p t  of  a w e l f a r e  s t a t e ,  or  to  p r o v id e  f o r  
economic  i n t e g r a t i o n  on a n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  or  t o  e n f o r c e  
o b l i g a t i o n s  assumed on b e h a l f  o f  the  s t a t e  a t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o n v e n t io n s .  The e n la r g e m e n t  o f  th e  g o v e rn m e n ta l  a c t i v i t ­
i e s  l e a d s  to  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  which  u l t i m a t e l y  
r e s u l t s  i n  an  i n c r e a s e d  demand of  f i n a n c e s .  But c o n s t i t u ­
t i o n a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s i n g  from the  d i v i s i o n  of  l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  powers and the  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r o h i b i t i o n s  upon the  
e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e s e  po w ers ,  have l e d  to  th e  f r u s t r a t i o n  of
1
See e . g . ,  R. v .  B a r g e r  ( 1908) 6 C.L.R.  4-1; Commonwealth 
O i l  R e f i n e r i e s  Co. v .  South  A u s t r a l i a  (1927) 38 C.L.R. 408;  
Madden v .  N e lso n  e t c .  Ry. Co. I 1889J A.C. 626; I n  r e  I n s u r -  
ance Act  of Canada L ^932J A.C. 41; B a i l e y  v .  D re x e l  F u r n i ­
t u r e  Co. (1922) 269 U.S. 20.
2
C f . Dixon J .  i n  Melbourne C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  Commonwealth 
(194-7) 74- C.L.R.  31 j a t  pp . 7 9 5 80. Latham C . J .  i n  South 
A u s t r a l i a  v .  Commonwealth (194-2) 65  C.L.R. 373? a t  p . 4-11.
3 .
many f e d e r a l  schemes a d o p te d  t o  meet a c r i s i s  on a n a t i o n a l
i
s c a l e  , and a t  t im e s  t o  an  u n f o r t u n a t e  h e s i t a t i o n  i n
2
d e a l i n g  w i t h  piess ing  p rob lem s  , w hereas  the  S t a t e s  o f  the  
f e d e r a t i o n  s u f f e r e d  from l a c k  o f  r e s o u r c e s  to  f i n a n c e  
p r o j e c t s  and programmes sp o n s o re d  by them. At the  same 
t im e ,  a t t e m p t s  by way of v a r i o u s  e x p e d i e n t s  and d e v ic e s  
such  as  1l e g i s l a t i v e  schem es1 c o m p r i s in g  two or  more Acts 
t h r o u g h  the  c o - o p e r a t i o n  o f  the  f e d e r a l  and the  r e g i o n a l  
g overnm en ts  o r  o t h e r w i s e ,  or  g r a n t s - i n - a i d  g i v e n  t o  the  
r e g i o n a l  g o v e rn m e n ts ,  have b e en  made, and have su cceed ed  to  
a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  i n  a c h i e v i n g  r e s u l t s  which  co u ld  n o t  have 
b e e n  a c h i e v e d  d i r e c t l y .  Such e x p e d i e n t s  o r  d e v i c e s  i n  so 
f a r  as  r e c o g n i s e d  by the  c o u r t s  d i s c l o s e  l i m i t a t i o n s  upon 
the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  the  maxim *what can n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  
c a n n o t  be done i n d i r e c t l y 1 .
The p u rp o se  of  the  p r e s e n t  s tu d y  i s  to  examine the  
o p e r a t i o n  of  the  maxim Twhat c a n n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  can n o t  
be done i n d i r e c t l y *  and t o  work o u t  i t s  scope a s  a p r i n c i p i  
o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  the  r e a lm  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  law and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  law .  However, i t  would be a s tu p e n d o u s  t a s k  
1
See e . g . j  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l c f  Canada v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  o f  
O n t a r i o  [ i9371 A.C. 326; A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  o f  Canada v . 
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  o f  O n t a r i o  I 1 937J A.C. 375; James"v . 
Commonwealth (1936) 55 C.L.R.  1 ( P . C . ) .
2
See the  R e p o r t  f rom the  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t 1s J o i n t  
Committee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review (1959) 5 a t  p p . 1 20-132 .
to appreciate correctly and deal with all the complexities 
and obscurities involved in its application by reference to 
all the federal constitutions in existence at the present 
day. Hence an attempt is made at a general study of its 
operation; bringing out its importance in the United States 
of America, Canada and Australia, and also in South Africa; 
then follows a more detailed examination of the application 
of the maxim in Australian constitutional law.
II
The origin of our maxim, particularly in the field of 
constitutional law - how it came into existence and under 
what circumstances it was first applied - is not clearly 
traceable. But a near approach to its underlying idea is 
to be seen in the following two maxims of Lord Coke:
(i) *Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur
•1et omne per quod devenitur ad illud1 2.
When anything is prohibited, everything
relating to it is prohibited.
(ii) tQuando aliquid prohibetur ex directo
pprohibetur et per obliquum*. When
1
2 Inst. 48.
2
Coke on Littleton (19th ed.) at p. 223*
5 .
anything is prohibited directly, it is 
also prohibited indirectly.
The first maxim is discussed by Coke under the 
Chapter on Magna Carta: "Every oppression against Law,
by colour of any usurped authority, is a kind of destruction 
for, Quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod 
devenitur ad illud. And it is the most oppression that is 
done by colour of Justice”. This does not lead us any­
where as to the manner and the circumstances of application 
of the maxim^.
pThis maxim is also mentioned in Broom1s Legal Maxims 
as illustrating prohibition implied by law in transactions 
dealing with transfer of property. For example, an Act 
provided that a bank consisting of more than six partners, 
doing business within sixty-five miles of London, could not 
accept, in the course of such a business, a bill of exchange 
payable at less than six months from the time of acceptance; 
a London bank entered into an agreement with a Canadian 
bank that its manager, not being a partner therein, should 
accept bills drawn on him by the Canadian bank and that the 
London bank should provide funds for the payment of such 
1
It is one of the instances wba?e it seems Coke has used a 
maxim arbitrarily without any reference or context.
2
(9th ed.) at p. 3^3«
6 .
bills; although the manager was the nominal acceptor, the 
transaction went through the books of the two banks as if 
the London bank had been the acceptor. The acceptance of 
such bills, in execution of such an agreement was held
•iunlawful . Tindal C.J. remarked that ’’Whatever is prohib­
ited by law to be done directly, cannot legally be effected
2by an indirect and circuitous contrivance” . So a trans­
action, which is a mere device to by-pass the law under 
tthe colour, guise or pretence1 of doing something that is 
expressly prohibited, will not be held valid.
Maxwell^ also referred to the maxim while discussing 
rules of construction to prevent evasion. In the Magdalen 
College Case\  a question was raised whether the King not 
being specially named in 13 Eliz. e.10, was bound by it.
By that statute it was enacted that *all leases, grants, 
or conveyances to be made by any master and fellows of any 
college ... of any houses, lands ... to any person or 
persons, bodies politic or corporate, for a longer term 
than twenty-one years, shall be utterly void1. It was
1
Booth v. Bank of England (1840) 7 Cl. & F. 509; cf. Morris 
v. Blackman (1864) 2 H. & C. 912, at p. 918: Minty v. 
Sylvester I 191 51 8*+ L.J.K.B. 1982, at p. 1986.
2
Ibid., at p. 540.
3Interpretation of Statutes (10th ed.) , at p. 114. See 
also Craies, Statute Law (5th ed.), at p. 233*
4
(1616) 11 Co. Rep. 66b.
7 .
c o n te n d ed  by the  p l a i n t i f f s  t h a t  a l e a s e  made to  the  Queen
by M agdalen  C o l le g e  f o r  a l o n g e r  te rm  t h a n  tw en ty -o n e
y e a r s  was n o t  v o id  as  the  Queen was n o t  bound by s t a t u t e s
u n l e s s  named i n  them. But  i t  was h e l d  t h a t  the  s t a t u t e
e x t e n d e d  to  r e s t r a i n  the  m a s t e r  and f e l l o w s  of  the  C o l le g e
from making g r a n t s  t o  the  Queen, a l t h o u g h  she was n o t
e x p r e s s l y  named i n  the  A c t .  Lord Coke e x p l a i n e d :
But  i t  was n e v e r  s e e n ,  t h a t  a g e n e r a l  A c t ,  made 
f o r  the  m a in te n a n c e  of  r e l i g i o n ,  advancement  o f  
l e a r n i n g ,  and r e l i e f  o f  the  p o o r ,  sh o u ld  be by 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  law so expounded ,  t h a t  a by-way 
sh o u ld  be l e f t  open,  by which  the  s a i d  g r e a t  
and d a n g ero u s  m i s c h i e f s  sh o u ld  r e m a in ,  and the  
n e c e s s a r y  and p r o f i t a b l e  remedy s u p p r e s s e d ;  f o r  
the  o f f i c e  o f  the  Judge i s ,  t o  make such  con­
s t r u c t i o n  as  w i l l  s u p p r e s s  th e  m i s c h i e f ,  and 
advance  the  remedy,  and to  s u p p r e s s  a l l  e v a s i o n s  
f o r  the  c o n t i n u a n c e  of  the  m i s c h i e f ;  and such  
by-way s h a l l  n e v e r  be l e f t  open by c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t  be f o r  the  k in g * s  b e n e f i t . ^
I n  P h i l p o t t  v . S t .  G eorge r s H o s p i t a l ^ ,  though  the  b e q u e s t
i n  q u e s t i o n  was h e l d  v a l i d  w i t h i n  the  meaning of  the
S t a t u t e s  o f  Mortmain ,  Lord C ranw or th  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t
1
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 71b .
2
(1857) 8 H .L.C. 338« I n  t h i s  c a se  the  q u e s t i o n  r e l a t e d  
t o  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  w i l l  o f  Lord Beauchamp, which  
depended on the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  to  be p u t  upon the  A c t  of  
the  9 t h  Geo. I I ,  c . 36 ; t h a t  Ac t  p r e v e n t e d  the  d i s p o s i t i o n  
o f  l a n d s  f o r  c h a r i t a b l e  p u r p o s e s .  A cco rd in g  to  the  
b e q u e s t ,  i f  any p e r s o n  sh o u ld  p u r c h a s e  and g iv e  a p i e c e  of  
l a n d  for  a lm sh o u ses  the  t r u s t e e s  of  the  w i l l  s h o u ld  pay  a 
sum of  money to  the  c h a r i t y  so i n s t i t u t e d ,  b u t  so t h a t  no 
p a r t  sh o u ld  be l a i d  o u t  i n  the  p u r c h a s e  of  l a n d .
8’’whenever you can find that anything done that is substan­
tially that which is prohibited, I think it is perfectly 
open to the Court to say that that is void, not because it 
comes within the spirit of the statute, or tends to effect 
the object which the statute is meant to prohibit, but 
because by reason of the true construction it is the thing, 
or one of the things, actually prohibited.” It is summed 
up in the remark of Wllmot C.J., that ’’Whenever Courts of 
law see such attempts made to conceal such wicked deeds,
they will brush away the cobweb varnish, and shew the
2transactions in their true light.”
This maxim has also been used in the interpretation
of prohibitions or restrictions on legislative powers in
the field of public law. For example, in Australia in 
3Deakin v. Webb , the question posed was whether an author­
ity having no power to levy tax on the income of certain 
people, has power to make dimunition of that income. 
Griffith C.J. thought that both were in substance the same 
and said:
If it has no power, it cannot affect the same 
purpose by the use of another form of words. The
1Ibid., at p. 3*+9. Also refer to Jefferies v. Alexander 
-(i860) 31 L.J. Ch.9j at p. 14 per Blackburn J.
^Collins v. Blantern (1767) 2 Wilson K.B. 341 , at p. 3^9.
3(1904) 1 C.L.R. 585.
9.
corollary of the maxim quando lex aliguid alicui 
concedit, concedit et id sine.quo res ipsa esse 
non potest, on which this Court mainly based its 
judgment in D1Emden v. Pedder , is quando aliquid 
prohibetur. prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur 
ad illud. When the law prohibits the doing of 
anything, the prohibition cannot be evaded by 
doing something which is substantially the same, 
merely by using a different form of words to 
describe it2 34.
Similarly in Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwea1thß, the 
question related to the validity of the Banking Act, 19*+7, 
one of whose objects was 1 the taking over by the Common­
wealth Bank of the banking business of private banks and 
the acquisition on just terms of property used in that 
business*• Dixon J. while discussing acquisition of the 
interest of the shareholders in such banks, observed: ”1
have reached the conclusion that tUs is but a circuitous 
device to acquire indirectly the substance of a proprietary 
interest without at once providing the just terms guaran­
teed by s.51(xxxi) of the Constitution"; and further 
explained: "When a Constitution undertakes to forbid or
restrain some legislative course, there can be no prohibi­
tion to which it is more proper to apply the principle 
embodied in the maxim quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur
et omne per quod devenitur ad illud.l+n
1(1904) 1 C.L.R. 91.
2(1904) 1 C.L.R. 585, at pp. 612, 613.
3(1948) 76 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.).4Ibid., at p. 349.
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Dixon C . J .  a g a i n  r e f e r r e d  to  t h i s  maxim i n  the  c o n t e x t  of
s .92 o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  G ra n n a l  v .  M a r r i c k v i l l e  Mar- 
1
g a r i n e  P ty  Co. Hence i t  may he s a i d  t h a t  the  maxim i n  
i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  h a s  come t o  convey th e  same se n se  a s  t h a t  
of  th e  maxim *what c a n n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  c a n n o t  be done 
i n d i r e c t l y 1 .
The second  maxim a p p e a r s  t o  be much n e a r e r  our maxim, 
or  l i t e r a l l y  c a r r i e s  th e  same m ean ing .  R e f e r r i n g  a g a i n  to  
Broom*s L e g a l  Maxims2 , i t  i s  n o t i c e d  t h a t  i t  i s  d i s c u s s e d  
i n  th e  same c o n t e x t  as  the  f i r s t  one (m en t io n ed  above)  and 
b o t h  maxims a p p e a r  t o  convey the  same i d e a .  Coke d i s c u s s e d  
i t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a p rob lem  of  c o n v e y a n c in g ^ .  " I f  a 
t r a n s f e r  i s  made upon th e  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  the  t r a n s f e r e e  
s h a l l  n o t  a l i e n  th e  l a n d  to  any ,  th e  c o n d i t i o n  i s  v o i d ,  b u t  
i f  the  c o n d i t i o n  be such  t h a t  th e  t r a n s f e r e e  s h a l l  n o t  
a l i e n  t o  someone, or t o  any o f  h i s  h e i r s ,  or  o f  the  i s s u e  
of  su ch  a one ,  t h e n  such  a c o n d i t i o n  which does n o t  t ake  
away a l l  th e  power o f  a l i e n a t i o n  from the  t r a n s f e r e e ,  or  
any of  h i s  h e i r s ,  or  o f  th e  i s s u e  o f  such  a one ,  i s  good 
b e c a u se  th e  t r a n s f e r o r  does  n o t  r e s t r a i n  th e  t r a n s f e r e e  of
1
(1955) 93 C.L.R.  55,  a t  p .  78 .
2
Loc. c i t . ,  a t  p .  313- 
3
Coke on L i t t l e t o n  ( 1 9 t h  e d . )  a t  p .  2 2 3 ( b ) .  A lso  r e f e r  to  
C h e s h i r e ,  Modern R e a l  P r o p e r t y  ( 7 t h  e d . )  a t  p p .  3 ^ 5 ,  3 1 6 .
1 1 .
a l l  h i s  power t o  a l i e n a t e " .  T h e r e f o r e  i f  the  t r a n s f e r e e  
r e s t r i c t s  the  r i g h t  of  a l i e n t a t i o n  o f  th e  t r a n s f e r e e  i n  
such  a f a s h i o n  t h a t  i t  l o o k s  on the  f a c e  of  i t  a s  i f  i t  
i s  a p a r t i a l  r e s t r a i n t ,  though  i n  r e a l i t y  b e in g  a t o t a l  
r e s t r a i n t ,  the  maxim w i l l  a p p ly  and the  c o n d i t i o n  s h a l l  be 
v o id  and i n o p e r a t i v e .  In  o r d e r  to  f i n d  o u t  w h e th e r  t h e r e  
i s  a t o t a l  r e s t r a i n t  o r  p a r t i a l  r e s t r a i n t ,  the  c o u r t s  w i l l  
see w h e th e r  the  t r a n s f e r e e  h a s  b e e n  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d e p r i v e d  
of  h i s  power of  a l i e n t a t i o n .  T h is  i s  c l o s e l y  s i m i l a r  t o  
c a s e s  a r i s i n g  u n d e r  the  f i r s t  form o f  the  maxim. However,  
the  second  form does  n o t  seem to  have b e en  u sed  so f r e ­
q u e n t l y  as  the  f i r s t  one i n  th e  f i e l d  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
law •
I I I
The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  our  maxim i s  a l s o  i n v o l v e d  i n  the  
d o c t r i n e  of  u l t r a  v i r e s , a p r o d u c t  o f  c o r p o r a t i o n  law and 
l a i d  down i n  1 2c l e a r  and u n q u a l i f i e d 1 l an g u a g e  i n  the  m id d le  
o f  th e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ^ .  At t h a t  t ime the  d o c t r i n e
1
The w r i t e r  c o u ld  f i n d  i t s  r e f e r e n c e  o n ly  i n  one c a s e :
Duncan v .  Q ueens land  (1916) 22 C.L.R.  55&, a t  p .  625«
2
See S t r e e t ,  The D o c t r i n e  of  U l t r a  V i r e s  ( 1 9 3 0 ) 5 a t  p p .
1—31• A lso  r e f e r  to  Gower, Modern Company Law (2nd e d . ) , 
a t  p . 7 8 , e t  s e q . ;  J e n n in g s  i n  A C en tu ry  of  M u n i c ip a l  
P r o g r e s s  183*3- 1935 ( e d .  L a s k i ,  J e n n i n g s  and Robson,  1935) 5 
a t  p .V l ö ;  de Sm ith ,  J u d i c i a l  Review of  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A c t io n
( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  a t  p .  57.
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emphasised the lach of capacity in corporations to do any
ultra vires act. "The question is not what they may do,
1hut what they can do" . Statutory corporations as opposed
pto corporations at common law are created by Acts of 
Parliament for the attainment of certain purposes, and 
thus have limited powers. They cannot do anything that 
is contrary to the provisions of a statute and an act done 
beyond the scope of their powers would be ultra vires and 
void.
This doctrine first came to be applied to cases
dealing mostly with railway companies which were created
by Parliament limiting in scope the exercise of their
activities. For example, in Colman v. Eastern County R .
3Co. , the directors of a railway company, for the purpose
1
Street, loc. cit. . at p. 14.
2
Statutory corporations have been distinguished from cor­
porations at common law (based on royal charter) on the 
basis of a statement by Lord Coke in the Case of Sutton1 23s 
Hospital (1612) 10 Co. Rep. 23a, at 30b, saying that the 
latter can do everything that an ordinary man can do: see 
e.g., Attorney-General v. Manchester Corporation [1906]
1 Ch. 643. at p. 651; Attorney-General v. Leicester Cor­
poration (1943) Ch. 06, at p. 93» But this doctrine has 
been doubted: see Jennings, Principles of Local Government 
Law (3rd ed.), at p. 146; Street, loc. cit.. at pp. 20-22.
3
(1846) 10 Beav. 1. See also Bloxam v. Metropolitan Ry.
Co. (1868) L.R. 3 Ch. 337; Riche v. Ashbury Railway Carriage 
Co. (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653? London County Council v. 
Attorney-General [1902] A.C. 165; cf. Attorney-General v. 
Great Eastern Ry. [1880] 5 App. Cas. 473.
13
of increasing traffic on their railway, proposed to 
guarantee certain profits and secured the capital of an 
intended steam-packet company (for which there was, however 
no authority to he found in the Act creating the railway 
company) who were to act in connection with the railway.
It was held that such a transaction was not within the 
scope of their authority and accordingly restrained them 
from carrying it into effect. "The powers which are given 
by an Act of Parliament, like that now in question", said 
Langdale, M.R.,"extend no further than is expressly stated 
in the Act, or is necessarily and properly required for 
carrying into effect the undertaking and works which the 
Act has expressly sanctioned" . This view was approved by 
the House of Lords as early as 1855 in Eastern Counties Ry.
pv. Hawkes where Lord Cranworth said that: "It must,
therefore,be now considered as a well-settled doctrine 
that a company incorporated by Act of Parliament for a 
special purpose cannot devote any part of its funds to 
objects unauthorised by the terms of its incorporation, 
however desirable such an application may appear to be"3.
It was also recognised later that if a statutory
1
Ibid., at p. 1k.
2
(1855) 5 H.L.C. 331.
3 Ibid., at p. 3^8.
Corporation attempted to do something that was beyond the
scope of its powers by adopting circuitous means, that
attempt would be declared as ultra vires. The leading
1case is Riche v. Ashbury Railway Carriage Co. , where a 
statutory corporation, its object being substantially 
to carry out the business of general contractors, had 
power to act as Mechanical engineers and general contract­
ors1, and certain contracts lto construct railways1 were 
made by the directors on behalf of the corporation. It 
was argued that inasmuch as those contracts have been 
ratified and adopted by shareholders, they were binding 
on the company. But the House of Lords held that the 
contracts which were not authorised by the Act could not 
be made valid subsequently by any action on the part of 
the shareholders even if such action was unanimous. "The 
shareholders”, explained Lord Cairns, ”would thereby by 
unanimous consent have been attempting to do the very thing 
which by the Act of Parliament they were prohibited from 
doing” .^
This doctrine was extended to municipal corporations 
which "ceased to be forms of property and became instruments 
1
(1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 653.
2
Ibid., at p. 672.
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of  governm ent"  a f t e r  th e  p a s s i n g  of  the  M u n ic ip a l  C o rp o ra -
t i o n  A c t ,  1835 • I t  w ould ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be u l t r a  v i r e s  the
c o r p o r a t i o n  i f  a m u n i c i p a l  b y - l a w  i s  made i n  e x c e s s  o f
th e  s t a t u t o r y  power a u t h o r i s i n g  i t  or  r e p u g n a n t  to  t h a t
s t a t u t e .  Thus a c o r p o r a t i o n  m ig h t  be r e s t r a i n e d  from
3
u s i n g  i t s  fu n d s  f o r  im p ro p e r  p u r p o s e s  o r  a c t i n g  i n  an
4
u n a u t h o r i s e d  manner . A b y - l a w  m ig h t  a l s o  be h e l d  u l t r a
5
v i r e s  on the  ground  o f  1 2345u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 1 .
The u n d e r l y i n g  n o t i o n  of  t h i s  d o c t r i n e  l a t e r  found  
an e x c l u s i v e  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  th e  f i e l d  of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
law g e n e r a l l y ,  as  t h a t  law became more s y s t e m a t i s e d  and 
r e c o g n i s e d  as  a d i s t i n c t  b ra n c h  of  law .  Modern governm ents
1
J e n n i n g s  i n  A C e n tu ry  of  M u n ic ip a l  P r o g r e s s  1 8 ^ 5 -1 9 8 5 . 
l o c .  c i t . ,  a t  p p .  420 ,  421 .  R e f e r  a l s o  to  S t r e e t ,  l o c . 
c i t . ,  a t  p . 15-
2
I t  i s  d e f i n e d  by Lord R u s s e l l  i n  Kruse v .  John so n  [ 1898]
2 Q.B. 9 1 3 a t  p .  98 , as  " an  o r d in a n c e  a f f e c t i n g  the  p u b l i c  
or  some p o r t i o n  o f  the  p u b l i c  imposed by some a u t h o r i t y  
c l o t h e d  w i t h  s t a t u t o r y  powers o r d e r i n g  som eth ing  t o  be 
done o r  n o t  to  be done and accompanied  by some s a n c t i o n  o r  
p e n a l t y  f o r  i t s  n o n - o b s e r v a n c e .  . . .  F u r t h e r ,  i t  i n v o l v e s  
t h i s  consequence  -  t h a t ,  i f  v a l i d l y  made, i t  h a s  th e  f o r c e  
o f  law w i t h i n  the  sp h e re  of i t s  l e g i t i m a t e  o p e r a t i o n . "
3
E . g . ,  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  v .  L i c h f i e l d  C o r p o r a t i o n  (1840)
11 Beav.  120 ; A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  v .  M e r th y r  T y d f i l  Union 
[ 1900 ] 1 Ch. 5 1 6 .
4
E . g . ,  Brown v .  Holyhead L o c a l  Board  (1862) 32 L . J .  Ex. 25; 
Tynemouth C o r p o r a t i o n  v . A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  [1899] A.C. 293; 
London County C o u n c i l  v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  [1902]  A . C . 165; 
W il l i a m  Bean & Sons v .  F l a x t o n  R .D .C . L1929] 1 K.B. ^50 .
5
E . g . ,  Kruse v .  Jo h n so n  [ 1 898] 2 Q.B. 91*
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have to deal with diverse and complex problems of national
and international character and Parliaments tad to lay
down general principles and leave the details to be filled
up later in the form of rules or regulations by Ministers
or any other competent authority. Framing of rules or
regulations, as in the case of municipal by-laws, is
subject to the control of Acts of Parliament authorising
relevant authorities to do so; they are supposed not to
act beyond the scope of their powers and if they do so
they act without authority. Courts thus have power to
determine the validity of rules or regulations by reference
to the power authorising them and if it is found that the
power has been exceeded"* , or exercised in a manner not
pauthorised by the statute , or repugnant to the general 
law3, it would be declared as ultra vires.
But one of the grounds on which courts can further 
declare municipal by-laws and departmental regulations as
ultra vires is if the power conferred on an authority is
_
E.g., R. v. Minister of Transport; ex. p. Uominster 
Services [1934J 1 K.B. 277.
2
E.g., R. v. Minister of Health: ex. p. Pore [1927] 1K.B. 
765; R. v. Minister of Health; ex.p. Yaffg I 1930] 2 K.B.
98; [1931] A.C. ^94; Jackson Stanfield & Sons v . Butter- 
worth [1948] 2 All E.R. 558.
3
E.g., R. & W, Paul Ltd.v. Wheat Commission [1937] A.C.
139.
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ab u sed  or  e x e r c i s e d  n o t  bona f i d e .  The power must  be u sed  
f o r  the  p u rp o se  f o r  which  i t  i s  c o n f e r r e d .  F o r  ex am ple ,  i n  
M u n i c ip a l  C o u n c i l  of  Sydney v .  Campbell  , a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  
had s t a t u t o r y  power t o  a c q u i r e  c o m p u l s o r i l y  l a n d  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  p u r p o s e s  of  c i v i c  e x t e n s i o n  and improvement .  When the  
l a n d  was a c q u i r e d  m e re ly  b eca u se  o f  i t s  p r o b a b l e  i n c r e a s e  
i n  v a l u e ,  the  c o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  was 
e n d e a v o u r in g  to  g iv e  a new form to  the  t r a n s a c t i o n  and 
e x e r c i s i n g  i t s  power f o r  a p u rp o se  d i f f e r i n g  from t h a t  
s p e c i f i e d  i n  th e  s t a t u t e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  B ro w n e l l s  L t d , v .
p
I ro n m o n g e r s1 Wages Board . a wages b o a rd  empowered to  
d e te r m in e  the  w ork ing  h o u r s  o f  employees  and payments  f o r  
o v e r t im e  work, p r o v i d e d  a p e n a l t y  f o r  employees  w ork ing  i n  
shops a f t e r  5 . ^ 5  p .m. The High C o u r t  h e l d  i t  to  be i n v a l i d  
on th e  ground  t h a t  the  wages b o a rd  had no power to  r e g u l a t e  
h o u r s  o f  t r a d i n g  as  d i s t i n c t  f rom h o u r s  of  w o rk in g ,  and 
f u r t h e r  t h a t  th e  h o u r s  s p e c i f i e d  c o n f l i c t e d  w i t h  th e  p r o v i ­
s i o n s  o f  the  Shops Act  1 925-1 9*+5. "The Board i s ,  u n d e r  the  
g u i s e  o r  p r e t e n c e  o f  f i x i n g  r a t e s  fo r  o v e r t i m e " ,  s a i d  
Latham C . J . ,  " s e e k i n g  to  impose what a r e  i n  s u b s t a n c e  
p e n a l t i e s  upon em p lo y e rs  f o r  k e e p in g  shops open a t  a t ime 
when the  L e g i s l a t u r e  had s a i d  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be l a w f u l  to
1
[1925]  A.C. 3 3 8 .
(1950)  81 C.L.R.  108.
2
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1 2keep  shops open” . T o ro n to  v .  F o r r e s t  H i l l  i s  a n o th e r
r e c e n t  example  of  an  abuse  of  power.  I n  t h a t  case  the  
Supreme C o u r t  o f  Canada h e ld  t h a t  s A 1 of  the  M u n i c i p a l i t y  
o f  M e t r o p o l i t a n  T o ro n to  A c t ,  1953 ( O n t . ) ,  which a u t h o r i s e d  
th e  p a s s i n g  of  b y - l a w s  f o r  r e g u l a t i n g  the  su p p ly  of w a te r  
r i n  o r d e r  to  s e c u r e  a c o n t i n u e d  and ab u n d an t  su p p ly  o f  pure  
and wholesome w a t e r 1 d id  n o t  empower the  m u n i c i p a l i t y  to  
p r o v i d e  f o r  the  f l o u r i d a t i o n  of  the  e x i s t i n g  w a te r  s u p p ly .  
While the  a d d i t i o n  of  the  c o n te m p la te d  amount o f  f l o u r i n e  
would n o t  a f f e c t  the  q u a l i t y  o f  w a t e r  o t h e r w i s e  wholesome, 
i t  d id  n o t  i n v o lv e  a w a te r  p u rp o se  (which  a lo n e  was a u t h o r ­
i s e d  by the  s t a t u t e )  b u t  r a t h e r  a m e d i c i n a l  p u r p o s e ,  e . g . ,  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  the  i n c i d e n c e  of  t o o t h  d e c a y .  nBut  i t  i s  n o t " ,  
s a i d  Rand J . , Mto  promote the  o r d i n a r y  use  of  w a te r  as  a 
p h y s i c a l  r e q u i s i t e  f o r  the  body t h a t  f l o u r i d a t i o n  i s  p r o p o s e d .  
That  p r o c e s s  h a s  a d i s t i n c t  and d i f f e r e n t  p u r p o s e ;  i t  i s  n o t  
a means to  an  end of  wholesome w a te r  f o r  w a te r * s  f u n c t i o n  
b u t  to  an  end of  a s p e c i a l  h e a l t h  p u rp o se  f o r  which  a w a te r  
su p p ly  i s  made use  o f  as  a m eans ' '^ .  Thus i f  an a u t h o r i t y  
upon whom the  power h a s  b e en  c o n f e r r e d  f o r  a c e r t a i n  p u r p o s e ,  
e x e r c i s e s  i t  u n d e r  a r p r e t e n c e ,  g u i s e  or  c o l o u r 1 so t h a t  i n
1
I b i d . , a t  p .  120.
2
(1957)  9 D.L.R. (2d) 113.
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 113.
3
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Substance and reality1 2 it is different from what it was 
supposed to he contemplated, the courts will declare the 
exercise of that power as ultra vires. This sort of exer­
cise of power is covered by our maxim.
IV
By-laws and regulations made by local authorities and
other administrative agencies are comparable to laws framed
by legislatures having powers defined or enumerated in a
federal constitution. It is not within the competence of
either the federal or a regional legislature to act beyond
its powers or trench upon the exclusive powers of the other;
and if they do act that way, courts have power to declare
their actions as unconstitutional - a function like testing
■1the hy-laws of municipal corporations . Tracing historically
the precedents and cases which provided a basis for the
American doctrine of judicial supremacy, Haines observed:
Referring on some occasions to an overruling law of 
nature, on other occasions to the fundamental 
principles embodied in the great English charters 
of liberties, and, finally, to formally enacted 
written instruments, colonial and state courts 
steadily asserted and maintained the right to 
invalidate acts, and thus they promulgated for 
the United States and put into an effective form 
Coke*s theory of the supremacy of the courts.2
1
See e.g., Hari v. Secretary of State for India (1903)
I.L.R. 27 Bom. h25j at p. l+39*
2
Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (191^) 
at p .120.
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In the United States it is true that the power of 
judicial review over Congressional and State legislation 
and of pronouncing them to he void if they are repugnant 
to the Constitution was established by Justice Marshall in
•jMarbury v. Madison by reference to 1extra-constitutional*
concepts so as to place beyond doubt the Supreme Court as
the guardian of the Constitution. But the notion of
limited or subordinate legislative power had by then taken
2concrete form in the opinions rendered in state courts.
The position of Congress, as Bryce remarked, might Mbe 
compared to that of an English municipal corporation or 
railway company*' and "a statute passed by Congress beyond 
the scope of its powers is of no more effect than a bye- 
law made ultra vires by an English municipality''-^ .
It is not difficult to perceive the application of the 
doctrine of ultra vires to Acts of colonial legislatures as 
there could be no colonial legislature with unrestricted 
or unlimited powers^. In fact the Privy Council used the
same italicised words ultra vires to convey the sense of
_
(1803) 1 Cranch 137«2
Haines, loc. cit.. at pp. k6-k9.
3Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1888), Vol. I, at 
|?p. 328 and 329.
See Street, loc. cit.. at p. kl6.
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i n v a l i d a t i o n  of  an Act  of a c o l o n i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e 1
The c o n s t i t u t i o n s  g r a n t e d  by the  B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t  to
Canada and A u s t r a l i a  have o f t e n  b e en  t r e a t e d  by the  c o u r t s
as  s t a t u t e s  s u b j e c t  t o  the  o r d i n a r y  r u l e s  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Lord L o re b u rn  once r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  B r i t i s h  N o r th  America
Act  1 8 6 75 o b s e r v e d  t h a t  " i f  the  t e x t  i s  e x p l i c i t  the  t e x t
i s  c o n c l u s i v e ,  a l i k e  i n  what i t  d i r e c t s  and what i t  f o r b i d s .
When th e  t e x t  i s  ambiguous . . .  r e c o u r s e  must  be had t o  the
2
c o n t e x t  and scheme of  the  Act"  . S i m i l a r  e x p r e s s i o n s  have 
b e en  u s e d  by the  High C o u r t  of A u s t r a l i a  w h i l e  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
th e  Commonwealth o f  A u s t r a l i a  C o n s t i t u t i o n  A c t ,  1900^. 
However, t h e s e  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  d i f f e r  from t h a t  o f  th e  U n i t e d  
Kingdom i n  t h a t  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  c r e a t e d  t h e r e i n  a r e  n o t  
u n l i m i t e d ,  b u t  have r e s t r i c t e d  p o w e rs .  Thus i t  i s  w i t h i n
1
E . g . ,  Grand Trunk R a i l  Co. o f  Canada v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  
f o r  Canada I 1907 1 A.C. 65« a t  p .  6 8 ; F i e l d i n g  v . Thomas 
LI8 9 6 J A.C. 6Ö0, a t  p .  609; Madden v .  N e lso n  and F o r t  
Sheppard  Ry. Co. [1899]  A.C. 6 2 6 , a t  p .  627.
2
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  O n t a r i o  v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  
Canada [1912J A.C. 571,  a t  p .  5 8 3 . C f .  B r i t i s h  Coal  Cor­
p o r a t i o n  v .  The King [1935]  A.C. 500, a t  p .  518 ; a l s o  
r e f e r  t o  J e n n i n g s ,  The S t a t u t e  of  W e s tm in s te r  and Appeals  
t o  th e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  (1936) 52 L .Q.R. 173? a t  p .  181.
3
See A d e la id e  S team sh ip  Co. L t d , v .  Amalgamated S o c i e t y  of  
E n g in e e r s  (1 92G) 28 C .L .R .  129% a t  p p . 146, 14-7. I n  
Tasmania  v .  Commonwealth (190^5 1 C .L .R .  329s a t  p .  338 ,  
G r i f f i t h  C . J .  s a i d ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  the  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u ­
t i o n  t h a t  " t h e  same r u l e s  of  i n t e r p r e a t i o n  a p p ly  t h a t  
a p p ly  t o  any o t h e r  w r i t t e n  docum en t" .  Cf .  B a x te r  v .  
Commissioner  of T a x a t i o n  (1907) *+ C .L .R .  10873 a t  p . 11055 
The Jumbunna Coal  Mine v .  The V i c t o r i a n  Coal  M i n e r s 1 23 Assn. 
(1908) 6 C .L .R .  3 0 9 ,  a t  p p .  3 6 7 , 3 6 8 .
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t h e  p r o v i n c e  of c o u r t s  to  see  w h e th e r  th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s ,
f e d e r a l  as  w e l l  a s  r e g i o n a l ,  a c t  w i t h i n  th e  scope of  t h e i r
powers  a l l o c a t e d  by t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  even  though  th e y
1
a r e  supreme w i t h i n  t h e i r  s p h e r e s  .
1
Hodge v .  Queen [ 1 883] 9 A.C, 117; J a p a n e se  C a n d a i a n s . 
C o - o p e r a t i v e  Committee on v . Canada I 19^ +1 J A.C. 87; 
Musgrove v .  Chung Tee Ong Toy I 1Ö911 A.C. 272; B a x te r  v .  
Ah Way (1909) 8 C .L .R .  626; V i c t o r i a n  S t e v e d o r i n g  and 
G e n e r a l  C o n t r a c t i n g  Co. P ty  L td  v .  D ignan  (1931) 
kb C .L .R .  73, a t  p .  Qk.
PART ONE
Operation of our Maxim 
in
Constitutional Law - General
CHAPTER II
The United States of America
The American constitutional history has been marked 
by controversies and conflicts involving philosophic and 
political concepts as to the problems of federalism and its 
concomitant problems of sovereignty, state-Federal relations, 
individual freedoms and such other matters. To a certain 
extent it has been a history of the development of the 
Supreme Court and the role played by its Justices project­
ing their individual personalities in the judgments. Thus 
there have been shifts in judicial opinion - judicial 
tactivismx to judicial 1 self-restraint1 and then back to 
judicial ^activism* - resulting in the overruling of cases 
from time to time. But our maxim has been recognised since 
the very beginning and at no time has it been rejected or 
its application denied. It is true that, at time^ cases 
in which the maxim found its application have beaa overruled, 
but that is because of the shift in judicial attitude to 
policy questions involving philosophic and political concepts 
which are pre-requisites in determining its scope. No 
attempt is made here to discuss its operation along with
23.
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the historical growth and development of constitutionalism 
in the United States; instead an endeavour is made to 
bring out its importance as a principle of cons titutional 
interpretation.
In the United States the federal government is one of 
enumerated powers (the state governments having residual 
powers); the constitution is the instrument specifying them, 
and in its terms authority must be found for the exercise 
of any power which the federal government assumes to poss­
ess. Problems have arisen where the courts had to resort 
to a principle which is either limited from or analogous 
to our maxim. In McCulloch v. Maryland , Chief Justice 
Marshall, referring to the scope of federal powers said: 
"Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt 
measures which are prohibited by the Constitution; or 
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, 
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted 
to the government, it would become the painful duty of this 
tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come 
before it, to say that such an Act was not the law of the 
land"2.
One of the powers which is readily susceptible to be
-
(1819)  b W hea t .  3 1 6 .
2 .Ibid., at p .  4-23. See also Railroad Co. v .  Peniston 
(7373)  18 Wall. 5 ,  at p .  3 5 .
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u sed  f o r  the  p u rp o se  of  a c c o m p l i s h in g  som eth ing  n o t  w i t h i n
the  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  power i s  the  t a x i n g  power .  I t  was e s t a b -
•1
l i s h e d  i n  B a i l e y  v .  D re x e l  F u r n i t u r e  Co. t h a t  Congress  
c o u ld  n o t ,  u n d e r  the  p r e t e x t  of r a i s i n g  r e v e n u e ,  e x e r c i s e  
i t s  t a x i n g  power f o r  p o l i c e  power p u r p o s e s .  That  case  
i n v o l v e d  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  the  C h i ld  Labour Tax Law 
which  imposed t e n  p e r  c e n t ,  e x c i s e  t a x  upon the  a n n u a l  n e t  
p r o f i t s  of m in e s ,  q u a r r i e s ,  f a c t o r i e s  and o t h e r  e s t a b l i s h ­
m e n t s ,  which d u r i n g  any p o r t i o n  o f  the  t a x a b l e  y e a r  en p lo y ed  
c h i l d r e n  c o n t r a r y  to  the  r e g u la t io n s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  A company 
p e r m i t t e d  a boy u n d e r  the  age of  f o u r t e e n  y e a r s  ( c o n t r a r y  
to  th e  r e g u l a t i o n s )  to  work i n  i t s  f a c t o r y  d u r in g  the  t a x a b le  
y e a r .  I t  r e c e i v e d  n o t i c e  from the  t a x  c o l l e c t o r  t h a t  the  
company would be a s s e s s e d  a t  t e n  p e r  c e n t ,  o f  i t s  n e t  p r o f i t s  
under  the  p r o v i s i o n s  of  the law .  I t  p a i d  the  t a x  under  
p r o t e s t  and b r o u g h t  s u i t  to  r e c o v e r  the  amount of the  t a x  
upon the  ground t h a t  the  law im pos ing  the  t a x  was u n c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l .  I t  was co n te n d ed  t h a t  th e  law was i n  r e a l i t y  a 
r e g u l a t i o n  of  c h i l d  l a b o u r  i n  the  S t a t e s  -  an e x c l u s i v e l y  
S t a t e  f u n c t i o n  u n d e r  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  T h is  c r i t e r i o n  was 
a c c e p t e d  by the  Supreme C o u r t .  Taxes a r e  p r i m a r i l y  imposed 
to  r a i s e  revenue  and th ey  do n o t  l o s e  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r  as 
1
(1922) 259 U.S. 20 .  See a l s o  H i l l  v .  W allace  (1922) 259 
U.S . hk; Hammer  v .  D a g en h a r t  (1 918) 25-7 U.S. 251; c f .
Chicago  Board of  Trade v .  O lsen  (1923) 262 U.S. 1; U n i te d  
S t a t e s  v .  Darby (194-1) 312 U.S . 100.
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taxes if they incidentally regulate a certain activity.
"But there comes a time in the extension of the penalising 
features of the so-called tax", said Chief Justice Taft,
"when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere 
penalty, with the characteristics of regulation and punish­
ment"”' . Although Congress did not expressly declare that 
the employment within the mentioned ages was illegal, it 
did exhibit its intent to achieve the same result by adopt­
ing a criteria of wrongdoing and imposing its principal 
consequence on those who should transgress its standard.
Also the federal government cannot, in the guise of a 
tax, impose penalties in addition to any the State may 
decree for the violation of a state law, irrespective of 
the fact that it is within its jurisdiction to levy excises 
as revenue measures regardless of whether they are permitted 
or prohibited by state or federal law. In United States v. 
Constantine^ , a federal law imposed, in addition to $25 
excise tax on retail liquor dealers, a special excise tax of 
$1000 on such dealers when they should carry on the business 
contrary to state law. The question arose whether the exac­
tion of $1000 in addition by reason solely of violating State 
1
Ibid., at p . 38.
2
(1935) 296 U.S. 287. See also Civil Rights Cases (I883)
109 U.S. 3.
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l aw ,  was a t a x  or  p e n a l t y .  A f t e r  the  r e p e a l  of  the  
E i g h t e e n t h  Amendment , the  Supreme Court  h e ld  i t  u n c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  as  "being h i g h l y  e x o r b i t a n t  and g r o s s l y  d i s p r o p o r ­
t i o n a t e  to  the  amount o f  the  norm al  t a x  imposed upon the  
same b u s i n e s s  when n o t  i n  v i o l a t i o n  of  S t a t e  law. “D i s ­
r e g a r d i n g  th e  d e s i g n a t i o n  of the  e x a c t i o n ;  and v iew ing  i t s  
s u b s ta n c e  and a p p l i c a t i o n ” , J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s  s a i d ,  "we h o ld  
t h a t  i t  i s  a p e n a l t y  f o r  the  v i o l a t i o n  of  S t a t e  law and as
p
such  beyond the  l i m i t s  of f e d e r a l  power" . Thus und e r  the  
g u i s e  of a t a x i n g  Act  th e  p u rp o se  was to  u su rp  the  p o l i c e  
powers o f  the  S t a t e s .
A nothe r  im proper  use of  the  t a x i n g  power may be by 
deny ing  a t a x - e x e m p t io n  to  c l a i m a n t s  who r e f u s e  to obey 
c o n d i t i o n s  r e q u i r i n g  them t o  s u r r e n d e r  r i g h t s  or  l i b e r t i e s  
g u a r a n t e e d  t o  them u n d e r  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  Thus i n
1
I t  p r o v i d e s :  " A f t e r  one y e a r  from the  r a t i f i c a t i o n  of
t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  the  m a n u f a c t u r e ,  s a l e ,  or  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of 
i n t o x i c a t i n g  l i q u o r s  w i t h i n ,  the  i m p o r t a t i o n  t h e r e o f  i n t o ,  
o r  the  e x p o r t a t i o n  t h e r e o f  from the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and a l l  
t e r r i t o r y  s u b j e c t  to  the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t h e r e o f  f o r  b e v e rag e  
p u r p o s e s  i s  h e re b y  p r o h i b i t e d .
"The C ongress  and the  s e v e r a l  S t a t e s  s h a l l  have c o n c u r r ­
e n t  power to  e n f o r c e  t h i s  a r t i c l e  by a p p r o p r i a t e  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n .
"T h is  a r t i c l e  s h a l l  be i n o p e r a t i v e  u n l e s s  i t  s h a l l  have 
been  r a t i f i e d  as  an  amendment t o  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  by the 
l e g i s l a t u r e s  of  the  s e v e r a l  S t a t e s ,  as  p r o v i d e d  i n  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  w i t h i n  sev en  y e a r s  from the  d a te  of the  
s u b m is s io n  t h e r o f  to  the  S t a t e s  by C o n g r e s s .  [ J a n . 2 9 , 1 91 9 ] . "
0935) 296 U.s. 287, a t  p .  294-.
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S p e i s e r  v .  R a n d a l l  , i t  was h e l d  t h a t  t o  deny a t a x  exemp­
t i o n  to  c l a i m a n t s  who engaged  i n  c e r t a i n  form s of sp e ec h  was 
i n  e f f e c t  t o  p e n a l i s e  them f o r  such  s p e e c h ,  and p r o v i d e d  the  
same d e t e r r e n t  as  i f  the  S t a t e  were to  f i n e  them f o r  the 
s p e e c h .  There the  C a l i f o r n i a n  l e g i s l a t u r e  e n a c t e d  a s t a t u t e  
to e f f e c t u a t e  a p r o v i s i o n  i n  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  C a l i f o r n i a  
t h a t  t a x  e x em p t io n  he d e n ie d  to  p e r s o n s  who a d v o c a te d  the  
u n l a w f u l  o v e r th r o w  of  the  government  of  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
or  of  a s t a t e ,  or  who a d v o c a te d  the  s u p p o r t  of  a f o r e i g n  
governm ent  engaged  i n  h o s t i l i t i e s  w i t h  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  - 
r e q u i r i n g  a p r o p e r t y - t a x  ex em p t io n  c l a i m a n t  to  s i g n  a 
s t a t e m e n t  on h i s  t a x  r e t u r n  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  he does n o t  
engage i n  the  p r o s c r i b e d  a d v o cacy .  W ith o u t  r e a c h i n g  the  
q u e s t i o n  of  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  the  S t a t e  c o n s t i t u t i o n ­
a l  p r o v i s i o n ,  Brennan  J . , i n  an  o p i n i o n  r e f l e c t i n g  the  v iews 
of s i x  members ( C la r k  J . , d i s s e n t i n g )  of  the  Supreme C o u r t ,  
h e l d  t h a t  the  s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  d e n ie d  the  c l a i m a n t s  
f reedom  of  sp e ec h  w i t h o u t  the  p r o c e d u r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  r e q u i r e d  
by the  due p r o c e s s  c l a u s e  of  the  F o u r t e e n t h  Amendment ,
•1
1
( 1958) 357 U.S. 5135 see a l s o  F i r s t  U n i t a r i a n  Church v .  
County of  Los A n g e le s  ( 1958) 357 U.S. 59-5 .
2
" S e c t i o n  I .  A l l  p e r s o n s  b o rn  or  n a t u r a l i z e d  i n  the  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s ,  and s u b j e c t  t o  the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  t h e r e o f ,  a re  
c i t i z e n s  o f  the  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and of the  S t a t e  w h e r e in  they  
r e s i d e .  No S t a t e  s h a l l  make or  e n f o r c e  any law which  s h a l l  
a b r i d g e  the  p r i v i l e g e s  or im m u n i t i e s  o f  c i t i z e n s  of  the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ;  n o r  s h a l l  any S t a t e  d e p r i v e  any p e r s o n  of  
l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  or  p r o p e r t y ,  w i t h o u t  due p r o c e s s  of law; nor  
deny to  any p e r s o n  w i t h i n  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  the  e q u a l  p r o t ­
e c t i o n  of  the  l a w ."
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since the statute sought to enforce the constitutional 
provision through a procedure which placed the burden of 
proof of non-engagement in the proscribed advocacy on the 
taxpayer.
It is equally true in the case of State governments, 
even though their powers are not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution (as in the case of federal government). If 
under the guise or pretext of acting within its powers a 
State government adopted measures for the accomplishment of 
objects which are within the federal jurisdiction, it would 
not be a lawful exertion of its authority. In Woodruff v. 
Parham , the Charter of Mobile authorised that city to 
impose a tax for municipal purposes. A person claimed that 
he was not liable to the tax as regards goods which were 
brought into the State from other neighbouring States of 
the Union. The Supreme Court declared the law void as in­
terfering with the unquestioned power of Congress to regulate 
commerce among the States. Similarly in Guy v. Baltimore^, 
where the City of Baltimore under its large powers of taxa­
tion attempted to impose a certain tax under the form of 
wharfage, it was held that a State cannot charge vessels 
1
(1869) 8 Wall. 1239 cf. Veazie Bank v. Fenno (1869) 8 Wall. 
533* See also Crandall v. Nevada (1867)~& Wall. 35.
(1879) 100 U. S. 5-3*+; see also Cook v. Pennsylvania (1878)
97 U.S. 586; Passenger Cases (185-9) 7 How. 283.
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l o a d e d  w i t h  p r o d u c t s  o f  o t h e r  S t a t e s  l a r g e r  f e e s  f o r  the  
use  o f  p u b l i c  wharves  t h a n  a re  c h a rg ed  f o r  v e s s e l s  l o a d e d  
w i t h  p r o d u c t s  o f  the  S t a t e .  J u s t i c e  H a r l a n  s a i d  t h a t  the  
f e e s  c o u ld  n o t  be r e g a r d e d  llas  c o m p e n sa t io n  m e re ly  f o r  the  
use  o f  the  C i t y 1  2s p r o p e r t y ,  b u t  as  a mere e x p e d i e n t  o r  d e v ic e  
t o  a c c o m p l i s h ,  by i n d i r e c t i o n ,  what the  S t a t e  c o u ld  n o t  
a c c o m p l i s h  by a d i r e c t  t a x ,  v i z . ,  b u i l d  up i t s  d o m e s t i c  
commerce by means of  u n e q u a l  and o p p r e s s i v e  b u rdens  upon 
i n d u s t r y  and business o f  o t h e r  S t a t e s ' ^  .
But  i t  i s  n o t  enough f o r  an Act t o  be d e c l a r e d  i n v a l i d  
t h a t  a n o t h e r  p u rp o se  t h a n  the  one shown on i t s  f a c e  may be 
a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the  A c t ,  even  i f  the  p u rp o se  i s  som eth ing  n o t  
w i t h i n  the  l a w f u l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  c o n c e r n e d .
The p o s s i b l e  abuse  of  power i s  n o t  an a rgum ent  a g a i n s t  i t s
P pe x i s t e n c e  . I n  McCray v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s -3 , the  Supreme C o u r t
s u s t a i n e d  a f e d e r a l  Act  l e v y i n g  a t a x  of t e n  c e n t s  p e r  pound 
on the  m a n u f a c tu r e  and s a l e  of  o l e o m a r g a r in e  a r t i f i c i a l l y  
c o lo u r e d  t o  r e sem b le  y e l l o w  b u t t e r ,  when the  t a x  on o l e o ­
m a r g a r in e  n o t  so c o lo u r e d  was o n ly  a q u a r t e r  of  a c e n t  p e r
1
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 443 .
2
Champion v .  Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 3 21 ,  a t  p .  3 6 3 .
( 190^9 195 U.S. 27 .  See a l s o  V eaz ie  Bank v .  Fenno ( 1869)
8 W a l l .  533; F l i n t  v .  Stone Tracv Co. (1911) 220 U.S . 107; 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  PoremiTs (1919) 249 U.S. 8 6 ; N igro  v .  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  (1928) 276 U.S . 332;  Sonz insky  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
(1937) 300 U.S . 506; U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  Sanchez (1950) 340 U.S. 
42; U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  F a h r i g e r  (1953) 345 U.S. 2 2 .
pound. The Act was challenged on the ground that its true 
purpose was not taxation but the regulation of manufacture 
and sale, and as such it invaded the reserved powers of the 
States. Justice White1s opinion, speaking for the majority, 
turned upon the Court1 s refusal to inquire into the motive"* 
or intent behind the Act or the result produced. The Court 
said that the discretion of Congress in the exercise of 
its constitutional powers to levy excise taxes could not be 
controlled or limited by the courts because the latter 
might deem the incidence of the tax oppressive or even 
destructive•
It may be noted that in the case of powers which cannot 
be defined by reference to purpose, such as the taxing 
power, the United States Courts are more hesitant to declare 
a law invalid on the ground that it is being used as a 
disguised way of doing something that is not legitimate.
In such a case of possible abuse of power, it must be almost 
apparent on the face of the Act that the power which is 
sought to be exercised is being used solely to enforce a 
regulation of matters with respect to which the legislature 
has no authority to interfere. For example, a tax imposed 
by Congress must be so heavy as to be confiscatory or highly
exorbitant or with the sole purpose of penalising certain
_
In this case it is difficult to distinguish between purpose 
and motive.
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1conduct. In the Child Labour Tax Case , Chief Justice Taft 
said that a taxing Act could not he declared invalid just 
because "another motive than taxation, not shown on the face
pof the act, might have contributed to its passage" ; but 
referring to the facts in question he concluded that "a 
court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is 
imposed to stop the employment of children within the age 
limits prescribed"^. Similarly in United States v. De Witt\  
it was held that an Act of Congress, which made it a mis­
demeanour to mix for sale naptha and illuminating oils, or 
sell such a mixture or offer it for sale, or to sell or 
offer for sale petroleum containing certain inflammable 
oils, was invalid as being a mere police regulation and as 
such void to the extent of its application within a state.
So if Congress could conceal its regulatory or prohib­
itory purposes beneath the form and language of a statute 
which appears on its face to be only a taxing measure, the 
Courts might not receive, or act on, other evidence -
1
(1922) 259 U.S. 20. For an abuse of taxing power as 
invading individual freedom see Gros.jean v. American Press 
Co« O 936) 297 U.S. 233j Jones v. Opelika 094-3) 319 U. S.
103; Murdock v. Pennsylvania (194lY 11Q TT.S. 105. For an 
abuse of commerce power, see e.g., United States v. Steffens 
(1879) 100 U.S. 82; Employers1 234 Liability Cases (1908) 207
U.S. 4-63.
2
Ihqid., at p. 4-3 (Italics supplied)
3
Ibid., at p . 37.
4
(1870) 9 Wall. 41.
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c e r t a i n l y  n o t  as  t o  " m o t iv e " ,  and p e rh a p s  n o t  even  as to
" p u r p o s e " .  The F i r e a r m s  A c ts  o f  193*+ imposed an e x c i s e
t a x  of  $200 on d e a l e r s  i n  " f i r e a r m s "  d e f i n e d  i n  such  a way
as  t o  e x c lu d e  p i s t o l s ,  r e v o l v e r s ,  and guns of  a type  used
i n  s p o r t s .  A p e r s o n  was c h a rg ed  w i t h  v i o l a t i o n  of  the  Act
by d e a l i n g  i n  f i r e a r m s  w i t h o u t  payment of  the  t a x .  I n
•1
S o n z in sk y  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  , the  t a x  was s u s t a i n e d ,  and the
C o u r t  h e s i t a t e d  " t o  s p e c u l a t e  as  to  the  m o t iv e s  which  moved
C o n g ress  t o  impose i t ,  or as  t o  the  e x t e n t  to  which i t  may
2
o p e r a t e  to  r e s t r i c t  the  a c t i v i t i e s  t ax e d "  •
An abuse  of  power a l s o  depends upon the  a t t i t u d e  
a d o p te d  by c o u r t s  to  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  l e g i s l a ­
t i v e  p o w e rs .  I n  Hammer v .  D a g en h a r t8 , a q u e s t i o n  a r o s e  
w h e th e r  i t  was w i t h i n  the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  C ongress  i n  r e g u l a t ­
in g  commerce among the  S t a t e s  to  p r o v id e  f o r  the  C h i ld  
Labor  A c t  which  was i n t e n d e d  to  p r e v e n t  i n t e r s t a t e  commerce 
i n  the  p r o d u c t s  of  c h i l d  l a b o u r .  The Supreme C our t  by a 
m a j o r i t y  o f  f i v e  to  f o u r  h e l d  t h a t  the  Act  ex ceed ed  the  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y  o f  C o n g re s s .  J u s t i c e  Day, s p e a k in g  
1
0 9 3 7 )  300 U.S. 506.
2
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 51 *+•
(1918) 25-7 U.S. 251.
3
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f o r  the  C o u r t ,  s t a t e d  v a r i o u s  c a s e s  d e c id e d  e a r l i e r  and 
o b se rv e d  t h a t  i n  e a c h  one of  them " th e  use  of  i n t e r s t a t e  
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  was n e c e s s a r y  to  the  accom pl ishm en t  o f  
h a rm f u l  r e s u l t s .  I n  o t h e r  w ords ,  a l t h o u g h  the  power o v e r  
i n t e r s t a t e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  was t o  r e g u l a t e ,  t h a t  c o u ld  o n ly  
be a c c o m p l i s h e d  by p r o h i b i t i n g  the  use  of  the  f a c i l i t i e s  
o f  i n t e r s t a t e  commerce to  e f f e c t  the  evi.1 i n t e n d e d " ^ .  But  
t h a t  e le m e n t  was w a n t in g  i n  the  p r e s e n t  case  as  the  goods 
s h ip p e d  were of  t h e m s e lv e s  h a r m l e s s .  The d e c i s i o n  was th u s  
b a sed  on the  c o n c e p t  of * d u a l  s o v e r e i g n t y 1 23 which o p e r a t e d  to  
keep the  xf e d e r a l  b a l a n c e 1 , i . e . ,  i n t e r s t a t e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
a s  a g a i n s t  l o c a l  m a t t e r s  such  as  r e g u l a t i o n  of  l a b o u r  
c o n d i t i o n s  ; and our  maxim i n  e f f e c t  found  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n .  
However, t h e r e  was a s h i f t  i n  the  C o u r t* s  o p i n i o n  i n  U n i t e d
S t a t e s  v .  Darby \  where a s i m i l a r  and a lm o s t  i d e n t i c a l
_
Champion v .  Ames (1903) 188 U.S . 321;  H i p o l i t e  Egg Co. v .  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  (1910) 220 U.S. 45; Hoke v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
(1913) 227 U.S. 308;  C a m i n e t t i  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  (1917)
24-2 U.S. 4-70.
2
(1918) 24-7 U.S. 251 , a t  p . 2 7 1 . J u s t i c e  Holmes , d i s s e n t i n g ,  
d i s a g r e e d  w i t h  the  v iew  of  the  m a j o r i t y  and s a i d :  "The
n o t i o n  t h a t  p r o h i b i t i o n  i s  any l e s s  p r o h i b i t i o n  when a p p l i e d  
t o  t h i n g s  now th o u g h t  e v i l  I  do n o t  u n d e r s t a n d .  But  i f  t h e r e  
i s  any m a t t e r  upon which  c i v i l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  have a g r e e d ,  - 
ihr more u n an im o u s ly  t h a n  th ey  have w i t h  r e g a r d  to  i n t o x i c ­
a n t s  and some o t h e r  m a t t e r s  over  which t h i s  c o u n t r y  i s  now 
e m o t i o n a l l y  a r o u s e d ,  - i t  i s  the  e v i l  of  p rem a tu re  and 
e x c e s s i v e  c h i l d  l a b o u r " :  i b i d . ,  a t  p .  280.
3
J u s t i c e  Holmes t h o u g h t  t h a t  C ongress  m ig h t  c a r r y  o u t  i t s  
v iew s o f  p u b l i c  p o l i c y  w h a te v e r  i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  t h e y  m ig h t  
^have upon the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  the  S t a t e s :  i b i d . , a t  p .  281.
(194-1) 312 U.S. 100.
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problem was involved. The Fair Labor Standards Act set up 
a comprehensive legislative scheme for preventing the 
shipment in interstate commerce of certain products 
produced in the United States under labour conditions as 
respects wages and hours which failed to conform to 
standards set up by the Act. This time the Act was up­
held. It is true that Hammer v. Dagenhart was formally 
overruled but it was done not because the maxim we are 
considering was disapproved, but because ”the distinc­
tion on which the decision was rested that Congressional 
power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to 
articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleter­
ious property - a distinction which was novel when made and 
unsupported by any provision of the Constitution - has 
long since been abandoned” . It was the concept of dual 
sovereignty that had placed limitations upon federal 
action, but it was outmoded by the time the present case 
arose. MThe reasoning and conclusion of the Court1s opin­
ion there”, said Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, 
”cannot be reconciled with the conclusion which we have 
reached, that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause 
is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce
psubject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution”^
1
Ibid., at p. 116 (Italics supplied).
Ibid., at p. 116.
36.
Further the Constitution placed no restriction on the 
motives of regulating interstate commerce - these were 
matters for the exercise of legislative judgment and the 
courts were given no control over them. Congress could 
follow its own conception of public policy as to whether 
products destined for interstate commerce were injurious 
to public health, morals or welfare. Thus the scope of 
regulating interstate commerce was enlarged under the later 
concept of plenary powers of the Congress, and the operation 
of our maxim accordingly was restricted.
However, in a borderline case it is rather a question 
of degree depending upon an individual opinion. That is why 
many of these cases have strong dissents . One of such 
borderline cases is Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
pRailroad Co. In that case the federal Railroad Retire­
ment Pension Act of 193^5 which provided for compulsory 
retirement and made a pension scheme applicable to interstate 
carriers, was held unconstitutional by a majority of five to 
four. The Court concluded that the social aim of the Act
was too remote from the promotion and protection of inter-
_
E.g., Champion v. Ames (1903) 188 U.S. 321; Hammer v. 
Dagenhart (1918) 2*+7 U. S. 251; United States v. Constantine 
(1935) 296 U.S. 287; Carter v. Carter Coal Co. (1936) 298 
U.S. 238; United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U.S. 1. See 
also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis (1937) 301 U.S. 5^8.
2
(1935) 295 U.S. 330. For its discussion see Recent 
Decisions in (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 932.
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s t a t e  commerce t o  "be c a r r i e d  ou t  under  the  g u i s e  of commerce 
power ,  MI t  has  and can  have no r e l a t i o n " ,  s a i d  J u s t i c e  
R o b e r t s , " t o  the  p r o m o t io n  of  e f f i c i e n c y ,  economy or  
s a f e t y  by s e p a r a t i n g  th e  u n f i t  from the  i n d u s t r y .  I f  t h e s e  
ends  demand the  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  aged em p lo y ee s ,  t h e i r  r e t i r e ­
ment f rom the  s e r v i c e  would s u f f i c e  to  a c c o m p l i sh  the  o b j e c t .  
F o r  t h e s e  p u r p o s e s  the  p r e s c r i p t i o n  of  a p e n s i o n  f o r  th o se  
d ropped  from s e r v i c e  i s  w h o l ly  i r r e l e v a n t " ^ .  On the  o t h e r  
h and ,  "The common judgment  t a k e s  n o te  of the  f a c t " ,  C h ie f  
J u s t i c e  H ughes , s p e a k in g  f o r  the  d i s s e n t e r s ,  c o n te n d e d ,
" t h a t  the  r e t i r e m e n t  of  w o rk e rs  by r e a s o n  of i n c a p a c i t y  due 
to  a d v a n c in g  y e a r s  i s  an  i n c i d e n t  of employment and t h a t  a 
f a i r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h e i r  p l i g h t  j u s t i f i e s  r e t i r e m e n t  
a l l o w a n c e s  as  a f e a t u r e  of  the  s e r v i c e  to  which th e y  have 
long b e en  d e v o te d "  . Jud g in g  the  two o p i n i o n s  on m e r i t ,  i t  
may be s a i d  t h a t  the  m a j o r i t y  took  an e x t r e m e ly  na rrow  view 
of  the  commerce power ( b e in g  a power n o t  d e f i n a b l e  by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  p u rp o se )  and im p l i e d  t h a t  the  power d i d  n o t  
e x te n d  e v en  to  c e r t a i n  m a t t e r s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  to  t r a n s p o r ­
t a t i o n  i t s e l f ^ .  Doubts  as  to  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  o p i n i o n
2
3
I b i d . , a t  p . 367. 
I b i d . , a t  p . 38k.
See the  p e n e t r a t i n g  c r i t i c i s m  of the  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  by 
P o w e l l ,  Commerce, P e n s io n s  and Codes (1935) k9 Harv .  L. Rev.
1, 193- '
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1have been cast in United States v. Lowden , where Justice 
Stone observed that the Congressional judgment there was 
not without rational basis. And in Mandeville Island Farms
pv. American Crystal Sugar Co. , Justice Rutledge listed 
Alton1s Case as one "foredoomed to reversal” by Lowden1s 
Case.
In Alton1s Case, though the taxing provisions relating 
to the contribution made by the employers and employees to 
a common fund were declared unconstitutional, the spending 
provisions relating to the pensions to be paid out of the 
fund to those who were retired compulsorily were unsever- 
able from the former. Justice Roberts said that the Act 
could not be re-written and given an effect altogether
3different from that sought by it when viewed as a whole •
Thus, if an Act deals with taxing as well as spending 
kaspects of a programme for the attainment of a prohibited 
end, the whole of the Act would be declared invalid.
1
0  939) 308 U.S. 225, at pp. 239 , 240.
2
(1948) 334 U.S. 219, at p. 230.
3
0  935) 295 U.S. 330, at p. 362.
4
The taxing and spending powers of Congress are provided 
in Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 1$ ”To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States."
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The i n s e v e r a b i l i t y  of t a x i n g  and sp en d in g  a s p e c t s  of
an A c t  was more s p e c i f i c a l l y  em phas ised  i n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .
1
B u t l e r  , which  i n v o l v e d  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of the  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  A d ju s tm e n t  Act  of  1933 - There a t a x  was 
imposed on p r o c e s s o r s  o f  fa rm  p r o d u c t s ,  the  p r o c e e d s  to  be 
p a i d  to  f a r m e r s  who would red u c e  t h e i r  a c r e a g e  i n  p r o d u c ­
t i o n ,  the  p l a n  b e in g  to  r e s t o r e  farm  p r i c e s  t o  c e r t a i n  
d e f i n e d  l e v e l s  by d e c r e a s i n g  the  q u a n t i t i e s  p ro d u c e d .  Here 
the  a p p ro a c h  of  J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s , who spoke f o r  the  m a j o r i t y ,  
was to  t r e a t  the  A c t  as a p l a n  f o r  the  c o n t r o l  and r e g u l a ­
t i o n  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  and to  examine the  con­
s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  of  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  t h e r e i n  by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  t h a t  e n d .  "The t a x ,  the  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  the
fu n d s  r a i s e d ,  and th e  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  d i s b u r s e m e n t ,  a re
2
b u t  p a r t s  of the  p l a n "  . I t  was,  t h e r e f o r e ,  h e ld  t h a t  as  
the  c o n t r o l  and r e g u l a t i o n  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n  was 
beyond th e  scope of  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  power ,  the  t a x i n g  and 
sp en d in g  a s p e c t s  o f  th e  Act were b u t  means t o  an u n c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  end i n  v i o l a t i o n  of  the  Tenth  Amendment^.
1
(1936) 297 U.S. 1 .
2
, I b i d . , a t  p . 68 .
I t  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  "The power n o t  d e l e g a t e d  t o  the  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  by th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  nor  p r o h i b i t e d  by i t  to  the  
S t a t e s ,  a r e  r e s e rv e d  t o  the  S t a t e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  or  t o  the  
p e o p l e ."
bo.
J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s  f i r s t  o b se rv ed  t h a t  the  p r o c e s s i n g  t a x  
was n o t  a t a x  a t  a l l ;  i t  was i n  r e a l i t y  b u t  p a r t  of  a 
sys tem  f o r  the  r e g u l a t i o n  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  He 
t h e n  inquired as  to  w h e th e r  the  p r o c e e d s  or b e n e f i t s  t o  the  
f a r m e r s  under  th e  p l a n  c o u ld  be j u s t i f i e d  under  the  spend ing  
power .  He was o f  the  v iew t h a t  a l t h o u g h  the  spend ing  power 
was n o t  l i m i t e d  by o t h e r  s p e c i f i c  g r a n t s  of  power"^ , n e v e r ­
t h e l e s s  i t  was q u a l i f i e d  by the  Tenth  Amendment and th u s  
co u ld  rot  be e x e r c i s e d  so as  to  invade  the  r e s e r v e d  r i g h t s  
of the  S t a t e s .  From t h i s  he c o n c lu d ed  t h a t  i n  r e a l i t y  the  
b e n e f i t s  c o n s t i t u t e d  a p a r t  of  the  sy s tem  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t i o n  p r o j e c t e d  und e r  the  g u i s e  of a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f o r  
the  I g e n e r a l  w e l f a r e 1 .
I t  was a s s e r t e d  by the  government  t h a t  w h a tev e r  m ight  
be s a i d  a g a i n s t  the  v a l i d i t y  of  the  p l a n  i f  co m p u lso ry ,  i t  
was c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  sound b ecau se  the  end was acc o m p l i sh e d  
by v o l u n t a r y  c o - o p e r a t i o n .  To t h i s  J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s  r e p l i e d  
t h a t  the  d e s i g n  f o r  r e g u l a t i o n  was no l e s s  r e a l  becau se  
d i s g u i s e d  u n d e r  a sys tem  of  v o l u n t a r y  c o n t r o l s .  The f a rm e r  
had no r e a l  c h o ic e  b u t  to  a c c e p t  b e n e f i t s  and submit  to  
r e g u l a t i o n :
1
A f t e r  exam in ing  the  t h e o r i e s  advanced  by Madison and 
H a m il to n  on the  scope and meaning o f  t h e  spend ing  power,  
J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s  came to  the  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  H a m i l t o n ' s  
b ro ad  and l i b e r a l  t h e o r y  was the  r i g h t  one .
The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, 
but the price of such refusal is the loss of 
benefits. The amount offered is intended to be 
sufficient to exert pressure on him to agree 
to the proposed regulation. The power to 
confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the 
power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower 
elects not to accept the benefits, he will 
receive less for his crops; those who receive 
payments will be able to undersell him. The 
net result will be financial ruin, ... This is 
coercion by economic pressure. The asserted 
power of choice is illusory”1.
These observations also lead to an implication that an
appropriation of money to the States on the fulfilment
of certain conditions might be ruled unconstitutional on
the ground that they amounted to coercion of the States,
otherwise the taxing and spending power "would become the
instrument for total subversion of the governmental powers
reserved to the individual States” . However, the concept
of a condition is itself a vague one which may vary from
control over the expenditure so that the money may be
spent for the purpose for which it was designed to complete
surrenders of the constitutional powers of the State or
Ifeven its essential governmental functions .
1
Ibid., at p . 71.
2
Ibid., at p . 75.
3
See the dissenting opinion of Justice Stone, ibid., at 
|?p. 85j 86.
See South Australia v. Commonwealth (19*+2) 65 C.L.R. 373; 
Victoria v. Commonwealth (1958) 99 C.L.R. 575»
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Even i f  th e  p l a n  were one f o r  v o l u n t a r y  c o - o p e r a t i o n ,
i t  would s t i l l  be n o t  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  as  C o n g re ss ,  J u s t i c e
R o b e r t s  r u l e d ,  c o u ld  n o t  use  moneys r a i s e d  by t a x a t i o n  to
' p u r c h a s e  c o m p la in c e 1 w i t h  f e d e r a l  f u n d s ,  s u b m is s io n  to
f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  of  m a t t e r s  of  s t a t e  c o n c e rn  w i t h  r e s p e c t
t o  which  C ongress  h as  no a u t h o r i t y  to  i n t e r f e r e .  "C ongress
h as  no power to  e n f o r c e  i t s  commands on th e  f a r m e r  to  the
ends  so u g h t  by th e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  A d ju s tm en t  A c t .  I t  must
f o l l o w  t h a t  i t  may n o t  i n d i r e c t l y  a c c o m p l i s h  th o s e  ends by
t a x i n g  and sp e n d in g  t o  p u r c h a s e  c o m p l ia n c e .  The C o n s t i t u t i o n
and th e  e n t i r e  p l a n  o f  our  governm ent  n e g a t i v e  any such  use
of  t h e  power to  t a x  and t o  spend as  th e  a c t  u n d e r t a k e s  to
a u t h o r i s e "  . J u s t i c e  R o b e r t s  was h e r e  t r y i n g  t o  p r e s e r v e
2
th e  d o c t r i n e  of  ' d u a l  f e d e r a l i s m '  , and h i s  a t t e m p t  i n v o lv e d  
n o t  o n ly  th e  use  of  th e  p r i n c i p l e  u n d e r  d i s c u s s i o n ,  b u t  a l s o  
by i m p l i c a t i o n  a n a r ro w  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  f e d e r a l  spend ing  
p o w e r .
The ground  of  i n v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s i n g  t a x  i s  i n
c o n t r a s t  w i t h  t h e  g round  of i n v a l i d i t y  o f  the  c h i l d  l a b o u r  
1
I b i d . , a t  p .  74-. On the  o t h e r  hand J u s t i c e  Stone i n  h i s  
d i s s e n t ,  r e f u s e d  t o  r e a d  any such  l i m i t a t i o n  on th e  spend ing  
power;  he was of  th e  v iew  t h a t  C ongress  c o u ld  r e l i e v e ,  when 
sp e n d in g  th e  money f o r  the  ' g e n e r a l  w e l f a r e * ,  a n a t i o n - w i d e  
economic m a l a d j u s t m e n t  by c o n d i t i o n a l  g i f t s  o f  money: 
i b i d . , a t  p . 86 .
2
See S c h w a r tz ,  Am erican  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Law ( 1 9 5 5 ) .  a t  pp .
41- 4-4-.
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t a x  i n  B a i l e y  v .  D r e x e l  F u r n i t u r e  Co. . The p u rp o se  or  
end of  the  c h i l d  l a b o u r  t a x  was to  r e s t r i c t  o r  p r o h i b i t  
the  employment of  c h i l d r e n  of  a c e r t a i n  a g e ,  and th u s  the  
t a x  was i n  r e a l i t y  n o t  a t a x  b u t  a p e n a l t y  imposed upon a 
p e r s o n  employing  c h i l d r e n .  On the  o t h e r  han d ,  the  p r o c e s ­
s i n g  t a x  was n o t  p r o h i b i t o r y  or  e v en  r e g u l a t o r y  i n  th e  
sen se  of  a p e n a l t y ;  i t  was r a i s e d  a s  revenue  the  p r o c e e d s  
of  which  were to  be u se d  f o r  the  c o n t r o l  and r e g u l a t i o n  of  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  Thus the  q u e s t i o n  h e re  r a i s e d  
was w h e th e r  the  money r a i s e d  by t a x e s  c o u ld  be used  f o r  the  
a cco m p l ish m en t  of  a l e g i s l a t i v e  end which  f e l l  w i t h i n  the  
r e s e r v e d  power of  the  S t a t e s .
The scope of  the  B u t l e r  Case d o c t r i n e ,  however ,  has  
been  g r e a t l y  weakened by s u b s e q u e n t  d e c i s i o n s ^ .  The l e a d i n g  
case  i s  S teward Machine Co. v .  D a v i s^ i n  which the  Supreme
1
(1922)  259 U .s .  20.
2
Steward  Machine Co. v .  Davis  (1937) 301 U.S. 5^8; H e l v e r i n g  
v .  Davis  (1937^ 301 U.S. 619; C a rm ich a e l  v .  S o u th e r n  Coal & 
Coke Co. (1937) 301 U.S. *+95$ see a l s o  C le v e la n d  v .  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  (19^5) 323 U.S. 3 2 9 .  Moreover the  c o n t r o l  and r e g u l a ­
t i o n  of  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i o n ,  which  the  B u t l e r  C a s e , supra, 
would n o t  a l l o w  to  be a c h i e v e d  und e r  the  t a x i n g  and spen d in g  
power ,  h a s  now b een  f u l l y  a c c o m p l i sh e d  und e r  the  commerce 
power:  see  M ulford  v .  Smith (1939) 307 U.S. 38; Wickard v .
F i l b u r n  ( 19^2) 317 U.S. 111.
(1937) 301 U . s .  5^8 .
3
Court upheld the unemployment insurance scheme of the Social 
Security Act of 1935» Under Title IX of the Act, an excise 
tax was levied upon all employers of eight persons or more. 
The proceeds when collected were to go into the general fund 
of the Treasury of the United States. But a taxpayer was 
granted a credit up to ninety per cent, of the tax for any 
contributions he might have made to a State unemployment 
fund under a State law provided the State law satisfied 
certain minimum criteria imposed by the federal government. 
Under Title III of the Act certain sums were authorised to 
be appropriated for the purpose of assisting the States in 
the administration of their unemployment compensation laws.
A corporation in the State of Alabama, which passed such an 
Act establishing an unemployment insurance fund, paid the 
tax and then filed a claim for its refund on the ground that 
the federal Act was invalid. One of the grounds on which 
the assailant relied was that an ulterior aim was wrought 
into the very structure of the Act and the aim was not only 
ulterior but unlawful as invading the reserved rights of 
the States. It was argued that the tax and credit in com­
bination were *weapons of coercion destroying or impairing 
the autonomy of the States3.
One noticeable feature in the opinion of Justice 
Cardozo, who spoke for the majority, from the Butler Case.
4-5 .
was t h a t  the  e x p r e s s i o n  * g e n e r a l  w e l f a r e 1 2 was g iv e n  a 
f a i r l y  wide and l i b e r a l  meaning f o r  p u r p o s e s  of a p p r o p r i a ­
t i o n  so t h a t  any amount s p e n t  f o r  the  g^ ie ra l  n a t i o n a l
w e l f a r e  would be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  under  the
1
sp e n d in g  power . He, t h e r e f o r e ,  f i r s t  lo oked  i n t o  the  
f a c t s  a s  to  th e  p rob lem  of  unemployment, and t h e n  i n q u i r e d  
w h e th e r  th e y  had assumed an a r e a  and dimension so as to  
w a r r a n t  any h e l p  from the  n a t i o n  i f  the  p e o p le  were n o t  to  
s t a r v e .  I f  i t  was so ,  as  he t h o u g h t  i t  was,  t h e n  unemploy­
ment was a l e g i t i m a t e  end f o r  the  p r o m o t io n  of  t g e n e r a l  
2
w e l f a r e 1 .
As to  th e  a rgum ent  of c o e r c i o n  1u n d e r  th e  whip of  
economic p r e s s u r e 1 i t  was e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  the  Act was n o t  a 
c o e r c i v e  measure  b u t  a l e g i t i m a t e  a t t e m p t  to  so lv e  the  
p rob lem  of  unemployment - a l a w f u l  end -  th ro u g h  the  co­
o p e r a t i o n  of  the  S t a t e  and F e d e r a l  g o v e rn m e n ts^ .  U n l ike
1
See a l s o  Helve r i n g  v .  Davis (1937) 301 U. S. 619, a t  p .64-1 , 
p e r  J u s t i c e  C a rd o z o : "Nor i s  the  c o n c e p t  of  the  g e n e r a l  
w e l f a r e  s t a t i c .  Needs t h a t  were n a r ro w  or  p a r o c h i a l  a 
c e n t u r y  ago may be i n t e r w o v e n  i n  our  day w i t h  the  w e l l ­
b e in g  of  the  n a t i o n .  What i s  c r i t i c a l  o r  urgent  changes  
w i t h  the  t i m e . "
2
(1937) 301 U. S. 54-8, a t  p p .  586, 587«
They were h e s i t a n t  to  d e a l  w i t h  the  p ro b lem  s e p a r a t e l y  
b e c a u se  of  the  p e c u l i a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  p r e v a i l i n g  a t  t h a t  
t im e :  see  i b i d . ,  a t  p .  588.  See a l s o  H e l v e r i n g  v .  Davis
(1937) 301 U.S. 619 ,  a t  p .  639 .
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Butler Case where payments offered to a farmer were held 
to he coupled to contracts oppressive in character because 
the farmer had no choice but to accept the offer, an 
employer under the unemployment insurance scheme was under 
no such restraint or coercion because an option to contrib­
ute a certain amount to the State unemployment fund and 
credit it to the extent of ninety per cent, against the tax 
to be paid under the Act placed no extra financial burden 
on him. He would have incurred in either case substantially 
the same liability, and certainly not greater than those in 
States which had no such system. In the same way there was 
no coercion of the States. A refund of ninety per cent, of 
the tax to the credit of employers in the State employment 
fund was a very strong temptation for the States to estab­
lish an unemployment insurance scheme, but the scheme had 
had the approval of the State concerned and could not be a 
law without it5 moreover, the condition of the credit was 
not linked to an irrevocable agreement, for the State at 
its pleasure might repeal its unemployment law, terminate 
the credit, and place itself where it was before the credit 
was accepted. "Who then is coerced through the operation 
of this statute?" asked Justice Cardozo. "Not the taxpayer. 
He pays in fulfilment of the mandate of the local legisla­
ture. Not the state. Even now she does not offer a
V7.
suggestion that in passing the unemployment law she was
affected by duress. See Carmichae1 v. Southern Coal and
1 2 Coke Co. , and Carmichael v. Gulf State Paper Corp. . For
all that appears she is satisfied with her choice and would
be sorely disappointed if it were now to be annulled"^.
The fallacy in the petitioner1s contention was seen in the
fact that Mit confuses motive with coercion. *Every tax is
in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes
an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed.1 Sonzinsky v. United States^. In
like manner every rebate from a tax when conditional upon
conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that
motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge
the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophic determinism
by which choice becomes impossible"^.
In an earlier case, Massachusetts v. Mellon^ , an
1
(1937) 301 u .s . h95.
2
(1937) 301 u .s . h95.
3
(1937) 301 U.S. 5k8, at p. 589.k
(1937) 300 u .s . 506.
5
(1937) 301 U.S. 5k8, at pp. 5895 590.6
(1923) 262 U.S. kk7; see also Florida v. Mellon (1927)
273 U.S. 12. --- ------
k&.
attempt was made to seek an injunction against carrying out 
the Maternity Act of 1921, which provided for federal grants 
to the States on condition that such States would comply 
with the provisions of the Act and use the aids for maternal 
and child health and welfare services. It was asserted 
that the Act constituted an effective means of inducing the 
States to yield a portion of their sovereign rights. Though 
the suit was dismissed on the procedural ground that neither 
the State nor the taxpayer had any standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Act, it was apparent in the opinion 
of Justice Sutherland that the condition of the grant raised 
no constitutional issue as "the powers of the State are not 
invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply 
extends an option which the State is free to accept or 
reject"”* .
But then where to draw a line between temptation and 
coercion? "It is one thing”, explained Justice Cardozo,
"to impose a tax dependent upon the conduct of the taxpayers, 
or of the State in which they live, where the conduct to be 
stimulated or discouraged is unrelated to the fiscal heed 
subserved by the tax in its normal operation, or to any
other end legitimately national. The Child Labor Tax Case2,
_
0923) 262 U.S. W7, at p. k80.
(1922) 259 U.S. 20.
2
*+9-
and Hill v. Wallace , were decided in the belief that the
statutes there condemned were exposed to that reproach. Cf.
2United States v. Constantine . It is quite another thing 
to say that a tax will be abated upon the doing of an act 
that will satisfy the fiscal need, the tax and the alterna­
tive being approximate equivalents. In such circumstances, 
if in no others, inducement or persuasion does not go beyond 
the bounds of power" . In the present case it was not 
coercion because the credit allowed for the State funds was 
not unrelated *to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in 
its normal operation since the purpose of Congress interven­
tion was to safeguard its own treasury and therefore to let 
the States share the burden upon equal terms1. However,
"the location of the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion and ceases to be inducement, would be a question
kof degree, - at times, perhaps, of fact," and the Court 
hesitated to lay down any test as to the validity of a tax 
"if it is laid upon the condition that a state may escape 
its operation through the adoption of a statute unrelated
in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of
_
(1922) 259 U.S. kb.
2
(1935) 296 U.S. 287.
3
0937) 301 U.S. 5^8, at p. 591.
4-
Ibid., at p . 590.
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n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  and power" . But  the  ten d en cy  i s  to  
s u p p o r t  such  a scheme u n l e s s  i t  i s  m a n i f e s t l y  u n j u f  or  
p a t e n t l y  o u t s i d e  the  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  power .  u The d i s c r e t i o n ,  
h o w ev er" ,  rem arked  J u s t i c e  C a rd o z o , " i s  n o t  c o n f i d e d  to  the  
C o u r t s .  The d i s c r e t i o n  b e lo n g s  to  C o n g re s s ,  u n l e s s  the 
c h o ic e  i s  c l e a r l y  wrong, a d i s p l a y  of  a r b i t r a r y  power,  n o t  
an  e x e r c i s e  of  judgment"  •
1
But suppose  t a x i n g  and spend ing  a s p e c t s  of a f e d e r a l
Act  a re  s e v e r e d  from one a n o t h e r  and th e y  a re  p r o v i b d  i n
two s e p a r a t e  A c t s ,  though  s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t i n g  p a r t s  of a p l a n
f o r  th e  a t t a i n m e n t  of  a p r o h i b i t e d  en d ,  i . e . ,  r e g u l a t i o n  of
a s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  w i t h i n  the  S t a t e s 1 r e s e r v e d  j u r i s d i c t i o n .
Would the  A c t s  s t a n d  a b e t t e r  chance t h a n  b e f o r e  so f a r  as
f e d e r a l  power i s  c o n ce rn ed ?  F o l lo w in g  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  v .
3
M ellon  , and the  way t h a t  case  was d i s t i n g u i s h e d  i n  the  
If
B u t l e r  Case , C ongress  a t t e m p t e d  to  p u t  the  R a i l r o a d
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 590.
2
H e l v e r i n g  v .  Davis  (1937) 301 U.S. 619,  a t  p .  6 k0 .
3
(1923) 262 U.S. 9-^7f a p e r s o n  has  no s t a n d i n g  to  c h a l l e n g e  
the  e x p e n d i t u r e  of  money t h a t  i s  made from the  g e n e r a l  fund  
of  the  T r e a s u r y .
b
( 1936) 297 U.S. 1 .  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  v .  M e l l o n , s u p r a , was 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d  on the  ground  t h a t  t h e r e  the  t a x p a y e r ' s  money 
was p a r t  of  the  g e n e r a l  fund  of  th e  T r e a s u r y ,  w h e reas  h e re  
the  t a x  l e v i e d  on p r o c e s s o r s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  was 
a l l  p a r t  o f  one Act  and i t  was a d e f i n a b l e  u n i t  which  had 
no r ev e n u e  p u rp o se  a p a r t  from the  programme e n v i s a g e d  i n  the  
A c t .
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R e t i r e m e n t  Act  beyond the  scope of j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  by
s e v e r i n g  the  t a x i n g  and spend ing  a s p e c t s  o f  the  r e t i r e m e n t
programme; one Act  p r o v i d e d  f o r  the  l e v y i n g  of  an e x c i s e
t a x  on em p lo y e rs  and employees  and making the  t a x  p a y a b le
i n t o  the  g e n e r a l  fu n d  o f  the  T r e a s u r y ,  and the  o t h e r  A c t ,
s e p a r a t e  b u t  p a r a l l e l ,  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  the  c r e a t i n  o f  a fund
from which  p e n s i o n s  c o u ld  be p a i d  a lo n g  the  l i n e s  of  the
2o r i g i n a l  scheme . This  scheme h as  n e v e r  been  t e s t e d  i n  the  
c o u r t s .  On the  o t h e r  hand ,  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  a p p e a r s  
t o  have been  t a k e n  f o r  g r a n t e d  i n  R a i l r o a d  R e t i r e m e n t  Board 
v . Duquesne Warehouse Co.^
However,  though  C ongress  has  a lm o s t  com ple te  c o n t r o l  
o v e r  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ,  i t  does n o t  mean t h a t  a m e a s u r e d  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  i s  n o t  j u s t i c i a b l e .  Any a t t e m p t  by Congress 
und e r  the  g u i s e  o f  a n  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  Act  to  do what i s  
p r o h i b i t e d  u n d e r  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  would be d e c l a r e d  i n v a l i d  
by the  C o u r t s .  I n  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  Love t t ^ ,  the  i s s u e  was
t ~ ;
The one h e l d  i n v a l i d  i n  R a i l r o a d  R e t i r e m e n t  Board v .  A l to n  
R a i l r o a d  C o . ,  s u p r a .
2
The Act  was f i r s t  amended i n  1937, 50 U.S. S t a t .  3 0 7 ,  and 
th e n  t h o r o u g h l y  r e v i s e d  i n  19^-6, 59 U. S. S t a t .  722.
3
(195-6) 326 U.S. 5-5-6. A s i m i l a r  scheme c o n s i s t i n g  of two 
s e p a r a t e  A c t s ,  one im pos ing  a t a x  on c a r r i e r s  and th e  o t h e r  
a u t h o r i s i n g  a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  f rom the  g e n e r a l  f u n d s  i n  the  
T r e a s u r y  f o r  r e t i r e m e n t  b e n e f i t s  f o r  r a i l r o a d  e m p lo y e e s , was 
s u s t a i n e d  i n  C a l i f o r n i a  v .  Anglim ( 9 t h  C i r .  195-2) 129 F.  2d.  
555 ,  C e r t ,  d e n i e d ,  (1952) 317 U.S. 669 .
5-
0 9 5 6 )  328 U.S. 3 0 3 .
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the  v a l i d i t y  o f  s . 3 0 k  of the  U rg en t  D e f i c i e n c y  A p p r o p r i a t i o n  
Act  of  19^3 a n d e r  which  Congress  had e n a c t e d  t h a t  no s a l a r y  
or c o m p e n sa t io n  sh o u ld  he p a i d  to  c e r t a i n  named employees 
of  the  Government o u t  o f  the  monies t h e n  or  t h e r e a f t e r  
a p p r o p r i a t e d , e x c e p t  f o r  c e r t a i n  named s e r v i c e s .  The Supreme 
C o u r t  h e l d  the  s e c t i o n  to  he i n v a l i d  a s  b e in g  i n  e f f e c t  a
■j
B i l l  o f  A t t a i n d e r  or  ex  p o s t  f a c t o  law a s  i t  was shown by
the  s e c t i o n * s  l an g u a g e  as  w e l l  as the  c i r c u m s ta n c e  of  i t s
p a s s a g e  t h a t  no mere q u e s t i o n  of  c o m p e n sa t io n  p r o c e d u r e  or
of a p p r o p r i a t i o n s  was i n v o l v e d .  J u s t i c e  B la c k  s a i d :
S e c t i o n  30^ 5 t h u s ,  c l e a r l y  a c c o m p l i s h e s  the  p u n i s h ­
ment of  named i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h o u t  a j u d i c i a l  t r i a l .
The f a c t  t h a t  the  pun ish m en t  i s  i n f l i c t e d  th ro u g h  
the  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  of an  Act  s p e c i f i c a l l y  c u t t i n g  
o f f  the  pay of  c e r t a i n  named i n d i v i d u a l s  found  
g u i l t y  o f  d i s l o y a l t y ,  makes i t  no l e s s  g a l l i n g  or  
e f f e c t i v e  t h a n  i f  i t  had been  done by an  Act  which 
d e s i g n a t e d  the  c o n d u c t  as  c r i m i n a l .  No one would 
t h i n k  t h a t  C ongress  cou ld  have p a s s e d  a v a l i d  law, 
s t a t i n g  t h a t  a f t e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i t  had found  L o v e t t ,
Dodd, and Watson ^ g u i l t y *  of  the  crime of en gag ing  
i n  1 2s u b v e r s i v e  a c t i v i t i e s 1 ; d e f i n e d  t h a t  term f o r  
the  f i r s t  t im e , a n d  s e n t e n c e d  them to  p e r p e t u a l  
e x c l u s i o n  from any government  employment .  S e c t i o n  
3 0 k ,  w h i l e  i t  does n o t  use  t h a t  l a n g u a g e ,  
a c c o m p l i s h e s  t h a t  r e s u l t *  The e f f e c t  was to  i n f l i c t  
p u n ish m en t  w i t h o u t  the  s a f e g u a r d s  of  a j u d i c i a l  
t r i a l  and 1 d e te r m in e d  by no p r e v i o u s  law o r  f i x e d  
r u l e * . ^
C o n d i t i o n a l  g r a n t s  pose  a n o t h e r  p rob lem  when examined
1
A r t  I ,  s e c .  9 o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  p r o h i b i t s  p a s sa g e  of 
b i l l s  of  a t t a i n d e r  by C o n g r e s s .
2
I b i d . ,  a t  p p .  3 1 6 ,  3 1 7 .
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i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  f reedom s  g u a r a n t e e d  by the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  C o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  to  a g r a n t  m ig h t  impinge 
upon  th e  i n d i v i d u a l  f reedom s  b u t  th ey  must be s u b s t a n ­
t i a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  the  p u rp o se  of the  f a c i l i t i e s  so u g h t  t o  
be p r o v i d e d ,  "The no rm al  d e s i r e  t o  e n jo y  t h e s e  p r i v i l e g e s 1  23, 
l i k e  th e  d e s i r e  t o  u se  p u b l i c  s t r e e t s  and p a r k s ,  c a n n o t  be 
made an  i n s t r u m e n t  of  s u p p r e s s i o n  u n l e s s  i n  th e  c o n t e x t  
of  th e  s t a t u t e  i n  q u e s t i o n  th e  s u p p r e s s i o n  i s  a d ju d g e d  t o
s e r v e  a l e g i t i m a t e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  of  such  g r a v i t y  a s  t o
1
w a r r a n t  i t "  .
I n  Oklahoma v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  Commission
a q u e s t i o n  a r o s e  as  t o  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s
of  th e  H a tch  Act  of 19^+0, which  a p a r t  from p r o h i b i t i n g
3
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  by S t a t e  employees  , f u r t h e r  p r o h i b i t e d  
p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  by S t a t e  employees  whose p r i n c i p a l  em­
p lo y m e n t  r e l a t e d  t o  any a c t i v i t y  f i n a n c e d  i n  whole or  i n
1
W i l l c o x ,  I n v a s i o n s  of  th e  F i r s t  Amendment t h r o u g h  C ond i ­
t i o n e d  P u b l i c  Spending  C19551 C o r n e l l  L . J .  1 2 . a t  p .  bk.
See a l s o  Notes  -  U n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  C o n d i t i o n s  (1900)
73 H arv .  L, Rev,  1595? a t  pp .  1599-1602 .
2
(19^7)  330 U.S. 127.
3
These p r o v i s i o n s  of th e  Hatch  Act were su s ta in s !  i n  U n i t e d  
P u b l i c  Workers v ,  M i t c h e l l  (19^+7) 330 U .S .  75$ i t  was 
r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s t r i c t i o n  o p e r a t e d  to  some e x t e n t  to 
i n f r i n g e  upon F i r s t  Amendment p r i v i l e g e s ,  b u t  th e  Surpeme 
C o u r t  u p h e ld  th e  s t a t u t e  as  a p r o p e r  e x e r c i s e  of  th e  
a u t h o r i t y  of  C ongress  over  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  and e f f i c i e n c y  
of  th e  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e .
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p a r t  by f e d e r a l  l o a n s  o r  g r a n t s .  The s a n c t i o n  c o n s i s t e d  
i n  th e  w i t h d r a w a l  from the  S t a t e  of an amount e q u a l  to  two 
y e a r s 1 s a l a r y  of  the  o f f e n d i n g  em ployee .  The Supreme Court  
f i r s t  found  t h a t  the  a u t h o r i s a t i o n  i n  the  s t a t u t e  of 
j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  of a d e c i s i o n  w i th d raw in g  b e n e f i t s  gave 
j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  d e te r m in e  the  v a l i d i t y  of  th e  s t a t u t e  as  
w e l l  a s  g e t t i n g  over  any d i f f i c u l t y  und e r  the  M a s s a c h u s e t t s  
v .  M e l lo n  d o c t r i n e .  But  the  C o u r t  d i s m i s s e d  the  s u i t  on the  
ground  t h a t  the  end s o u g h t  by Congress  th ro u g h  the  Hatch  
Act  was b e t t e r  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  by r e q u i r i n g  th o se  who admin­
i s t e r  fu n d s  f o r  n a t i o n a l  n eed s  to  a b s t a i n  from p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t i s a n s h i p .  The use  of c o n c e p t s  l i k e  * b e t t e r  p u b l i c  
s e r v i c e 1 b r i n g s  i n t o  p l a y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  which in v o lv e  
a h i e r a r c h y  of  v a l u e s  s e r v i n g  as  g u i d e s  be tw een  a l t e r n a t i v e s .
I n  A d le r  v .  Board of  E d u c a t i o n  , the  Supreme C o u r t  
s u s t a i n e d  a New York s t a t u t e ,  the  s o - c a l l e d  F e i n b e r g  Law, 
which p r o h i b i t e d  the  employment of any per son who a d v o c a te d  
the  o v e r th r o w  of  the  governm ent  by u n l a w f u l  means,  or who 
was a member of  an  o r g a n i s a t i o n  which  had a l i k e  p u r p o s e .
The F e i n b e r g  Law d i r e c t e d  the  New York Board of  R e g en ts  to  
make a l i s t i n g ,  a f t e r  n o t i c e  and h e a r i n g ,  of o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
1
(1952) 342 U.S . 485.
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of the  type  d e s c r i b e d .  Under the  s t a t u t e  the Regent  
p r o v i d e d  by r e g u l a t i o n  t h a t  membership i n  a l i s t e d  o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n  s h o u ld  be l p r im a  f a c i e  e v id e n c e  of  d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n 1 
f o r  employment i n  the  s c h o o l  sy s te m .  But  s u b s t a n t i a l  p r o c e d ­
u r a l  p r o t e c t i o n s  were a f f o r d e d  b o t h  to  i n d i v i d u a l s  and 
o r g a n i s a t i o n s .  J u s t i c e  M in to n , who spoke f o r  the  m a j o r i t y ,  
u p h o ld in g  the  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  s a i d  t h a t  the  p r e s u m p t io n  a r i s i n g  
f rom p r o o f  o f  membership i n  a l i s t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n  was n o t  
u n r e a s o n a b l e  o r  a r b i t r a r y  so as  to  be a d e n i a l  of due 
p r o c e s s  of  law b e ca u se  i t  was a l e g i s l a t i v e  f i n d i n g  t h a t  the  
member by h i s  membership s u p p o r t e d  the  i d e o l o g y  the  o r g a n i s a ­
t i o n  s t o o d  f o r ,  and the  Cour t  co u ld  n o t  say  t h a t  such  a 
f i n d i n g  was c o n t r a r y  to  f a c t  or t h a t  " g e n e r a l i t y  of 
e x p e r i e n c e "  p o i n t e d  to  a d i f f e r e n t  c o n c l u s i o n .  As to  the  
a rgum ent  t h a t  the  s t a t u t e  c o n s t i t u t e d  an ab r id g m en t  of the  
f reedom  of  sp e ec h  and a s se m b ly ,  he s a i d :  " I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t
such  p e r s o n s  have the  r i g h t  under  our  law to  a s se m b le ,  sp e ak ,  
t h i n k  and b e l i e v e  as  t h e y  w i l l .  American  Communication 
A s s o c i a t i o n  v .  Douds . I t  i s  e q u a l l y  c l e a r  t h a t  th ey  have 
no r i g h t  to  work f o r  the  S t a t e  i n  the  s c h o o l  sys tem  on t h e i r  
own t e r m s .  U n i t e d  P u b l i c  Workers v .  M i t c h e l l ^ .  They may
work f o r  the  s c h o o l  sy s tem  upon the  r e a s o n a b l e  te rm s l a i d
_
(1950) 339 U.S .  382 . See a l s o  Osman v .  Douds ( 1950 )
339 U.S .  8k6 .
2
( 19V7) 330 U.S. 75.
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down by the  p r o p e r  a u t h o r i t i e s  of  New York .  I f  t h e y  do n o t  
choose to  work on such  t e r m s ,  th ey  a re  a t  l i b e r t y  to  r e t a i n  
t h e i r  b e l i e f s  and a s s o c i a t i o n s  and go e l s e w h e r e .  Has the
S t a t e  th u s  d e p r i v e d  them of  any r i g h t  to  f r e e  sp eech  and
1
assem b ly ?  We t h i n k  n o t "  . However, the  d e c i s i o n  as  to  the  
r e a s o n a b i l i t y  o f  the  te rm s  or  c o n d i t i o n s  l i e s  u l t i m a t e l y  
w i t h  the  c o u r t s .  “When p a r t i c u l a r  co n d u c t  i s  r e g u l a t e d  i n  
the  i n t e r e s t  of  p u b l i c  o r d e r ,  and the  r e g u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s  i n  
an  i n d i r e c t ,  c o n d i t i o n a l ,  p a r t i a l  a b r id g m e n t  of s p e e c h " ,
p
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  V in so n  s a i d  i n  Doud*s Case . " t h e  d u ty  of  the  
c o u r t s  i s  t o  d e te r m in e  which of  t h e s e  two c o n f l i c t i n g  i n t e r ­
e s t s  demands the  g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  u n d e r  the  p a r t i c u l a r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  p r e s e n t e d " ^ .
Thus i n  o r d e r  to  d e te r m in e  w h e th e r  t h e r e  has  b e e n  an 
i n v a s i o n  of  i n d i v i d u a l  f r e e d o m s ,  i t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  
show t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  to  a g r a n t  a re  r e l a t e d  to  the  
p u rp o se  of  the  scheme 5 i t  has  f u r t h e r  to  be examined w h e th e r  
th ey  a r e  u n r e a s o n a b l e ,  a r b i t r a r y  or  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y .  F o r
1
(1952) 3*+2 U. S. Lt-85j a t  p .  k92.  I n  M c A u l i f fe  v .  New Bed­
f o r d  (1892) 155 M ass .  216, 29 N.E. 5 1 7 j i t  was s a i d  t h a t  
" th e  p e t i t i o n e r  may have a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  to  t a l k  
p o l i t i c s ,  b u t  he h a s  no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t  to  be a p o l i c e ­
man" 5 c f . Dou g l a s  and B l a c k , d i s s e n t i n g  i n  B arsky  v .  Board 
of R e g e n t s  0 9 5 0  3^7 U.S . 442,  a t  p .  V72.
2
(1950) 339 u .s . 382.
I b i d . , a t  p . 399 .
3
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ex am p le ,  i n  Wieman v .  U p d e g r a f f  i t  was h e l d  t h a t  the
r e q u i r e m e n t  t h a t  a p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l  must  tak e  an o a t h  of
non-membership  i n  s u b v e r s i v e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  v i o l a t e d  due
p r o c e s s  i f  knowledge of  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n 1s c h a r a c t e r  was
n o t  r e q u i r e d .  ’’I n d i s c r i m i n a t e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  i n n o c e n t
w i t h  knowing a c t i v i t y  must  f a l l  as an  a s s e r t i o n  of
2a r b i t r a r y  pow er” .
1
0952) 3^5 u .s .  183.
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 191.
2
CHAPTER III
Canada
The division of legislative powers between Dominion 
Parlament and Provincial legislatures in Canada is 
affected by sections 91-95 and by other sections of the 
British North America Act, 1867; but the main provisions 
are sections 91 and 92 and the problems of ultra vires have 
arisen mostly in the meaning and effect of those sections,
S.91 authorises the Dominion Parliament to make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of Canada in 
relation to all matters not coming within the sixteen 
classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the Provincial 
legislatures. And *for greater certainty, but not so as to 
restrict the generality of the foregoing1, it is declared 
that notwithstanding anything in the Act (i.e., notwithstand­
ing S.92), the exclusive legislative authority of the 
Dominion Parliament extends to all matters coming within 
the twenty-nine classes of subjects enumerated in s.91.
The last head of s.91 further provides that any matter
1
Originally there were twenty-nine enumerations; two more 
have been added by amendment.
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coming within the twenty-nine classes of subjects enumera­
ted jn S.91 1 shall not be deemed to come within the class 
of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the 
enumeration of the classes of subjects* assigned exclusively 
to the Provincial legislatures by s.92. S.92 gives the
Provincial legislatures exclusive power to legislate on 
matters coming within the sixteen heads enumerated therein 
of which the last one is 1 generally all matters of a merely 
local or private nature in the Privince1.
The *peace, order and good government1 clause in s.91 
was originally intended to be the major source of power of 
the Dominion Parliament with enumerated heads being merely 
illustrations of the general power"* . But through judicial 
interpretation the order was reversed relegating the general 
power to the role of supplement to the enumerated powers 
which became of major consequence. This led to a rule of 
construction which accorded Dominion legislation under the 
enumerated heads primacy over the Provincial powers enumera­
ted in s.92, but denied this primacy to the general clause2.
1See Kennedy, The Interpretation of the British North America 
Act (191*2) 8 Camb.L.J. 146, at p. 150.
2Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for Canada [1896] A.C. I1*#, at p.361; Attorney-General for Canada v. 
Attorney-General for Alberta I 1916] 1 A.C. 588, at p. 595;
In re Board of Commerce Act [1922] 1 A.C. I9I5 Toronto Elec­
tric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A.C. 398, at p. M-12; 
Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for British 
Columbia I 19301 A.C. 111, at p. 118; Attorney-Generai for 
Canada v . Attorney-General for 0ntariö~rT937jA.C. 326, at 
P.351 5 Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General 
for Quebec 119511 A.C. 179*
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Thus the scope of the general power was considerably 
narrowed down by reference to the enumerated heads of 
Provincial power under s.92, particularly to the property
and civil rights1 clause, except during periods of emergency
1such as war, pestilence and famine .
The Dominion power of 1regulation of trade and 
commerce1 under head (2) of s.91} a power which has immense 
potentialities and in fact proved to be a fruitful source of
federal legislative authority in the United States, has been
given a restricted meaning so as to render it almost use-
pless except for the regulation of external and
1
See In re Board of Commerce Act, supra, at p.200$ Fort 
Frances Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd, v. Manitoba Free Press Ltd.
L1923J A.C. 6955 at p. 70h; To'ronto Electric Commissioners 
v. Snider, supra., at p. hip; Japanese Canadians v. Attorney- 
General for Canada [19^+7] A.cT 87 5 at p . 101 : C.P.R. v. 
Attorney-General for British Columbia U950] A.C. 122, at 
p .1hO. Cf. Russel v. The Queen I 1882] 7 A.C. 829; and 
Attorney-General for Ontario v . Canada Temperance Federa­
tion T 199-61 A.C. 193.
See e.g., Citizens1 Insurance Co. v. Parsons [1881] 7 A.C. 
96; Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for 
Canada I 1896J A.C. 2h8; Great West Saddleiy Co. v . The King 
L1921J 2 A.C. 91; In re Board of Commerce Act, supra; 
Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, supra; Attorney- 
General for British Columbia v . Attorney-General for 
Canada I 19/37J A.C. 277: Canadian Federation of Agriculture 
v . Attorney-General for Quebec I 1991 I A.C. 179• Cf. 
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v . Attorney-General 
for Canada I 1931 I A.C. 310. at p. 326.
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interprovincial trade , and for the creation of national 
2trade marks . It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee 
that the Regulation of trade and commerce1 23*5 clause, if 
given unrestricted interpretation, would appear to be 
sufficient to give Dominion Parliament a complete control 
over the economic life of the country, so that many of the 
enumerations in s.91 would be regarded as meaningless^, and 
the degree of autonomy, which the provinces were intended 
to possess, would be seriously curtailed, if not virtually
Llextinguished • However, the clause could be applied in 
aid of some other independent power under s.91 which might 
with its assistance be interpreted to prevail over the 
provincial power of *property and civil rights1 .^
The last paragraph of s.91 has also been interpreted 
to include and correctly describe all the matters enumerated 
in S.92, as being, from a provincial point of view, of a
1
Reference re the Natural Products Marketing Act [1936] 
S.C.R. 398, at p.hlO, approved in Attorney-General for 
British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada I 1937]
A.C. 377, at p. 387.
2
Attorney-General for Ontario v• Attorney-General for 
Canada I 1937 I A.C. h05.
3
Citizens1 Insurance Co. v. Parsons, supra., at pp. 112, 113» 
4-
Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General for 
Quebec, supra, at p. 195«
5
In re Board of Commerce Act, supra, at p. 198. Toronto 
Electric Commissioners v. Snider, supra, at pp, 409, 4-10,
local and private nature1, whereas in its grammatical 
construction it appears to apply only to head 16 of s.922 
which provides for a law in relation to "generally all 
matters of a merely local or private nature in the provinc­
es". This interpretation also led to the denial of para- 
mountcy of Dominion legislation, except when enacted in 
relation to an enumerated head under s.91 or when ancillary 
to legislation so enacted.
The Dominion was thus handicapped in endeavouring to 
tackle the multifarious problems of a modern stated. It 
was, therefore, forced to seek some other power to serve 
its purpose. To a certain extent it did succeed in dis­
couraging economic malpractices by using its power in 
relation to criminal law under head 27 of s.91. For 
example, s.k98A of the Canadian Criminal Code prohibited 
certain kinds of trade combinations, and provided for penal 
sinctions in cases of breach. In Attorney-General for 
British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada**, the Privy
1
See e.g., Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General 
for Canada [1896J A.C. 3^8, at p. 3 5 9 ; Great West Saddlery 
Co. v. The King [1921] 2 A.C. 91, at pp. 99, 100.
2
See e.g., Citizens1 Insurance Co. v. Parsons, supra, at
p.108.
3
See Wheare, Federal Government (2nd ed.), at pp.Iß^-I^O; 
The Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion Provincial 
Relations, Book I, at p. 2^0.
1+
[1937] A.C. 368.
Council held that the section was in toto intra vires of
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the Dominion power. The basis of the decision was that 
there seemed to be nothing to prevent the Dominion, if i t 
thought fit in the public interest, from applying the 
criminal law generally to acts or omissions which so far 
were only covered by provincial enactments. MThe only 
limitation on the plenary power of the Dominion to determ­
ine what shall or shall not be criminalu said their 
Lordships, "is the condition that Parliament shall not in 
the guise of enacting criminal legislation in truth and in 
substance encroach on any of the classes of subjects 
enumerated in s.92n .^ It was no objection that it did in 
fact affect them, for it was a genuine attempt to amend 
the criminal law and it might obviously affect previously 
existing civil rights. In some cases it also succeeded 
in exploiting the negative character of provincial powers. 
For example, by declaring grain elevators to be works 
xfor the general advantage of Canada1 under head 10 of 
s.92, it has been able to exercise jurisdiction over the 
grain trade^.
1
Ibid», at p. 375*
2 4 %King v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co. (1925) S.C.R. t-3*+,
at p.M+8; there was no appeal to the Privy Council against 
the decision of the Supreme Court. For a general discussion 
of the power of the Dominion to declare works rfor the 
general advantage of Canada1, see Gouin and Claxton, 
Legislative Expedients and Devices adopted by the Dominion 
and the Provinces, Chapter IV.
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The general scheme of the division of legislative 
powers as provided in ss.91 and 92 clearly indicate that 
the specific powers of Dominion and provinces are mutually 
exclusive and in case of conflict pre-eminence is to be 
given to the Dominion. Still with regard to certain classes 
of subjects generally described in s.913 legislative power 
may reside as to some matters falling within the general 
description of these subjects in the legislatures of the 
provinces. In order to prevent such a conflict 1 the two 
sections must be read together, and the language of one 
interpreted and, where necessary, modified by that of the 
other"^. However, there may be cases where the Dominion 
as well as the provinces may legislate with respect to 
the same subject matter and still act within their respec­
tive powers. For example, in Brewers and Maltsters Assoc-
piation v. Attorney-General for Ontario , it was held that 
the provincial legislatures might validly require brewers, 
and distillers, though duly licensed by the Dominion
Government, to take out and pay for provincial licenses
_
Citizens1 Insurance Co. v. Parsons [1881] 7 A.C. 96, at p. 
109. See also Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada [1894] A.C.
315 Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King 11921] 2 A.C. 91) 
at pp. 116, 117. Also refer to the first proposition of 
Lord Tomlin in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney- 
General for British Columbia I 193OJ A.C. T11, at p. 118.
2
[1897] A.C. 231. See also Attorney-General for Manitoba v. 
Manitoba License Holders1 Association 119021 A.C. 73•
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a l s o .
B a t  a s i t u a t i o n  may a r i s e  where a law e n a c t e d  hy the  
Dominion or  a p r o v i n c e  may 1 und e r  the  gu ise ,  or  the
-i
p r e t e n c e ,  or  i n  th e  form of an  e x e r c i s e  of  i t s  own powers* 
d e a l  w i t h  a s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  which  i s  beyond i t s  p o w e rs ,  and 
have  the  a c t u a l  e f f e c t  of t r e s p a s s i n g  on the  e x c l u s i v e  
power of th e  o t h e r .  I n  such  a c a se  i t  may be n e c e s s a r y  
to  d e te r m in e  the  t r u e  n a t u r e  and c h a r a c t e r  of  the  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  and examine w i t h  some s t r i c t n e s s  i t s  s u b s t a n c e  f o r
th e  p u rp o se  of  d e t e r m i n i n g  what  i t  i s  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  i s  
2r e a l l y  do ing  . F o r  exam ple ,  i n  the  C anad ian  F e d e r a t i o n  
Case-*, th e  p r o h i b i t i o n ,  im p o r t  or s a l e  of  m a r g a r in e  as  
p r o v i d e d  i n  s . 5 ( a )  o f  th e  D a i ry  I n d u s t r y  Act of 1 9 2 75 was 
i n  q u e s t i o n .  The Act  was so u g h t  to  be j u s t i f i e d  as  a law 
w i t h i n  the  s u b j e c t  of  c r i m i n a l  law b e c a u se  i t s  b r e a c h  was 
p u n i s h a b l e ,  and such  b r e a c h  was t r i e d  by c r i m i n a l  p r o c e d ­
u r e s .  The J u d i c i a l  Com mit tee ,  however ,  took  the  v iew  t h a t
1
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  A l b e r t a  v . A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  Canada 
[1939J A.C. 117, a t  p .  130.
2
See R u s s e l l  v .  The Queen [ 18873 7 A.C. 829 a t  p .  839;  
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  O n t a r i o  v .  R e c i p r o c a l  I n s u r e r s  [1925]  
A.C. 328 ,  a t  p .  337« A lso  r e f e r  t o  MacDonald, C o n s t i t u t i o n ­
a l  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and E x t r i n s i c  E v idence  [1939]  17 Can. B. 
Rev.  7 7 j a t  p . 88 .
3
C a n ad ian  F e d e r a t i o n  of  A g r i c u l t u r e  v . A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  
f o r  O n t a r i o  I 1951 I A.C. 179 • See a l s o  Lower M ain land  
D a i ry  P r o d u c t s  S a l e s  A d ju s tm e n t  Committee v .  C r y s t a l  
D a i r y  L t d . 119331 A.C. 168.
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the prohibition was in pith and substance a law for the 
protection and encouragement of the dairy industry in 
Canada, and the fact that, incidentally, penalties were 
provided for any breach of the prohibition, was not 
sufficient per se to make the prohibition a law in rela­
tion to criminal law so as to fall within the exclusive 
legislative competence of the Dominion Parliament. The 
prohibition, it was observed, in fact related to Tcivil 
rights1 within each of the provinces. The law was, there­
fore, held invalid. Similarly, when British Columbia 
prohibited the employment of Chinamen of full age in 
underground coal workings, it was held in Union Colliery 
Co. of British Columbia v. Bryden  ^ that the law was ultra 
vires the provincial legislature. Regarded merely as a 
coal-working regulation, it would come within the provin­
cial domain of "Local Works and Undertaking1' and "Property 
and Civil Rights". But its exclusive application to 
Chinamen, who were aliens or naturalised subjects, estab­
lished a statutory prohibition which was within the 
exclusive authority of the Dominion Parliament in regard 
to 1naturalization and aliens1, in the guise of regulating 
labour in coal mines.
_
[1899] A.C. 580. See also Cunningham v. Tomev Homma 
[1903] A.C. 151. Cf. Caron v. The King [192^ -J A.C. 999.
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There are certain matters which are not expressly 
mentioned in s.91 and s.92, and which may not be wholly 
within the jurisdiction of either the Dominion Parliament 
or provincial legislatures, but ’’which in one aspect and 
for one purpose fall within s.92, may in another aspect
iand for another purpose fall within s.91" * Laws regulat-
2 1ing liquor traffic and trade combinati ons^ provide out­
standing examples of a subject-matter attracting the 
doctrine of "double aspect"^. The jurisdiction over 
matters of M s  type has to be examined "with reference to
the actual facts if it is to be possible to determine under
9which set of powers it falls in substance and in reality" . 
While dealing with these matters it is likely that a law 
may ostensibly be within the jurisdiction of the enacting 
body, but in substance and reality it may be found to be a
1
Hodge v. Queen [18833 9 A.C. 117? at p. 130.
2
See Russel v. Queen [1882] 7 A.C. 829; Hodge v. Queen, 
supra.
3See In re Board of Commerce Act, supra: Proprietory Articles 
Trade Association v. Attorney-General for Canada I1931J A.C. 
310. 
bOther examples of such matters are provided by insurance, 
labour disputes and marketing of natural products.
5John Deere Plow Co. Ltd, v. Wharton [1915] A.C. 330, at 
P.339* See also Russel v. Queen, supra, at pp. 839? 8k0.
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Colourable* legislation dealing with an aspect of the
matter which falls within the jurisdiction of some other
enacting body. Insurance provides a striking example.
Several attempts have been made by the Dominion Parliament
to regulate insurance as an exercise of power conferred by
one or more heads of s.9 1 j but all of them were disapproved
by the Judicial Committee as being colourable legislation
which encroached upon the power with respect to property
and civil rights* 1 2 in the provinces • For example, in the
2Second Insurance Reference Case , the question was whether 
a foreign or British insurer already licensed under the 
Quebec Insurance Act to carry on business within the 
province, could do so without being also licensed under 
the Insurance Act of Canada. The Act was sought to be 
justified as being within the Dominions power to legislate
See Citizens1 Insurance Co. v. Parsons, supra; Attorney- 
General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Alberta I 191o]
1 A.C. 608; Attorney-General for Ontario v . Reciprocal 
Insurers [192k I A.C. 828; In re Insurance Act of Canada
L1932J A.C. k1 ; Reference re Section 16 of the Special War 
Revenue Act (19k2j S .C.R. 6-295 the Privy Council refused 
leave to appeal: (19k3) k D.L.R. 657« See also Attorney- 
General for Canada v . Attorney-General for Ontario I 1987] 
A.C. 355- For a general discussion of insurance cases1 
see MacDonald, The Regulation of Insurance in Canada (196-6) 
2k Can. B. Rev. 2575 and Gray, More on the Regulation of 
Insurance (19k6) 2k Can. B. Rev. k81 .
2
In re Insurance Act of Canada [1932] A.C. k!.
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w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  * a l i e n s  and i m m i g r a t i o n * • I t  was h e l d  
t h a t  th e  Dominion P a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  n o t ,  under  th e  g u i s e  of  
l e g i s l a t i n g  as t o  a l i e n s ,  s e e k  t o  i n t e r m e d d l e  w i t h  th e  
c o n d u c t  of i n s u r a n c e  b u s i n e s s  which  was e x c l u s i v e l y  
s u b j e c t  t o  p r o v i n c i a l  law .  I n  the  F i r s t  I n s u r a n c e  R e f e r ­
ence  C ase^j  i t  had a l r e a d y  been  d e c i d e d  t h a t  i t  was n o t  com­
p e t e n t  t o  th e  Dominion to  r e g u l a t e  g e n e r a l l y  the  b u s i n e s s  
of i n s u r a n c e  i n  such  a way as  to  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  th e  
e x e r c i s e  of  c i v i l  r i g h t s  i n  the  p r o v i n c e s .
Y e t  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i n  the  F i r s t  
I n s u r a n c e  R e f e r e n c e  C a s e , i n  r e p l y  t o  a q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  
th e  Dominion P a r l i a m e n t  had j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  r e q u i r e  a 
f o r e i g n  company to  t a k e  ou t  a l i c e n s e  from the  Dominion 
m i n i s t e r ,  even  i n  a c a s e  when the  company d e s i r e s  t o  c a r r y  
on i t s  b u s i n e s s  w i t h i n  th e  l i m i t s  o f  a s i n g l e  p r o v i n c e ,
Lord H a ld a n e ,  sp e a k in g  on b e h a l f  o f  the  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  
s a i d  t h a t  ui n  such  a c a se  i t  would be w i t h i n  th e  power of 
th e  P a r l i a m e n t  of Canada,  by p r o p e r l y  f ram ed l e g i s l a t i o n ,  
t o  impose such  a r e s t r i c t i o n .  I t  a p p e a r s  to  them t h a t  
such  a power i s  g i v e n  by th e  head s  of s .91 which  r e f e r  t o  
th e  r e g u l a t i o n  of  t r a d e  and commerce and t o  a l i e n s ” . However,  
1
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  Canada v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  
A l b e r t a  I 1 9 1 6 J 1 A.C. 988.
2
[1916]  1 A.C. 588,  a t  p .  597.
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the Dominion has not yet succeeded in establishing a 
measure of control over insurance by ''properly framed 
legislation" .
Another example of colorable legislation is provided
2by Lethbridge Northern Irrigation District v. I.0,F. , in 
which a provincial law under the guise of dealing with the 
subject matter of Securities1 dealt with an aspect of the 
matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Dominion. 
The Provincial Guaranteed Securities Interest Act, and the 
Provincial Securities Interest Act, being parts of the 
Statutes of Alberta of 19375 purported to reduce the 
interest payable on certain securities guaranteed or issued 
by the province. The Judicial Committee declared the Acts 
ultra vires on the ground that they were in pith and sub­
stance dealing with 1interest1 within the meaning of head 
19 of S.91.
Even though the powers confered on the Dominion 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures are enumerated 
in s.91 and s.92 respectively, a sharp and definite
distinction between the classes of subjects in the two
_
Refer to the recommendation on insurance jurisdiction made 
by the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations 
(19^0) Book II, at pp. 59-62.
2
[19^0] A.C. 513.
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lists could not be attained. Some of the classes of one 
list unavoidably run into the classes of subjects of the 
other. Such a conflict arising from the overlapping of 
classes of subjects in ss.91 and 92 was not intended by 
the framers of the constitution, otherwise the powers 
exclusively assigned to the provincial legislatures would 
be absorbed in those given to the Dominion Parliament.
Thus nin order to prevent such a result the two sections 
must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, 
and where necessary modified, by that of the other"^. At 
the same time, courts have been careful to see that under 
the guise of acting within its powers the Dominion Parlia­
ment or a provincial legislature may not trench upon the
jurisdiction of the other. In Madden v. Nelson and Fort
2Sheppard Ry, Co., a provision of a provincial Cattle 
Protection Act that a Dominion railway company shall be 
responsible for cattle injured or hilled on the railway, 
unless it erects proper fences on its railway, was held to
1
Citizens1 2 Insurance Co. v. Parsons, supra, at p.109$ see 
also Russel v. Queen, supra, at p. Ö3SV Cf. Laskin, 
Canadian Constitutional Law (195*1)} at p. *+3.
2
[1899] A.C. 626. See also C.P.R. v. Parish of Notre Dame 
de Bonsecours [1899] A.C. 3^7} City of Toronto v. Bell 
Telephone Co. [1905JA.C. 52; Grand Trunk Ry. v. Attorney- 
General for Canada [ 1907] A.C” 65; Workmen*s Compensation 
Board v. C.P.R] [T920] A.C. 18*+; C,P.R. v. Attorney-General 
for British Columbia [1950] A.C. 122; Attorney-General for 
Ontario v. Winner I 1954] A.C. 5*+1 •
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be ultra vires. In reality it imposed a liability upon
the railway company to create such and such works upon
its roadway, and so was manifestly beyond the jurisdiction
of the provincial legislature, because such controls came
within the exclusive Dominion power. "Their Lordships
are not disposed to yield to the suggestion, even if it
were true to say that the statute was only an indirect
mode of causing the construction to be made, because it is
a very familiar principle that you cannot do indirectly,
1what you are prohibited from doing directly" .
Under the *peace, order, and good government1 23 clause 
of S.92, the Dominion Parliament has the exclusive power 
with reference to the incorporation of companies with other 
than provincial objects, for the matter is one not coming 
within the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to 
provincial legislatures, particularly the class of sub­
jects forming head 11 of s.92, the incorporation of
2companies with provincial objects • Here the power of 
Dominion and provinces as to the incorporation of companies 
clearly overhp, and in a number of cases^ the question
^Ibid.. at pp. 627, 628,2See John Deere Plow Co. Ltd, v. Wharton [1915] A.C. 330«
3John Deere Plow Co. Ltd, v.Wharton, supra: Great West 
Saddlery Co. v. The King [1921J 2 A.C. 915 Attorney-General 
for Manitoba v. Attorney-General for Canada I 1929 1 A.C.
260; Lymburn v. Mayland I 1932 I A.C. 318.
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arose as to what extent provincial laws applied in the 
case of Dominion companies. For example, in Great West 
Saddlery Co. v. The King^, the question was whether several 
Dominion companies could he restrained from carrying on 
their business in the province unless they had complied 
with the requirements (that they be registered or 
licensed) of the respective Companies Acts of the provinces 
of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. The view adopted 
by the Judicial Committee was that a Dominion company 
might be subject to provincial laws of general application 
such as laws imposing taxes, or relating to mortmain, or 
even requiring licenses for certain purposes, or as to 
the form of contracts, but a provincial legislature could 
not validly enact for the enforcement of such laws sanctions 
if applied would sterilise or destroy the capacities and 
pows which the Dominion has validly conferred. "Within 
the spheres allotted to them by the Act", their Lordships 
observed, "the Dominion and the Provinces are rendered on 
general principle co-ordinate Governments. As a conse­
quence, where one has legislative power the other has not, 
speaking broadly, the capacity to pass laws which will 
interfere with its exercise. What cannot be done directly 
1
[1921] 2 A.C. 91.
7^ .
1cannot be done indirectly" . Hence the Acts, excepting 
the provisions relating to mortmain which were severable, 
were held to be ultra vires.
Another example of an apparent conflict is to be 
found in the taxing powers of the Dominion and the provinc­
es under head 3 of s.915 *the raising of money by any mode 
or system of taxation1 23, and under head 2 of s.92 ,^ tdirect 
taxation within the province in order to the raising of a 
revenue for provincial purposes1, respectively. The con­
flict is due to overlapping in the field of direct taxation 
but "each power is the necessary adjunct of mutually 
independent government", and these powers deemed to involve 
no direct conflict. "They are two independent powers 
springing from the same source which do not interfere with 
each other. The power granted to the Dominion is broad 
and inclusive of any and every sort of taxation, while the 
power of taxation given to the provinces is definitely
limited in kind and area"3. Further the taxing powers of
1Ibid., at p. 100. See also Attorney-General for Manitoba v. Attorney-General for Canada [19291 A.C. 2b0; It was held 
that a provincial Act could not prohibit a Dominion company 
from selling its shares in the province.
2Refer also to head 9 of s.92, Tshop, saloon, tavern, auc­
tioneer and other licenses1, but its scope is not entirely 
certain: Kennedy and Wells, The Law of the Taxing Power
in Canada (1931) Chapters V and VI.
3Kennedy and Wells, loc. cit., at p. 15.
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the Dominion and the provinces are defined by reference to 
purpose • Thus an Act imposing a tax would be regarded 
as invalid "if the tax as imposed is linked up with an
pobject which is illegal” • For example, the Second
Insurance Reference Case^ involved the validity of s.16 of
the Special War Revenue Act of Canada, which imposed upon
every resident in Canada a tax in respect of the cost of
insuring any property in Cana’da with any British or foreign
insurer not licensed by the Dominion. The Privy Council
rejected the contention of the Dominion seeking to justify
this provision as relating to matters covered by taxation
under head 3 of s .91j and held it to be ultra vires. In
the guise of legislation imposing Dominion taxation, it in
reality dealt with a subject-matter which was within the
exclusive authority of the provinces. "S.16 clearly
assumes”, their Lordships observed, ”that a Dominion
license to prosecute insurance business is a valid license
all over Canada and carries with it the right to transact
insurance business. But it has been already decided that
this is not so ... It is really the same old attempt in 
hanother way” •
T
Ibid., at p . 17.
2
In re Insurance Act of Canada [1932] A.C. Vt , at p. 52.
3
[1932] A.C. k1.k
Ibid., at pp. 52, 53»
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In the Great West Saddlery Case, it was laid down 
that no provincial legislature could use its powers as an 
indirect means of destroying powers given legally by the 
Dominion Parliament. In other words, a provincial law 
must be justified as directed exclusively to the attain­
ment of an object of legislation assigned by s.92 to 
provincial legislatures. The taxing power is no excep­
tion to this interpretation. And it equally applies in 
reverse to the Dominion Parliament. MBy parity of reason”, 
observed Lord Phillimore in Caron v. The King , "the 
Parliament of Canada could not exercise its powers of taxa­
tion so as to destroy the capacity of officials lawfully 
appointed by the province”. Thus the respective taxing 
powers of the Dominion and the provinces may not be used 
by either of them so as indirectly to destroy or sterilise 
capacities and powers conferred by the other upon its
functionaries. In Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-
2General for Canada , a question related to the validity of 
the Taxation of Banks Bill of Alberta which proposed to 
levy an annual tax, in addition to any tax payable under
1
[192*+] A.C. 999? at p. 1006. Here it may be noted that the 
doctrine of immunity of instrumentalities was not recognised 
in this case; see also Kennedy, Essays in Constitutional 
Law (193*0 at p. 110; Abbott v. City of Saint John I 1908] 
h0 S.C.R. 597; Forbes v. Attorney-General for Manitoba 
[1937] A.C. 2o0; Judges v. Attorney-General for Saskat­
chewan (1937) 2 D.L.R. 209.
2
[1939] A.C. 117.
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any other Act, on the paid-up capital and on the reserved 
funds of the Canadian chartered hanks, other than the Bank 
of Canada, doing business in the province. The Judicial 
Committee held that on a consideration of the object of the 
Bill and its effect, the proposed taxation was not an 
effort to raise a revenue for provincial purposes but to 
interfere with the banking operations within the province. 
The Act was therefore declared ultra vires the Alberta 
legislature.
It was noted that the justification of a taxing 
measure did not depend upon the size of the tax, or its 
being discriminatory. But these facts could as well in 
certain circumstances amount to an abuse of the taxing 
power. Thus the tax may be of such magnitude as to be 
prohibitive or destroy the capacities and powers of 
Dominion institutions . Or "under the guise of discrimin­
atory taxation in the province", added their Lordships,
"it would be easy not only to impair, but even to render 
wholly nugatory, the exclusive legislative authority of 
the Dominion over a number of the classes of subjects
specifically mentioned in s.91 by making them valueless"2.
_
Ibid., at pp. 1315 132.
Ibid., at pp. 128, 129.
2
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In this case their Lordships found that firstly the rate 
of taxation was such that it was designed to have the effect 
of preventing the hanks from carrying on their business , 
and secondly the taxation was aimed at singling out the 
banks and no other corporation, body or persons in the 
province^.
Another consideration that moved their Lordships to 
reach their conclusion was based upon the fact that the 
Bill formed part of a general scheme of social credit 
legislation, the basis of which was the Social Credit Act 
of 1937; and the Act itself was declared invalid on other 
grounds by the Supreme Court . It was noted that the Bill 
contained no reference to the Act, yet their Lordships 
agreed with Kerwin J. (concurred in by Crocket J.) that 
there was no escape from the conclusion that, instead of 
being in any true sense taxation in order to the raising 
1Ibid., at p. 132.
2Ibid., at p. 131.
3Reference re Alberta Statutes (1938) Can. S.C.R. 100. 
Though the validity of the Social Security Act did not come 
up formally before the Privy Council, their Lordships 
expressed an opinion that on examination there was “little 
doubt that the Act was an attempt to regulate and control 
banks and banking in the province": Attorney-General for
Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, supra, at pp.
132, 133.
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of a revenue for provincial purposes, the Bill was merely 
"part of a legislative plan to prevent the operation within 
the province of those hanking institutions which have been 
called into existence and given the necessary powers to 
conduct their business by the proper authority, the Parlia- 
ment of Canada" .
However, in the case of two other Bills which also 
formed part of the same scheme, their Lordships refused to 
hear arguments as to their validity, because they could 
operate only if certain institutions created by and working 
under the Social Credit Act, were in existence. Moreover, 
since the order of the Supreme Court the Act was also
prepealed by the Alberta legislature .
Thus in determining the validity of an Act, it may 
be necessary to have a look at another Act, if the latter 
either constitutes a legislative scheme with the former to 
achieve a certain purpose or forms the basis of the opera­
tion of the former.
The colourable character of an Act was also examined
7~
Attorney-General for Alberta v. Attorney-General for Canada, 
supra, at p. 133•
2Ibid., at pp. 127, 128.
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by reference to another Act in Attorney-General for 
Ontario v. Reciprocal Insurers . The Dominion Insurance 
Act empowered the minister to grant licenses to companies 
authorising them to carry on in Canada the business of 
insurance, and provided for a comprehensive system of regu­
lations controlling licenses in relation to the form and 
basis of contracts of insurance. In order to make the 
Insurance Act effectual the Criminal Code was amended so 
as to make it an indictable offence to carry on such a 
business without a license. The question raised was 
whether certain companies licensed under the Ontario 
Insurance Act, were entitled to carry on insurance business 
even though rendered illegal or otherwise affected by the 
provisions of the Criminal Code in the absence of a 
license under the Dominion Insurance Act. The Privy 
Council held the amendment to the Criminal Code ultra vires 
since, in substance though not in form, it was in regula­
tion of contracts of insurance, a subject not within the 
legislative competence of the Dominion. "These two 
statutes, which are complementary parts of a single legi­
slative plan", their Lordships said, "are admittedly an 
attempt to produce by a different legislative procedure 
1[1924] A.C. 328.
8 1 .
the results aimed at by the authors of the Insurance Act
of 1910, which in Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-
General for Alberta was pronounced ultra vires of the
Dominion Parliament." Similarly in Lethbridge Northern
2Irrigation District v. I.0,F. , it was held that the 
Provincial Guarantees Securities Proceedings Act of the 
Statutes of Alberta of 19375 which purported to prohibit 
any proceedings in Alberta for recovering directly or 
indirectly money due in respect of any guaranteed security 
without the consent of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, 
was in fact designed to effect the same purpose as the 
Provincial Guaranteed Securities Interest Act (also form­
ing part of the Statutes of Alberta of 1937)5 which was 
held to be ultra vires as dealing with interest1, a 
subject-matter within the exclusive legislative competence 
of tie Dominion. Therefore the Act must fall with the 
latter Act. It was an attempt to do by indirect means 
something which the Provincial parliament could not do .
As noticed earlier, the taxing power of the Dominion 
and the provinces is defined by reference to purpose.
1
[1916] 1 A.C. 588 (First Insurance Reference Case) .
2
[1940] A.C. 513* Also refer to Plourde v. Roy (1942)
3 D.L.R. 646; reversed on other grounds, (1943) S.C.R. 262. 
3
Ibid., at pp. 533, 539.
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The provinces are empowered to impose taxes for raising a 
revenue for provincial purposes, and so is the Dominion 
for Dominion purposes. It means that the spending power 
of the Dominion and the provinces is implied in their 
respective taxing powers. S.106 further provides that 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund shall he appropriated hy 
the Dominion parliament for the public service.
Since 1913 grants-in-aid have been made by the 
Dominion to the provinces for some specific purpose such 
as public health, highways, technical education, old-age
ipensions and unemployment relief . These grants were 
designed to help the needy provinces, but each province 
had to comply with certain conditions which might touch 
on a matter of provincial concern. Such devices raise
some doubts as to the validity of the exercises of
2Dominion legislative authority . But they have never been 
challenged in the courts and the position is uncertain. 
However, in Canada on the whole the Courts have frustrated 
legislative schemes to provide some flexibility modifying
1
For a general discussion of the Dominion-provincial finan­
cial relations see Dawson, The Government of Canada (2nd 
ed.) , Chapter VI.
2
See Gouin and Claxton, Legislative Expedients and Devices 
adopted by the Dominion and the Provinces. Chapter III.
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the rigid compartmentalisation of the Dominion and
•1provincial legislative powers .
In Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General
pfor Ontario , Lord Atkin said that it is true that the 
Dominion may impose taxation for the purpose of creating 
a fund for special purposes and apply that fund for making 
contributions in the public interest, "but assuming that 
the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund, 
it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes 
of it is necessarily within the Dominion competence. It 
may still be legislation affecting the classes of subjects 
enumerated in s.92, and if so, would be ultra vires'* . In 
that case the question related to the validity of the 
Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935? in which an 
attempt was made to pay direct benefits to the citizens 
under a scheme of unemployment insurance financed partly 
from the money provided by the Dominion government, and 
partly from the contributions made by employers and workers. 
The Judicial Committee held that the Act was ultra vires 
of the Dominion parliament, as in its pith and substance
T - -
See Birch, Federalism, Finance and Social Legislation 
(1955) Chapter III.
2
[1937] A.C. 355.
Ibid., at pp. 3^6, 3 6 7 .
3
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it was an insurance Act affectng the civil rights of the 
employers and workers in each province.
One of the arguments put forward in support of the 
legislation was that the obligation imposed upon the employ­
ers and workers was a mode of taxation under head 3 of 
S.9I5 and the money so raised became public property with 
the result that the Dominion had complete legislative 
authority to apply it towards the establishment of the 
insurance scheme. Lord Atkin replied to this by saying 
that even in such a case a law might be so framed as to 
invade rproperty and civil rights1 within the province.
"If on the true view of the legislation it is found", his 
Lordship said, "that in reality in pith and substance the 
legislation invades civil rights within the province, or 
in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise encroach­
es upon the provincial field, the legislation will be 
invalid. To hold otherwise would afford the Dominion an 
easy passage into the provincial domain"^.
To overcome difficulties arising due to the rigid 
distribution of legislative powers, an attempt by enabling 
the delegation of power by a province to the Dominion and 
vice versa, was made. Such a device would have to a
1
Ibid., at p. 3&7-
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c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t  g i v e n  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  f l e x i b i l i t y  to  
cope w i t h  th e  n e e d s  of  ch an g in g  t i m e s .  T i l l  r e c e n t l y  i t s  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  was somewhat u n c e r t a i n  . But  i n  A t t o r n e y -
p
G e n e r a l  f o r  Nova S c o t i a  v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  Canada , 
t h e  Supreme C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  i n t e r d e l e g a t i o n  be tw een  
Dominion and p r o v i n c e s  was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  m a in ly  on two 
g ro u n d s ;  f i r s t l y  i t  would d i s t u r b  th e  s e t t l e d  l i n e  of  
d e m a r c a t i o n  b e tw een  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  powers o f  Dominion 
and p r o v i n c e s  i n d i c a t e d  by th e  use  of  the  word " e x c l u s i v e -  
l y M i n  s . 9 2 , and s e c o n d ly  i t  would o v e r r i d e  the  c o n s t i ­
t u t i o n a l  e q u a l i t y  b e tw een  Dominion and p r o v i n c e s  a s  b o t h  
p o s s e s s  e q u a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  w i t h i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  f i e l d s .
However, a d e l e g a t i o n  o f  e x e c u t i v e  or a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
power,  i n c l u d i n g  ev en  r u l e - m a k i n g ,  to  a s i n g l e  b o a rd  
a p p o i n t e d  by b o t h  Dominion and p r o v i n c e ,  has  b een  h e l d  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e - ^ . I t  has  b e en  fo u n d  w orkab le
1
See C o r r y ,  D i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  D iv id e d  J u r i s d i c t i o n . Appendix  
No. 7 .
2
[1950]  b D.L.R.  3 6 9 . A lso  r e f e r  t o  i t s  c r i t i c i s m  o f  
B a l l e m ,  Note (1951) 29 Can. B. Rev. 79 .  Also  r e f e r  t o  
Note (1938) 1b Can. B. Rev. 353;  Tuck, D e l e g a t i o n  -  A Way 
over  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  H u rd le  (l9*+5) 23 Can. B. Rev.  79; 
S c o t t .  Note (19*+8) 26 Can. B. Rev.  98*+; Read,  I s  R e f e r e n ­
t i a l  L e g i s l a t i o n  Worth W h i le ? (19*+0) 12 Can. B. Rev.  *+15*
3
See P o t a t o  M a rk e t in g  Board  v .  W i l l i s  and A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  
f o r  Canada 119521 b D .L .R .  1 *+6; R e f e r e n c e  r e  O n t a r i o  Farm 
P r o d u c t s  M a rk e t in g  Act (1957) 7 D.L.R.  ( £ i . )  257.
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in those cases where a subject-matter by its nature is 
shared between the competence of Dominion and province, so 
that acting singly neither could have effective or adequate 
regulation of the subject-matter. Schemes for marketing or 
regulation of trade in certain commodities provide an 
illustration in this context. These schemes are local 
in so far as they involve buying or selling or similar 
operations within a province, but as soon as their opera­
tion goes beyond the territorial limits of a province 
they become inter-provincial. In such cases the only 
effective means open, apart from conditional legislation, 
is that of co-operative action taking the form of a single 
board to administer regulations referred by both Dominion 
and province on agreed measures. The constitutionality of
such schemes was tested in Potato Marketing Board v. Willis
-1and Attorney-General for Canada . Under the provincial law 
of Prince Edward Island, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council 
was empowered to establish schemes to regulate transporta­
tion, packing storage and marketing of natural products, 
and to set up marketing boards to administer the scheme and 
to vest in the boards all necessary powers to enable them
to carry out their functions. The boards were also given
_
[ 1952] 4 D.L.R. 146..
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t h e  power,  on th e  a p p r o v a l  of th e  L ie u t e n a n t - G o v e r n o r  i n  
C o u n c i l ,  t o  p e r f o r m  any f u n c t i o n  or  d u ty  and t o  e x e r c i s e  
any power imposed or c o n f e r r e d  upon i t  by th e  Dominion,
The Dominion c o u n t e r p a r t  of  t h e  scheme was a law which  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  th e  G o v e rn o r -G e n e ra l  i n  C o u n c i l  may d e l e g a t e  
th e  D o m in io n ' s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  ove r  i n t e r p r o v i n c i a . 1  and 
e x t e r n a l  a s p e c t s  of  t r a d e  i n  n a t u r a l  p r o d u c t s  t o  any b o a rd  
or  agency  a u t h o r i s e d  un d e r  th e  law o f  any p r o v i n c e .  Both  
th e  L ie u t e n a n t - G o v e r n o r  i n  C o u n c i l  and G o e r n o r - G e n e r a l  i n  
C o u n c i l  a c t e d  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  th e  fo rm e r  i n  c o n s t i t u t i n g  a 
b o a rd  and th e  l a t t e r  i n  g r a n t i n g  to  i t  th e  Dominion1s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n .  The Supreme C our t  h e l d  t h a t  th e  d e l e g a t i o n  
by th e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  i n  C o u n c i l  t o  th e  p r o v i n c i a l  b o a rd  
was i n t r a  v i r e s , as  the  b o a rd  was a t l e g a l  e n t i t y 1 
s e p a r a t e  and d i s t i n c t  from th e  p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  and 
a d e l e g a t i o n  to  i t  d id  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  a d e l e g a t i o n  t o  the  
p r o v i n c i a l  l e g i s l a t u r e .
I t  seems r a t h e r  h a rd  to  p e r c e i v e  any d i f f e r e n c e  
b e tw een  d i r e c t  d e l e g a t i o n  to  a l e g i s l a t u r e  and a d e l e g a t i o n  
t o  an a g e n t  of th e  l e g i s l a t u r e ,  as  th e  l a t t e r  would  a l s o  to  
a c o n s i d e r a b l e  e x t e n t  d i s t u r b  th e  E x c l u s i v e n e s s 1 or
o v e r r i d e  th e  E o v e r e i g n t y 1 of  Dominion and p r o v i n c e s ' .
_
See B a l lam ,  Note (1952) 30 Can. B. Rev. 1050.
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It follows that if the former device is unconstitutional, 
the latter should also meet the same fate. But in view 
of the decision in the Willis Case permitting delegation 
by Parliament to a provincial agency, the Supreme Court 
has, to that extent, restricted the application of the 
maxim Twhat cannot be done directly cannot be done 
indirectly1.
It may be said in conclusion that the operation of our 
maxim found a fruitful scope in the realm of Canadian 
constitutionalism, and it has been one of the main tools 
used by the courts to prevent any abuse of power. This is 
mainly due to two factors. Firstly there is a double 
enumeration of powers, unlike the enumeration in the con­
stitutions of the United States and Australia. Secondly 
many legislative powers, including the power to tax and
spend, are defined by reference to purpose. In recent
1decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada there is a ten­
dency toward relaxation of the rigid compartmentalising of
legislative powers, on which earlier decisions rested; there
_
Potato Marketing Board v. Willis and Attorney-General for 
Canada, supra; Reference re Ontario Farm Products Marketing 
Act, supra; Murphy v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. (1958)
15 D. L. R. ( 2d.) 14-5 ; Crawford v. Attorney-General for 
British Columbia (i960) 22 D.L.R. (2d.) 3215 Laskin, 
Provincial Marketing Levies : Indirect Taxation and Federal 
Power (1959) 18 Uni, of T. L.J. 1.
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has not, however, been any explicit repudiation of the 
general maxim here considered, nor of its extensive 
application by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
even though appeals to that body were abolished in 19l+7.
1
See Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for 
Canada I 19*+7 I A,C. 127.
CHAPTER IV
Australia 1
In the Australian Constitution the division of legis­
lative powers between the Commonwealth and the States 
resembles that of the United States model. The Common­
wealth is assigned certain specified powers, while the 
States retain the residuum of power. Both the Commonwealth, 
on the one hand, and each of the States on the other, is 
within the ambit of its authority supreme, that is,
clothed with plenary powers subject only to the restric-
2tions or prohibitions imposed by the Constitution .
S.51 of the Constitution as amended empowers the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws for the peace, order, 
and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to
1
For a general discussion of the main trends in the 
judicial interpretation of the Australian Constitution 
see Latham in Essays on the Australian Constitution (R. Else- 
Mitchell ed., 1952;, Interpretation of the Constitution;
Sawer, in The British Commonwealth - The Development of its 
Laws and Constitutions (Vol. 2, The Commonwealth of 
Australia, G.W. Paton gen. ed. 1952), Constitutional Law; 
Bailey, Fifty Years of the Australian Constitution (1951;
25 Aust. L.J. 315.
2
See Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. The Adelaide 
Steamship Co. Ltd. (1920) 2Ö C.L.R. T29 (the Engineers1 2
Case), at p. 153•
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f o r t y  c l a s s e s  of  s u b j e c t s  en u m era ted  t h e r e i n .  But i t  
does  n o t  i n  te rm s  make t h e s e  c l a s s e s  of  s u b j e c t s  e x c l u s i v e  
t o  the  Commonwealth so t h a t  t o  e ac h  there i s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  th e  S t a t e s  a r e  a l s o  a u t h o r i s e d  to  l e g i s l a t e  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  them c o n c u r r e n t l y  . B e s i d e s  t h e s e  c l a s s e s  of 
s u b j e c t s ,  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  has  e x p r e s s l y  a s s i g n e d  e x c l u s ­
iv e  power to  th e  Commonwealth t o  make laws w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  
c e r t a i n  m a t t e r s  i n  s . 5 2 , and a l s o  i n  s s .  9 0 j 11*+ and 1 1 5 » 
S .122 f u r t h e r  empowers the  Commonwealth to  make laws f o r  
th e  governm ent  o f  t e r r i t o r i e s .  The r e s t  of  th e  f u n c t i o n s  
n o t  c o v e re d  by th e  c o n c u r r e n t  o r  th e  e x c l u s i v e  f i e l d  of  the  
Commonwealth, and n o t  d e n ie d  t o  th e  S t a t e s ,  f a l l  w i t h i n  the  
e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  the  S t a t e s  by v i r t u e  of s . 1 0 7 .  
S .109 t h e n  g i v e s  a Commonwealth law, o v e r r i d i n g  o p e r a t i o n  
ove r  a S t a t e  law so f a r  as  t h e r e  i s  a c t u a l  c o n f l i c t  
be tw een  the  two la w s .
The words *w i th  r e s p e c t  t o 1 2 o c c u r r i n g  i n  s .51  g iv e  a 
wide scope to  th e  Commonwealth p o w ers ,  and e v e r y  l e g i s l a t i v e  
power c a r r i e s  w i t h  i t  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  to  make laws g o v e rn in g  
or  a f f e c t i n g  m a t t e r s  t h a t  a r e  i n c i d e n t a l  or  a n c i l l a r y  to  the
1
As t o  some ( e . g .  (x) , F i s h e r i e s  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  w a t e r s  
beyond t e r r i t o r i a l  l i m i t s )  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  the  S t a t e s  
n e v e r  had power,  and a s  t o  o t h e r s  ( e . g .  ( v i ) , d e f e n c e )  
s u b s e q u e n t  p r o h i b i t i o n s  ( e . g .  s.11*+) e x c lu d e  power,  
p a r t l y  or  w h o l l y .
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subject-matter of that power^1 2. For example, laws with 
respect to taxation necessarily include many provisions 
besides the imposition of taxes, aad all such provisions 
as are necessarily incidental or ancillary to the exercise 
of the power of taxation, are authorised by the express 
grant. In G.G. Crespin & Son v. Colac Co-operative Farm­
ers Ltd.^, the question was whether s.1?2 of the Customs 
Act was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth power to make 
laws with respect to taxation1. That section in effect 
provided that where an alteration of the duty upon goods of 
a particular kind has been made after a contract for the 
sale of goods of that kind and before delivery, the seller 
was entitled to recover from the purchaser the difference 
caused by the alteration on the agreed price. The High 
Court sustained the section on the ground that such an 
adjustment of the incidence of taxation was within the power
1See e.g., Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Brewery 
Employees1 Union of New South Wales (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469 
(Union Label Case), at p. 610; Hudhart Parker & Co. Pty Ltd, 
v. Moorehead (1908) 8 C.L.R. 330^ at pp. 40Ö, 409$ R. v. 
Kidman (191?) 20 C.L.R. 4-25, at p. 4-34*, G.G. Crespin & Son 
v. Colac Co-operative Farmers Ltd. (1916) 21 C.L.R. 205, 
at "pi 222; R. v. Macfarlane (1923~) 32 C.L.R. 5^8, at p.
57l+* It becomes more evident when these words are read 
along with placitum (xxxix), "matters incidental to the 
execution of any power vested by this Constitution in the 
Parliament or either House thereof . .."$ cf. G.G. Crespin 
& Son v.Colac Co-operative Farmers Ltd., supra; South 
Australia v. Commonwealth (194-2) 65 C. L. R . 373 •
2
Supra.
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of 1 taxation1. Barton J. said:
It is true that it affects certain contracts, 
and that legislation upon contracts is ordinrily 
the province of the State and not of the Federa­
tion. But this is a case of the adjustment of 
obligations which necessarily are affected fairly 
or unfairly, but directly, by the federal law, 
and it is impossible to say that in such a case 
as this the endeavour to prevent the unfair 
effect is not within the competence of the makers 
of that law”! .
A question, which has occasioned much controversy, 
was whether, in like manner as incidental or ancillary 
powers are implied in the grant of legislative powers to 
the Commonwealth, certain restrictions could be implied 
upon the legislative powers of the Commonwealth and the 
States based upon implications from the federal nature 
of the Constitution. Such implications were recognised 
by the majority of the High Court as originally consti­
tuted, and the doctrines of 1 immunity of instrumentalities1 
and :implied prohibitions1 were adopted as principles of 
constitutional interpretation. These doctrines required 
the courts to treat the Constitution as impliedly 
reserving (i.e., guaranteeing) to the States a certain 
minimum area of governmentalpower, and also the administra­
tive organisation necessary to exercise this power.
_
Ibid., at pp. 214, 215*
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1
G e n e r a l l y  sp e a k in g  th e y  were s t r o n g e s t  from 1903 t o  1920 ,
w e a k e s t  from 1920 t o  1 9 4 7 ,  and s i n c e  t h e n  had some
3
r e v i v a l  . However, th e  e x i s t e n c e  of such  d o c t r i n e s  i s  
i m p o r t a n t  f o r  the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  th e  maxim u n d e r  r e v i e w ,  
b e c a u se  such  i m p l i e d  p r o h i b i t i o n s  a r e  vag u e ,  f l e x i b l e  and 
p o t e n t i a l l y  f a r - r e a c h i n g  and so p r o v i d e  numerous o p p o r tu n ­
i t i e s  f o r  in v o k in g  an argument  o f  t c o n c e a l e d t b r e a c h  of 
e v a s i o n .
A c c o r d i n g l y  th e  Commonwealth powers r e c e i v e d  f i r s t
1
See e . g . ,  P e t e r s w a l d  v .  B a r t l e y  (1904) 1 C.L.R. 497; 
Dt Emden v .  Pedder  (1904) 1 C .L .R .  91; Deakin  v .  Webb (1904)
1 C .L .R .  585; The F e d e r a t e d  Amalgamated Government Ry. v .
New So u th  Wales R a i lw ay  T r a f f i c  E m p lo y ees* 1 *6 A s s o c i a t i o n
(1906) 4- C .L .R .  488 ( t h e  R a i lw ay  S e r v a n t s 1 C a se ) ;  B a x te r
v .  Commissioner of  T a x a t i o n  (1907) 4 C.L.R.  1O8 7 ; R. v .  
B a r g e r  (1908) 6 C.L .R .  4 1 ; A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  New South
Wales v . Brewery  Employees Union of  New Sourth Wales (1908)
6 C .L .R .  469 ( t h e  Union L ab e l  C ase ) ;  H uddar t  P a r k e r  & Co. 
P ty  L td  v .  Moorehead (1909) 8 C.L.R.  3 3 0 .  However I s a a c s  
and H ig g in s  J J .  r e f u s e d  t o  imply  such p r o h i b i t i o n s  and 
were i n  f a v o u r  of g i v i n g  f u l l  scope  t o  Commonwealth powers ;  
t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  t o o ,  i n  Webb v .  Outr im (1907) 4 C .L .R .  
3 5 6 ; [1907]  A.C. 81 ,  h e l d  a v iew c o n t r a r y  to  t h a t  of th e  
High C o u r t .  See a l s o  R . v .  S u t t o n  (1907) 5 C .L .R .  789; 
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  New South  Wales v . C o l l e c t o r  of 
Customs (1908) 5 C .L .R .  818; H e in e r  v . S c o t t  (1915)
19 C .L .R .  3 8 1 ; Commonwealth v .  New South  Wales (1918)
25 C.L .R .  3 2 5 .
2
See Amalgamated S o c i e t y  of  E n g in e e r s  v .  AdeMde Steam­
s h ip  Co. L td  (1920) 28 C.L.R.  129 ( th e  E n g i n e e r s 1 C a s e ) .
3
See Melbourne  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  Commonwealth (1947) 74 
C.L.R.  31 ( t h e  S t a t e  Banking  Case) . A lso  r e f e r  t o  Holmes, 
Back t o  Dual S o v e r e i g n t y  (1948) 21 A u s t .  L . J .  162;
Sawer, I m p l i c a t i o n s  and th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  (1948) 4 Res 
J u d i c a t a e  15 and 85*
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restrictive and after the Engineers1 Case expansive inter­
pretation. It might be said that in a general sense the 
restrictive interpretation was a form of our maxim or at 
least achieved a similar result. More important, however, 
it is the case that the courts have consistently applied 
the maxim through all the phases of interpretation. Thus 
whenever the validity of a Commonwealth statute is in issue, 
regard must be had to its substance rather than its literal 
form and it cannot be brought within the Commonwealth 
powers by disguising it in such a manner that its form 
appears to be within the legislative competence.
In a complex constitution of this kind, interpreted 
(as it has been) with a good deal of attention to tradi­
tional legal casuistry, the possible occasions for 
invoking our maxim are almost limitless. However, it 
could be conveniently assumed that the powers most likely 
to be 1 abused1 in the sense indicated by our maxim are 
those under which illustrative cases have arisen - cases 
in which the principle expressed by the maxim has been 
relied on to a substantial extent in argument, whether 
successfully or not. Hence the Australian material is 
distributed in the following sections under tpowerr 
rubrics indicated by the cases, but some regard is also
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paid to rindirect* uses of some of those powers which have 
not been under judicial notice.
II
Firstly, cases relating to taxation. In R. v. Barger , 
the question related to the validity of the Commonwealth 
Excise Tariff Act of 1906, which provided for the imposi­
tion of excise duties on dutiable goods, but the Act was 
not to apply to goods manufactured by any person, in any 
part of the Commonwealth, who observed certain prescribed 
conditions. Dutiable goods were agricultural implements 
of different sorts, and the duty imposed was in some cases 
at fixed rates and in others at ad valorem rates. The 
defendants objected that, notwithstanding the title and 
phraseology of the Act, it was, in substance, not an 
exercise of the power of taxation conferred on the Common­
wealth Parliament, but an attempt to regulate the internal 
trade and industry of the States, which was not within the 
powers of the Commonwealth but was reserved to the States. 
The High Court, Isaacs and Higgins JJ. dissenting, upheld 
the objection, and the Act was declared invalid.
Within the ambit of its authority the Commonwealth
(1908) 6 C.L.R. 1+1 .
i
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Parliament is plenary and supreme, and the exercise of 
powers conferred upon it may produce indirect or incidental 
consequences upon powers conferred on State legislatures. 
But in a federal constitution in which the competency of a 
legislature is not unlimited, it would he legitimate, in 
determining the validity of a statute, to inquire as to 
the extent of the legislative power concerned and the ambit 
of limits, if any, upon the exercise of that power under 
the Constitution. It was in respect of these inquiries 
that the majority and minority opinions differed. The 
majority was of the view that the Commonwealth powers were 
to be understood as limited by 1implied prohibitions1 
against any direct interference with matters reserved 
exclusively to the States. On the other hand, Isaacs and 
Higgins JJ. refused to limit the extent of the exercise of 
Commonwealth powers by first assuming the extent of State 
powers. Their Honours thought that the Commonwealth powers 
might be exercised to their utmost extent and in as plenary 
a manner as if the Commonwealth were a unitary State 
subject only to the express limitations found in the Con­
stitution itself; and the powers of the States were, 
therefore, those which remained after full effect was 
given to the Commonwealth powers.
Then the question turned upon the characterisation of 
the Excise Tariff Act as to whether it was in reality an
98.
exercise of the Commonwealth taxing power. Could the 
Commonwealth Parliament by the exercise of its taxing 
power make the liability or non-liability to taxation 
conditional upon the observance of certain conditions 
defined in the Act? It was conceded by all that the Court 
should give regard to substance and not to form or label 
of the Act . But the operation of this principle pre­
supposes the nature and character of the powers of Common­
wealth and States and the extent of limitations upon their 
exercise. Its scope would, therefore, oscillate along 
with the interpretation, restrictive or expansive, given 
to the Commonwealth powers.
Thus as to the question of substance, the majority was 
of the view that as, under the Act, the selection of a 
particular class of goods produced in Australia for taxa­
tion by a method which made the liability to taxation 
dependent upon certain conditions to be observed in the 
industry in which they were produced, the Act was, under 
the guise of an exercise of the taxing power, an unjus­
tifiable regulation of the conditions of manufacture of 
these goods, i.e., an interference with the domestic affairs
i
(1908) 6 C.L.R. hi, at p. 75 per Griffith C.J., at 
p.118 per Higgins J.
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of a State. This conclusion was reinforced hy a sugges­
tion that a law similar to the one challenged could be 
validly framed by a State legislature, and therefore it 
was only the State legislature which was competent to do 
so. It did not matter whether the fee imposed was called 
duty of excise or by some other name .
However, following the expansive interpretation of 
the Commonwealth powers, the operation of our maxim would 
be restricted to the bare minimum. Thus Isaacs and Higgins 
JJ. were of the view that the Act imposed taxation upon 
agricultural implements which were not in fact manufactured 
under defined conditions but did not render any conditions 
unlawful, and it was consequently not a regulative Act, 
which a State could pass in the same terms, but an exercise 
of the taxing power, and, if passed by a State legislature, 
would be invalid, since it would be a duty of excise
pprohibited to the States .
Griffith C.J. pointed out that the means adopted to 
achieve certain ends had to be distinguished from the ends
themselves. The fact that taxation might produce indirect
_
Ibid., at pp. 7*+ and 76.
S.90 of the Constitution.
2
1 0 0 .
consequences was irrelevant to the question of competence 
to impose the tax. Similarly the motive which actuated 
the legislature, and the ultimate end desired to he 
obtained, were equally irrelevant. But the motive or 
indirect results in contemplation of the legislation are 
not to be mixed up with the purpose of the Act. "An 
inquiry into the purpose of an Act", said Griffith C.J.,
"is not an inquiry into the motives of the legislature, 
but into the substance of the legislation" . On the other 
hand, Isaacs J. made no distinction in dealing with purpose 
on the one hand and motive or object on the other, and 
thought that all of them were irrelevant in any inquiry
pinto the substance of the Act . This difference of approach 
to the relevancy of purpose has also a bearing upon the 
maxim under consideration as purpose does provide a ground 
for recognising the substantial nature and character of an 
Act.
The relevancy of purpose was also used in supplying 
an answer to the argument that the conditions attached to
the taxation were not in substance a regulation of the
_
Ibid., at p. 75•
2
Ibid., at p. 985 cf. Higgins J. at p. 118; perhaps his 
Honour referred as motives or consequences to what Griffith 
C.J. meant as purposes.
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m a n u f a c t u r e .  G r i f f i t h  C . J .  s a i d  t h a t  though  th e  r e g u l a t i o n  
was n o t  i n  th e  n a t u r e  of  a law p r o v i d i n g  s a n c t i o n  f o r  i t s  
d i s o b e d i e n c e ,  t h e  s a n c t i o n  was th e  same i n  s u b s t a n c e ,  and 
e q u a l l y  e f f e c t u a l ,  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e .  O the rw ise  " th e  
Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  m igh t  assume and e x e r c i s e  com ple te  
c o n t r o l  ove r  e v e r y  a c t  of e v e ry  p e r s o n  i n  th e  Commonwealth 
by th e  s im p le  method of im pos ing  a p e c u n i a r y  l i a b i l i t y  on 
e v e ry o n e  who d id  n o t  conform t o  s p e c i f i e d  r u l e s  of a c t i o n ,  
and c a l l i n g  t h a t  o b l i g a t i o n  a t a x ,  n o t  a p e n a l t y "  .
However, i f  p u rp o se  i s  n o t  r e l e v a n t ,  i t  would be h a r d  t o  
c o n c e iv e  a t a x i n g  Act t o  be r e g u l a t o r y  u n l e s s  i t  i s  
a p p a r e n t  on i t s  f a c e  as  p r o v i d i n g  a p e c u n i a r y  p e n a l t y  
imposed as  a p u n ish m en t  f o r  an  u n l a w f u l  a c t  or o m is s i o n .
A n o th e r  f a c t o r  which  need s  a t t e n t i o n  i s  w h e th e r  a l e g -
2i s l a t i v e  power i s  d e f i n e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  p u rp o se  . I f  an 
Act i s  p a s s e d  i n  p u r s u a n c e  of a power which  i s  n o t  d e f i n e d  
by r e f e r e n c e  t o  p u r p o s e ,  such  as  th e  t a x i n g  power,  p u rp o se  
may n o t  assume such  im p o r tan c e  as  i n  th e  c ase  of a power 
d e f i n e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  p u r p o s e .  Looking from t h i s  p o i n t
of v iew ,  i t  may be t h a t  i n  so f a r  a s  th e  r e l e v a n c y  of
_
I b i d . , a t  p .7 7 .  Of c o u r s e  t h e s e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  p re s u p p o s e  
t h a t  t h e  t a x i n g  power c o u ld  n o t  be c o n s t r u e d  as  d e p r i v i n g  
th e  S t a t e s  of  t h e i r  e x c l u s i v e  powers r e s e r v e d  t o  them.
2
See S ten h o u se  v .  Coleman ( 1 9 ^ )  6 9  C.L.R.  k57 a t  p . k 7 l j  
p e r  Dixon J .
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purpose in relation to the validity of the Excise Tariff 
Act was concerned, the view adopted by Isaacs and Higgins 
JJ. was preferable.
However, apart from the question of the relevancy of 
purpose as such, purpose and motive often overlap and it 
is not easy to distinguish one from the other, and in a 
border-line case it is largely a matter of opinion. For 
example, in Osborne v. Commonwealth^, the use of the taxing 
power was approved by the High Court so as to achieve 
purposes other than revenue without ceasing in substance 
to be taxation. In that case the Land Tax Act, as explained 
by the Land Tax Assessment Act, was questioned on the ground 
that it was not truly an exercise of the taxing power, but 
was an attempt to prevent the holding of large quantities (f 
land by a single person, a subject within the exclusive 
competence of the States. The High Court held that the 
Act was in substance and in form an Act imposing taxation. 
The exposition of the decision is found in the opinion of 
Barton J., that the objectionable purposes alleged were not 
to be collected from the terms of the Acts and there was 
nothing in them which specified who should hold land and 
who should not, or how much land any person should hold.
(1911) 12 C.L.R. 321.
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"They may be", he said, "the motive or even the ultimate 
object. We have not to do with either of these things.
The arguments, in effect, predict certain results as 
consequences of the oppressive operation of the tax.
These predictions are not for us to examine, because they 
are not relevant to the question of lawful authority" . *
At first glance 0sborneTs Case may appear to be some­
what difficult to reconcile with Bargerts Case, but on 
closer analysis of the Acts involved in these cases, one 
could be distinguished from the other. The pertinent
pquestion was how to determine the purpose of the Land Tax 
Act and the Excise Tariff Act respectively. As pointed out 
by Barton J., "a law must be construed by its terms, and 
by these alone. It is only when it plainly appears from 
them, of course including any clear inference from them, 
to be in substance an attempt to deal with a matter outside 
the ambit of the power conferred that the Court is entitled 
to declare it invalid on that ground" . Applying this 
criterion the Land Tax Act was distinguishable from the
1
Ibid., at p. 3^5.
2
Taking fir granted that the purpose, as distinct from 
motive, was relevant, in the exercise of the taxing power.
3(1911) 12 C.L.R. 321, at p. 3kk.
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Excise Tariff Act in that the land tax imposed was not 
dependent upon any express conditions and the purpose, if 
it could be distinguished from the motive, had to be 
implied from the consequences of the operation of the Act, 
whereas the excise duty was directly related to the 
conditions of manufacture of agricultural implements, as 
these conditions were expressly provided in the Act, and 
formed the very basis of exemption from payment of the 
duty. In the Osborne Case, the purpose of controlling 
land holdings had to be derived by implication from infor­
mation not in the Act - information of a general political 
and economic character.
It is true that after the expansive interpretation 
received by the Commonwealth powers in the Engineers1 Case 
the scope of the operation of our maxim has been 
considerably restricted, but it was still applied with 
equal effectiveness to uncover any disguised encroachment 
by State laws upon the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth 
Parliament. In Commonwealth Oil Refineries v. South 
Australia , the Act in question was described as an Act to 
impose a tax upon the income of vendors of motor spirit, 
and for other purposes. It levied three pence for every 
1
(1926) 38 C.L.R. 408.
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gallon of motor spirit sold and delivered In South
Australia to persons within that State for the first
time after (a) entry into the State, or (b) production
or refining in the State. The first vendor had to pay
the tax, but the tax was one which normally would be passed
on to the buyer. One of the grounds of attach on the
validity of the Act was that the tax imposed was a duty
of customs and excise and, therefore, beyond the competence
2of State legislatures by force of s.90 of the Constitution.
The High Court (Gavan Duffy J. dissenting) held the Act
invalid on that ground. Following the reasoning in
Peterswald v. Bartley^ . it was explained that in order that
a levy might come within an excise duty law, it should be
so connected with the production of the article sold or
otherwise so imposed as in effect to be a method of taxing
Athe production of the article . Here in the ordinary course
1
The other ground was that the tax would operate as a res­
traint on the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse 
among the States in contravention of s.92 of the Constitution
2It provides: "On the imposition of uniform duties of
customs the power of the Parliament (Commonwealth) to impose 
duties of customs and of excise, and to grant bounties on 
the production or export of goods, shall become exclusive".3(190*0 1 C.L.R. 497.4The law on this subject is in a somewhat uncertain state: 
see Mathews v. The Chicory Board (1938) 60 C.L.R. 263;
Hopper v. The Egg Board I 1939 1 A.L.R. 249.
106
of e v e n t s  th e  f i r s t  s e l l e r  w i t h i n  th e  S t a t e  of such 
s p i r i t  was th e  p r o d u c e r .  In  e f f e c t  t h e  t a x  was p a y a b le  
by e v e r y  p r o d u c e r  i n  th e  S t a t e  of motor  s p i r i t  on a l l  
s p i r i t  p ro d u ced  by him w i t h i n  th e  S t a t e ,  e x c e p t  so much 
t h e r e o f  as  was n o t  s o l d  or  was s o l d  f o r  e x p o r t  from the  
S t a t e .  Such a t a x  was e s s e n t i a l l y  a t a x  on p r o d u c t i o n ,  
and was t h e r e f o r e  an e x c i s e  d u t y .
A nothe r  example  of  a S t a t e  law p u r p o r t i n g  to  do i n d i r  
e c t l y  what  i t  c o u ld  n o t  do d i r e c t l y  i s  found  i n  A t t o r n e y -
-i
G e n e r a l  f o r  New South  Wales v . Homebush F l o u r  M i l l s  Ltd  • 
The F l o u r  A c q u i s i t i o n  Act  1931-33 (N .S .W .) p r o v i d e d  f o r  
th e  e x p r o p r i a t i o n  of  f l o u r  coming i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  a f t e r  the  
commencement of th e  Act i n  New So u th  Wales and t o  v e s t  i t  
i n  t h e  Crown, and to  c o n v e r t  a l l  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  t h e r e  
i n  i n t o  c l a im s  f o r  c o m p e n s a t io n .  The amount o f  compensa­
t i o n  was t o  be c a l c u l a t e d  by th e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  " th e  
f a i r  and r e a s o n a b l e  p r i c e ” as  f i x e d ,  w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  to  
g rad e  o r  q u a l i t y ,  by a comm ittee  u n d e r  the  A c t ,  and a 
" s t a n d a r d  p r i c e "  f i x e d  by th e  Governor  i n  C o u n c i l .  U n le s s  
and u n t i l  p o s s e s s i o n  was demanded by the  Crown, th e  f l o u r  
was l e f t  i n  th e  p o s s e s s i o n  of th e  e x p r o p r i a t e d  owner,  who 
1
0  937) 56 C.L.R.  3 9 0 .
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held it for the Gown at his own risk. It was the duty of 
the Minister to sell any flour vested in the Crown under 
the Act, hut the owner of the flour was given a first right 
to purchase it, and its sale or disposition by such owner 
was deemed an exercise of such right. The price which the 
owner was required to pay for the flour in the case of 
flour for human consumption was the "standard price" as 
fixed by the Governor in Council. The compensation was 
to be set off against the "standard price" and "the 
balance of the purchase money" was payable under penalty 
to the Minister. If the owner did not choose to exercise 
his right to purchase the flour acquired from him, the 
Minister had the power to sell it, and the owner then could 
only get his compensation or the amount realised less 
expenses, whichever was the lesser amount. The proceeds 
of any sale received by the Minister were to be paid into 
a special fund for the relief of necessitous farmers. The 
High Court unanimously held that the Act infringed s.90 
of the Constitution and was therefore invalid.
The Act was sought to be justified on the ground that 
each part of the Act was within the power of the State 
legislature: firstly, the legislature had the power to
pass a law acquiring property, and then the State could sell
108.
the property so acquired and, if a profit was made, could 
receive and spend the money. But "it is an analysis", 
replied Latham C.J., "which, like the dissection of a 
living thing, may destroy reality in professing to exhibit 
it"^. It is true that the validity of an Act must be 
determined by reference to its legal character and not 
its practical results, effects or consequences which it
pmight happen to produce ; at the same time, it has to be 
examined as a whole in order to inquire into its substance 
or real object. The essential part of the Act was the 
adoption of the "standard price" that exceeded the "fair 
and reasonable price" fixed by the Committee. The Act did 
not say that the price fixed for resale to the owner should 
be higher than the Committee1 2s price, but it contemplated 
such an excess, for it assumed in its provisions that the 
proceeds should be applied to the relief of necessitous 
farmers. As the adoption of the "standard price" was to be 
determined by the Executive under the Act, it was the act
1
Ibid., at p. 399•
2
Ibid., at pp. 398 and b01 per Latham C.J. , at p. bob per 
Rich J., at pp. b07j b08 per Starke J* It was also appar­
ent from the course adopted by Dixon and McTiernan JJ. in 
the examination of the Act. Evatt J. was of the opinion 
that where the Court had to investigate the question whether 
a State enactment imposed a duty of excise, it might be 
necessary to look into the actual operation of the enact­
ment: ibid., at p. bl8.
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of the Executive that resulted in the payment of the 
difference between the two prices to the government, and 
that amounted to a tax.
But it was objected that the Act did not involve any 
imposition of taxation because the prior owners of the 
expropriated flour were under no obligation to re-purchase 
the flour and, therefore, had the option of not paying 
any money to the government. A strong inducement held out 
to the divested owners to purchase could not be construed 
into a legal compulsion. But all members of the Court 
were of the opinion that looking at the provisions of the 
Act, the option conferred on the owners was illusory or 
unreal, for in practice they were compelled to pay the 
"balance of the purchase money" or in the alternative to 
give up the business altogether. The situation, in which 
the owner was placed, was explained by Dixon J. thus: "The 
dilemma consisted of alternatives prescribed by or under 
the statute. The one, namely, sale, involved the levy of 
a tonnage rate. The other involved loss of his power of 
disposal of the flour, storage of the flour at his own 
risk and expense for as long a period as the Executive 
Government chose, and a title to no greater sum than the 
net proceeds of the flour when and if sold by tie Crown
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and perhaps to less. It involved also the suspension of 
the miller*s ordinary business. The disadvantages thus 
artificially created fcrm a strong deterrent under the 
influence of which he would be extremely unlikely to reject 
the alternative involving payment of the subvention to the 
special fund at the ascertained rate per ton" •
This objection raises an important issue as to the 
distinction between inducement and compulsion, and when 
inducement reaches the stage of compulsion. Dixon J. 
suggested that when the desired contributions were obtained 
not by direct command but by exposing the intended contrib­
utor, if he did not pay, to worse burdens or consequences 
which he would naturally seek to avoid, the payment became 
an exaction. But an assessment of burdens or consequences js 
subjective, and in a dilemma consisting of alternatives, 
i.e, payment or non-payment of the contribution, it would 
not be easy to lay down any criteria in order to assess 
which of the burdens or consequences would be worse.
However in the present case the Court was unanimous in 
declaring that the payment of the difference between the 
two prices was nothing else but exaction of money as 
taxation. "Although it is true", Dixon J. said, "that 
1
Ibid., at p. k11.
the statute does not impose an ordinary legal duty to pay
enforceable hy judicial process, it makes the raising of
money its purpose and seeks to secure fulfilment of that
purpose by imposing a clear detriment upon the miller who
refrains from paying" . Such a detriment appeared to him
to be indistinguishable from a sanction incurred by failure
to pay. Rich J. was also of the same view when he said
that the substance of the Act was to impose a tax subject
to a means of escape which no one would adopt if he con-
2sidered the business and the pecuniary consequences • 
McTiernan J. tried to explain exaction in terms of exprop­
riation as a means to achieve collection of revenue. He 
said that the State legislature had contrived to enable the 
owner of the flour to sell any flour which had been ex­
propriated as if there had been no expropriation. But it 
had attached to any sale under this power the liability of 
contributing money to the revenue, the expropriation being 
the means to an end^•
Further, though the exaction was payable upon the sale 
of flour, it was a tax by way of indirect taxation amounting
1
Ibid., at p. k12.
2
Ibid., at p. k05*
3
Ibid., at p. k21.
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1
to an excise duty . Evatt J. reinforced this view hy 
pointing out that the Act intended that the owners would 
pass the tax on to their customers to the intent that the 
public as the ultimate consumer of flour, would hear the
preal burden of the levy or charge . Thus the real object 
of the Act was not to acquire flour by the State for its 
own purposes, but to impose an excise duty. The Act was, 
therefore, plainly an attempt to evade the constitutional 
provision which prevented a State law from imposing any 
duties of excise.
It may, therefore, be said that the power to tax may 
be used to achieve *indirect purposes1 for so to do would 
normally be irrelevant to the validity of a taxing Act.
But the purpose may become relevant if an Act is punitive 
in character or the purpose it deals with a matter outside 
the ambit of Commonwealth powers, or prohibited to the 
Commonwealth, and this plainly appears from its terms, 
including any clear inference from them.
1
See Peterswald v. Bartley, supra; Commonwealth Oil Refin­
eries Ltd, v. South Australia, supra; John Fairfax & Sons 
Ltd, v. New South Wales (1927) 39 C.L.R. 139-
2
(1937) 56 C.L.R. 419.
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A r e c e n t  A c t  r e l a t i n g  t o  income t a x  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
th e  i n t e r e s t  p a i d  or  p a y a b le  on borrowed  c a p i t a l  would n o t  
be t r e a t e d  as  an a l l o w a b l e  d e d u c t i o n  from the  a s s e s s a b l e  
income of  companies  ( e x c e p t i n g  th o s e  p r o v i d e d  t h e r e i n )  i n  
r e s p e c t  of c e r t a i n  o u t g o i n g s .  T h is  was i n  p o l i t i c a l  f a c t  
a d e v ic e  to  d i s c o u r a g e  bo r ro w in g  money d i r e c t  f rom th e  
p u b l i c  a t  h ig h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ty c e r t a i n  t y p e s  of compan­
i e s ,  such  as  h i r e - p u r c h a s e  com pan ies ,  which c o u ld  p a s s  on 
t h e s e  r a t e s  t o  t h e i r  c u s t o m e r s .  However, t h i s  u l t e r i o r  
p u rp o se  ( o r  m o t iv e )  c an n o t  be i n f e r r e d  from th e  p r o v i s i o n s  
of  th e  A c t .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  B a r g e r *s 
Case d o c t r i n e  o r  our maxim has  any a p p l i c a t i o n  to  such  a 
c a s e .
I l l
A f t e r  money h as  b een  r a i s e d  as  rev e n u e  by the  Common­
w e a l t h ,  a n o t h e r  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  a s  t o  w h e th e r  i t  can  be 
a p p r o p r i a t e d  i n  f i e l d s  over  which  th e  Commonwealth has  no 
l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y .  I f  i t  i s  so ,  t h e n  the  Commonwealth 
c o u ld  a c h i e v e  i n d i r e c t l y  many p u r p o s e s  which  i t  c o u ld  n o t  
a c h i e v e  d i r e c t l y  by a c t i n g  w i t h i n  th e  a n b i t  o f  i t s
1 “
Act 108 of  1961 (Cr w t h ) .
m.
l e g i s l a t i v e  p o w e rs .  S.81 of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  s t a t e s  t h a t  
th e  money or  r e v e n u e  i s  t o  be a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  the  " p u rp o se s  
o f  th e  Commonwealth". But  the  e x p r e s s i o n  " p u r p o s e s  of  the  
Commonwealth" i s  ambiguous ,  and q u e s t i o n s  have a r i s e n  as  t o  
w h e th e r  i t  means o n ly  p u r p o s e s  r e l a t e d  t o  the  o t h e r  l e g i s ­
l a t i v e ,  e x e c u t i v e  and j u d i c i a l  powers g i v e n  t o  the  
Commonwealth, or  e x t e n d s  t o  any p u rp o se  w h a t s o e v e r  on 
w hich  th e  p a r l i a m e n t  ch o o ses  to  spend money. I t s  meaning
came up f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  V i c t o r i a  v .
2Commonwealth , b u t  the  d e c i s i o n  i n  th e  c ase  d id  n o t  depend 
upon th e  a c c e p t a n c e  of one or  o t h e r  o f  the  v i e w s .  However, 
i t  was r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  e v en  i f  th e  Commonwealth has  an 
u n l i m i t e d  sp e n d in g  power,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  under  the  g u i s e  of 
a p p r o p r i a t i n g  rev e n u e  th e  Commonwealth c o u ld  n o t  l e g i s l a t e  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r s  f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  the  j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n  of  th e  S t a t e s .  I n  t h i s  c a se  the  q u e s t i o n  r e l a t e d  to  
the  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  B e n e f i t s  Act of 19*+*tj 
which  p r o v i d e d  f o r  the  su p p ly  by c h e m is t s  w i t h o u t  ch a rg e  to  
th e  p u b l i c  o f  c e r t a i n  m e d ic in e s  p r e s c r i b e d  by m e d ic a l  
p r a c t i t i o n e r s ;  th e  Act a p p r o p r i a t e d  money to  pay  the  
1
I t  p r o v i d e s :  " A l l  r e v e n u e s  or  money r a i s e d  or  r e c e i v e d  by
the  E x e c u t i v e  Government  of the  Commonwealth s h a l l  form one 
C o n s o l i d a t e d  Revenue Fund ,  to  be a p p r o p r i a t e d  f o r  the  
p u r p o s e s  of the  Commonwealth i n  th e  manner and subjast  t o  
th e  c h a r g e s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  imposed by t h i s  C o n s t i t u t i o n . "
2
(19^5) 71 C.L.R.  237* ( t h e  P h a r m a c e u t i c a l  B e n e f i t s  Case ) .
chemists for the medicines supplied, and imposed duties on 
medical practitioners and chemists in relation to the pres­
cription and supply of medicines. The attack upon the 
Act was based upon the contention that it was not authorised 
by any power conferred upon the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution, and, therefore, invaded the State legislative 
area • The Commonwealth sought to justify its action by 
invoking s.81 in conjunction with the incidental power - 
s*5Kxxxix) of the Constitution. It was argued that s.81 
in itself contained an independent grant of power to 
appropriate revenues or moneys for the "purposes of the 
Commonwealth", and that power was to be exercised by making 
laws - s.83 .^ It was not disputed that s.17 of the Act 
which provided for an appropriation of money would be 
invalid, but as to other provisions cortained in the Act it 
was said that they were incidental to the appropriation 
made under s.175 or to the purpose for which money was
1
The other contention involved the issue of locus standi to 
challenge the validity of the Act, but it was held by 
Latham C.J., Rich, Starke, Dixon and Williams JJ., that the 
Attorney-General of a State had a sufficient title to invoke 
the provisions of the Constitution for the purpose of 
challenging the validity of Commonwealth legislation which 
extended to, and operated within, the State whose interests 
he represented. Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 262 
U.S. M+7.
2
It provides: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury
of the Commonwealth except under appropriation made by 
law."
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appropriated, viz., the provision of pharmaceutical 
benefits, and the enactment of the provisions other than 
S.17 was authorised by s.51(xxxix). The High Court held 
(McTiernan J. dissenting) that the Act was not justified 
by s.8l or s.51(xxxix), and was, therefore, invalid.
It may be noted that the spending power, in contrast 
to the taxing power, is defined by reference to purpose, 
viz., revenues or moneys to be appropriated for the 
'“purposes of the Commonwealth", and the validity of an 
appropriation of money by the Commonwealth has to be 
determined by reference to that purpose. "In other words, 
there cannot be appropriations in blank, appropriations 
for no designated purpose, merely authorising expenditure 
with no reference to purpose. An Act which merely provided 
that a minister or some other person could spend a sum of
money, no purpose of the expenditure being stated, would
1not be a valid appropriation Act" . Thus it would be 
logical first to understand the meaning of the purpose for 
which money could be appropriated under s.81.
Latham C.J. said that the words "purposes of the 
Commonwealth1 1, which plainly included purposes "in respect
1
09*+5) 71 C.L.R. 237, at p. 253.
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of which Parliament has power to make laws”, were not 
identical in meaning with the latter words, and were inten­
ded to include Commonwealth purposes other than those in 
respect of which power to make laws was given elsewhere in 
the Constitution, otherwise they would have no legal effect 
whatever. As the appropriation was to be made by law, it 
was, the Chief Justice pointed out, not the Executive or 
the Judiciary but the Commonwealth Parliament which was the 
proper authority to determine what purposes were purposes 
of the Commonwealth. Thus, in his opinion, the Commonwealth 
Parliament had a general, and not a limited, power of 
appropriation of public moneys. It was general in the 
sense that it was for the Parliament to determine whether 
or not a particular purpose should be adopted as a purpose 
of the Commonwealth. Starke and Williams JJ. took a restric­
tive view and agreed that the "purposes of the Commonwealth" 
were more specific than the "general welfare of the United 
States". Starke J. was of the view that the Commonwealth 
did not have unlimited power to appropriate its revenues 
or moneys for any purpose that it thought proper. The 
"purposes of the Commonwealth" were those of an organised 
political body established under the Constitution and 
empowered with legislative, executive and judicial functions, 
whatever was incidental thereto, and matters arising from
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the existence of the Commonwealth and its status as a 
Federal Government, e.g., payment etc., of members of 
Parliament, exploration and so forth. Similarly Williams J. 
said that the insertion of these words, if they were to 
have any effect, must place some constitutional limitation 
upon the purposes for which the Commonwealth Parliament 
could pass an appropriation Act. The Commonwealth, as 
distinct from the States, was created for certain specific 
purposes, and those purposes must all be found within the 
four corners of the Constitution. Dixon J., with whom 
Rich J. was in substantial agreement, also emphasised the 
fact that the words ’’purposes of the Commonwealth” could 
not be regarded as doing the work which the words "general 
welfare” have been required to do in the United States, 
but he did not think it necessary to explain any further in 
the present case. However, he added that in determining 
the validity of a law making appropriation, it would be 
necessary to remember what position a national government 
occupied, and the basal consideration would be found in 
the distribution of power and functions between the Common­
wealth and the States. It was likely that his Honour might 
have taken sides with Starke and Williams JJ., if the 
decision in the case had hinged on this point. McTiernan
J., like Latham C.J.T took the widest possible meaning of
1 1 9 .
t h e  p u r p o s e s  u n d e r  s . 8 1 ,  and th o u g h t  t h a t  the  p u r p o s e s  of 
th e  Commonwealth were such  p u r p o s e s  as  the  P a r l i a m e n t  
d e t e r m i n e d .
I n  s p i t e  o f  the  d i f f e r i n g  v iew s  as  t o  the  meaning of 
th e  " p u r p o s e s  of  th e  Commonwealth", a l l  members of  the  
C o u r t  e x c e p t  McTiernan J .  were of th e  o p i n io n  t h a t  the  Act 
c o u ld  n o t  be s u p p o r t e d  under  s .81  b e ca u se  i t  p u r p o r t e d  to  
a p p r o p r i a t e  money f o r  a p u rp o se  which  was n o t  th e  p u rp o se  
of  th e  Commonwealth, i . e . ,  the  r e g u l a t i o n  of  p u b l i c  h e a l t h ,  
d o c t o r s ,  c h e m i s t s ,  h o s p i t a l s ,  d r u g s ,  m e d ic in e s  and m e d ic a l  
and s u r g i c a l  a p p l i a n c e s .  Latham C . J .  s a i d  t h a t  though  the  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  w h e th e r  a p a r t i c u l a r  p u rp o se  s h o u ld  be 
r e g a r d e d  and a d o p te d  as  a Commonwealth p u rp o se  was a 
p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r ,  the  power to  a p p r o p r i a t e  and spend money, 
however wide t h a t  power m igh t  b e ,  d id  n o t  e n a b le  the  
Commonwealth to  e x te n d  i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  powers beyond th o se  
marked o u t  and d e f i n e d  by the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h ,  i n  
h i s  o p i n i o n ,  th o s e  powers i n c l u d e d  a g e n e r a l  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  
power .  "The r e s u l t  of  a con tra ry  v iew would be?1, he e x p l a i n e d ,  
" t h a t ,  by th e  s im p le  d e v ic e  of p r o v i d i n g  f o r  the  e x p e n d i t u r e  
of a sum of money w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  s u b j e c t -  
m a t t e r ,  t h e  Commonwealth c o u ld  i n t r o d u c e  a scheme which  i n  
p r a c t i c e  would c o m p l e t e ly  r e g u l a t e  and c o n t r o l  t h a t
1 2 0.
subject-matter" . Dixon J. also thought that even with the 
widest possible construction of the power of appropriation, 
the Act was invalid, as it contained a general legislative 
plan covering much more than the appropriation of money; 
it was the appropriation of money which was the consequence 
of the plan and not vice versa. Starke and Williams JJ. 
in giving a restrictive interpretation to "purposes of the 
Commonwealth" had no hesitation in declaring the Act beyond 
the competence of the Commonwealth.
As to the argument based upon s.51 (xxxix), Latham 
C.J. said that it was of no avail; this power authorised 
legislation with respect to matters incidental to the 
expenditure of the money, but did not authorise legislation 
which was incidental only to the purposes for which the 
money appropriated was to be expended, unless there was 
power to make laws for such purposes. On the other hand, 
McTiernan J. thought that the Act could be justified as 
incidental to the appropriation power because it defined, 
specified or limited the purpose of appropriation, or 
because it was incidental to the expenditure of the approp­
riated revenue.
It is true that the difference of opinion in the Court
_
(1945) 71 C.L.R. 237, at p. 263.
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as to the meaning of the ''purposes of the Commonwealth" 
did not affect the decision in the case; however, doubts 
arose as to the constitutionality of other social services 
schemes in operation at that time involving appropriations, 
such as maternity allowances, child endowments, widows1 
pensions and unemployment and sickness benefits. It was 
likely that the majority (Rich. Starke, Dixon and Williams 
JJ.) of the members of the Court who took part in the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Case might be unwilling to regard 
the purposes of these schemes as the "purposes of the 
Commonwealth" under s.81. Thus in 19^ +6, s.51 (xxiiiA)^ 
was introduced into the Constitution as an amendment 
enabling the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to 
various social services. Thereafter the Commonwealth 
Parliament enacted the Social Services Act 195-7-1959 con­
solidating the law relating to the payment of age pensions, 
invalid pensions, widows1 pensions, maternity allowances, 
child endowment, unemployment benefits and sickness benefits, 
and for other purposes, and the National Health Act 1953“ 
1959) relating to the provision of pharmaceutical, sickness 
and hospital benefits,and of medical and dental services.
1
It provides: "The provision of maternity allowances,
widows1 pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharma­
ceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental 
services (but not so as to authorize any form of civil 
conscription), benefits to students and family allowances."
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On f i r s t  r e a d i n g , P a r t  V I I  of  th e  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s  Act which 
d e a l s  w i t h  th e  Commonwealth r e h a b i l i t a t i o n  s e r v i c e  m ight  
seem n o t  t o  be c o v e re d  by any of the c a t e g o r i e s  p r o v i d e d  
i n  p l a c i t a  ( x x i i i )  and ( x x i i i A )  of  s .51*  That  p a r t  
p r o v i d e s  i n  d e t a i l  the  t r e a t m e n t  and t r a i n i n g  of ( i )  
p e n s i o n e r s  and c l a i m a n t s  f o r  i n v a l i d  p e r n s i o n s ,  ( i i )  b e n e ­
f i c i a r i e s  and c l a i m a n t s  f o r  b e n e f i t s  who, w i t h o u t  t h a t  
t r e a t m e n t  and t r a in in g ,  would be l i k e l y  t o  become unemploy­
a b l e ,  ( i i i )  p e r s o n s  i n  r e s p e c t  of whom a l lo w a n c e s  a r e  b e in g  
p a i d  u n d e r  s . 9  of the  T u b e r c u l o s i s  Act 19^8, and ( i v )  
p e r s o n s  b e tw een  th e  age of f o u r t e e n  and s i x t e e n  y e a r s ,  
and who, w i t h o u t  t h a t  t r e a t m e n t  and t r a i n i n g ,  would be 
l i k e l y  to  become q u a l i f i e d  to  r e c e i v e  p e n s i o n s  on a t t a i n i n g  
th e  age of s i x t e e n  y e a r s .  The t r e a t m e n t  and t r a i n i n g  of 
p e r s o n s  i n  ( i i )  and ( i i i )  a r e  j u s t i f i a b l y  c o v e re d  under  the  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  unemployment , s i c k n e s s  and h o s p i t a l  b e n e f i t s ,  
b u t  a s  t o  p e r s o n s  i n  ( i )  and ( i v ) ,  i t  may be a rg u e d  t h a t  
th e  word p e n s i o n s 1 sh o u ld  n o t  be s t r e t c h e d  so as  to  i n c l u d e  
th e  c o n c e p t  of t r e a t m e n t  and t r a i n i n g .  However, "These 
m a t t e r s " ,  as  Dixon J .  e x p l a i n e d ,  " s h o u ld  be i n t e r p r e t e d  
w i d e ly  and a p p l i e d  to  no n a r ro w  c o n c e p t i o n  of th e  f u n c t i o n s  
of  th e  c e n t r a l  government  o f  a c o u n t r y  i n  the  w o r ld  of  
t o - d a y " ^ .  M oreover ,  such an e x t e n s i o n  of  the  a r e a  of
1
(19^5)  71 C.L.R.  237, a t  p .  269.
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legislation would be warranted by s.51(xxxix). Thus it 
would not be unreasonable to assume that that part of the 
Act is valid.
There has been much appropriation of money for purposes
of research carried on by research organisations established
by the Commonwealth, such as to be found under the heading
of Research and Science in Yol. Ill of the Commonwealth
Acts 1901-1935} and Vol. VI of the Commonwealth Acts 1901 —
1950 - Institute of Anatomy, Economic Research, Forestry
Bureau, Geo-physical Survey, Science and Industry, Endow-
1ment and Research • The most notable example is the 
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, 
now operating under the Science and Industry Research Act 
19 +^95 for the purpose of, among others, the initiation and 
carrying out of scientific researches and investigation in 
connection with, or the promotion of, primary and secon­
dary industries in the Commonwealth. In the modern age 
of rapid scientific progress, expansion and promotion of 
scientific and industrial research in Australia is not only 
necessary as a national matter for the general welfare of 
the population, but also important in the sphere of inter­
national affairs so as to maintain its position among 
1
In some cases there has been only an appropriation of 
money such as for Antarctic exploration.
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th e  n a t i o n s  hy k e e p in g  pace  w i t h  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  deve lopm en ts  
i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  of  the  w o r l d .  From t h i s  p o i n t  o f  v iew the  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  money f o r  c e r t a i n  r e s e a r c h  a c t i v i t i e s  
r e l a t i n g  to  m a t t e r s  which  a re  of  a g e n e r a l  n a t u r e  such  as 
r a b b i t  c o n t r o l  by th e  use  of myxomatosis  or some o t h e r  
c h e m ic a l ,  or  m a t t e r s  upon which  th e  economy of the  c o u n t r y  
i s  d i r e c t l y  b a s e d ,  such  as  im prov ing  the  q u a l i t y  of  w h e a t ,  
or  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  m ea t ,  or  deve lopm ent  of economic 
p r o c e s s e s  i n  g i v i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  d e s i r a b l e  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  wool 
f i b r e s  to  e n a b le  i t  t o  compete s u c c e s s f u l l y  w i t h  s y n t h e t i c  
f i b r e s ,  would be a " m a t t e r  a r i s i n g  from the  e x i s t e n c e  of 
th e  Commonwealth and i t s  s t a t u s  as  a F e d e r a l  Government" ,  
and e v en  on th e  n a r r o w e r  view of th e  " p u rp o se s  of  the  
Commonwealth" th e  ch an c es  a r e  t h a t  i t  m igh t  be r e g a r d e d  as  
a v a l i d  e x e r c i s e  of  th e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  power und e r  s . 8 l .  
However, th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of  money f o r  
r e s e a r c h  i n t o  m a t t e r s  such  as  c h i l d  i l l n e s s e s  which  the  
I n s t i t u t e  of C h i ld  H e a l t h  u n d e r t a k e s ,  or  o b sc u re  an im a l  
n u t r i t i o n a l  p r o b l e m s ,  i s  n o t  c e r t a i n .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the  
J o i n t  Committee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review a p p o in t e d  i n  1959 
recommended f o r  an amendmentjn  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  by adding  
the  s u b j e c t  of  S c i e n t i f i c  and i n d u s t r i a l  r e s e a r c h 1 i n  s .5 1
-1
i n  r e s p e c t  of  w hich  the  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  may make laws .
1
R e p o r t  f rom the  J o i n t  Committee on C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Review 
( 1959) , a t  p .  73.
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It was noted above that in the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Case, a distinct question was whether the plaintiffs or 
some of them had locus standi to sue. The existence of 
adequate legal procedure for testing questions of consti­
tutional validity and enforcing restrictions on competence 
is indeed a pre-condition for the operation of our maxim 
over the whole area of its possible application. However, 
the question of locus standi is specially important in 
relation to questions under the spending power, because of
the persuasive influence of the decision in Massachusetts 
•1v.Mellon , and the sort of doctrine it embodies - a judicial 
unwillingness to permit appropriations to be challenged by 
persons who are merely taxpayers . It may be suspected 
that this procodiral difficulty has contributed a good deal 
to the apparent ability of the Commonwealth to spend money 
on ways not clearly within its powers under the ’’narrow" 
construction suggested in the pharmaceutical Benefits Case. 
Even if the State Attorneys-General have locus standi to 
challenge a mere appropriation (which is not at all certain) 
they are unlikely to object to the kind of activity carried
on by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
_
C1923) 262 u.s. 447.2
In case of Commonwealth expenditure not accompanied by 
the creation of legal duties, private or special interests 
affecting the position of individuals, the difficulty of 
locus standi to challenge the expenditure would be much 
greater: Anderson v. Commonwealth (1932) 57 C.L.R. 50*
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Organization, and no private person is likely to have 
locus standi to object.
IV
Another power analagous to the spending power that 
has been extensively used as a device by the Commonwealth 
to achieve something indirectly which it could not achieve 
directly is s.96 of the Constitution. It provides that the 
Commonwealth Parliament may grant financial assistance to
-1any State on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit1. 
Conditional grants have been made to the States from time 
to time in respect of several activities , and the main 
issue that has arisen is whether the Commonwealth may induce 
a State by offering a grant with conditions attached to do 
something that it could not do by acting within the ambit 
of its constitutional powers. The High Court is of the 
view that the imposition of such conditions attached to a 
grant is validly authorised under s.96. Thus in Victoria v.
Commonwealth-^ , the Federal Aid Roads Act, 1926, which
_
In the United States and Canada it is done under the power 
to tax and spend.
2
Refer to Nicholas, The Australian Constitution (2nd ed.), 
at pp. 29? 30: .Anderson in the Essays on the Australian 
Constitution (r . Else-Mitchell ed.) , at pp. 114 and 120.
3
(1926) 38 C.L.R. 399-
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p u r p o r t e d  to  a u t h o r i s e  th e  e x e c u t i o n  by and on b e h a l f  of 
the  Commonwealth o f  a g re e m e n ts  be tw een  the  Commonwealth 
and e ac h  S t a t e ,  and t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  th e  C o n s o l i d a t e d  
Revenue Fund t o  th e  e x t e n t  of  such  amounts as  was n e c e s s a r y  
f o r  the  p u r p o s e s  o f  e ac h  ag reem en t  e x e r c i s e d  by the  
Commonwealth, was u p h e ld  as  a v a l i d  e n a c tm e n t .
Moran v • Deputy F e d e r a l  Commissioner of  T a x a t i o n ^ , 
p r o v i d e s  a t y p i c a l  example  where s . 9& was u se d  as  a d e v ic e  
t o  g e t  a round  the  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  i n  
t a x a t i o n  be tw een  S t a t e s  a s  p r o v i d e d  i n  s . 5 1 ( i i )  and s .99  
of  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  by making g r a n t s  t o  some S t a t e s  and n o t  
t o  o t h e r s .  The Commonwealth imposed e x c i s e  d u t i e s  on f l o u r  
a t  a u n i fo rm  r a t e  t h r o u g h o u t  the  Commonwealth, b u t  p a i d  
an amount e q u a l  to  t h a t  r a i s e d  i n  Tasmania  t o  th e  Tasmanian 
g overnm en t ,  which  p a i d  i t  back  to  the  o r i g i n a l  t a x p a y e r s .  
The e x c i s e  d u t i e s  were imposed w i t h  th e  o b j e c t  of a s s i s ­
t i n g  the  w h e a t -g ro w in g  i n d u s t r y  which  a t  t h a t  t ime was 
i n  a d e p r e s s e d  c o n d i t i o n ,  b u t  i t  r a i s e d  no p ro b lem  i n  
Tasmania  where t h e r e  were no w h e a t - g r o w e r s .  A c c o r d in g ly  
s . 9 6  was u sed  as  a d e v ic e  to  exempt Tasmanian m i l l e r s  
f rom the  payment o f  t a x .  The High C o u r t ,  and on a p p e a l  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  h e l d  i t  v a l i d ,  Latham C . J ,  e x p l a i n e d  i n
1
(1939) 61 C.L.R.  7 3 5 ; 63 C.L.R.  338 ( P . C . ) :  [ 195-0 ] A.C.  
838 .
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iSouth Australia v. Commonwealth that there might he 
discrimination between States and preferences to States 
under s.96 because that section was not subject to any 
limitation with respect to discrimination.
The scheme involved in Moran1s Case in no way affected 
the balance between the Commonwealth and States as to their 
respective legislative powers, and its successful operation 
was mainly due to the co-operation between the Commonwealth 
and the State governments. But the recognition of s.9& as 
a means of enabling the Commonwealth virtually to curtail 
the autonomy of the States, despite their unanimous opposi­
tion, was highlighted in the First Uniform Tax Case. The 
scheme involved in that case consisted of four Acts by 
which the Commonwealth took over State income taxation 
departments and made it virtually impossible for the States 
to impose any income tax. The question was whether the 
Acts were to be considered separately or as part of the 
scheme to bring about the abandonment by the States of the 
power to tax. The High Court followed the former course 
and held that all the Acts were valid (Latham C.J. and 
Starke J. dissenting as to some of the Acts involved). As
to the Grants Act (one of the four Acts), which provided
_
(19^2) 65 C.L.R. 373 (the First Uniform Tax Case).
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that each State that retired from the field of taxation 
should be given a grant equal to its average receipt from 
that source during the period 1939-^1, it was said that the 
Act was valid under s.96 as it was in substance a law 
granting financial assistance to any State to which it 
became payable.
It was urged that the inducement offered by the Grants 
Act practically amounted to coercion compelling the States 
to surrender the power to tax incomes. Latham C.J. 
considered that temptation (or very attractive inducement) 
was not coercion and said that in the present case the 
States were not coerced as the Act provided for only a 
very attractive inducement and there was no command that
•1they would not impose such a tax on income . However 
Starke J. disagreed with this view and thought that the 
condition imposed by the Act amounted to abdication by the 
States of their powers of taxation. MThe argument that the 
States Grants Act leaves a free choice to the States, offers 
them an inducement but deprives them of and interferes with 
no constitutional power", he said, "is specious but
unreal* 2. An argument based on compulsion would in any case
_
(19^2) 65 C.L.R. 373, at pp. 417, VI8.
2
Ibid., at p. kk3.
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f a i l  i f  the  G r a n t s  Act i s  examined s e p a r a t e l y  as  o f f e r i n g  
f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  would n e v e r  r e a c h  the  s t a g e  of com­
p u l s i o n .  There  may be a p o s s i b i l i t y  of  i t s  s u c c e s s  i f  
t h e  Tax Act and th e  G r a n t s  Act a r e  examined as  p a r t s  of a 
l e g i s l a t i v e  scheme, b u t  i t  was n o t  as  was th o u g h t  by the  
C o u r t ,  the  c a se  t h e r e .
1
The High C o u r t  had i n  V i c t o r i a  v .  Commonwealth , 
a n o t h e r  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  examine the  u n i fo rm  t a x  scheme 
w hich  was p u t  on a pe rm an en t  b a s i s  a f t e r  the  l a s t  w ar ,  and 
a g a i n  h e l d  i t  t o  be v a l i d .  Though the  o ld  A c ts  were r e p e a l ­
ed and r e p l a c e d  by a f r e s h  s e t  of  A c t s ,  t h e y  were a lm o s t  
i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h o s e  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  the  F i r s t  Uniform Tax 
Case and o p e r a t e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the  same way.
The d e c i s i o n  on the  G ra n ts  Act  i n  the  Second Uniform 
Tax Case m a in ly  h in g e d  on the  n a t u r e  of c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  
c o u ld  be a t t a c h e d  to  a g r a n t  g i v e n  und e r  s . 9 6 . I t  was 
a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  G r a n t s  Act  was no t  a g r a n t  of f i r m c i a l  
a s s i s t a n c e  as  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a t t a c h e d  were i n t e n d e d  to  
p l a c e  the  S t a t e s  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  wbs*e th e y  were n o t  f r e e  to  
f o l l o w  th e  c o u r s e  which  o t h e r w i s e  th e y  m igh t  have t a k e n
w i t h i n  the  am bi t  of  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o w e rs .  I n  o t h e r
_
(1958) 99 C .L .R .  975 ( t h e  Second Uniform Tax C ase ) .
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words, applying the rule in Barger*s Case, could it not he 
argued that the Act, in its substance, was one interfering 
with the autonomy of the States? In order to understand 
the full implications of this argument it becomes necessary 
to have a proper understanding of the Commonwealth legisla­
tive powers as to their scope and character, particularly 
after the Engineers1 Case, and the nature of restrictions 
upon their exercise.
In Melbourne Corporation v . Commonwealth , Dixon J. 
explained that the effect of the Engineers1 Case was that a 
power to legislate with respect to a given subject enabled 
the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws whih, upon that 
subject, affected the operation of the States and their 
agencies. This rule was, however, subject to certain 
reservations, one of which, in his opinion, related to the 
use of federal legislative power to make, not a law of 
general application, but a law which discriminated against 
States and interfered with the exercise of powers and the 
fulfilment of functions constitutionally belonging to them. 
Though this sort of interference may arise by a law enacted 
with respect to a matter falling within the enumerated 
subjects of federal legislative power, it must be so enacted
1
(I9V 7) 7^ C.L.R. 31 (the State Banking Case).
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as  to  r e s t r i c t  S t a t e  a c t i o n ,  the  p r e s c r i b i n g  of  the  c o u rse  
the  S t a t e  governmot must  t ak e  or  the  l i m i t i n g  of  the  
c o u r s e s  a v a i l a b l e  to  i t .
I f  a law i s  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  a s u b j e c t  of Commonwealth 
power,  b u t  n o t  so as  to  r e s t r i c t  any S t a t e  a c t i o n ,  i t s  
v a l i d i t y  would s im p ly  depend upon w h e th e r  i t  oug h t  t o  be 
r e g a r d e d  as  e n a c t e d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  th e  s p e c i f i e d  m a t t e r  
f a l l i n g  w i t h i n  th e  Commonwealth power .  I f  the  law has  an 
a c t u a l  and im m edia te  o p e r a t i o n  w i t h i n  a f i e l d  a s s i g n e d  t o  
th e  Commonwealth, i t  would be h e l d  to  f a l l  w i t h i n  th e  power 
u n l e s s  some f u r t h e r  r e a s o n  a p p e a r s  f o r  e x c l u d in g  i t .
However, r e l e v a n c y  of  p u rp o se  ( o r  m o t ive )  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  i n  
such  an i n q u i r y  and a law may be v a l i d  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  a 
p u rp o se  ( o r  m o t ive )  of  a c h i e v i n g  some r e s u l t  which  l i e s  
w i t h i n  the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  the  S t a t e s .  But the  same 
d o c t r i n e  c o u ld  n o t  be a p p l i e d  to  a use  of f e d e r a l  power f o r  
a p u rp o se  r e s t r i c t i n g  or  b u r d e n in g  the  S t a t e  i n  th e  e x e r c i s e  
of i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o w e rs .  ”The one i n v o l v e s  no more 
t h a n  a d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  the  s u b j e c t  of  a power and the  
p o l i c y  whih  c a u s e s  i t s  e x e r c i s e .  The o t h e r  b r i n g s  i n t o  
q u e s t i o n  th e  in d e p e n d en c e  from f e d e r a l  c o n t r o l  o f  the  S t a t e  
i n  the  d i s c h a r g e  of  i t s  f u n c t i o n s ” • Thus p u rp o se  i s  
1
(19*+7) 7^ C .L .R .  3"lj a t  p .  80,  p e r  Dixon J .
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relevant in determining the validity of a law if it inter­
feres with the exercise of constitutional pova?s or func­
tions of a State in spite of the fact that it is enacted 
with respect to a matter falling mthin the Commonwealth 
power.
However it is not necessary that a restriction or 
burden a law seeks to impose upon State action must be 
placed directly upon the States or their agencies, "The 
duty may be imposedn, observed Dixon C.J. in the Second 
Uniform Tax Case, Mnot on the State or its servants, but 
on others and yet its intended operation may interfere 
unconstitutionally with the governmental functions of the 
State in such a way as to take the law outside federal 
power” , For example, s.k8 of the Banking Act, 19^+55 
prohibited the banks from doing the business of the States 
unless the Treasurer of the Commonwealth consented. It was 
held in the State Banking Case that that section was not a 
valid exercise of the power in relation to Ibanking1 
conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by s.51(xiii) 
of the Constitution, which did not authorise the making of 
a law directed to the control or hindrance of the States 
in the execution of their governmental functions. The
primary prohibition was laid upon the banks and not upon
_
(1958) 99 C.L.R. 5“+5, at p. 610.
th e  S t a t e s ,  b u t  i t  was i m m a t e r i a l  b e c a u se  i t  was j u s t  as 
e f f e c t u a l  t o  deny to  th e  S t a t e s  the  use  of banks  and t h a t  
was i t s  o b j e c t .  Even though  tie law c o u ld  be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
as  r e l a t i n g  to  b a n k i n g * ,  i t s  o b j e c t  was t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
th e  no rm al  b a n k in g  b u s i n e s s  c a r r i e d  on by the  S t a t e s .  To 
t h a t  e x t e n t  1 o b j e c t 1 or  Tp u rpose*  was r e l e v a n t  i n  d e te rm ­
i n i n g  the  v a l i d i t y  of the  .Act.
There  was a s u g g e s t i o n  by Dixon J .  t h a t  t h e  f e d e r a l  
l e g i s l a t i v e  power m ig h t  be c l a s s i f i e d  b r o a d l y  i n t o  two 
c a t e g o r i e s ,  i . e . ,  th o se  i n  r e s p e c t  of which  a law m ig h t  be 
b a se d  upon the  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ,  and th o se  i n  r e s p e c t  of 
which  a law ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  m igh t  a l s o  r e s t r i c t  or  c o n t r o l  
a S t a t e  i n  the  e x e r c i s e  of  i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s ,  as 
i n  th e  c a se  of most  powers some i n g e n u i t y  would be needed  
f o r  a law t o  d e a l  w i t h  b o th  the  a s p e c t s .  11 I t  i s ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  see  how anylaw b a s e d  on the  power 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  l i g h t h o u s e s ,  a s t r o n o m i c a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s ,  
f i s h e r i e s ,  w e i g h t s  and m e a s u r e s ,  b i l l s  of exchange or 
m a r r i a g e  c o u ld  be aimed a t  c o n t r o l l i n g  S t a t e s  i n  the  
e x e c u t i o n  of  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s .  But  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  b u r d e n  the  
e x e r c i s e  of  S t a t e  f u n c t i o n s  by means of  th e  power to  t a x  
n eeds  no i n g e n u i t y ” . 1 
1
0 9 ^ 5 )  7*+ C.L.R.  31 , a t  p .  80,  p e r  Dixon J .
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Thus a r e s t r i c t i o n  on the  fo rm er  c o u ld  be i m p l i e d  from 
some c o n c e p t i o n  of  p u rp o se  f o r  which  the  p a r t i c u l a r  power 
was c o n f e r r e d  upon the  P a r l i a m e n t ,  w hereas  i n  th e  c ase  of 
the  l a t t e r  i t  c o u ld  f u r t h e r  be i m p l i e d  from some g e n e r a l  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n  upon the  powers of the  P a r l i a m e n t  . 
I t  was a l s o  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  the  g r e a t e r  number of powers 
u n d e r  which  th e  S t a t e s  c o u ld  be th e  s u b j e c t  of s p e c i a l  
b u r d e n s  or  d i s a b i l i t i e s  c o n te m p la te d  l e g i s l a t i o n  of  
g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n .
Coming b ack  go s . 9 6  of the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  th e  m a t t e r  
w i t h  which  th e  power c o n f e r r e d  by t h a t  s e c t i o n  i s  c o n ce rn e d  
r e l a te s  t o  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  be g iv e n  by th e  Common­
w e a l t h  to  the  S t a t e s .  I t  i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  terms which  do n o t  
c o n te m p la te  a law of  g e n e r a l  a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and t h e r e  i s  
n o t h i n g  i n  i t  which  would e n a b le  the  making of  a c o e r c i v e  
law .  “ I t  i s  b u t  a pow er" ,  s a i d  Dixon C . J . , " t o  make g r a n t s  
of money and to  impose c o n d i t i o n s  on th e  g r a n t ,  t h e r e  b e in g  
no power of c o u r s e  t o  compel a c c e p t a n c e  of the  g r a n t  and
1
P e r h a p s  e v en  i n  the  c a se  of  the  fo rm er  i t  may n o t  be 
i m p o s s i b l e  to  im ag ine  a s i t u a t i o n  where a law may r e s t r i c t  
or  c o n t r o l  the  e x e r c i s e  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  of a 
S t a t e .  F o r  exam ple ,  a f e d e r a l  law which  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  no 
s t e a m s h ip  l i c e n s e d  u n d e r  a S t a t e  law would be p e r m i t t e d  to  
use  l i g h t h o u s e  f a c i l i t i e s  p r o v i d e d  by the  Commonwealth 
u n l e s s  a c e r t a i n  sim, n o t  demanded from o t h e r  u s e r s ,  i s  
p a i d  by the  owner of  the  s t e a m s h i p ,  may be an i n t e r f e r e n c e  
w i t h  th e  e x e r c i s e  of th e  powers of  a S t a t e .
1with it the accompanying term or condition" • This sort 
of power is not subject to restrictions which, as explained 
above, are implied either from some conception of the 
purpose or from some general constitutional limitations 
based upon the federal nature of the Constitution. Those 
restrictions may not be difficult to be perceived in the 
case of coercive powers, that is those demanding obedience, 
but no law under s.96 cold infringe them because it is 
never compulsive in its operation. Thus the argument based 
upon implied constitutional limitations interfering with 
the exercise of constitutional functions of the States would 
fail so far as a federal law deals with financial assistance 
to the States.
However, the utmost that could be done as an exercise
of the power conferred by s.96 is to supply the inducement
to comply with the terms and conditions attached to the
grants. If the States do not want grants offered to them,
they will not take them. They cannot be forced to accept
them "for the essence of an exercise of that power must be
a grant of money or its equivalent and beyond that the
legislature can go no further than attaching conditions to 
2the grant" . So far as conditions attached to a grant are
1
(1958) 99 C.L.R. 5^5, at p. 605.
2Ibid., at p. 610. Cf.Steward Machine Co.v. Davis (1937)
301 U.S. 5^8, at pp. 589, 590.
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concerned, the nature of the conditions is not justiciable 
because there is nothing in the Constitution indicating any 
limitation upon them. Moreover, one cannot spell out of 
the subject-matter any criteria for limiting the kinds of 
conditions. It may thus be readily seen that the possibil­
ity of the applicability of the rule in Barger*s Case is 
also ruled out because the questioncf doing indirectly 
arises only when something could not be done directly under 
the power under consideration.
But it does not mean that the use of s.96 is without 
any limits whatever. For example, there might be a 
possible colourable use of s.96 if a law gave no assistance 
to the State as a body politic but used it only as a conduit 
or an agency by which the moneys would be distributed among 
a class of persons in order to fulfil some purpose pursued 
by the Commonwealth, and one outside its power to effect 
directly. Dixon C.J. remarked that he would himself find 
it difficult to accept that doctrine in full and carry it 
into logxal effect"* •
V
The defence power, as provided in s.J1 (vi)^ of the
_
(1958) 99 C.L.R. 575, at p. 607.
2It provides: ’’The naval and military defence of the
Commonwealth and of several States ...”.
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Constitution, is a conspicuous example in the sense that 
unlike most other powers, it involves the notion of 
purpose or object. The nature of this difference was
-iexplained by Dixon J. in Stenhouse v. Coleman , thus:
In. most of the paragraphs of s.Jl the subject of 
the power is described either by reference to a 
class of legal, commercial, economic or social 
transaction or activity (as trade and commerce, 
banking, marriage), or by specifying some class 
of public service (as postal installations, 
lighthouses), or undertaking or operation (as 
railway construction with the consent of a State), 
or by naming a recognised category of legisla­
tion (as taxation, bankruptcy). In such cases 
it is usual, when the validity of legislation is 
in question, to consider whether the legislation 
operates upon or affects the subject-matter, or 
in the last case answers the description, and to 
disregard purpose or object ... But xa law with 
respect to the defence of the Commonwealth1 is 
an expression which seems ratha* to treat defence 
or war as the purpose to which the legislation 
must be addressed.
He was of the view that the rpurposer approach was
implied within the defence power as any connection of the
regulation with defence could scarcely be other than 
2purposive , though Starke J. preferred to follow a 
different approach and treated it the same way as any other 
power by inquiring as to what subject-matter in substance
a law or regulation in question related. However it is the
1
0944) 69 C.L.R. 457, at p. 471.2See also Commissioner of Taxation v. Moran (1939)
61 C.L.R. 7355 at p. 760. per Latham C.J.: "If power is
not defined by reference to purpose, the element of 
purpose is irrelevant".
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p u r p o s e 1 23 a p p ro a c h  t h a t  p r e v a i l e d  i n  the  High C o u r t  • 
A c c o r d i n g l y  th e  o p e r a t i o n  of  th e  d e fe n c e  power i s  c o n d i ­
t i o n e d  f o r  d e fe n c e  p u r p o s e s ,  and th e  Commonwealth P a r l i a ­
ment may n o t  a c h i e v e  p u r p o s e s  o t h e r  t h a n  d e fe n ce  p u r p o s e s  
u n d e r  c o v e r  of  th e  d e fe n c e  power.  Here i s  t h u s  a p o t e n ­
t i a l l y  f r u i t f u l  a r e a  f o r  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  our  maxim.
Then th e  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  as  to  the  meaning of d e fe n ce  
p u r p o s e s  so as  to  e n a b le  the  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  to  
make a law v a l i d  und e r  the  d e fe n c e  power.  I t  was f i r s t  
e n u n c i a t e d  i n  F a r e y  v .  B u r v e t t -^, where a Commonwealth 
r e g u l a t i o n  f i x i n g  the  maximum p r i c e  of  b r e a d  was u p h e ld  
as  c o n d u c iv e  to  th e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  th e  f i g h t i n g  f o r c e s .
The b a s i s  of th e  d e c i s i o n  was u n d e r l i n e d  i n  a s t a t e m e n t  of 
I s a a c s  J . , t h a t  a m easure  would be a u t h o r i s e d  u n d e r  the  
d e fe n c e  power i f  i t  m ig h t  '‘c o n c e i v a b l y  . . .  even  i n c i d e n t a l l y  
a i d  th e  e f f e c t u a t i o n  of  th e  power o f  d e f e n c e " ^ .  The d e fe n ce  
power was th u s  s u s c e p t i b l e  to  a v e r y  wide i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
and i n  f a c t  i t  has  been  u sed  t o  o b t a i n  a lm o s t  com ple te
1
See Sawer,  The Defence  Power of  th e  Commonwealth i n  Time 
of War (1946) 20 A u s t .  L. J .  295$ Menzies  i n  E ssa y s  on the  
A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n  (R. E l s e - M i t c h e l l  e d . ) ,  The Defence 
Pow er , p .1 3 2 .
2
(1916) 21 C .L .R .  433 .
3
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  455; see  a l s o  a t  p .  444 p e r  G r i f f i t h  C . J . , a t  
p p .  448-9  p e r  B a r t o n  J . , and a t  p .  460 p e r  H ig g in s  J .
140
1control over the lives of the people during war-times .
Though Isaacs J. *s formula was accepted by all the 
members of the High Court, with the exception of Starke J., 
during the second world war as the basis to determine the 
validity of a law professed to be made under the defence 
power, there has been considerable difference of opinion 
as to its actual application^. However, there ws unanimity 
to the extent that the defence power was not without limits 
whatever and in order that a law might be validly enacted 
under that power there must be some connection between the 
law in question and defence purposes. But all of them 
introduced the conception of Reasonableness1^ . This 
conception hardly made the connection clear or intelligible 
so as to formulate or predict any test or criterion The 
fact is that it is not possible to state any clear legal 
test or criteria! for war creates all sorts of problems and
1
Refer to cases cited by Menzies, loc. cit., at p. 134.
2
See Sawer, loc. cit.. at pp. 297, 298.
3
E.g., Latham C.J. in Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v. 
Commonwealth (194-3) 67 C.L.R. 347 (the Women1 s Employment 
Board Case) , at p. 357; Rich J. in Victorian Chamber of 
Manufactures v . Commonwealth, supra, at p . 375; McTiernan 
J. in Victoria v. Commonwealth (1942) 66 C.L.R. 488 (the 
Public Service Case), at p. 525; and Williams J. in R. v. 
Commonwealth Court, etc.; Ex. p. Victoria (1944) 68 C.L.R. 
485, at pp. 500, 501.
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because of their diversity and complexity in character it 
would be difficult to assess which of them are related to 
defence purposes. The difficulty is enhanced by further 
problems of degrees of connection and causation. Thus, 
as observed by Dixon J., ’’the solution of the question is 
bound to depend much less upon the abstract formulation of 
the general test or criteria to be applied than upon a 
correct ascertainment of the true nature and operations 
of the provisions impugned and of their bearing upon the 
prosecution of the war"'' , But even the correct ascertain­
ment of * some connection1 between a law in question and 
the prosecution of the war is uncertain because of the 
difficulties in producing evidence of facts of which the 
Court may take judicial notice. Thus it is a matter of 
opinion as to the question of degrees of connection which 
is rather inferential (or speculative) deper;ding upon how 
one feels or attaches importance to some measure as an 
aid to further defence purposes than of an abstract 
formulation of a general test or criterion to be applied 
to a particular situation.
Differences of opinion occurring frequently in the 
High Court illustrate this view. In the First Uniform 
Tax Case, the High Court by a majority consisting of Rich.
1
Stenhouse v. Coleman, supra. at p. 469»
1 *+2 .
McTiernan and W i l l i a m s  J J .  , Latham C . J .  and S t a r k e  J .  
d i s s e n t i n g ,  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  Income Tax (War-Time A rrangem ents )  
A c t ,  w h ich  e n a b l e d  the  Commonwealth to  t ak e  over  f rom the  
S t a t e s  t h e i r  o f f i c e r s ,  p r e m is e s  and equipm ent  co n ce rn e d  
w i t h  th e  a s s e s s m e n t  and c o l l e c t i o n  of  income t a x ,  and 
p r o v i d e d  f o r  th e  t r a n s f e r  from th e  S t a t e s  t o  the  Common­
w e a l t h  of r e c o r d s  r e l a t i n g  to  Commonwealth income t a x ,  was 
a v a l i d  e x e r c i s e  of  th e  d e fe n c e  power .  The view of the  
m i n o r i t y  was no d o u b t  i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t h a t  
i f  the  Act  was h e l d  v a l i d ,  th e  Commonwealth c o u ld  use  the  
d e fe n c e  power f o r  ends  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  th e  e x e r c i s e  of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  of the  S t a t e s .  But  i n  R. v .
A
U n i v e r s i t y  of Sydney , i t  was h e l d  t h a t  Reg. 16 of  the  
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  ( U n i v e r s i t i e s  Commission) R e g u l a t i o n s ,  
p u r p o r t i n g  t o  make p r o v i s i o n  f o r  the  c o n t r o l  of a d m is s io n  
to  u n i v e r s i t i e s ,  was n o t  w i t h i n  th e  d e fe n c e  power and was 
i n v a l i d .  But  Latham C . J . ,  w i t h  whom McTiernan J .  j o i n e d  
hands t h i s  t im e ,  was a g a i n  i n  th e  m i n o r i t y ,  w h e rea s  R ich  
and W i l l i a m s  J J . , a lo n g  w i t h  S t a r k e  J . , c o n s t i t u t e d  the  
m a j o r i t y .  Latham C . J . t h o u g h t  t h a t  th e  R e g u l a t i o n s  had a
1
(1953) 67 C.L.R.  95 ( t h e  U n i v e r s i t i e s  Commission Case ) .
See a l s o  A d e l a i d e  Co. of J e h o v ah 1s W i tn e s s e s  v .  Commonwealth 
(195-3) 6 7 C.L.R.  116 ( t h e  J e h o v a h 1 s W itnesse 's  C ase ) ;  R. v .  
Commonwealth C o u r t  of C o n c i l i a t i o n  and A r b i t r a t i o n ; e x . p . 
V i c t o r i a  (195k) 68 C.L .R. k85 .
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direct relation to the maximum utilisation of the man­
power of Australia. On the other hand, the majority 
held a contrary view and rested its decision on the ground 
that the general control of education in the schools and 
universities of Australia was outside the scope of the 
defence power.
Whereas dicta in cases of the first World War sugges­
ted that the defence power might be almost without limits, 
second War casas suggested several limitations. For 
example, under the guise of acting under that power, the 
Commonwealth may not take over State governmental admin­
istration so as to abolish the federal system of govern­
ment established under the Constitution^. In the Public
pService Case , it was held unanimously that the National 
Security (Supplementary) Regulations, in so far as they 
purported to control the holidays and remuneration of 
members of the public service of Victoria who were not 
engaged in work associated with the prosecution of the war, 
were not within the ambit of the defence power. Latham 
C.J., Rich, McTiernan and Williams JJ., were of the view 
1
Refer also to Dixon J. in Melbourne Corporation v. Comm­
onwealth (the State Banking Case), surra.
2
(19^2) 66 C.L.R. k88.
t h a t  t h e r e  was no ( o r  no r e a s o n a b l e )  c o n n e c t i o n  be tw een  
th e  R e g u l a t i o n s  and d e fe n c e  p u r p o s e s ,  and u n l e s s  i t  was 
so th e  R e g u l a t i o n s  c o u ld  n o t  be s u p p o r t e d  under  th e  d e fe n c e  
pow er .  S t a r k e  J . , of  c o u r s e ,  a p p l i e d  th e  t e s t  of * p i t h  
and s u b s t a n c e 1 and had no d i f f i c u l t y  i n  r e a c h i n g  t h a t  
c o n c l u s i o n .  However, Latham C . J .  and S t a r k e  J .  a l s o  seemed 
t o  have b a se d  t h e i r  o p i n i o n s  upon an i m p l i c a t i o n  drawn 
f rom  th e  f e d e r a l  n a t u r e  of  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  o r d e r  to  
r e s t r i c t  Commonwealth i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  S t a t e  i n s t r u m e n ­
t a l i t i e s .  A n o th e r  i l l u s t r a t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d  by V i c t o r i a n  
Chamber of M a n u f a c tu re s  v .  Commonwealth , where i t  was h e ld  
t h a t  th e  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  ( I n d u s t r i a l  L i g h t i n g )  R e g u l a t i o n s  
were  n o t  a u t h o r i s e d  by th e  N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  Act  1939-V),
and were beyond the  d e fe n c e  power .  There  i s  some l o g i c a l
2d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a c c e p t i n g  th e  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h a t  c a s e  , b u t  
i t  does  show t h a t  u n d e r  th e  c o l o u r  of  th e  d e fe n c e  power 
the  Commonwealth may n o t  t r e n c h  *undu ly*  upon th e  j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n  of  the  S t a t e s .
D uring  th e  two w o r ld  w a r s ,  many r e g u l a t i o n s  were h e ld  
v a l i d ,  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  which  depended  upon th e  o p i n i o n  of 
a M i n i s t e r  t h a t  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  was n e c e s s a r y  or e x p e d i e n t
1
0 9 ^ 3 )  &7 C.L.R.  VI3 ( t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  L i g h t i n g  C ase ) .
2
See Sawer, l o c . c i t . . a t  p .  299*
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1in the interests of defence or the prosecution of the war ,
though there were dicta also suggesting that a law might
become invalid on grounds of constructive bad faith in the
2sense of 1 2arbitrariness* or Tcapriciousnesst . But that
was because the regulations were construed as relating to
a subject which fell within the defence power during
hostilities. The effect of the regulations was therefore
to limit the discretion conferred upon the Executive by
reference to defence purposes. For example, in Shrimpton
3v. Commonwealth , a question arose as to the validity of 
the National Security (Economic Organization) Regulations. 
The regulations prohibited the purchase of land without 
the consent of the Treasurer, and gave the Treasurer an 
absolute discretion to refuse consent or to grant it 
either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he 
thought fit. A person applied to the Treasurer for his 
consent to a transaction for the purchase of land, but the 
Treasurer was willing to give his consent upon condition
1
Lloyd v. WaLlach (1915) 20 C.L.R. 299; Ex. Parte Walsh 
(1942) A.L.R. 359; Little v. Commonwealth (1947) 75 C.L.R. 
94.
2
See e.g. Starke J. in the Case of Jehovahts Witnesses, 
supra, at p.15l; Rich J. in the Industrial Lighting Case, 
supra, at p. 419; cf. McTiernan J. in the Women*s Employ­
ment Board Case., supra. at p. 384.
(1945) 69 C.L.R. 613.3
l !+6
that the purchaser should deposit in her bank security of 
a certain value. The plaintiff challenged the validity of 
the Regulations as well as the action of the Treasurer.
As to the Regulations, the Court upheld their validity in 
a curious way: Rich and Williams JJ. considered them to
be invalid; Latham C.J. and McTiernan J. were of the 
opinion that they were valid; Starke J. expressed no 
opinion; and Dixon J. was not prepared to say that they 
were beyond the defence power. However, the Regulations 
were so construed that the limits of the authority would 
be exceeded if the Treasurer exercised his discretion to 
impose a condition having no relation to matters affecting 
the defence of the country or the prosecution of the war. 
Applying this criterion, Latham C.J., Starke, Dixon and 
McTiernan JJ. he}.d that the condition imposed by the Treas­
urer went beyond the purpose for which the discretion was 
conferred upon him and, accordingly, was not authorised 
by the Regulations. The discretion which the Treasurer 
was entitled to exercise, thoigh described as absolute, was, 
in Latham C.J.xs opinion, not arbitrary and unlimited, it 
must be exercised bona fide and for the purpose of the
Regulations .
_
Ibid., at pp. 6195 620.
The defence power does not cease to he effective 
instantaneously with the cessation of wa? and continues
to operate not only in the transition period from war to
1 2 peace , hut also in times of peace , so long as it can he
shown that a particular measure or control is desirable
or possibly necessary for defence purposes. Its operation
must then he determined by reference to the exigencies
that attend the cessation of war or the demands that
call for the preparation of war rather than the need of
sustaining the hostilities. However, the connection
between a law in question and defence purposes must he
Ireasonahle1^ , and the problem is still primarily one of
degree upon which opinion may differ^, and the remoteness
_
See an exhaustive discussion by Else-Mitchell, Transition 
al and Post-War Powers in the Commonwealth of Australia 
(19W?) 25 Can.B.Rev. 854; (1950) 28 Can.B.Rev. 407.
2
Marcus Clark & Co. Ltd v. Commonwealth (1952) 87 C.L.R. 
177.3See e.g.j Hume v. Higgins (1949) 78 C.L.R. 116, at p.124 
per Latham C.J. , at p. 127 per Rich J. , at p. 135 per 
Dixon J. , at p. 139 per Williams J. , and p.142 per Webb J. 
See also Marcus Clark & Co. Ltd v. Commonwealth, supra, 
at p. 220 per Dixon C.J., at p. 234 per Williams J., at 
pp. 254 and 257 per Fullagar J., and at p. 258 per Webb J. 
who used an analogous word *fairly* this time.
4
It is typically illustrated by Dawson v. Commonwealth 
(1946) 73 C.L.R. 157; the Chief Justice and two other 
Justices were of the opinion that the regulations in 
question were valid whilst the remaining three considered 
them invalid; as the Court was equally divided the judg­
ment followed the opinion of the Chief Justice.
148.
or proximity of the effects which a law is likely to produce
would depend upon the nature of the subject for legislation
jand the existing circumstances varying in time and place .
It is true that the defence power enabled the Common­
wealth Parliament to deal with exigencies for the change 
back from war conditions to an order proper to peace. At 
the same time, it is limited in its operation so as not to 
be used as an indirect means to achieve virtual unification 
or to disregard the federal nature of the Constitution.
For a war measure dealing with a subject otherwise falling 
within the exclusive province of the States to be continued 
after the cessation of hostilities, the Court must see with 
reasonable clearness how it was incidental to the defence 
power to prolong its measure and unless it could do so it 
was the duty of the Court to pronounce the enactment 
beyond the defence power. It was one thing, pointed out
1
For example, in 195-6 control on the sale of cars was held 
as not justified in Crouch v. Commonwealth (19^ +8) 77 C.L.R. 
339 j whereas in 19^+9 a conviction was upheld in relation to 
a dealing in land which occurred in 195-7 in Hume v. Higgins 
(195-9) 7o C.L.R. 116. Similarly in 1939 the establishment 
of a clothing factory on a commercial basis was upheld in 
Attorney-General for Victoria v. Commonwealth (1935) 52 
C.L.R. 533j whereas in 1926 the Board constituted by the 
Commonwealth Shipping Act to carry on engineering estab­
lishments was not authorised to enter into agreemeris to 
supply turbo-alternators in Commonwealth v. The Australian 
Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926) 39 C.L.R. 1.
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D ixon  J . , t o  t r e a t  th e  d e fe n c e  power as  e x te n d in g  to  
m a t t e r s  which  were i n c i d e n t a l  so t o  sp eak  to  w in d in g  up 
th e  w ar ;  i t  was an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  t h in g  to a s s e r t  
a u t h o r i t y  -over t h i n g s  c o n n e c te d  w i t h  th e  war o n ly  as  a 
m a t t e r  of c a u s a t i o n  or h i s t o r y 1 23*5. In  R. v .  F o s t e r  , the  
High C o u r t  u n a n im o u s ly  h e l d  t h a t  none of the  R e g u l a t i o n s ,  
i . e .  t h e  Women1s Employment R e g u l a t i o n s ^ , the  L iq u id  F u e l  
R e g u l a t i o n s ^  and R e g u l a t i o n s  30A t o  30AF of th e  War S e r v i c e  
M ora to r ium  R e g u l a t i o n s  , c o u ld  be s u p p o r t e d  und e r  the  
d e f e n c e  power.  In  e a c h  c a se  t h e y  were so u g h t  to  be contin­
ued i n  f o r c e  f o r  the  p u rp o se  of d e a l i n g  w i t h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
w h ich  c o u ld  be r e g a r d e d  m e re ly  as  co n seq u e n ce s  of w ar .
" I f  i t  were h e l d " ,  Dixon C . J .  s a i d ,  " t h a t  the  d e fe n c e  power 
would j u s t i f y  any l e g i s l a t i o n  a t  any t ime which  d e a l t  w i t h
1
Crouch v .  Commonwealth, s u p r a , a t  p .  356 .
2
(195-9) 79 C.L.R.  5-3.
3
These  p r o v i d e d  f o r  th e  r e m u n e r a t i o n  and working  c o n d i t i o n s  
of  f e m a le  em ployees  i n  war i n d u s t r i e s  and i n  e s s e n t i a l  
c i v i l i a n  employment .  During  th e  war the  r e g u l a t i o n s  were 
h e l d  v a l i d  i n  V i c t o r i a n  Chamber of M a n u f a c tu re s  v .  Common­
w e a l t h  ( t h e  Women*s Employment Board  C a s e ) , s u p r a .
These p r o v i d e d  f o r  th e  r a t i o n i n g  of  l i q u i d  f u e l  t h r o u g h ­
o u t  A u s t r a l i a .
5
These  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a p r o t e c t e d  p e r s o n  m igh t  o b t a i n  a 
w a r r a n t  of  p o s s e s s i o n  a u t h o r i s i n g  him to  occupy a d w e l l i n g  
h o u s e .  T h e i r  c o n t i n u a n c e  im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  th e  war was 
u p h e ld  i n  R e a l  E s t a t e  I n s t i t u t e  of New South Wales v .  B l a i r  
(195-6) 73 C.L.R.  213.
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any m a t t e r  th e  c h a r a c t e r  of which  had been  changed by the  
w ar ,  or w i t h  any p ro b lem  which  had b een  c r e a t e d  or a g g r a ­
v a t e d  by th e  w ar ,  t h e n  th e  r e s u l t  would be t h a t  the  
Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  would have a g e n e r a l  power of 
making laws f o r  t h e  p e a c e ,  o r d e r  and good government  of 
AiBtra l ia  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a lm o s t  e v e r y  s u b j e c t " .
I t  i s  s e e n  t h a t  th e  d e fe n c e  power has  a f i x e d  co n cep ­
t i o n  w i t h  a c h an g in g  c o n t e n t  v a r y i n g  from time to  t im e ,  
and f o r  i t s  v a l i d  o p e r a t i o n  or  a p p l i c a t i o n  t h e r e  must be 
th e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t i o n  be tw een  a law i n  q u e s t i o n  and the  
d e fe n c e  of th e  Commonwealth. There  a r e  two more m a t t e r s  
of  f u n d a m e n ta l  im p o r ta n c e  t h a t  came up f o r  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  
A u s t r a l i a n  Communist P a r t y  v .  Commonwealth • F i r s t l y  the  
n e c e s s a r y  c o n n e c t i o n  of  a law w i t h  d e fe n c e  or a c a p a c i t y  
to  a s s i s t  d e f e n c e  must be p e r c e i v e d  i n  what th e  law does 
and n o t  i n  what  w i l l  f o l l o w  when i t  does  i t .  Second ly ,  
r e c i t a l s  i n  an Act  a r e  n o t  d e c i s i v e  of the  v a l i d i t y  or 
i n v a l i d i t y  of th e  Act  f o r  t h a t  i s  a q u e s t i o n  to  be d e c id e d  
by the  c o u r t s  f i n a l l y  and c o n c l u s i v e l y ;  the  Commonwealth 
P a r l i a m e n t  c a n n o t  " r e c i t e  i t s e l f "  i n t o  power.  I n  the
Communist P a r t y  C ase^ ,  i t  was h e l d  by the  High C o u r t ,
1
(1951)  83 C .L .R .  1 ( t h e  Communist P a r t v  C a s e ) .
2
S u p r a . F o r  a d e t a i l e d  d i s c u s s i o n  see  B e a s l e y ,  A u s t r a l i a 1s 
Communist P a r t y  D i s s o l u t i o n  Act (1951) 29 Can. B. Rev. 5-90. 
A lso  r e f e r  t o  A n d e rso n ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Communist P a r t y  v .  The 
Commonwealth (1951)  1 U n i .  of  Q ,L . J .  (3 )  35-.
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Latham C . J .  d i s s e n t i n g ,  t h a t  th e  Communist P a r t y  D i s s o l u ­
t i o n  Act  1950^5 p r o s c r i b i n g  the  Communist P a r t y  eo nomine 
and i n c a p a c i t a t i n g  communists  f rom c e r t a i n  employments ,  
c o u ld  n o t  he s u s t a i n e d  u n d e r  the  d e fe n c e  power .  The 
r e c i t a l s  i n  th e  p ream b le  to  th e  Act were m a t t e r s  upon which  
th e  Commonwealth Parl iament c o u ld  l e g i s l a t e  u n d e r  the  
d e fe n c e  power w h e th e r  i n  peace  or i n  w ar ,  b u t  the  q u e s t i o n  
t u r n e d  as  t o  the  e x a m in a t io n  of  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  a c t u a l l y  
e n a c t e d .  A l l  members of  th e  C our t  who formed th e  m a j o r i t y
1
The i m p o r t a n t  s e c t i o n s  a r e  h ,  5 and 9* S.*+ d e c l a r e s  the
A u s t r a l i a n  Communist P a r t y  to  be an u n l a w f u l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  
d i s s o l v e s  i t ,  and p r o v i d e s  f o r  th e  v e s t i n g  of i t s  p r o p e r t y  
i n  a r e c e i v e r ;  s . 5  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  where th e  G o v e rn o r -G e n e ra l  
i s  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  a body of p e r s o n s  i s  a body of p e r s o n s ,  
c o r p o r a t e  or i n c o r p o r a t e ,  which  i s  dom in a ted  by communists 
or communist d o c t r i n e ,  and t h a t  th e  c o n t i n u e d  e x i s t e n c e  of 
t h a t  body of  p e r s o n s  would be p r e j u d i c i a l  to  t h e  s e c u r i t y  
and d e fe n c e  of the Commonwealth or t o  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  or  
m a in te n a n c e  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  or  of  th e  laws of the  
Commonwealth, t h e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  may d e c l a r e  t h a t  body of 
p e r s o n s  t o  be an u n l a w f u l  a s s o c ia t io n ;  and s . 9  p r o v i d e s  t h a t  
where th e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  i s  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  a p e r s o n  i s  
a p e r s o n ,  who i s  or  was f o r  a cer ta in  t im e  a communist ,  and 
t h a t  t h a t  p e r s o n  i s  engaged or i s  l i k e l y  to  engage i n  
a c t i v i t i e s  p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  the  s e c u r i t y  and d e fe n c e  of the  
Commonwealth or t o  the  e x e c u t i o n  or m a in te n a n c e  of the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  or  o f  th e  laws of th e  Commonwealth, th e  Gover­
n o r - G e n e r a l  may make a d e c l a r a t i o n  a c c o r d i n g l y .
2
The aims and a c t i v i t i e s  a s s e r t e d  i n  t h e s e  r e c i t a l s  i n c l u d e  
th e  o v e r th ro w  of e s t a b l i s h e d  governm ent  i n  A u s t r a l i a  by 
means of  f o r c e ,  v i o l e n c e ,  i n t i m i d a t i o n  and f r a u d u l e n t  
p r a c t i c e s ,  e s p io n a g e  and s a b o t a g e ,  and d e l i b e r a t e  d i s l o c a ­
t i o n ,  d i s r u p t i o n  and r e d u c t i o n  and r e t a r d a t i o n  of  p r o d u c t i o n  
i n i n d u s t r i e s  v i t a l  to  t h e  s e c u r i t y  and d e fe n c e  of A u s t r a l i a .
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were of the view that the mere opinion of the Parliament 
was not sufficient to establish the necessary connection 
between the legislation and defence purposes. Dixon, 
McTiernan, Williams, Fullagar and Kitto JJ. were in sub­
stantial agreement that the recitals could hardly be made 
the subject of proof or disproof by evidence in the ordinary 
way as they related to a particular association and no 
specific act or fact was asserted; the Act afforded no 
objective test by reference to which the Court could judge 
whether its provisions were referable to the defence power; 
and therefore it would be impossible to say anything about 
its supposed connection with the defence power. McTiernan 
J.also thought that it would have been better if the Court 
had had the guidance of a formal statement made by the 
Executive Government of its appreciation of the internation­
al situation. Webb J. followed altogether a different 
approach and was of the view that the question of the 
validity or invalidity of the Act depended upon the judicial 
determination of the facts without any limitation by the 
recitals, and the plaintiffs were entitled to adduce 
evidence to establish their point of view; however, in the 
absence of any evidence on that issue the Act failed. The 
legal position was summarised by Professor Beasley thus:
153
The judgment of the High Court (apart from the 
dissenting opinion of Latham C.J.) appears to be 
based largely on the proposition that, except in 
time of actual war or of national emergency (the 
existence of the latter depending upon judicial 
notice or denial of it), legislative power as to 
unincorporated voluntary associations is vested 
in the States. The constitutions of the States, 
like that of the Commonwealth, contain no 
guarantees of, for example, freedom of speech, 
freedom of association, immunity from forfeiture 
except by due process of law. Hence what cannot 
at the moment be done directly by Commonwealth leg­
islation could be done in other ways: (a) by all 
States passing legislation identical in substance 
or form to outlaw the Australian Communist Party 
within their respective areas; or (b) by all 
States referring this power to the Commonwealth 
Parliament under section 51 (xxxvii) of the 
Constitution*.
Fullagar J. explained that because of its *purposive* 
nature the defence power had two aspects. In its prim­
ary aspect it authorised the making of laws which had, as 
their direct and immediate object, the naval and military 
defence of the Commonwealth, e.g., the enlistment and 
training and equipment of men and women, the provision of 
ships and ammunitions, the manufacture of weapons etc.
In its secondary aspect it authorised the making of laws 
which related to matters not normally regarded as having 
any connection with defence, e.g., the price control and 
rationing of goods, rent and eviction of tenants, the
transfer of interests in land, and the conditions of
_
Loc.cit., at p. 513*
employment generally. The matters falling within the 
primary aspect were ex facie connected, with defence purpos­
es, hut in case of those falling within the secondary 
aspect, the necessary connection would depend upon basic 
facts which gave rise to the extension of the power; such 
facts had always hitherto been matters of public general 
knowledge and matters, therefore, of which a court could 
and would take judicial notice. Thus in determining the 
validity of a law with respect to a matter falling within 
the secondary aspect there were two stages: (i) the
existence of war or national emergency or such other 
exigency and its recognition as bringing into play the 
secondary or extended aspect of the p o w  by judicial notice 
which provided a presumption of validity not in existence 
otherwise, and (ii) the examination of the law with regard 
to its character as a step to assist in dealing with the 
emergency. The question at the second stage might turn on 
particular facts as distinct from overriding general fact 
of war or emergency or exigency. Coming to the Act itself, 
the most conspicuous feature of the Act was that it did not 
purport to impose duties or confer rights or prohibit acts 
or omissions, but purported simply to declare the Communist 
Party unlawful and to dissolve it. In such a case there 
could be no presumption of validity for the simple reason
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that there would he no presumption that the Communist Party 
had done or was likely to do anything which could bring it 
within the defence power. As to the position affected by 
the recitals contained in the preamble, he thought that it 
would be impossible to allow them conclusive force because 
the Parliament could not recite itself into a field, the 
gates of which were locked against it by the Constitution.
Thus the Act could only be supported, if at all, as an 
exercise of the defence power in its extended or seconcdry 
aspect which must depend upon judicial notice of an emergency, 
but there was hardly any matter worth judicial notice so as 
to bring the secondary aspect into operation.
The first aspect of the defence power has often been 
availed of by the Commonwealth as well as in peace as in 
war, but its secondary aspect has been regarded as only 
coming into operation in time of war, and the period 
necessary for post-war readjustment^. However, there were
pdicta in earlier cases and it was implicit in some of the
opinions in the Communist Party Case^ that the secondary
1
See Australian Communist Party v. Commonwealth, sipra, at 
p.251+ per Fullagar J.
2
E.g., Farey v. Burvett. supra, at p.M+1; R. v. Foster, 
supra., at p. 81.
3
Supra, at p. 195 per Dixon J., at p.225 per Williams J., 
and at p. 27*+ per Kit to J.
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aspect might come into operation even in a situation
falling short of war. It was family established in Marcus
■\Clark & Co. Ltd, v. Commonwealth , where the High Court 
upheld the validity of the Defence Preparations Act 1951? 
and the regulations made thereunder, restricting the issue 
of share capital. The Court, in contrast to its experience 
of the Communist Party Dissolution Act, found in the Act 
objective tests by which it could judge that the provisions 
in question had the necessary connection with the defence 
of Australia. The objectivity of the tests was provided 
by references to circumstances warranting defence prepara­
tions at that time. As to the judification of the restric­
tion on the issue of share capital, the Constitution did 
not expressly exclude economic and financial controls from 
the means which the Commonwealth Parliament might, in times 
of peace, provide for the purpose of preparing the country 
to resist aggression and to meet the possible dangers and 
adversities that might overtake Australia under modern 
conditions of war. It is true that in considering the 
operation of the defence power the distinction between a 
period of actual hostilities and a period of apprehended 
danger short of war could never be disregarded, but the 
restrictions imposed by the regulations were auxiliary to 
1
(1952) 87 C.L.R. 177 (the Capital Issues Case).
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and consequential upon the diversion of tangible and 
intangible resources to warlike purposes, and such a 
diversion might be made under the threat of war as well as 
when actually engaged in the war. As to the argument that 
the Commonwealth could not, by taking steps which were 
within power, achieve the result of extending the ambit of 
its power, Fullagar J. replied that as the gravity of the 
situation increased, the scope of what was complementary 
to the defence power must become progressively enlarged, 
and the reactions of measures taken must often call for 
control or modification by other measures . However, the 
possibility that the legislature will be found achieving 
something ‘'indirectly1' increases proportionately as the 
operation of the defence power contracts according to the 
change in circumstances from the period of war to the 
establishment of peace, and in times of peace the chances 
are the most.
It may also be noticed that the validity of a law with 
respect to defence is closely related to the question of 
whether and what evidence is admissible to establish the 
necessary connection between an emergency dealt with and 
the defence purposes. This matter was dealt with more
fully by Fullagar J. in the Communist Party Case. According
_
Ibid., at p. 255.
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to him matters falling within the first aspect of the 
defence power create no problem as they are ex facie 
connected with defence. But for matters failling within 
the secondary aspect of the power, the problem may arise 
at two levels. Firstly, the existence of some emergency is 
to be recognised (connected with the international situation) 
so as to bring into operation that extended or secondary 
aspect of the power, and it could be done only as a matter 
of judicial notice"^. It is only after the fulfilment of 
this requirement that the court would pass on to the 
question of admissibility of evidence at the second level.
In the Communist Party Case, nothing could be judicially 
noticed as to the conduct or objectives of the individuals 
who constituted the Communist Party, whereas in the Capital 
Issues Case the international situation warranting prepara­
tion of war on the scale authorised by the Defence 
Preparations let was a matter to be judicially noticed.
.After the existence of the secondary aspect has been 
established by judicial notice of an emergency, evidence at 
the second level is admitted to connect the law in question 
with the defence power. Whether and what evidence is 
admissible depends on the circumstances of each particular
T
Dixon J. might not accept this restriction: the
Communist Party Case,supra.
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case. In Jenkins v. Commonwealth , where the National 
Security (Mineral) Regulations which provided for the 
acquisition of mica compulsorily were held not beyond the 
defence power notwithstanding that two years had elapsed 
after the cessation of hostilities, the circumstances that 
were noticed were the necessity of building up an adequate 
reserve for defence forces especially in view of the 
conditions in India and the consideration that the Parlia­
ment and the Executive must be afforded a reasonable period 
during the transition from hostilities to peace to consider 
whether legislation within the constitutional powers of
the Commonwealth in normal times was required to replace
2the existing regulations. In Sloan v. Pollard , the con­
tinuance of an order restricting the use and sale of cream 
made under the National Security (Food Control) Regulations 
was held to be justified on the ground that its object was 
to increase exportable surplus of butter and cheese which 
was necessitated by the fulfilment of an agreement between 
the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom during the war.
And in the Capital Issues Case the circumstances for the 
justification of the regulations imposing restrictions on 
the issue of share capital were that the execution of a 
1
(195-7) 75- C.L.R. 50o.
(195-7) 75 C.L.R. 5-5-5.
1
2
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s u b s t a n t i a l  d e fe n c e  programme a t  t h a t  t ime was q u i t e  
l i k e l y  to  b r i n g  a b o u t  economic s t r a i n s  and d i s l o c a t i o n s  of 
su c h  a n a t u r e  t h a t ,  u n l e s s  th ey  c o u ld  be c o n t r o l l e d  by the  
a u t h o r i t y  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  d e f e n c e ,  t h e  
d e fe n c e  programme i t s e l f  m igh t  be i m p e r i l l e d  or impeded.
Even a t  the  second  l e v e l  th e  c o u r t  would n o rm a l ly
c o n f i n e  i t s e l f  t o  m a t t e r s  of  which  j u d i c i a l  n o t i c e  c o u ld  be
t a k e n ,  and t h u s  i t  must  depend upon  m a t t e r s  of g e n e r a l
p u b l i c  k n ow ledge .  T h is  i s  so b e c a u se  (a)  the  t a k i n g  of
e v id e n c e  m ig h t  o f t e n  i n v o lv e  d i s c l o s u r e s  which would be
p r e j u d i c i a l  t o  the  s t e p s  b e in g  t a k e n  by the  E x e c u t iv e  to
d e a l  w i t h  th e  em ergency ,  (b) th e  c o u r t  i s  bound by the
l e g a l  r u l e s  o f  e v i d e n c e ,  and t h e r e  a r e  t h u s  l i m i t a t i o n s
upon th e  m a t e r i a l  i t  c o u ld  r e c e i v e ,  and (c)  th e  f a c t s  m igh t
i n  many c a s e s  be o f  such  a g e n e r a l  c h a r a c t e r  a s  t o  be
d i f f i c u l t  or  i m p o s s i b l e  to  p rove  or  d i s p r o v e  by l e g a l l y
a d m i s s i b l e  e v i d e n c e ,  w h i l e  q u i t e  c a p a b le  of  b e in g
-1
j u d i c i a l l y  n o t i c e d  . Thus the  e n t i r e  p r o c e s s  i s  so 
f l e x i b l e  as  t o  p r e v e n t  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  any c r i t e r i o n  or 
t e s t  from which  may be deduced the  d e g re e  of  c o n n e c t i o n  f o r
th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a law .  However, t h e r e  seems t o  be c l a r i t y
1
S tenhouse  v .  Coleman, s u p r a , a t  p p .  469 ,  4-70; A u s t r a l i a n  
Communist P a r t y  v .  Commonwealth, s u p r a , a t  p .  2^6 .  See 
a l s o  R. v .  F o s t e r , s u p r a , a t  p p .  51 , 52; Holmes, Evidence  
i n  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Cases  (-1949-50) 23 A u s t . L . J .  235.
161 .
on two p o i n t s .  F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  n o t  th e  E x e c u t iv e  or the  
P a r l i a m e n t ,  b u t  the  C o u r t  whose o p i n i o n  would be f i n a l ,  
though  o r d i n a r i l y  th e  c o u r t  would n o t  s u b s t i t u t e  i t s  
o p i n i o n  f o r  t h a t  of th e  E x e c u t iv e  or  th e  P a r l i a m e n t .  
S e c o n d ly ,  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of some e x t r i n s i c  p u rp o se  or 
u l t e r i o r  m o t ive  i n  th e  minds of  the  P a r l i a m e n t  or  the
2
G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  c o u ld  n o t  be i n v e s t i g a t e d  by a c o u r t  .
The most i n t e r e s t i n g  example  of r e l i a n c e  on the  p e a c e ­
t ime d e fe n c e  power f o r  a p r o j e c t  on ly  d o u b t f u l l y  w i t h i n  
f e d e r a l  d e fe n c e  power i s  the  Snowy M ounta ins  H y d r o - E l e c t r i c  
Power Act 195-9-58 • The p ream ble  t o  the  Act s t r e s s e s  the  
d e fe n c e  power as  th e  b a s i s  of  th e  f e d e r a l  a c t i o n ,  p a r t l y  
i n  d e l i b e r a t e  r e l i a n c e  on Ashwander v .  l e n n e s s e e  V a l l e y
F u l l a g a r  J .  i n  th e  Communist P a r t y  C a s e , s u p r a . a t  p .2 5 5 ;  
Dixon J. i n  S te n h o u se  v .  Coleman, s u p r a . a t  p .  5-70; R ic h  J.  
i n  Andrews v .  Howell  (195TJ 65 C .L .R .  255 a t  P« 263; Latham 
C . J .  i n  the  F i r s t  Uniform Tax C a s e ., s u p r a , a t  p .  5-32.
2
Stenhouse  v .  Colem an, s u p r a ,  a t  p .  5-715 p e r  Dixon J . ;  the  
Communist P a r t y  C a s e , s u p r a . a t  p .  255-, p e r  F u l l a g a r  J .
3
The Snowy M oun ta ins  Scheme i s  a v a s t  e n g i n e e r i n g  p r o j e c t  
by which  the  sn o w -fed  w a t e r s  of  the  A u s t r a l i a n  Alps  w i l l  
be d i v e r t e d  w es tw a rd s  th r o u g h  t r a n s m o u n t a i n  t u n n e l s  under  
th e  G r e a t  D i v i d i n g  Range to  the  d ry  p l a i n  of th e  i n l a n d .  
These w a t e r s  w i l l  be u sed  f o r  g e n e r a t i n g  huge q u a n t i t i e s  
of power .  Funds f o r  th e  scheme a re  b e in g  p r o v i d e d  by the  
Commonwealth Government .  Payment o f  i n t e r e s t  and repaym ent  
of  c a p i t a l  a r e  b e in g  f i n a n c e d  by th e  s a l e  of  e l e c t r i c i t y  t o  
th e  consumer S t a t e s  of  New South  Wales and V i c t o r i a .
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Authority . Actually, the Snowy Mountains Authority con­
stituted under the Act is mainly concerned with water con­
servation and electric power generation for general 
agricultural and industrial purposes, having no specific 
relation to defence. Probably the Commonwealth would also 
have relied on the spending power if necessary, but would 
have faced the difficulties under that power mentioned above. 
In fact the Commonwealth felt so doubtful about its consti­
tutional position that it went to considerable lengths to 
avoid giving any private person occasion for challenging the 
Authroity1s activities, and tried for many years to obtain 
State authorisation for the activities of the Authority; 
the States concerned, New South Wales and Victoria, derived 
so much benefit that they did not take any action to 
challenge its validity,and finally in 1958 those States
ppassed Acts giving support of State constitutional power - 
undoubtedly sufficient for the purpose - to the somewhat 
shaky legal structure of the Snowy Mountains Authority.
VI
The maxim under review was also cited in relation to 
the operation of s.109 of the Constitution in Clyde
T  _(1935) 297 U.S. 288; the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Tennesee Valley Authority might be authorised 
to sell its surplus water in peace-time. Also refer to 
Attorney-General for Victoria v. Commonwealth (1935) 52 
C.L.R. 533.2Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Agreements Act 1958 (N.S.W.); 
Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Agreements Act 1958 (Vic.).
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E n g in e e r in g  Co. L t d , v .  Cowburn . An award made u n d e r  the  
Commonwealth C o n c i l i a t i o n  and A r b i t r a t i o n  Act p r e s c r i b e d  
r a t e s  of  pay and o v e r t im e  b a se d  on a work ing  week of  f o r t y -  
e i g h t  h o u r s .  A l a t e r  Ac t  of New South Wales e n t i t l e d  the  
F o r t y - f o u r  Hours Week Act p u r p o r t i n g  to  a p p ly  t o  p e r s o n s  
bound by th e  Commonwealth award p r e s c r i b e d  a working  week cf 
f o r t y - f o u r  h o u rs  and made a p r o v i s i o n  f o r  th e  a d j u s t m e n t  
of r a t e s  o f  pay and o v e r t im e  a c c o r d i n g l y .  Cowburn r e l y i n g  
on th e  S t a t e  l a w , s u e d  f o r  a w ork ing  week of  f o r t y - f o u r  h o u rs  
o n l y .  The High C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  when an award had b e en  made 
und e r  th e  Commonwealth A c t ,  th e  p a r l i a m e n t  o f  a S t a t e  
c o u ld  n o t  a l t e r  th e  te rm s  of an  award or c o n f e r  or impose 
on the  p a r t i e s  to  i t  r i g h t s  o r  o b l i g a t i o n s  which  were 
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  such  t e r m s .  MNo S t a t e  law can  i n  the  
p r e s e n c e  of  s .1 0 9  of the  C o n s t i t u t i o n " ,  s a i d  I s a a c s  J .  ,
"be p e r m i t t e d  t o  s t a n d  i n  th e  way of  s e t t l e m e n t  so 
a u t h o r i z e d  or d i r e c t e d .  No S t a t e  law can  p r e v e n t  t h a t  
s e t t l e m e n t  by d i r e c t  p r o h i b i t i o n ,  e i t h e r  w h o l ly  or p a r t l y .
p
And what i t  c a n n o t  do d i r e c t l y  i t  c a n n o t  do i n d i r e c t l y " .
_
(1926) 37 C.L.R.  466 .
2
I b i d . , a t  p .  k91 . I n  F e d e r a t e d  Saw M i l l s  & Co. Employees1 
A s s o c i a t i o n  of  A u s t r a l i a  v .  James Moore & Sons P ty  L t d . 
C1909) Ö C.L.R.  465 ( t h e  Saw M i l l s 1 Case) , and A u s t r a l i a n  
Boot  Trade E m ployees1 F e d e r a t i o n  v • Whybrow & Co. (1910)
10 C.L .R. 266 ( t h e  Whybrow CaseT . i t  was h e l d  t h a t  a Common­
w e a l t h  d e c i s i o n  c o u ld  n o t  o v e r r i d e  a S t a t e  law .  L a t e r  i n  
F e d e r a t e d  E n g i n e - D r i v e r s 1 and F i r e m e n s 1 A s s o c i a t i o n  of  Aus­
t r a l a s i a  v .  A d e la id e  Chemica l  and F e r t i l i z e r  Co. (1920)
28 C.L .R. 1 ( t h e  Engine  D r iv e r s *  C a se ) , i t  was h e l d  t h a t  
s i n c e  b o th  c o u ld  be obeyed by employment a t  the  low er  min­
imum, b o th  th e  laws were v a l i d .
1
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A c t u a l l y ,  t h e r e  have b een  no o t h e r  A u s t r a l i a n  
exam ples  of  a t t e m p t s  t o  I e v a d e I th e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of  S t a t e  
law i n v o l v e d  i n  s . 1 0 9 5 and the  e x p r e s s i o n s  u sed  by I s a a c s  J. 
i n  Cowburn*s Case were u n n e c e s s a r i l y  r h e t o r i c a l  - th e  S t a t e  
laws on i n d u s t r h l  r e l a t i o n s  had n e v e r  b e en  p a s s e d  i n  o r d e r  
t o  d e f e a t  a f e d e r a l  law ,  b u t  on a v iew  h av in g  a good d e a l  cf 
e a r l i e r  s u p p o r t  t h a t  t h e y  were v a l i d  u n l e s s  d i r e c t l y  i n  
c o n f l i c t  w i t h  the  d u t i e s  o f  o b e d ie n c e  r e q u i r e d  by f e d e r a l  
law .  No s i t u a t i o n  com parab le  w i t h  th e  laws of  s o u t h e r n  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  r e q u i r i n g  th e  c l o s i n g  of s c h o o l s  and u n i v e r ­
s i t i e s  f a c e d  w i t h  f e d e r a l l y - r e q u i r e d  r a c i a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  has  
a r i s e n ,  though  i t  m ig h t  have done i f  th e  a t t e m p t  of th e  New 
S o u th  Wales governm ent  under  J .T .  Lang ( P r e m i e r ,  1925-1927 
and 1930- 1932) t o  d e fy  f e d e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  p o l i c y  had gone 
f u r t h e r  .
V I I
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  i t  may be s a i d  t h a t  whenever  the  
v a l i d i t y  o f  a law ,  w h e th e r  Commonwealth or  S t a t e ,  was i n  
d i s p u t e ,  i t  h a s  a lw ays  b een  i n  th e  minds of  ju d g e s  to  
n o t i c e ,  w h e rev e r  p o s s i b l e ,  b e f o r e  g i v i n g  th e  f i n a l  v e r d i c t ,
1
See New So u th  Wales v .  Commonwealth (1931) 5-6 C.L.R.  155; 
5-6 C .L .R .  235; 46 C.L.R.  25-6. (The G a r n is h e e  C a s e s ) . Fo r  
a d e t a i l e d  a c c o u n t  o f  the  s t o r y  see  E v a t t ,  The King and 
H is  Dominion G overnors  (1 9 3 6 ) ,  Ch.XIX.
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whether there was any attempt to do indirectly what could 
not be done directly. It is true that the maxim hd ups 
and downs in the constitutional development in Australia, 
but nowhere was it suggested that its application has 
fallen into disuse. The ups and downs were mainly due to 
the changes in the technique of interpretation, particularly 
before and after the Engineers* Case. But much depends on 
what a particular legislative power is understood to mean.
The maxim has had especially fruitful Australian 
application in the sphere of constitutional prohibitions and 
legislative schemes, which are further discussed elsewhere, 
and of which the Homebush Flour Case and the Uniform Tax 
Cases provide examples. Such problems can always be con­
sidered as a projection of the ’’single statute” types of 
case mainly considered in this chapter, and indeed the High 
Court of Australia is certain when deciding a "legislative 
scheme” case before it to be influenced more by the auth­
orities mentioned above than by comparative "legislative 
scheme” studies drawing on other countries. But for the 
purpose of this thesis it was thought desirable to assemble 
Australian and other "legislative scheme” cases elsewhere, 
since some analytical features of the problems caused by 
"legislative schemes” in relation to constitutional problems 
are brought out better in a comparative treatment.
CHAPTER V
South Africa
South Africa has a unitary Constitution”^ , an Act 
of the British Parliament, which formally contains no 
limitations or restrictions on the law-making powers of 
the Union Parliament such as those provided in the United 
States, Canadian and Australian Constitutions, The Union 
Parliament has full powers to make laws for the peace, 
order and good government of the Union^ and ordinarily it 
functions bi-camerally^ (requiring action by a simple 
majority of each House sitting separately), but problems 
akin to those of the federal constitutions have arisen 
from the cases excepted by s.35 and s.152j known as the 
Tentrenched clauses1 23. S.35 relates to franchise in the 
Cape Colony and provides that a person who is capable,
1
South Africa Act, 1909*
2s.59 of the South Africa Act.
3
In case the two Houses do not agree, it is provided under 
s.63 of the Act that the Governor-General may convene a 
joint sitting of both Houses and if the Bill is affirmed 
by a majority of the members of both Houses present at 
such sitting, it shall be taken to have been duly passed 
by both Houses of Parliament.
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or who might become capable, of being registered as a 
voter in the Cape Colony should not be disqualified from 
being so registered by reason of his race or colour only 
unless a Bill embodying such a provision “be passed by 
both Houses of Parliament sitting together, and at the 
third reading be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of 
the total number of members of both Houses“• In s.152 
is provided an express prohibition against a repeal or 
alteration of any part of s.35? and of s.137 which guaran­
tees the equal status of English and Dutch as the official 
languages of the Union, together with a repeal or altera­
tion to any part of s.152 itself “unless the Bill for 
such repeal or alteration shall be passed by both Houses 
of Parliament sitting together, and at the third reading 
be agreed to by not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of both Houses“.
•iAfter the passing of the Statute of Westminster 1931 
there was uncertainty as to the impact of the Statute 
upon the operation of s.35 and s.152 of the South Africa
1
For its general discussion see Wheare, The Statute of 
Westminster and Dominion Status (5th ed.Tj Latham, The 
Law and the Commonwealth (1937); Keith, The Constitution­
al Law of the British Dominions (1933); The Dominions as 
Sovereign States (1933); Jennings, The Law and the Con­
stitution (3rd~ed.), Ch.IV.
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Act. The Statute contained no express provision repeal­
ing or altering those sections, and yet it could he so 
implied from s.2(2)^ of the Statute. In effect, the 
problem raised was of a bigger magnitude involving the 
meaning of the concept of *Dominion status1 2 and 1 sover­
eignty of Parliament“1. The problem has been examined 
many times , but here an endeavour is made (though at 
the cost of repetition) to emphasise the conflict between 
Parliament and the courts and to recognise how far the 
courts have asserted an authority to review the actions 
of the Union Parliament, particularly in view of the maxim
1
It provides: nNo law and no provision of any law made
after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of 
a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground 
that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the 
provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regula­
tion made under any such Act, and the powers of the 
Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to 
repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation 
insofar as the same is part of the law of the DominionM.
2
E.g., Marshall, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Common­
wealth (1957) Ch.XI; Cowen, Legislature and Judiciary : 
Reflections on the Corbbitutional Issues in South Africa 
(1952) 15 Mod. L.Rev. 282, (1953) 16 Mod. L.Rev. 273; 
McWhinney, The Union Parliament, the Supreme Court, and 
the uEntrenched Clauses” of the South Africa Act (19927 
30 Can. B. Rev. 692; Court versus Legislature In the 
Union of South Africa : The Assertion of a Right of 
Judicial Review (1993) 31 Can. B. Rev. 52: Griswold,
The Coloured Vote Case in South Africa (1952) 65 Harv. 
lT Rev. 1361; The Demise of the High Court of Parliament 
in South Africa (1953) 66 Harv. L. Rev. 06l+.
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*what c a n n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  c a n n o t  be done i n d i r e c t l y 1 , 
so as  t o  p r e s e r v e  th e  s a n c t i t y  of  th e  i n t r e n c h e d  
c l a u s e s 1 i n  South  .A f r i c a .
I I
The Union P a r l i a m e n t ,  u n l i k e  th e  B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t ,  
was c r e a t e d  by l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and th e  two Houses of P a r l i a ­
ment were  e s t a b l i s h e d  by the  So u th  A f r i c a  Act and d e r i v e d  
t h e i r  powers f rom  t h a t  A c t .  A f t e r  the  p a s s i n g  of the  
S t a t u t e  of  W e s t m in s t e r ,  a q u e s t i o n  of  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
im p o r ta n c e  a r o s e  w h e th e r  the  i n t r e n c h e d  c l a u s e s 1 of  the  
Sou th  A f r i c a  Act were s t i l l  e n t r e n c h e d ,  o r  w h e th e r  the  
Union P a r l i a m e n t  was ,  a s  a co n seq u en ce  of  th e  1 s o v e r e i g n ­
ty  of  P a r l i a m e n t 1 , no l o n g e r  s u b j e c t  t o  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  
imposed by th e  1 e n t r e n c h e d  c l a u s e s 1 and f r e e  t o  amend 
any s e c t i o n  of th e  S o u th  A f r i c a  A c t ,  even a l t h o u g h  such  a 
s e c t i o n  m igh t  o r i g i n a l l y  have b e en  e n t r e n c h e d  . This  
q u e s t i o n  was c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  th e  f i r s t  t ime i n  Ndlwana
v .  Hofmeyr,  N .O .^ ,  w h ich  i n v o l v e d  a n  a c t i o n  by a n a t i v e
_
P r i o r  t o  the  p a s s i n g  of  th e  S t a t u t e  of W e s t m in s t e r ,  th e  
p r o c e d u r e  p r e s c r i b e d  by the  i n t r e n c h e d  c l a u s e s 1 was 
u n d i s p u t a b l y  o b l i g a t o r y , and i n  R. v .  Ndobe (1930) A .D .48k ,  
th e  South  A f r i c a n  C o u r t  of A ppeal  had s p e c i f i c a l l y  
r e j e c t e d  an  a rgum ent  t h a t  the  C o u r t s  of law had no j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  to  i n q u i r e  i n t o  the  o b se rv a n c e  of th e  i n t r e n c h e d  
c l a u s e s 1 .
2
(1937) A.D. 229.
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whose voting status was changed under the Representation 
of Natives Act 193^* The Act provided for the exclusion 
of the names of natives from the voters1 lists which 
included the names of persons qualified to vote in the 
Cape Province and in which the natives had up to the 
passing of the Act been included, and provided for their 
being included in another list. Though the Act was passed 
by the Union Parliament in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by s.35 of the South Africa Act, it was contend­
ed that it was not a Isw which fell within the provisions 
of s.35 and, therefore, the procedure prescribed by s.35 
should not have been followed. The Cape Provincial 
Division overruled the objection as the Act contained 
provisions which were in effect, in the opinion of Judge- 
President Van Zyl (who spoke for the Court), disqualifying 
provisions within the meaning of s.35* The Judge-Presi­
dent, however, went on to say that the effect of the 
passing of the Statute of Westminster was to withdraw 
from the Union the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and 
to make the Union Parliament the sovereign legislature 
in the Union with power to repeal or amend any British 
Act, including the South Africa Act, so far as it was
i
Act No. 12 of 1936 (South Africa).
p a r t  of th e  law of  the  Union .  On a p p e a l  the  A p p e l l a t e  
D i v i s i o n  a f f i r m e d  th e  d e c i s i o n  of  the  Cape P r o v i n c i a l  
D i v i s i o n .  S t r a t f o r d , A . C . J . , ( t h e  o t h e r  members of th e  
C o u r t  c o n c u r r i n g ) , a r r i v e d  a t  h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  assum ing th e  
Union P a r l i a m e n t  t o  be th e  supreme and s o v e r e i g n  law -  
making body and e q u a l  i n  s t a t u s  to  th e  I m p e r i a l  P a r l i a ­
ment s i n c e  the  p a s s i n g  of  the  S t a t u t e  of W e s tm in s t e r .
The A c t in g  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  s a i d :
P a r l i a m e n t s  w i l l ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  as  e x p r e s s e d  i n  an  
Act of P a r l i a m e n t  c a n n o t  now i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y ,  as  
i t  c a n n o t  i n  E n g la n d ,  be q u e s t i o n e d  by a C our t  of 
law whose f u n c t i o n  i t  i s  t o  e n f o r c e  t h a t  w i l l ,  
n o t  t o  q u e s t i o n  i t .  . . .  I t  i s  o b v i o u s l y  s e n s e l e s s  
t o  sp e ak  of  an  Act of a s o v e r e i g n  law-making 
body as  u l t r a  v i r e s . . . .  Now, assuming t h a t  we a re  
e n t i t l e d  t o  i n f e r  f rom i t s  r e f e r e n c e  to  the  two 
p r o v i s i o n s  of s . 3 5  t h a t  Act 12 of 1936 was p a s s e d  
by th e  two Houses s i t t i n g  t o g e t h e r  and n o t  
b i c a m e r a l l y  th e  q u e s t i o n  t h e n  i s  w h e th e r  a C o u r t  
of  law can  d e c l a r e  t h a t  a s o v e r e i g n  P a r l i a m e n t  
c a n n o t  v a l i d l y  p ronounce  i t s  w i l l  u n l e s s  i t  a d o p t s  
a c e r t a i n  p r o c e d u r e  - i n  t h i s  c ase  a p r o c e d u r e  
i m p l i e d l y  i n d i c a t e d  as  u s u a l  i n  th e  South A f r i c a  
A c t?  The answer i s  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t ,  composed of 
i t s  t h r e e  c o n s t i t u e n t  e l e m e n t s ,  can  a d o p t  any 
p r o c e d u r e  i t  t h i n k s  f i t ;  the  p r o c e d u r e  e x p r e s s  or 
i m p l i e d  i n  th e  Sou th  A f r i c a  Act i s  so f a r  as C o u r t s  
o f  law a r e  c o n c e rn e d  a t  the  mercy of  P a r l i a m e n t  
l i k e  e v e r y t h i n g  e l s e . ^
These o b s e r v a t i o n s  so f a r  as  a m a t t e r  of a p p l i c a t i o n  to  
A c ts  g e n e r a l l y  m ig h t  p o s s i b l y  be r e g a r d e d  as  m e re ly  a 
s t r o n g  d i c tu m ,  a s  th e  Act i n v o lv e d  was an Act c o n te m p l a t e d
I b i d . , a t  p p .  229j .230, 231 ( I t a l i c s  s u p p l i e d ) .
1
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by s.35 of the South Africa Act - it was passed by the 
two Houses sitting together and by a two-thirds vote.
However, the question came up squarely before the
Appellate Division in Harris v. Minister of the Interiorl ,
where the actual question in issue was whether the
2Separate Representation of Voters Act, 195*1 5 was in whole, 
or in part, enforceable in a Court of law. The Act 
provided for the separate representation of European and 
non-European voters ii the Cape Province. In effect, a 
non-European who was immediately prior to the passing of 
the Act, entitled to vote in the same constituency as a 
white person, was debarred from doing so on the ground 
of his colour or race. It was clear that the Act had 
been passed bicamerally and not unicamerally as contem­
plated by s.35 and s.152 of the South .Africa Act. The 
Act was challenged on the ground that it provided for 
1disqualification1 within the meaning of s.35? and was 
invalid because it had not been passed in accordance with 
the procedure prescribed by s.152. The Court accepted 
this argument and held that the Union Parliament was a
sovereign legislature but it had to observe the provisions
_
[1952(2)] S.A. >+28 (A.D.) (the Vote Case).
Act No. h6 of 1951 (South Africa).
2
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of the South Africa Act, and the Courts of law had power 
to declare invalid an Act on the ground that it had not 
been passed in accordance with the mode of legislation 
pnscribed by that Act.
It was contended that the Statute of Westminster had 
had the effect of repealing or_ modifying the provisions 
of S.35 and s.1^2 of the South Africa Act. Centlivres,
C.J., speaking for the Court, first referred to the events 
which led up to the passing of the Statute and had no 
difficulty in recognising the continued effectiveness of 
those sections. As to s.2^ of the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act, 1865, it was said that it could have no application 
to a repeal or an alteration of the South Africa Act 
because such repeal or alteration was specifically author­
ised by s.152 of that Act, which was a later Act than the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act and must, therefore, in case cf 
conflict, override the earlier Act.
As to the Statute of Westminster, it contained no
express repeal of the *entrenched sections1. The effect
1It provides: "Any colonial law which is or shall be m
any respect repugnant to the provisions of any Act of 
Parliament extending to the colony to which such law may 
relate, or repugnant to any order or regulation made 
under authority of such Act of Parliament, or having in 
the Colony the force and effect of such Act, shall be read 
subject to such Act, order, or regulation, and shall to 
the extent of such repugnancy, but not otherwise, be and 
remain absolutely void and inoperative."
of the repeal of the Colonial Laws Validity Act was to 
remove a fetter on the Union Parliament - inability to 
pass a law repugnant to a British Act in so far as that 
Act extended to the Union, And in similar terms was the 
object of s.2(2) of the Statute which conferred, by 
necessary implication, powers on the Union Parliament 
which it did not possess prior to the passing of the 
Statute, viz., the power to make a law although repugnant 
to an existing or future enactment of the United Kingdom, 
the power to make a law having extra-territorial operation 
and the termination of the supremacy of the British 
Parliament in South Africa. But there was nothing in the 
Statute to suggest, even impliedly, the inference that 
there was any intention to repeal or modify the *entrencM 
clauses1 2 of the South Africa Act. The Chief Justice 
explained:
The words Parliament of a Dominion1 in the 
Statute of Westminster must, in my opinion, be 
read, in relation to the Union, in the light of 
the South Africa Act. It is implicit in that 
Act that the Parliament of the Union must function 
bicamerally. save in the cases excepted by secs. 35?63 and 152. ... It is that Act and not the Statute
1
1
See s.2(1) of the Statute of Westminster, 1931? which 
provides: "The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865? shall
not apply to any law made after the commencement of this 
Act by the Parliament of a Dominion."
2
[1952(2)] S.A. H-28 (A.D.), at p. ^63.
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of Westminster which prescribes the manner in 
which the constituent elements of Parliament 
must function for the purpose of passing legis­
lation.
Ss. 7^ and 8^ of the Statute, which provided for saving 
clauses against any amendment of the Constitution in the 
case of Canada, Australia and New Zealand hut none in 
relation to the Union of South Africa, was also relied 
on in support, hut they were explained away as being 
inserted ex ma.iori cantela in order to quiet any fear 
there might be against misconstruction^.
As to the contention that the Union Parliament, in 
view of the Statute of Westminster, had become the exact
1
Ibid., at p .
2
It provides: “(1) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to
apply to the repeal, amendment or alteration of the 
British North America Acts, 1867 to 1930? or any order, 
rule or regulation made thereunder. (2) The provisions 
of sec.2 of this Act shall extend to laws made by any of 
the Provinces of Canada and to the powers of the legis­
latures of such Provinces. (3) The powers conferred by 
this Act upon the Parliament of Canada or upon the legis­
latures of the Provinces shall be restricted to the 
enactment of laws in relation to matters within the com­
petence of the Parliament of Canada or of any of the 
legislatures of the Provinces, respectively."
3
It provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to
confer any power to repeal or alter the Constitution or 
the Constitution Act of the Commonwealth of Australia or 
New Zealand otherwise than in accordance with the law 
existing before the commencement of this Act."
[1952(2)] S.A. 1*28 (A.D.), at p. 466.
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r e p l i c a  of the  B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t ,  i t  was p o i n t e d  o u t  
t h a t  the  fo rm e r  h av in g  i t s  so u rc e  i n  the  South A f r i c a  Act 
was d i f f e r e n t  i n  k in d  from  th e  l a t t e r .  F o r  a s t a t e  t o  be 
s o v e r e i g n  i t  was n o t  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  the  l e g i s l a t u r e  must  
be c o m p l e t e ly  s o v e r e i g n .  L eg a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  i n  a s t a t e  
m ig h t  be d i v i d e d  b e tw een  two a u t h o r i t i e s .  MIn  the  c a se  cf 
th e  U n i o n , M th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  c o n t i n u e d ,  " l e g a l  s o v e r e i g n ­
t y  i s  or  may be d i v i d e d  be tw een  P a r l i a m e n t  as o r d i iB r i ly
c o n s t i t u t e d  and P a r l i a m e n t  a s  c o n s t i t u t e d  under  s e c .  63
1 2and the  p r o v i s o  to  s e c .  152*M I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of s . 4  of 
th e  S t a t u t e  of W e s tm in s t e r ,  which  had by n e c e s s a r y  i m p l i ­
c a t i o n  b e en  amended by s . 2^ of  the  S t a t u s  o f  th e  Union 
A c t ,  193^5 th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  "To say  t h a t  
th e  Union i s  n o t  a s o v e r e i g n  s t a t e ,  s im p ly  b e c a u se  i t s
1
I b i d . , a t  p .  46k .
2
I t  p r o v i d e s :  "No Act of  P a r l i a m e n t  of  the  U n i t e d  King-
dome p a s s e d  a f t e r  the  commencement of  t h i s  Act s h a l l  
e x t e n d ,  or  by deemed t o  e x t e n d ,  t o  a Dominion as  p a r t  of 
th e  law of  t h a t  Dominion u n l e s s  i t  i s  e x p r e s s l y  d e c l a r e d  
i n  t h a t  Ac t  t h a t  t h a t  Dominion h as  r e q u e s t e d ,  and co n ­
s e n t e d  t o ,  the  e n a c tm e n t  t h e r e o f . "
3
I t  p r o v i d e s :  "The P a r l i a m e n t  of th e  Union s h a l l  be the
s o v e r e i g n  l e g i s l a t i v e  power i n  and over  the  Union,  and 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  a n y th i n g  i n  any o t h e r  law c o n t a i n e d ,  no 
Act  of th e  P a r l i a m e n t  of  th e  U n i t e d  Kingdom and N o r t h e r n  
I r e l a n d  p a s s e d  a f t e r  th e  e l e v e n th  day of December, 1931 5 
s h a l l  e x t e n d ,  o r  be deemed to  e x t e n d ,  to  th e  Union,  
u n l e s s  e x te n d e d  t h e r e t o  by an  Act  of the  P a r l i a m e n t  of  
th e  U n io n ."
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Parliament functioning bicamerally had not the power to 
amend certain sections of the South Africa Act, is to
state a manifest absurdity. Those sections can be amended
1by Parliament sitting unicamerally.”
Attention was then turned on to the consideration of 
NdlwanaTs Case, which was, however, regarded as an author­
ity establishing the Union Parliament as completely 
sovereign in the sense that it could adopt any procedure 
which it might choose. The Chief Justice pointed out 
that the Court in that case did not seem to have applied 
its mind to the question whether the Statute of Westmin­
ster impliedly repealed the 1 entrenched clauses1 of the 
South Africa Act. Thus, following the reasoning adopted 
in the present case, the dicta in Ndlwana*s Case were 
finally, though perhaps reluctantly, dissented from.
Ill
Immediately after the decision in the Vote Case, the
pHigh Court of Parliament Act, 1952 , was passed by a simple 
majority of the two Houses of the Union Parliament sitting 
separately. The purpose of this Act was to make any
1
[1951(2)] S.A. 428 (A.D.), at p. 468.
Act No. 35 of 1952 (South Africa).
2
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judgment  or  o r d e r  of th e  A p p e l l a t e  D i v i s i o n  of  th e
Supreme C o u r t ,  w h e th e r  g i v e n  or  made b e f o r e  or a f t e r  the
commencement of  th e  A c t ,  which i n v a l i d a t e d  i n  whole or
p a r t  an Act o f  P a r l i a m e n t ,  s u b j e c t  to  r e v ie w  by a
P a r l i a m e n t a r y  c o u r t  t o  be known as t h e  High C o u r t  of
Pa r l iam en t"^ .  The C o u r t  was c o n s t i t u t e d  of a l l  members of
2th e  two Houses of th e  Union P a r l i a m e n t  . I t  was empowered 
on any l e g a l  g round  by r e s o l u t i o n  to  c o n f i r m ,  v a r y  or 
s e t  a s i d e  th e  judgment  o r  o r d e r  of th e  Supreme C o u r t  by 
a s im p le  m a j o r i t y  o f  th e  members p r e s e n t  and v o t i n g ;  and 
i t s  d e c i s i o n  was t o  be f i n a l  and b i n d i n g ,  and to  be 
e x e c u te d  i n  e v e r y  r e s p e c t  as  i f  i t  were a d e c i s i o n  of  the  
Supreme C our t  . The p r o c e e d i n g s  were to  be i n i t i a t e d  by 
a M i n i s t e r  of  S t a t e  who sh o u ld  lodge  w i t h  th e  P r e s i d e n t  
of the  C o u r t  an  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  th e  r e v ie w  of  a c a s e ^ .
The a c t u a l  b u s i n e s s  was,  however ,  t o  be c o n d u c ted  by a 
s m a l l e r  body t o  be known as t h e  j u d i c i a l  comm ittee  ( to  
which th e  r e f e r e n c e  would be made by the  P r e s i d e n t  of the  
C our t )  c o n s i s t i n g  of  t e n  members of  the  C o u r t  a p p o i n t e d  by
T
S . 2 .
2
S . 3 0 ) .
3
S . 8 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) ,  and ( 3 ) .
k
S . 5 ( D .
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t h e  P r e s i d e n t ,  and th e  C o u r t  would a c t  upon the  r e p o r t  of
th e  Committee ,  and such  recom m endat ions  as  i t  m igh t  deem
f i t  to  make . I t  was a l s o  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  no member of the
C o u r t  was d i s q u a l i f i e d  from s i t t i n g  a s  a member of th e
C o u r t  or  a j u d i c i a l  com m it tee  by r e a s o n  of the  f a c t  t h a t
he p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  th e  p r o c e e d i n g s  of  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  h i s
c a p a c i t y  as  a member of  e i t h e r  House d u r in g  the  p a s s i n g
of the  Act of P a r l i a m e n t  which formed the  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r
2of the  judgment  or o r d e r  under  r e v ie w  .
I n  p u r s u a n c e  of t h e  p r o v i s i o n s  of the  High C our t  of 
P a r l i a m e n t  A c t ,  th e  Pr ime M i n i s t e r  made an a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  
th e  r e v ie w  of th e  Vote  C a s e , and the  High C o u r t  of P a r l i a ­
ment d e c l a r e d  t h a t  th e  d e c i s i o n  i n  t h a t  c ase  had been  
wrong i n  law .  I n  th e  meanwhile  th e  s u c c e s s f u l  a p p e l l a n t s  
i n  the  Vote Case a p p l i e d  t o  the  Cape P r o v i n c i a l  D i v i s i o n ,  
a s  the  Cour t  of  th e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e , f o r , i n t e r  a l i a , an 
o r d e r  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  th e  High C o u r t  of  P a r l i a m e n t  Act was 
i n v a l i d ,  n u l l  and v o i d  and of no l e g a l  f o r c e  and e f f e c t .  
The Cape P r o v i n c i a l  D i v i s i o n  g r a n t e d  the  o r d e r .  Then an 
a p p e a l  was t a k e n  t o  the  A p p e l l a t e  D i v i s i o n ,  which  i n  
1
S . 6 ( 1 ) ,  ( 2 ) , and ( 8 ) .
2
S . 3 ( 7 ) ( b ) .
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Minister of the Interior v. Harris  ^ unanimously confirmed 
the decision in the Cape Provincial Division. It was held 
that the At altered s.152 of the South Africa Act; 
accordingly, as it was passed hicamerally and not in the 
manner prescribed by s.152, it was invalid. It was fur­
ther held that the High Court of Parliament was not a 
Court of Law such as was envisaged by s.152; nor was it 
in substance, a Court of Law.
Centlivres C.J., first referred to certain rights 
conferred on individuals by s.35 and s.137 and their 
entrenchment by providing a special mode of legislation 
in s.152, and said that it was the duty of the Courts to 
protect those rights and make them effective, unless and 
until they were modified by legislation in such a form 
as under the Constitution could validly affect such 
modification. However "it does not, of course, follow”, 
the Chief Justice added, Mthat Parliament sitting bicam- 
erally is not entitled to amend those sections of the 
Constitution which deal with the Judiciary, but it cannot 
in my opinion bicamerally pass any Act, the effect of 
which would be to render nugatory the rights entrenched 
in the Constitution” . The contention based on the
T
["1952(5-)] S.A. 769 (A.D.) (the High Court Case).
2
Ibid., at p. 78O.
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distinction between substantive law and adjective or 
procedural law was also, in his view, insupportable 
because nto call the rights entrenched in the Constitu­
tion constitutional guarantees and at the same time to 
deny to the holders of those rights any remedy in law 
would be to reduce the safeguards enshrined in s.152 to 
nothing” .
The Chief Justice then passed on to the question 
whether the High Court of Parliament Act infringed the 
provisions of s.152. This question was approached by 
comparing a Court of Law as envisaged by s.152 with the 
High Court of Parliament as provided by the Act, to see 
whether the latter conformed to the requirements of the 
former. It was found that the High Court of Parliament 
was an entirely different type of Court from what was 
envisaged by s.152 ,^ and this fact was, according to the 
Chief Justice, sufficient to justify the view that the 
Act was passed in contravention of s.152.
1
Ibid., at p. 7Ö0*
2
The differences were due to (i) common membership in 
Parliament and the High Court of Parliament, (ii) the 
denial of access to the High Court of Parliament of 
individuals, (iii) and the effect of a decision of the 
High Court of Parliament being the same as legislation 
repealing the safeguards contained in s.152: ibid.. at
p. 782.
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Another (or better) approach, however, to the 
problem whether the High Court of Parliament was in fact 
a Court of Law was, the Chief Justice suggested, to have 
a look at the substance and not merely the form of the 
Act. In form the High Court of Parliament was a "court 
of law"; inform there was a "judicial committee"; and in 
form the High Court of Parliament might on "legal grounds" 
"confirm, vary or set aside" the judgment of the 
Appellate Division. But when one looked at the substance 
of the matter, the so-called "High Court of Parliament" 
was not a Court of Law but was simply Parliament func­
tioning under another name. The High Court of Parliament 
differed in material respects from a Court of Law because 
(i) members of Parliament were also members of the High 
Court of Parliament and they first in their capacity as 
legislators passed an Act and then in their capacity as 
judges were called upon to adjudicate upon it, (ii) 
individuals who had been deprived of their rights, did 
not have access to the High Court of Parliament; it was 
only a Minister of State who was competent to approach 
that Court, although he might not be a party to a dispute^ 
and although parties to a dispute themselves might not 
wish to carry the matter any further, (iii) the High 
Court of Parliament being the highest Court in the land
183.
d e p r i v e d  an i n d i v i d u a l  of  h i s  r i g h t  to  c h a l l e n g e  an Act 
on the  ground t h a t  th e  Act was n o t  p a s s e d  i n  c o n f o r m i ty  
w i t h  th e  p r o c e d u r e  p r e s c r i b e d  by s . 1 5 2 .  The p r o c e d u r e  
p r e s c r i b e d  by th e  Act  was P a r l i a m e n t a r y  and unknown to  
C o u r t s  of Law b e c a u s e  C o u r t s  of Law were n o t  supposed  to  
d e l e g a t e  t o  a body su ch  as  a ‘‘j u d i c i a l  com m ittee"  th e  
t a s k  of  a s c e r t a i n i n g  what th e  law was and t h e n  "by 
r e s o l u t i o n "  g iv e  i t s  judgm ent .  And the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  
High C o u r t  of  P a r l i a m e n t  m igh t  on any " l e g a l  g round" 
c o n f i r m ,  v a r y  or s e t  a s i d e  any judgment  of  th e  A p p e l l a t e  
D i v i s i o n  d i d  n o t  c a r r y  th e  m a t t e r  any f u r t h e r  b e c a u se  i t  
was s t i l l  P a r l i a m e n t  t h a t  was f u n c t i o n i n g  and n o t  a Cour t  
of  Law. “ The r e s u l t  i s  e x a c t l y  th e  same", c o n t i n u e d  the  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e ,  "a s  i f  P a r l i a m e n t  had s a t  u n i c a m e r a l l y  i n  
p a s s i n g  Act 46 of 1951 5 had p a s s e d  t h a t  Act by a m a j o r i t y  
f a l l i n g  s h o r t  of  t h e  p r e s c r i b e d  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  and 
h a d ,  a f t e r  h e a r i n g  c o u n s e l  i n  s e l e c t  c o m m it tee ,  i n s e r t e d  
t h e r e i n  a s e c t i o n  d e c l a r i n g  t h a t  on l e g a l  g rounds  th e  Act 
was v a l i d " ^ .  Thus P a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  n o t  by p a s s i n g  an 
Act  g i v i n g  i t s e l f  t h e  name of  a C o u r t  of Law come to  any 
d e c i s i o n  which  would have the  e f f e c t  of  d e s t r o y i n g  the  
e n t r e n c h e d  p r o v i s i o n s  of  s . 152 .
i
[1952(1+)] S.A. 769,  a t  p .  784.
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O ther  members of  th e  C our t  a l s o ,  l i k e  th e  C h ie f  
J u s t i c e ,  assumed,  though  each  o f f e r i n g  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
g r o u n d s ,  t h a t  u n d e r  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  C o u r t s  of Law had a 
power of  j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  a law which  d e a l t  
w i t h  c e r t a i n  r i g h t s  c o n f e r r e d  on i n d i v i d u a l s  by the  
Te n t r e n c h e d  c l a u s e s 1 , and a t  th e  same t ime p a s s e d  o t h e r ­
w ise  t h a n  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  th e  p r o c e d u r e  p r e s c r i b e d  by 
t h o s e  c l a u s e s .  They a l s o  a g re e d  w i t h  th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  
t h a t  th e  High C o u r t  of P a r l i a m e n t  d id  n o t ,  i n  s u b s t a n c e ,  
conform  to  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of a C o u r t  of Law, and,  t h e r e ­
f o r e ,  t h e  High C o u r t  of P a r l i a m e n t  Act s e t t i n g  up t h a t  
C o u r t  was p a s s e d  i n  c o n t r a v e n t i o n  of  s . 1 5 2  and was i n v a l i d .
B u t  suppose  P a r l i a m e n t  s i t t i n g  b i c a m e r a l l y  p a s s e d  an 
Act p r o v i d i n g  f o r  the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  a t r i b u n a l  which 
conform ed t o  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  a C our t  of Law w i t h  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  to  r e v i e w  th e  d e c i s i o n s  of  th e  A p p e l l a t e  
D i v i s i o n  g en e ra l ly .  Would such  an Act be h e l d  v a l i d ?
C e n t l i v r e s  C . J .  would p o s s i b l y  a g re e  to  up h o ld  the  v a l i d -
■1
i t y  o f  such  an Act  . Greenberg  J .A .  was c l e a r l y  of  the
1
From the  s t a t e m e n t s  made by C e n t l i v r e s  C . J . , i b i d . ,  a t  
pp* 7Ö0 and 7 8 3 j one m ig h t  g e t  th e  i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  the  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  would r e j e c t  any d e v ic e  h a v in g  the  e f f e c t  
o f  r e n d e r i n g  n u g a t o r y  th e  r i g h t s  e n t r e n c h e d  i n  th e  C o n s t i ­
t u t i o n ,  b u t  on r e a d i n g  th e  whole of th e  judgment  of  the  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e  and a l s o  th e  e x p r e s s  s t a t e m e n t  by G reenberg  
J . A . , i b i d . ,  a t  p . 7 8 9 ,  of h i s  b e in g  i n  no d i s a g r e e m e n t  
w i t h  a n y t h i n g  i n  th e  r e a s o n s  g i v e n  by th e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  
i t  seems t h a t  t h e y  would have o b j e c t e d  o n ly  to  an Act 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  a t r i b u n a l  which  d i d  n o t  conform to  the  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  of a C o u r t  of  Law.
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o p i n i o n  t h a t  i t  c o u ld  v a l i d l y  he done "w h e th e r  i t  be a 
g e n e r a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  or a j u r i s d i c t i o n  l i m i t e d  to  c e r t a i n  
q u e s t i o n s "  • On the  o t h e r  hand ,  S c h r e i n e r  J .A .  th o u g h t  
i t  u n n e c e s s a r y  and t o  some e x t e n t  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  to  
p r o c e e d  on th o s e  l i n e s  b eca u se  " i t  would i n v o lv e  a r a d i c a l  
d e p a r t u r e  f rom th e  j u d i c i a l  h i e r a r c h y  s e t  up i n  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n  and a g rav e  im pa i rm en t  of th e  p r o t e c t i v e  
sy s tem  i m p l i c i t  i n  s . 1 5 2 " ^ .  He would t h u s  r e g a r d  the  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  such  a t r i b u n a l  as  h a v in g  the  e f f e c t  of 
a l t e r i n g  o r  amending th e  r i g h t s  e n t r e n c h e d  by s . 152«
Van Den Heever J .A .  ad o p te d  a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  
a p p ro a c h  w hich  was b a s e d  p r i m a r i l y  on th e  supremacy of  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n .  "The f a c t  r em a in s"  he s a i d ,  " t h a t  th e  
South  A f r i c a  Act  i s  our  c o n s t i t u t i o n  and a p a r t  from t h a t  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e r e  a r e  no o rg a n s  of  s t a t e  and no p o w e rs" ^ .  
The powers of P a r l i a m e n t  had t h e i r  s o u rc e  i n  th e  South  
A f r i c a  A c t ,  t h e r e  b e in g  no o t h e r  c o n c e i v a b l e  so u rc e  of 
such  power,  and t h e r e f o r e  i n  the  e x e r c i s e  of  t h o s e  powers 
P a r l i a m e n t  must  c o n t i n u e  t o  o b s e r v e  the  p r o v i s i o n s  of t h a t  
A c t .  Under the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  P a r l i a m e n t  f u n c t i o n i n g  
1
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  785 .
2
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  788 .
I b i d . , a t  p . 791 •
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b i c a m e r a l l y  had u n l i m i t e d  power t o  r e o r g a n i s e  the  
j u d i c i a r y .  I t  c o u ld  t h u s  c r e a t e  a Court ,  or C o u r ts ,  
s u p e r i o r  t o  th e  A p p e l l a t e  D i v i s i o n  and c o n f e r  upon them 
such  j u r i s d i c t i o n  as  i t  t h o u g h t  f i t .  However t h e r e  was 
o n ly  one l i m i t a t i o n  t h a t  the  C o u r t  so c r e a t e d  must  be a 
C o u r t  of  Law. As a C o u r t  of  Law was c o n c e iv e d  as  be in g  
th e  a r b i t e r  be tw een  P a r l i a m e n t  and s u b j e c t s ,  i t  was s a i d
t h a t  Mi t  must  n e c e s s a r i l y  be a body o t h e r  t h a n  P a r l i a m e n t
1
and c a p a b le  of  p a s s i n g  judgment  on t h a t  i s s u e ” .
However, t h e  im p o r ta n c e  of  th e  c a se  l i e s  i n  the
r e c o g n i t i o n  of  the  f a c t  t h a t  though  the  High C o u r t  of
P a r l i a m e n t  Act  p r o v i d e d  i n  form o n ly  f o r  an  amendment of
the  j u d i c i a l  sy s te m ,  i t  was i n  s u b s t a n c e  an a t t e m p t  by
P a r l i a m e n t  s i t t i n g  b i c a m e r a l l y  t o  a l t e r  or amend s . 1 5 2 .
2
T h is  a s p e c t  was d i s c u s s e d  i n  d e t a i l  by C e n t l i v r e s  C . J .  ,
w i t h  whom G reenberg  J .A .  was i n  no d i s a g r e e m e n t  . H oex te r
J .A .  a l s o  e m p h as ised  i t  i n  s u p p o r t  of h i s  a rgum ents
a g a i n s t  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of the  A c t .  He s a i d :
To a c c e p t  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  the  High C our t  i s  
a C o u r t  of Law b e c a u s e  the  Act says  so would be 
to  assume th e  v a l i d i t y  of  th e  Act  and t h e r e f o r e
1
I b i d . j  a t  p .  792.
2
See s u p r a , a t  p p .  1 8 2 -3 .
[ 1 9 5 2 0 ) ]  S.A. 769 , a t  p .  787 .
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to beg the very question in issue. It is 
because this Court may not assume the validity 
of the Act that it is its duty to penetrate 
the form of the Act in order to ascertain its 
substance‘.
Schreiner J.A. used rather different expression but 
meant to apply the same principle. In reaching his 
conclusion that the High Court of Parliament was not a 
Court of Law he said that by “wearing some of the trapp­
ings of a Court“ Parliament had “simply itself assumed
2the role of watchman over its own actions" . Van Den 
Heever J.A. also thought the same way. “No legislative 
organ", he said, "can perform an act of levitation and 
lift itself above its own powers by the bootstraps of 
method"^. It was pointed out that if a legislature did 
not succeed in barring avenues to the realisation of some 
mischief which was sought to be repressed, it would be 
perfectly legitimate for the subject to practise evasion 
and a Court would give the statute a restrictive inter­
pretation. It would be a different matter, however, if 
the statute expressly applied curbs on legislative powers 
in the interests of the subject. In the latter case "a 
Court would not be doing its duty“ , he said, “if by
1
Ibid., at p. 796.2
Ibid., at p. 788.
Ibid., at p . 790.
3
1 8 8.
mechanical adherence to words it allowed the patent 
intention of the constituent Legislature to be defeated 
and the rights to be proscribed" .
Van Den Heever J.A. also said that "it (Parliament)
cannot empower another to do what it cannot do by 
2itself" . This statement by itself stands to reason, 
but according to his previous reasoning, no question 
of "empowering" another body arose here; it was the 
proper function of the judiciary to decide the issue, and 
his Honour had conceded that Parliament could reorganise 
the judiciary. Hence the only question was whether the 
"High Court of Parliament" constituted a "reorganised 
judiciary" or something else. If the Court in question 
had conformed to the requirements of a Court of Law, 
there would have been no further question of empowering 
it because, according to him, it would then have the 
capacity to adjudicate upon any question (of course, 
depending upon its place in the hierarchy of Courts of 
Law) as being the arbiter between Parliament and subjects.
However this statement of Van Den Heever J.A.
1
Ibid., at p. 79^*
Ibid., at p. 790.
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a p p e a r s  to  become r e l e v a n t  i n  th e  c o n t e x t  of  th e  v iew  
t a k e n  by G reenberg  J .A .  , and p o s s i b l y  C e n t l i v r e s  C . J .  , as 
t o  the  c o n f e r r i n g  of g e n e r a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  on a b i c a m e r a l l y -  
c r e a t e d  t r i b u n a l  which  conformed t o  the  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of a 
C o u r t  o f  Law. A cco rd in g  to  them, such  a c o n fe rm e n t  co u ld  
v a l i d l y  be c a r r i e d  o u t  un d e r  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  B u t  would 
t h i s  n o t  have the  e f f e c t  of r e n d e r i n g  n u g a to r y  th e  s a f e ­
g u a rd s  e n s h r i n e d  i n  s .1 5 2 ?  I f  P a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  n o t  a l t e r  
or  amend th e  1 e n t r e n c h e d  c l a u s e s 1 e x c e p t  i n  a manner 
p r e s c r i b e d  by s . 152s i t  c o u ld  n o t  a c c o r d i n g l y  empower 
a n o t h e r  body to  a l t e r  o r  amend t h o s e  c l a u s e s  u n l e s s  i t  
a d o p te d  th e  p r o c e d u r e  p r e s c r i b e d  by s . 152 , even  a l t h o u g h  
t h a t  body m ig h t  conform to  the  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of  a C o u r t  of 
Law. Here th e  r em ark s  of S c h r e i n e r  J .A .  m ig h t  be r e c a l l e d .  
" O th e r  t r i b u n a l s  can  r e a d i l y  be c o n c e iv e d " ,  he s a i d ,
"which  would o r d i n a r i l y  be c a l l e d  C o u r t s  of Law b u t  to  
which  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t  c o u ld  
e f f e c t i v e l y  e n t r u s t  by b i c a m e r a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  th e  power 
t o  d e c l a r e  th e  v a l i d i t y  o r  i n v a l i d i t y  of A c ts  of 
P a r l i a m e n t "  . These rem arks  a p p e a r  t o  be more r e a l i s t i c  
and i n  l i n e  w i t h  th e  s p i r i t  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h a n  the  
v iew s  of  C e n t l i v r e s  C . J .  and G reenberg  J .A .
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 7 8 8 .
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After an unfavourable decision in the High Court 
Case, the Government thought of vindicating the
1 sovereignty of Parliament1 2 by an Act passed unicamerally 
with a two-thirds majority so that the Act might not any 
more be open to attack in the Courts. In September 1953 
and again in May 1955- attempts were made to validate the 
Separate Representation of Voters1 Act of 1951? in a 
joint session of both Houses of Parliament, but each time 
the Bill lapsed because it failed to secure the necessary 
two-thirds majority. Then in May 1955 the Government 
introduced a Bill to provide for a dissolution and recon­
stitution of the Senate, such that the Government would 
at any joint sitting of both the Houses have a two-thirds 
majority. The Bill was passed bicamerally and became an 
Act known as the Senate Act, 1955 • THe political aims cf 
the Act were no secret; they were to put the Coloureds on 
a separate roll and to put the 1 sovereignty of Parliament1 
beyond all doubt in terms of the decision in Ndlwana*s 
Case, but the preamble to the Act did not state any reason
pfor the expediency . The Senate was accordingly
1Act No.53 of 1955 (South Africa).
2The preamble to the Act simply stated thus: nTo make 
provision for the dissolution and the constitution of the 
Semte, to amend the South Africa Act, 1909 5 and the 
South-West Africa Affairs Amendment Act, 19^95 and to 
provide for matters incidental thereto.”
IV
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reconstituted under the Act, and the Government could 
command a two-thirds majority in a joint session of both
-jthe Houses. In March 1956 the South Africa Amendment Act , 
hereinafter called the Validation Act, which purported 
to validate the Separate Representation Act and to abolish 
the jurisdiction of the Courts to pronounce upon the 
validity of Acts of Parliament , was passed by a two-thirds 
majority in a joint session of both the Houses in conform­
ity with the provisions of s.152 of the South Africa Act.
A coloured person living in the Cape Province applied 
to the Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court for 
an order declaring that the Senate Act as well as the 
Validation Act were invalid, null and void and of no legal 
force in terms of s.35 and s.152 of the South Africa Act.
It was alleged that the Senate Act, in itself or in con­
junction with the Validation Act, had the effect of des­
troying the constitutional guarantees contained in s.35 
and s.152, and was enacted as part of a legislative plan 
or scheme designed to effect indirectly the removal of 
cohured voters from the common roll in the Cape Province 
and to disqualify coloured persons in future from 
1
Act No. 9 of 1956 (South Africa).
2
With the expressed exception of Bills affecting the 
status of the English and Dutch languages (s. 137 and 
s.152 of the South Africa Act).
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registration on such roll, in violation of the rights 
safeguarded to them in terms of s.35 and s.l52. Such a 
plan or scheme was denied by the Government and it was 
stated that the Senate Act was passed in the bona fide 
view that it could be passed by Parliament sitting bicam- 
erally^, that the reconstitution of the Senate might 
assist in the final ending of the constitutional situation 
and that the Validation Act was passed in the bona fide 
view that it could be passed at a joint sitting of the 
two Houses of Parliament in conformity with the provisions 
of s.35 and s.l 52 of the South .Africa Act. The Cape 
Provincial Division upheld the validity of the impugned 
Acts and dismissed the application. An appeal was then 
taken to the Appellate Division, which, with the dissent 
of Schreiner J.A., confirmed the decision of the Provin-
pcial Division in Collins v. Minister of the Interior .
The majority judgment was delivered by Centlivres 
C.J., with Steyn J.A., delivering a separate concurring 
judgment. According to the majority, the Senate Act and
the Validation Act, when taken by themselves, could not be
1
See So25 of the South'Africa Act, which provides; "Par­
liament may provide for the manner in which the Senate 
shall be constituted after the expiration of ten years,
M• • o •
2
(1957(1)] S.A. 552, (A.D.) (the Senate Case).
193
s a i d  to  be i n v a l i d  a s  an  i n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  the  ^ e n t r e n c h e d  
c l a u s e s 1 , as  th e  f o r m e r  d i d  n o t  r e p e a l  or  a l t e r  any 
p r o v i s i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  th o s e  s e c t i o n s  and the  l a t t e r  was 
p a s s e d  by more t h a n  a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  a t  the  j o i n t  
s e s s i o n  of  b o t h  th e  Houses of P a r l i a m e n t .  I t  was c l e a r  
t h a t  the  o b j e c t  of  p a s s i n g  the  Se n a te  Act was t o  i n c r e a s e  
th e  membership of  th e  S ena te  so t h a t  the  Government would 
s u c c e e d  i n  o b t a i n i n g  th e  n e c e s s a r y  t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  
a t  a j o i n t  s e s s i o n  of  b o t h  the  Houses i n  o r d e r  t o  v a l i d a t e  
the  S e p a r a t e  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  A c t ,  b u t  i f  P a r l i a m e n t  
s i t t i n g  b i c a m e r a l l y  had p l e n a r y  power to  r e c o n s t i t u t e  
th e  S e n a te ,  t h a t  o b j e c t  b e in g  th e  m o t iv e  or u l t e r i o r  
p u r p o s e  would be i r r e l e v a n t  i n  law .  " I f  a l e g i s l a t u r e " ,  
s a i d  the  C h ie f  J u s t i c e ,  "has  p l e n a r y  power to  l e g i s l a t e  
on a p a r t i c u l a r  m a t t e r  no q u e s t i o n  c an  a r i s e  as t o  the  
v a l i d i t y  o f  any l e g i s l a t i o n  on t h a t  m a t t e r  and such  l e g i s ­
l a t i o n  i s  v a l i d  w h a te v e r  the  r e a l  p u rp o se  of  t h a t  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  is""^ •
I t  was c o n te n d e d  t h a t  th e  r e c o n s t i t u t e d  Sen a te  was n o t  
one of th e  "Houses of  P a r l i a m e n t "  w i t h i n  th e  meaning of  
s . 1 5 2 . I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  s . 1 5 2  sh o u ld  be c o n s t r u e d  i n  such
manner as to  i n v a l i d a t e  any Act w h ich  d e s t r o y e d  any
_
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  5^5 ( I t a l i c s  s u p p l i e d ) .
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e n t r e n c h e d  r i g h t s  when such  an Act  was p a s s e d  by means of 
a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  which  was a r t i f i c a l l y  c r e a t e d  f o r  
t h e  v e r y  p u rp o se  of  p a s s i n g  t h a t  A c t .  A ccord ing  to  the  
C h ie f  J u s t i c e ,  t h e r e  was no a u t h o r i t y  f o r  j u s t i f y i n g  such 
a c o n s t r u c t i o n .  The S ena te  A c t ,  which  c r e a t e d  the  a r t ­
i f i c i a l  m a j o r i t y ,  was n o t  h i t  by s . 1 5 2  u n l e s s  one r e a d  
som eth ing  by i m p l i c a t i o n  i n t o  t h a t  s e c t i o n  ( t h e r e  b e in g  
no e x p r e s s  statement to  t h a t  e f f e c t )  . P a r l i a m e n t  s i t t i n g  
b i c a m e r a l l y  m ig h t  c o n c e i v a b l y  c i r c u m v e n t  the  p r o v i s i o n s  
of  s . 152 by r e c o n s t i t u t i n g  e i t h e r  House or b o th  Houses 
f o r  th e  p u rp o se  of  p r o v i d i n g  th e  Government w i t h  the  
n e c e s s a r y  m a j o r i t y ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  the  o n ly  remedy f o r  such 
an abuse  of power was an a p p e a l  to  th e  e l e c t o r a t e .
The High C o u r t  Case was d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from th e  
p r e s e n t  one on th e  ground  t h a t  th e  s o - c a l l e d  High Cour t  
of P a r l i a m e n t  was n o t  a C o u r t  of Law so as  to  p r o v i d e  the  
s a n c t i o n  o f  i n v a l i d i t y  b u t  i n  s u b s t a n c e  s im ply  P a r l i a m e n t  
f u n c t i o n i n g  u n d e r  a n o t h e r  name, w hereas  i n  the  p r e s e n t  
c a s e  i t  c o u ld  n o t  be s a i d  t h a t  th e  r e c o n s t i t u t e d  Sena te  
was n o t  a Sena te  i n  th e  o r d i n a r y  meaning of t h a t  word.
As th e  Senate  Act  was n o t  h i t  by the  p r o v i s i o n s  of  s . 1 5 2 ,  
i t  f o l l o w e d  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t  s i t t i n g  b i c a m e r a l l y  had 
p l e n a r y  powers to  r e c o n s t i t u t e  th e  S e n a te  i n  any manner 
i t  p l e a s e d  and t h a t  th e  p u rp o se  or m o t ive  which i t  had i n
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mind was irrelevant in law.
It was further contended that following the High 
Court Case, the direct effect of the Senate Act was to 
render nugatory the appellant1s rights entrenched by s.35 
and s.1525 it was the passing of that Act (bicamerally) 
that resulted in the passing of the Validation Act 
rendering the appellant*s rights valueless; and the fram­
ers of the Constitution never intended that the entrenched 
rights could be deprived by means of a legislative plan 
or scheme otherwise than by means of a genuine two-thirds 
majority at a joint sitting of the two Houses. The Chief 
Justice approached this contention by considering each 
step taken in the scheme and came to the conclusion that 
each of the Acts, was, on its face, intra vires and each 
was enacted by a legislature which was competent to enact 
it. Thus each step in the legislative scheme to pass the 
Validation Act was taken in accordance with the provisions 
of the South Africa Act and the scheme as a whole was 
designed in such a way that the Separate Representation 
Act would be validated in accordance with the requirements 
of s.35 and s.152.
The dissent of Schreiner J.A., was in sharp contrast 
to the majority judgment. He was of the view that a
1 9(\
Senate constituted ad hoc for the purpose of securing, 
by nomination, or its equivalent, a two-thirds majority 
in a contemplated joint sitting was not a House of Parlia­
ment within the meaning of s.152. There did not seem to 
be any doubt that Parliament could, acting bicamerally, 
assign to any body of persons whatsoever the title of 
Senate and give it the ordinary functions exercisable 
bicamerally. But any legislative action which affected 
the entrenched rights must conform to the requirements of 
s.152, as a matter of substance and not merely as a matter 
of form. It was thus necessaiy to examine the circum­
stances surrounding the passing of the Senate Act, to see 
whether the reconstituted Senate was really a House of 
Parliament for the purposes of s.152. The proviso to 
that section was intended to furnish a real and not a 
merely theoretical protection against Parliamentary 
majorities acting bicamerally. The framers of the Con­
stitution did not intend that Parliament should have the 
power by bicameral legislation to convert an insufficient 
majority in a joint session into a sufficient one, merely 
by invoking the procedure of nomination or its equivalent.
The argument for the Government was based upon the 
reasoning that so long as the legislation affecting the
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f r a n c h i s e  of th e  c o l o u r e d  p e o p le  could he s p l i t  up i n t o  
s t a g e s ,  e ac h  of  which  t a k e n  by i t s e l f  was l e g a l  ( a s  
happened t o  be th e  c a s e ) , the  whole was l e g a l ,  even though  
the  two or  more A c ts  r e q u i r e d  c o n s t i t u t e d  a l e g i s l a t i v e  
p l a n  to  c r e a t e  a t w o - t h i r d s  m a j o r i t y  by i n t r o d u c i n g  i n t o  
th e  l e g i s l a t u r e  p e r s o n s  n o m in a ted  f o r  th e  s o l e  p u rp o se  of 
s e c u r i n g  t h a t  m a j o r i t y .  There a p p e a re d  to  b e ,  s a i d  
S c h r e i n e r  J . A . ,  no a u t h o r i t y  f o r  such  a p r o p o s i t i o n  and i t  
seemed to  be c o n t r a r y  to  p r i n c i p l e .  In  g e n e r a l  the  p a r t s  
of a scheme to o k  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r  from the  w h o le .  A 
scheme to  d e f r a u d  was an o b v ious  exam ple .  A no the r  was 
a scheme t o  g e t  round  a l e g i s l a t i v e  o b s t a c l e .
Then, a c c o r d i n g  to  S c h r e i n e r  J . A . , where t h e r e  was a 
le g i s l a t i v e  p l a n  to  do i n d i r e c t l y  what the  l e g i s l a t u r e  
had no power t o  do d i r e c t l y ,  the  p l a n  and i t s  p u rp o se  
m ig h t  become c r u c i a l  to  v a l i d i t y .  Thus the  v a l i d i t y  of 
what P a r l i a m e n t  d i d  i n  p a s s i n g  th e  Sente  A c t ,  i n  h i s  v iew ,  
c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  th e  p u rp o se  w i th  which  i t  was done and 
o n ly  by h a v in g  r e g a r d  t o  t h a t  p u rp o se  one c o u ld  judge 
w h e th e r  th e  S e n a te  s e t  up by t h a t  Act was a House of 
P a r l i a m e n t  w i t h i n  th e  meaning of  s . 1 5 2 .
I t  was p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  m o t iv e  and p u rp o se  were n o t  
a lw ays  u se d  i n  t h e  same se n se  a l t h o u g h  one was som etim es
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used as equivalent to the other, and it made no differ­
ence whether the legislature had attempted to disguise 
its purposes or whether it had made no such attempt. 
However, in the absence of any clear purpose expressed in 
the Senate Act and if in fact the only real expediency 
related to the creation of a two-thirds majority in the 
contemplated joint sitting, the Act was in truth legisla­
tion for the amendment of Cape franchise which was 
disguised as legislation for the improvement of the 
Senate. An identical Senate Act passed in other circum­
stances not connected with a plan to provide a two-thirds 
majority in the contemplated joint sitting would have been 
a valid Act. uThe difference in the two results of the 
identical Act follows," explained Schreiner J.A., "not 
from a difference between the motives of the legislators, 
but from a difference in the purpose of the two Acts, the 
one being part of a legislative plan, the other not" .
Also a legislative plan to secure a two-thirds majority by 
modifying the system of delimitation of electoral areas 
so as to favour the Government, or by changing the quali­
fications of voters, as for instance, by reducing the age 
limit, might not be invalid as being too remote a
i
Ibid., at p. 580.
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conseq u en ce  t o  w a r r a n t  th e  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h a t  was th e  
p u rp o se  of  th e  A c t ,  I t  m igh t  o n ly  he e q u i v a l e n t  to  a 
mo t  iv  e ,
S c h r e i n e r  J . A . , r e f e r r e d  to  th e  High C o u r t  C a s e , 
and s a i d  t h a t  th e  c r u c i a l  d e f e c t  i n  the  High C o u r t  of 
P a r l i a m e n t  was,  n o t  t h a t  i t  c o ld  i n  no c i r c u m s ta n c e s  be 
r e g a r d e d  as  a c o u r t ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  was n o t  a c o u r t  f o r  the  
p u r p o s e s  o f  s . 1 5 2 ,  and the p o s i t i o n  of  the  S ena te  under  
the  S e n a te  Act seemed to  be s i m i l a r .  I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  
the  High C o u r t  of P a r l i a m e n t  was n o t  g iv e n  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
i n  m a t t e r s  o t h e r  t h a n  th o s e  i n  which  th e  v a l i d i t y  of  an  
Act o f  P a r l i a m e n t  was i n  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  had i t  b e en  g iv e n  
such  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i t  would have made no d i f f e r e n c e .  
S i m i l a r l y  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  p l a n  f o l l o w e d  by P a r l i a m e n t  
was t o  p a s s  an  Act  which  d id  n o t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  be tw een  
the  two f u n c t i o n s  o f  th e  Sena te  ( f o r  the  p u r p o s e s  of 
s .152 and o t h e r w i s e ) ,  c o u ld  n o t  make any d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
the  s u b s t a n c e  of  th e  m a t t e r .
B o th  th e  m a j o r i t y  and th e  m i n o r i t y  r e f e r r e d  to  the  
A m er ican ,  C an ad ian  or  A u s t r a l i a n  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  s u p p o r t  
of t h e i r  a rg u m e n t s .  How f a r  t h e s e  a u t h o r i t i e s  co u ld  be 
a s a f e  g u id e  to  d e a l  w i t h  p rob lem s  a r i s i n g  i n  a u n i t a r y  
s t a t e  l i k e  Sou th  A f r i c a  c o u ld  n o t  be s a i d  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y .
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In a federal constitution legislative power is divided 
between central government and regional governments and 
courts have a power to review their actions in case of 
an encroachment by one over the jurisdiction of the other, 
whereas in a unitary constitution there is no such divi­
sion of power and courts have no such role to play. To 
this extent there is no similarity between the constitu­
tions of the United States, Canada and Australia, and the 
constitution of South Africa. However, a written con­
stitution, federal or unitary, may provide for civil 
liberties and prescribe checks against their alteration 
or repeal. In this respect the Bill of Rights in the 
United States Constitution may seem to bear an analogy to 
the intrenched clauses1 in the South Africa Act. But 
this analogy is rather superficial than real as under the 
United States constitution the process of amendment is tte 
same for the Bill of Rights as for the rest of the con­
stitution, whereas it is only the intrenched rights1 
which enjoy a special status in the South African Act.
Thus a problem such as the one involved in the present 
case would not arise in the United States, and the cases 
decided by the Supreme Court might not be a safe guide 
for courts in South Africa. However, the authorities 
from the federations appear to have been used under the
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impression that the 1 entrenched clauses1 bear a fair 
analogy to provisions delimiting competing spheres in a 
federation.
Under the South Africa Act there is only one Parlia­
ment empowered to exercise legislative functions in the 
Union and no question of competence would arise as such 
in the courts. However, it may have to follow different 
procedures, bicamerally or unicamerally, for different 
purposes as provided in the Act, and non-compliance with 
a procedure may provide an occasion for its actions to be 
challenged in a court. A problem of characterisation 
might arise but only in an indirect way, if at all, for 
the purpose of ascertaining whether proper procedure has 
been followed in the passing of a law in question. Even 
when the characterisation of a law is in issue, since the 
supremacy of Parliament is the rule and non-compliance 
with the procedure only exceptionally an invalidating 
factor, it is the necessary legal effect of the law that 
should be the determining factor for validity. Thus 
one would expect that purpose may not be so important in 
South Africa as in a federation. Moreover, civil libert­
ies guaranteed in a constitution confer no positive 
functions, but act as prohibitions upon the powers of a
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legislature, and it is all the more pertinent to look to 
the law rather than its consequences. It is true that 
policy considerations play an important role in the 
United States Supreme Court, but that is mainly due to 
the concept of “due process of law“ which does not appear 
in the South AMca Act. Further, the intrenched clauses1, 
in contrast with the Bill of Rights which act as prohib­
itions of substance, provide a check only of procedure, 
and this fact also minimises the importance of setting 
or context and consequences of a law.
However, though there was no disagreement that the 
motive which actuated the legislation was irrelevant, the 
basic difference between the two approaches centred round 
the relevancy of purpose. The majority thought that the 
purpose for which an Act or a scheme consis ting of two or 
more Acts was passed was irrelevant in law because the 
operation of the proviso of s.1?2 was confined to an Act 
which would have the legal effect of rendering nugatory 
the entrenched rights. On the other hand, the minority 
was of the view that the subject-matter and the setting 
or context were often of crucial importance, and a plan 
consisting of two or more Acts must be examined as a 
whole by reference to its ultimate effect in spite of the
fact that each Act taken by itself belonged to a different
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field. It is true that the distinction between purpose 
ard motive is sometimes difficult to work out, but they am 
not the same. However, a possibility of abuse, even if 
it be almost certain under the circumstances, would rank 
only as motive. Bearing this in mind, an Act has first 
to be characterised as affecting entrenched or unentrenched 
rights. Then the validity of the Act depends entirely on 
the procedure adopted by Parliament, as entrenched rights 
could be destroyed only at a joint sitting of the two 
Houses of Parliament, in terms of the proviso to s.152.
In the Senate Act tbre was nothing which gave any indica­
tion that its provisions were likely to be used in order 
to avoid the proviso to s.152. The purpose was to 
reconstitute the Senate and the Act could not be charac­
terised as affecting the entrenched rights. The Valida­
tion Act did affect the entrenched rights but it was 
passed in conformity with the proviso to s.1^2. Thus the 
scheme or plan was not to affect indirectly something 
which Parliament did not have the power to achieve 
directly. Schreiner J.A., of course, realised "Where is 
one to stop"? but he went too far in the direction of 
reading the "purpose" into the legislation.
Both the majority and minority heavily relied on the
2 0 *+. •
High Court Case. The crucial question in that case was 
whether the High Court of Parliament Act rendered the 
entrenched rights nugatory in law. If that was so, the 
Act must have been passed in conformity to the proviso 
to s.152. There it was assumed by all the members of the 
Court, rightly or wrongly, that a power of judicial review 
existed under the South Africa Act to enforce the entrench­
ed rights. Thus if a new Court was to be provided so 
as to review the decisions of the Appellate Division, it 
must be in substance, not in form, a Court of Law. But 
it was found that the High Court of Parliament as provided 
in the Act was not in substance a Court of Law. In other 
words, it had the effect of rendering the entrenched 
rights nugatory in law. However, similar considerations 
do not apply to the Senate reconstituted under the Sere, te 
Act. No assumption could be read in the proviso to s.152 
against the reconstitution of the Senate. On the other 
hand, it is expressly provided in the South Africa Act 
that it could validly be done by Parliamentsitting 
bicamerally. In another respect too the present case 
differed in that the question related to the validity of 
two Acts constituting a plan or scheme whereas the High 
Court Case involved only one Act. In the case of a plan 
or scheme the Acts must be so inter-connected as to be 
apparent, or raise a very strong presumption, to achieve
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a certain purpose or object. No such inter-connection 
was noticeable in the plan or scheme involved in the 
present case.
However, from the point of view of the maxim we are 
considering, the contrast between the High Court of Par­
liament Case and the Senate Case brings out with unusual 
clarity two general points of importance.
Firstly, there is the question of directness1 and 
1 indirectness1. We can assume in the two cases, as a 
result of the decision in the Vote Case, that "abolition 
of the coloured vote otherwise than by a joint meeting" 
was the prohibited purpose which might not be achieved 
directly and therefore not indirectly. But there was 
obviously a considerable contrast in the machinery of the 
two cases on this from the point of what was being 
achieved. If the High Court of Parliament Act had been 
held valid, then undoubtedly the coloured vote would have 
been abolished without a joint meeting of parliament.
That is, the very thing which was prohibited would have 
been achieved. But under the Senate Act, a state of 
affairs was created in which the prohibited thing1 was 
not achieved at all. The abolition of the coloured vote
pursuant to the Senate Act was carried out at a joint
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meeting. The dissenting opinion of Schreiner A.J. 
involves as its basis not merely the proposition: "coloured 
vote shall not be abolished save at a joint meeting"; it 
involves the much wider proposition: "coloured vote shall
not be abolished even at a joint meeting if other powers 
have been used so as to ensure that there will be a 
suitable vote at that meeting". Indeed, his Honour*s 
view went close to saying: "coloured vote shall not be
abolished at all", which is plainly not the constitutional 
prohibition. It was a somewhat bold and courageous step 
for the appellate court to take when it constructed the 
first prohibition mentioned as if it were a fundamental 
guarantee of the same politico-legal type as the guarantees 
in the first fourteen amendments to the Constitution of 
the U.S.A. To expand this prohibition into the second 
form advocated by Schreiner A.J. would in effect have 
landed the Court in the embarrassing responsibility of 
investigating and weighing up all the motives and purposes 
which might influence any government and parliamentary 
majority when proposing any alteration in the franchise, 
electoral districts, aisent voting laws etc. in relation 
to the Senate. Indeed, the restriction would not have 
been confined to the Senate, since the required majority 
could equally well result from an alteration in the size
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and political balance of the Lower House. Perhaps, 
indeed, Schreiner A. J.*s view would have involved the 
consequence that the laws relating to the structure of 
parliament would have to remain frozen so long as the 
abolition of the coloured vote was a political issue at 
all.
This leads us to the second important point arising 
from these cases. They can be seen as involving the 
Court in a choice of two legal values, or perhaps one 
should say ’’constitutional1 values. This is seen most 
clearly in the Senate Case. On the one hand was the 
value of preserving so far as possible the rights pro­
tected by the entrenched clauses. On the other hand was 
the constitutional vsLue of the legislature*s power to 
pass bicamerally any legislation dealing with the 
structure of the Houses of Parliament; the competence of 
Parliament to deal with those questions has always been 
regarded by the communities of the British Commonwealth 
as an important value, a competence which ought to be 
possessed by legislatures and through them by the people 
at large. The view adopted by Schreiner A.J. would 
necessarily have placed a considerable restraint on the 
legislative competence to deal with the structure of
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Parliament. Moreover, although the Senate Act was 
undoubtedly framed for a motive derived from the position 
of coloured voters, and for the purpose of abolishing 
that vote, it was not in itself legislation of an unusual 
type. The Senate was a political body, making political 
decisions for political reasons, and this essential 
character was in no way altered by the Senate Act. Hence 
to strike this legislation down for the purpose of 
preserving the coloured vote would have involved a very 
serious clash between the two "constitutional values" 
concerned.
But there was also a clash of this character in the 
High Court Case. It is not so clearly seen because of 
the empirical circumstance that the High Court of 
Parliament Act was not on its face an ordinary exercise 
of the relevant kind of legislative power - here, 
power with respect to the structure of the judiciary.
But there was a clash of values in this case. The values 
embodied in the entrenched clauses had to be weighed 
against the constitutional value of a competence to re­
organise the judiciary. Here it was possible and persuas­
ive to prefer the values of the entrenched clauses, 
precisely because the operation of transforming
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parliament into a court was in the setting of contemporary 
government so bizarre, so unlikely to occur at all fre­
quently, if ever again. The contrast between the two 
cases is therefore brought out by putting to a practical 
democratic statesman, familiar with the fundamental ways 
of thought of modern constitutional states, the following 
questions. "If the High Court of Parliament Act is held 
invalid, you may be denied the power of vesting in the 
legislature for the time being a power to determine 
particular legal disputes as if the legislature were a 
court. Is this a serious restriction on your future com­
petence? If the Senate Act is held invalid, you may be 
denied the power in relation to either House of Parliamert 
to amend the law relating to the qualifications for voters 
and candidates, the distribution of voters in electorates, 
the kind of electoral counting system used and any other 
details of the electoral arrangements if it is shown 
that this is being done in order to increase the chances 
of a particular majority being achieved at a joint meeting 
of the two Houses. Is this a serious restriction of 
your future competence?1'
After the decision in the Senate Case, courts were 
left with no jurisdiction to review Acts of Parliament.
2 1 0 .
However, th e  e x p e r im e n t  i n  South  A f r i c a  d i s p l a y e d  t h a t  
even  i n  a u n i t a r y  c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  c o u r t s  c o u l d ,  on the  
a s s u m p t io n  of  a power of j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w ,  d e c l a r e  an Act 
of  P a r l i a m e n t  i n v a l i d  as  i n f r i n g i n g  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  of  a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  South  A f r i c a  th e  c o n f l i c t  a r o s e  due to  
the  d i f f e r i n g  o p i n io n s  a s  to  the  c o n c e p t  of 1 s o v e r e i g n t y  
of P a r l i a m e n t 5 . D ic e y t s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of a S o v e r e i g n 1 
and 5n o n - s o v e r e i g n 1 body i s  n o t  u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p t e d  
t o d a y ,  and a l e g i s l a t u r e  hav ing  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  
may "be s o v e r e i g n  w i t h i n  the  scope of i t s  d e f i n e d  p o w ers .  
Even D i c e y 1 s p o l i t i c a l  d o c t r i n e  of  S o v e r e i g n t y 1 - 
P a r l i a m e n t  c an  do or  undo a n y th in g  w h a te v e r  and i s  s u b j e c t  
t o  no l i m i t a t i o n s  -  has  been  c o n s i d e r a b l y  m o d i f i e d  a f t e r  
th e  p a s s i n g  of the  S t a t u t e  of  W e s t m in s t e r ,  1931• Can s.H- 
of th e  S t a t u t e  be r e p e a l e d ?  However th e  p rob lem  t h a t  
a r o s e  und e r  th e  South  A f r i c a  Act was somewhat of a 
d i f f e r e n t  n a t u r e  as  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n  imposed upon th e  Union 
P a r l i a m e n t  was p r o c e d u r a l ,  n o t  s u b s t a n t i v e .  But  i t  made 
no d i f f e r e n c e  a s  l e g a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  c o u ld  s t i l l  be d i v i d e d  
b e tw ee n  P a r l i a m e n t  as  ord inar i ly  c o n s t i t u t e d , and P a r l i a m e r t  
as  c o n s t i t u t e d  und e r  the  p r o v i s o  t o  s . 1 5 2 .  At th e  same 
t ime c o u r t s  were e q u a l l y  c o n s c io u s  t h a t  P a r l i a m e n t  m igh t  
n o t  ‘'p e r f o r m  an a c t  of l e v i t a t i o n  and l i f t  i t s e l f  above
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its own powers by the bootstraps of method", 
the Tentrenched clauses1 would be protective 
only.
otherwise 
in name
PART TWO
Operation of our Maxim 
in
Administrative Law
CHAPTER VI
D o c t r i n e  of U l t r a  V i r e s
The d o c t r i n e  of  u l t r a  v i r e s  e n a b l e s  the  E n g l i s h  
c o u r t s  t o  r e v i e w  the  a c t i o n s  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b o d i e s  
empowered t o  e x e r c i s e  d i s c r e t i o n  w i t h i n  l i m i t a t i o n s  p r e ­
s c r i b e d  by th e  e n a b l i n g  s t a t u t e s .  I t  t h u s  k eep s  the  
a c t i o n s  of such  b o d i e s  w i t h i n  the  bounds of law ,  i f  
t h e  power i s  e x ce ed e d ,  o r  e x e r c i s e d  n o t  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  
w i t h  th e  p r o c e d u r e  l a i d  down i n  th e  s t a t u t e ,  or  v i o l a t e d  
th e  p r i n c i p l e s  of n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e .  I t  a l s o  comes i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n  i f  the  power i s  e x e r c i s e d  f o r  an u n a u t h o r i s e d  
or  im proper  p u r p o s e ,  o r  on th e  b a s i s  of i r r e l e v a n t  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  or  i n  d i s r e g a r d  of r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  
or  w i t h  g r o s s  u n rea so n a b len e ss ,  even  though  the  a c t i o n  i s  
w i t h i n  i t s  l i m i t s  and i n  com pl iance  w i t h  a l l  l e g a l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  Thus an abuse of s t a t u t o r y  power or i t s  
e x e r c i s e  f o r  a p u rp o se  o t h e r  t h a n  th o s e  f o r  which  i t  was 
g i v e n  i n v i t e s  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of our maxim.
I n  p r e v e n t i n g  th e  abuse  of s t a t u t o r y  powers the  
u n d e r l y i n g  b a s i s  of the  d o c t r i n e  of  u l t r a  v i r e s  i s  t h a t
212
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the  c o u r t s  would be p r e p a r e d  t o  l o o k  i n t o  th e  p u rp o se  by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  which  the  p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t i e s  e x e r c i s e  t h e i r  
powers and would n o t  a l lo w  them to  be used  f o r  a p u rp o se  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h a t  f o r  which  th e y  were c o n f e r r e d .  In  F r a n c e ”^ 
t o o ,  j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  of the  e x e r c i s e  of s t a t u t o r y  powers 
by the  C o n s e i l  d * E ta t  d e v e lo p e d  on the  same b a s i s  under  
the  name of d e to u rn e m e n t  de p o u v o i r « b u t  i t  has  a much 
w id e r  scope i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t h a n  the  d o c t r i n e  of u l t r a  
v i r e s  i n  E n g la n d .  D e tournem ent  de p o u v o i r  o p e r a t e s  uby 
r e a d i n g  i n t o  a s t a t u t e ,  f ram ed i n  g e n e r a l  te rm s and 
a p p a r e n t l y  g i v i n g  an u n l i m i t e d  d i s c r e t i o n ,  a s p e c i a l  and 
l i m i t e d  p u rp o se  ( b u t ) and quash in g  as a d e to u rn e m e n t  de 
p o u v o i r  th e  u se  of the  power or  d i s c r e t i o n  n o t  c l e a r l y  
d i r e c t e d  to  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  of t h a t  p u rp o se  so r e a d  i n t o
p
t h e  s t a t u t e  by th e  C o n s e i l  d * E t a t M . But  one of the  
g rounds  f o r  a n n u lm e n t ,  c as  d t o u v e r t u r e  a s  th e y  a® c a l l e d ,  
i s  v i o l a t i o n  de l a  l o i  which  e n a b l e s  th e  C o n s e i l  d * E ta t  
t o  d e v i s e  r u l e s  s i m i l a r  to  Tth e  r u l e s  of n a t u r a l  j u s t i c e 1 
n o t  o n ly  to  g o v e rn  t r i b u n a l s  " b u t  a l s o  to  g o v e rn  the
t r a n s a c t i o n  of  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b u s i n e s s  by the  e x e c u t i v e " ^ ,
1
See g e n e r a l l y ,  S c h w a r tz ,  F r e n c h  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Law and 
the  Common-Law Wald (195*0 a t  p p . 217-220;  Hamson, Execu­
t i v e  D i s c r e t i o n  and J u d i c i a l  C o n t r o l  ( 195*0 .
2
Hamson, l o c . c i t . ,  a t  p .  I 67 .
3
I b i d . , a t  p . 172.
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and th u s  to  impose "upon th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  c o n fo r m i ty
t o  a s t a n d a r d  of c o n d u c t  n o t  e n a c t e d  a s  o b l i g a t o r y  by
1
any r e c o g n i s e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  a u t h o r i t y "  . The C o n s e i l
d t E t a t  i n  f o r m u l a t i n g  t h e s e  s t a n d a r d s  l,may lo o k  to  any
2
so u rc e  which  i t  c o n s i d e r s  r e l e v a n t "  . I t  may r e q u i r e  the  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  s t a t e  th e  grounds  of i t s  d e c i s i o n ,  even  
when i t  i s  n o t  o b l i g a t o r y ,  and i n v e s t i g a t e  i n t o  them to  
a r r i v e  a t  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o p i n i o n ^ .  Thus i f  a p e r s o n  
u n d e r  a law p r o h i b i t i n g  the  buy ing  of l a n d  w i t h o u t  p r i o r  
a u t h o r i s a t i o n  of  the  p r e f e c t  or m i n i s t e r  i s  r e f u s e d  
p e r m i s s i o n  t o  buy some l a n d  on g rounds  of  1p u b l i c  
i n t e r e s t 1 , t h e  C o n s e i l  d * E ta t  would h o ld  i t  too  wide and 
i n s u f f i c i e n t  a ground  f o r  r e f u s a l  and m igh t  a s k  the  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  s t a t e  more s p e c i f i c  r e a s o n s  to  j u s t i f y  i t s  
a c t i o n ^ .
The E n g l i s h  c o u r t s  i n  a p p ly in g  th e  d o c t r i n e  of u l t r a  
v i r e s  p ro b e  on ly  up to  a c e r t a i n  p o i n t  i n  a s c e r t a i n i n g  
w h e th e r  t h e r e  has b e e n  an abuse  of a s t a t u t o r y  power and 
c e r t a i n l y  would n o t  go as  f a r  as  the  C o n s e i l  d * E ta t  even
1
I b i d . , a t p . 170.
2
I b i d . , a t P . 170.
3
I b i d . , a t p . •
000
4
I b i d . , a t PP . I 6 7 - I 6 9 .  Cf .  Land R e a l i s a t i o n  Co. v .
P o s tm a s t e r - G e m  r a l  [1 9 5 0 ]  1 Ch. 435.
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though "theoretically the doctrine of ultra vires includes 
the cas d*ouvertures"^, In R, v. Brighton; ex parte
pShoosmith  ^ the court refused to intervene when a local 
authority having power to improve a road for public bene­
fit put a tarmac surface on the road so as to have it 
ready for races in time. Similarly in Re Decision of 
Walkery the court was concerned with the amount paid in 
wages and not the motive which led to that amount being paid. 
"How and why they arrive at that particular figure is", 
in the opinion of Lord Goddard C.J., "irrelevant. If
the result is a reasonable sum, that is enough to justify 
1+the payment" . Further, if the authorities do not state 
their reasons for reaching a certain decision, the courts 
cannot compel them to do so^.
However, in few cases the English courts appear to 
have developed the doctrine of ultra vires parallel to the
1
Ibid., at p. 166.
2
(1907) 96 L.T. 762. See also Westminster Corporation v. 
London and North Western Railway Co. M905J Ä.C. 526.
3
[1955] 1 K.B. 6kk.
b
Ibid., at p. 6h9.
5See e.g., Pilling v. Abergele U.D.C. [1950] 1 K.B. 636, 
at p. 639; R. v. Trebilco; ex parte F.S, Falkiner & Sons 
Ltd. (I930) 56 C.L.R. 20, at p. 32. Cf. R. v. Medical 
Appeal Tribunal; ex parte Gilmore [1957] 1 Q.B. 57^ +j 
at p. 582, per Denning L.J.~~
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F r e n c h  d o c t r i n e  of  d e to u rn e m e n t  de p o u v o i r . I n  R o b e r t s  
v .  Hopwood^ , i t  was h e l d  t h a t  the  d i s c r e t i o n  c o n f e r r e d  
upon a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  to  f i x  wages *as i t  t h i n k s  f i t *  
must  be e x e r c i s e d  r e a s o n a b l y ;  the  f i x i n g  by the  a u t h o r i t y  
of  an a r b i t r a r y  sum f o r  wages w i t h o u t  r e g a r d  t o  e x i s t i n g  
l a b o u r  c o n d i t i o n s  was n o t  an e x e r c i s e  of t h a t  d i s c r e t i o n ;  
and an e x c e s s  of e x p e n d i t u r e  on t h a t  ground was l i a b l e  to  
be d i s a l l o w e d  by the  a u d i t o r  as  c o n t r a r y  to  law .  UI  do 
n o t  f i n d  any w o rd s" ,  s a i d  Lord Sumner, " l i m i t i n g  h i s  
f u n c t i o n s  m ere ly  t o  th e  c a se  of bad f a i t h ,  or  o b l i g i n g  
him to  l e a v e  the  r a t e p a y e r s  u n p r o t e c t e d  from th e  e f f e c t s  
on their p o c k e t s  of h o n e s t  s t u p i d i t y  or u n p r a c t i c a l
pi d e a l i s m " . I n  R. v .  B r i g h t o n  C o r p o r a t i o n ;  ex p a r t e  T. 
T i l l i n g  L t d . 8 ,  a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  empowered to  g r a n t  
l i c e n s e s  t o  e n a b le  motor  b u se s  t o  p l y  f o r  h i r e  was 
r e q u i r e d  t o  " t r e a t  a l l  a p p l i c a n t s  a l i k e " ,  the  C o u r t  i n ­
s i s t i n g  on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e q u a l i t y . I n  Nakkuda A l i  v .
4
J a y a r a t n e  , the  r u l e s  of n a t u r a l  . j u s t i c e  were a p p l i e d  by 
the  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ;  i t  was h e ld  t h a t  the  words Twhere the
1
[1925]  A.C. 578.
2
F b i d o , a t  p .  60k .  ( I t a l i c s  s u p p l i e d ) .
3
(1916)  85 L . J .K .B .  1552.
4
[1951]  A.C. 66 .  See a l s o  P r e s c o t t  v .  Birmingham C o rp o ra ­
t i o n  [1955]  Ch. 210.
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C o n t r o l l e r  h a s  r e a s o n a b l e  g rounds  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  any 
d e a l e r  i s  u n f i t  t o  be a l lo w e d  t o  c o n t i n u e  as  a d e a l e r 1 
were to  be t r e a t e d  a s  impos ing  a c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  
must  i n  f a c t  e x i s t  such  r e a s o n a b l e  g ro u n d s ,  known t o  the  
C o n t r o l l e r , b e f o r e  he co u ld  v a l i d l y  e x e r c i s e  the  power of 
c a n c e l l a t i o n .  I n  such  c a s e s  th e  c o u r t s  r e s o r t e d  t o  s e e k ­
in g  g u id a n c e  i n  e x t r a - p o s i t i v e  c o n c e p t s .  But  th e  im pact  
of t h e s e  c o n c e p t s  on the  n a t u r e  of  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e s s  
depends  upon the  e x i g e n c i e s  and p u b l i c  o p i n io n  w hich  v a ry  
f rom t ime t o  t im e ,  and t h e r e  has  b e e n  a c o n t i n u a l  movement 
b a c k  and f o r t h  b e tw ee n  wide and na r ro w  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p o w e rs ,  the  fo rm er  o u s t i n g  or r e s t r i c t i n g  
j u d i c i a l  r e v i e w  w h e rea s  the  l a t t e r  p e r m i t t i n g  i t  by 
r e f e r e n c e  t o  e x t r a - p o s i t i v e  c o n c e p t s .  T h is  s o r t  of  
i n q u i r y  i s  f a r  f rom  the  f u l l  a c c e p t a n c e  or i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of  th e  F r e n c h  d o c t r i n e  i n t o  the  E n g l i s h  law.
But  the  u n d e r l y i n g  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  our maxim can  be 
s e e n  i n  th e  o p e r a t i o n  of th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  law c o n c e p t s  
of  U n a u t h o r i s e d  o r  im proper  p u r p o s e 1 , r e x t r a n e o u s  or 
i r r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n 1 and 1u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 1 • These 
g ro u n d s  " o v e r l a p  t o  a v e ry  g r e a t  e x t e n t "  and " r u n  i n t o
one a n o t h e r b u t  s t i l l  i t  would be c o n v e n i e n t  t o  d e a l
1
A s s o c i a t e d  P r o v i n c i a l  P i c t u r e  Houses L td ,  v • Wednesbury 
C o r p o r a t i o n  1 1 9 ^ 8 1 1 K.B. 223, a t  p .  229; see  a l s o  West­
m i n s t e r  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  London and N o r th  W es te rn  By. Co.
L1905J A.C. 426,  a t  p .  ^30^
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with them separately.
Unauthorised or Improper Purpose
Statutory powers are often conferred in terms which 
require them to he exercised for a particular purpose, and 
the exercise of these powers for any other purpose would 
he null and void as ultra vires. In Galloway v. Mayor and 
Commonalty of London , Lord Cranworth L.C., discussing 
the validity of the exercise of a discretionary power 
concerned with the compulsory purchase of land, said:
"Any company authorised by the Legislature to take com­
pulsorily the land of another for a definite object, will, 
if attempting to take it for any other object, be restrain­
ed by the injunction of the Court of Chancery from so
pdoingM . Similarly in Municipal Council of Sydney v. 
Campbell^, the acquisition of the land by the Municipal 
Council of Sydney which was empowered to acquire land 
compulsorily for the purpose of extending streets or 
improving the city, was held as an invalid exercise of
1
(1866) L.R.1 H.L. 34.
2
Ibid., at p . 43.
3
[1925] A.C. 338; also refer to R. v. Minister of Health; 
ex parte Davis [1929] 1 K.B. 619.
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power on th e  g round  t h a t  th e  C o u n c i l ,  p u r p o r t i n g  t o  
e x e r c i s e  i t s  power ,  a c q u i r e d  l a n d ,  n o t  f o r  the  p u rp o se  
of e x t e n s i o n  or  improvement ,  h u t  w i t h  th e  o b j e c t  of 
t a k i n g  a d v a n ta g e  of an a n t i c i p a t e d  i n c r e m e n t  i n  v a l u e .
"A body such  as  th e  M u n ic ip a l  C o u n c i l  of  Sydney a u t h o r ­
i s e d  to  t a k e  l a n d  c o m p u l s o r i l y  f o r  s p e c i f i e d  p u r p o s e s ” , 
s a i d  Duff J . , ”w i l l  n o t  be p e r m i t t e d  t o  e x e r c i s e  i t s  
powers f o r  d i f f e r e n t  p u r p o s e s ,  and i f  i t  a t t e m p t s  t o  do 
s o ,  the  C o u r t s  w i l l  i n t e r f e r e ” ^ .  A no th e r  way of  a c q u i r i n g
l a n d  f o r  an  u n a u t h o r i s e d  or  im proper  p u rp o se  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d
2i n  W er r ib ee  C o u n c i l  v .  K err  . The r e s p o n d e n t  was th e  
owner of c e r t a i n  l a n d  th r o u g h  which t h e r e  had f o r m e r l y  
b e en  a governm ent  r o a d  b u t  p u r c h a s e d  l a t e r  by the  
r e s p o n d e n t 1s p r e d e c e s s o r .  A company o b t a i n e d  th e  p e r ­
m i s s i o n  of  t h e  a p p e l l a n t ,  a m u n ic i p a l  c o u n c i l ,  t o  r u n  a 
l i n e  of  p i p e s  a lo n g  the  r o a d  and d id  so r u n  th e  p i p e s  
w i t h o u t  th e  c o n s e n t  of  the  r e s p o n d e n t .  The r e s p o n d e n t  
o b t a i n e d  an i n j u n c t i o n  d i r e c t i n g  the  company to  remove 
th e  p i p e s .  S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  a t  th e  s u g g e s t i o n  of  th e  company 
th e  a p p e l l a n t  p r o p o s e d  c o m p u l s o r i l y  to  a c q u i r e  th e  l a n d  
a lo n g  which  th e  p i p e s  were p l a c e d  f o r  the  p u rp o se  of  
p r o v i d i n g  a p u b l i c  r o a d .  The r e s p o n d e n t  opposed such  
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 3^3 •
(1928)  k2 C .L .R .  1 .
2
2 2 0 .
a c t i o n  on the  ground t h a t  the  r e a l  p u rp o se  of the  a p p e l l ­
a n t  i n  a c q u i r i n g  th e  l a n d  was n o t  to  p r o v i d e  a r o a d  b u t  
to  e n a b le  th e  company t o  c o n t in u e  the  p i p e s  i n  the  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  which  th e y  had b een  p l a c e d .  The High C our t  
a c c e p t e d  the  r e s p o n d e n t 1s c o n t e n t i o n  and h e ld  i n  h i s  
f a v o u r .
On the  same p r i n c i p l e  i n  Hanson v .  R a d c l i f f e  U.D.C. \  
d i s m i s s a l  of t e a c h e r s  on the  ground  of  economy by a l o c a l  
a u t h o r i t y  which had the  power to  d i s m i s s  them *on e d u ca ­
t i o n a l  g r o u n d s 1 was d i s a p p r o v e d  b e ca u se  “ the  mere d e s i r e  
t o  economise  does n o t  . . .  e n t i t l e  the  l o c a l  e d u c a t i o n  
a u t h o r i t y  to  t e r m i n a t e  the  employment of a t e a c h e r ,  
a l l e g i n g  t h a t  to  be an e d u c a t i o n a l  g ro u n d ” .
I f  a power i s  c o n f e r r e d  on an a u t h o r i t y  i n  such  terms 
t h a t  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  th e  power was c o n f e r r e d  f o r  a p a r ­
t i c u l a r  p u r p o s e ,  i t  must  be e x e r c i s e d  on ly  f o r  t h a t  
p u r p o s e .  In  o r d e r  to  p rove  abuse  of power,  t h e  power must 
have b e e n  e x e r c i s e d  f o r  some o t h e r  p u rp o se  and i t  i s  n o t  
enough t o  show t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i t y  c o n te m p la te d  t h a t  the  
power m ig h t  be u se d  f o r  an  u n a u t h o r i s e d  p u r p o s e .  In
i
[1922]  2 Ch. ^90 .  See a l s o  S a d le r  v .  S h e f f i e l d  C o rp o ra ­
t i o n ; Dyson v .  S h e f f i e l d  C o r p o r a t i o n  [1924J 1 Ch. 4 8 3 ; 
Smith v .  McNally 119121 1 Ch. 816; B la n c h a r d  v .  Dunlop 
L1917] 1 Ch. 16 5 5 M a r t i n  v .  E c c le s  C o r p o r a t i o n  [19191 
1 Ch. 3 8 7 .
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W e s tm in s t e r  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  London and N o r th  W es te rn  Ry. \  
t h e  W e s tm in s te r  C o r p o r a t i o n  h a v in g  power t o  c o n s t r u c t  
p u b l i c  c o n v e n i e n c e s ,  c o n s t r u c t e d  u n d e rg ro u n d  c o n v e n ie n c e s  
i n  such  a way t h a t  the  subway l e a d i n g  t o  them a l s o  p r o ­
v i d e d  a means of  c r o s s i n g  a busy  s t r e e t .  The c o n s t r u c t i o n  
was c h a l l e n g e d  on the  ground t h a t  th e  r e a l  o b j e c t  of  p r o ­
v i d i n g  th e  subway was n o t  p u b l i c  c o n v e n ie n c e s  b u t  the  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  a c r o s s i n g .  The C o u r t  of Appeal  t h o u g h t  "bad 
f a i t h "  was shown; the  House of Lords  (by m a j o r i t y )  
r e v e r s e d  t h a t  d e c i s i o n ,  " I n  o r d e r  t o  make o u t  a c a s e  of 
bad f a i t h " ,  s a i d  Lord McNaughton, " i t  must  be shewn t h a t  
th e  c o r p o r a t i o n  c o n s t r u c t e d  t h i s  subway as  a means of  
c r o s s i n g  th e  s t r e e t  u n d e r  c o lo u r  and p r e t e n c e  of p u b l i c  
c o n v e n ie n c e s  which  were n o t  r e a l l y  w an ted  a t  t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  p l a c e . " 2 3
When a power i s  c o n f e r r e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  a p u rp o se
which  i s  r a t h e r  v a g u e ,  th e  c o u r t  t r i e s  to  d e f i n e  i t s  scope
by lo o k in g  i n t o  the  c o n t e x t  and s e t t i n g  of the  A c t .  I n
3
M id d le s e x  County C o u n c i l  v .  M i l l e r  , i t  was h e l d  t o  be an 
abuse  of power where a N u r s e s 1 Act gave a l i c e n s i n g  a u t h ­
o r i t y  power t o  g r a n t  a l i c e n s e  t o  a p e r s o n  d e s i r i n g  to
1
[1 9 0 5 ]  A.C. k26 .
2
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  4-32. ( I t a l i c s  s u p p l i e d ) .
3
[19^8]  1 K.B. ^38;  c f .  Andrews v .  D ip ro se  (1937) 58 C.L.R. 
299 .
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carry on an agency for nurses ’'subject to such conditions 
as they may think fit for securing the proper conduct of 
Agency, including conditions as to the fees charged by 
the person carrying on the agency, whether to the nurses 
or other persons supplied, or to the persons to whom they 
are supplied", and the authority had imposed as a condi­
tion: "The licensee shall not demand or receive from
any person any sum in respect of the services of any 
nurse or other person supplied which is in excess of the 
amount appropriate to that nurse or other person calculated 
in accordance with the scale of charges approved by the 
council and furnished to the licensee". Lord Goddard C.J., 
referred to the implied purpose of providing such a legis­
lation dealing with domestic servant agencies, or employ­
ment agencies, or agencies of similar descriptions, by 
pointing out that some agents "charge excessive fees and 
may very likely prevent people getting employment except 
on the terms of their having to pay excessive remuneration, 
or impose upon them improper or undesirable terms’’^ , and 
therefore, described any condition coupled with the fees 
to be paid to the nurse as not for the purpose of securing 
the proper conduct of Agency,
Ibid., at pp. kk2, M+3 •
1
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Statutory power is sometimes conferred upon an 
authority with no reference to purpose. Does it mean that 
the authority has an absolute discretion in exercising 
its power and the courts would not bother to inquire in 
terms of result or consequence desired or intended to be 
achieved, or concerned with bad faith? In Arthur Yates & 
Go, Pty Ltd v. Vegetable Seeds Committee , Latham C.J. 
remarked that in such cases no inquiry into purpose would
pbe relevant. It appears to be an *overstatement1 as the 
courts do not assume the conferment of an unfettered 
discretion in terms of absoluteness and would ’’interfere
in cases where there is not a bona fide exercise of the 
powers given by the Parliament"3. Public bodies under 
general powers cannot do whatever they think right and the 
tendency has been to narrow down the scope of the exer­
cise of discretion by referring to the 1 spirit of the
enacted law* or its nature gathered from its context. In
nR.v„Paddington & St Marylebone Rent Tribunal , the Court
1
(19^5) 72 C.L.R. 37 (the Vegetable Seeds Case) , at p.68.2
See de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 
(1959) at p. 192.
3Biddulph v. The Vestry of St George. Hanover Square (1863) 
33 L. J. (Ch.) 411, at p. k17. 
k
[19k9] 1 K.B. 666; also refer to Dormer v. Newcastle- 
upon-Tyne Corporation [I9k0] 2 K.B” 20k, at p. 217.
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d e f i n e d  th e  l i m i t s  of d i s c r e t i o n a r y  powers  of th e  a u t h o r ­
i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  r e s t r a i n  i t  f rom e x c e e d in g  or a b u s in g  i t s  
pow ers ,  even  though  t h e r e  was no e x p r e s s  m e n t io n  of  any 
p u rp o se  i n  th e  A c t .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  h a v in g  power t o  r e f e r  
t e n a n c y  c o n t r a c t s  t o  a r e n t  t r i b u n a l  f o r  r e n t  r e v ie w  
und e r  the  F u r n i s h e d  Houses (Ren t  C o n t r o l )  Act ,  1946, a 
l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  i n  p u r s u a n c e  t o  t h e i r  p o l i c y  t h a t  where 
two or  more r e n t  r e d u c t i o n s  have b e en  made by the  t r i b u n a l  
i n  r e s p e c t  of any p r o p e r t y ,  a l l  o t h e r  c o n t r a c t s  of l e t t i n g  
t o  which  th e  Act  a p p l i e d  r e l a t i n g  to  such p r o p e r t y  sh o u ld  
be r e f e r r e d  t o  th e  t r i b u n a l ,  made to  the  t r i b u n a l  a b l o c h  
r e f e r e n c e  of 555 f l a t s  i n s t e a d  of r e f e r r i n g  them i n d i v i d ­
u a l l y .  The l a n d l o r d s  t h e r e u p o n  a p p l i e d  f o r  an o r d e r  of 
c e r t i o r a r i  t o  b r i n g  up and quash  the  o r d e r s  made by th e  
t r i b u n a l  i n  e i g h t  c a s e s  and f o r  an  o r d e r  of p r o h i b i t i o n  t o  
r e s t r a i n  i t  f rom  p r o c e e d i n g  w i t h  o t h e r  r e f e r e n c e s  made by 
the  a u t h o r i t y .  Lord Goddard C . J . ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  h a r d ­
s h i p s  f e l t  by th e  t e n a n t s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  accommodation a t  
t h a t  t ime s a i d  t h a t  t h e  Act  was ’'d e s i g n e d  f o r  the  p r o t e c -
t i o n  o f  th e  t e n a n t s  and n o t  f o r  the  p e n a l i z i n g  of l a n d l o r d s "  
and was n e v e r  i n t e n d e d  to  p r o v i d e  f o r  g e n e r a l  r e n t  f i x a ­
t i o n  t h r o u g h o u t  the  d i s t r i c t  b u t  t o  d e a l  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  
c a s e s  i n  which  h a r d s h i p  e x i s t e d  or m ig h t  r e a s o n a b l y  be
I b i d . , a t  p .  680 .
1
1
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supposed to exist^. Thus it was held that the action of 
the authority in referring the whole of the flats to the 
tribunal when they had not received any complaints from 
the tenants and had made no enquiry whether or not all 
the flats were furnished or the tenants were entitled to 
services rendered by the landlords, and no enquiry whether 
prima facie any one of the rents charged was unfair, was 
not a genuine exercise of the power conferred on them by 
the Act, and therefore the reference was wholly invalid.
However, in the absence of any purpose being express­
ly mentioned, or if mentioned it being of a vauge and 
indefinite description, the courts are less likely to
find a ready basis for preventing the abuse of statutory
2powers. For example, in Short v. Poole Corporation , a 
local Education Authority empowered to remove any teacher3 
gave a married woman teacher notice to terminate her 
engagement as they considered the duty of a married woman
1
Ibid., at p. 680.
2
[1926] 1 Ch. 66.
3
By s.148, sub.-s.1, of the Education Act, 1921, it was 
provided that UA local education authority may appoint 
necessary officers, including teachers, to hold office 
during the pleasure of the authority, and may assign to 
them such salaries or remuneration (if any) as they 
think fit, and may remove any of those officers.11
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was primarily to look after her domestic concerns and 
regarded it as impossible for her to do so and also to 
act effectively and satisfactorily as a teacher at the 
same time. It was recognised that the discretionary 
power of the Authority to terminate the engagement was 
not unlimited and was subject to being declared ultra 
vires, yet it was said that it was "their duty and within 
their province to consider whether a certain policy will 
or will not be a benefit to the cause of education
-igenerally" . Such a wide view could be taken only 
because the policy as a benefit to the cause of educa­
tion could not be pinned down to something specific for
the guidance of the Authority, Similarly, in Andrews v.
2Diprose , where the Director was not to issue a certi­
ficate of registration for dairy-produce premises unless 
he was satisfied that it was in the best interests of 
the industry that the same be registered, having regard 
to the situation and environments of the premises, the 
words "best interests of the industry" were interpreted 
as including not only the physical attributes of the 
proposed sites of the premises but also the effect upon 
the interest of the industry as a whole, covering economic 
1
Ibid., at p. 93- (Italics supplied).
2(1937) 58 C.L.R. 299.
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and c o m m erc ia l  i n t e r e s t s  as w e l l ,  which th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
of the  p r e m i s e s  a t  t h a t  s i t e  would h a v e .  M oreover ,  as 
the  b u rd e n  of  p r o v in g  w h e th e r  the  a c t i o n  was u l t r a  v i r e s  
l i e s  on th e  p e r s o n  c h a l l e n g i n g  the  a c t i o n  , i t  becomes 
a l l  th e  more d i f f i c u l t  f o r  him to  p rove  the  abuse  of power 
by r e f e r e n c e  to  a g e n e r a l  or vague or i n d e f i n i t e  p u r p o s e .
I t  would a l s o  be an  abuse  of  power i f  an a u t h o r i t y  
o p e r a t e s  i n  bad f a i t h  even  though  th e  c h a l l e n g e d  Act i s  "on
p
th e  f a c e  of i t ,  r e g u l a r  and w i t h i n  i t s  power" . I t  has  
b een  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  bad f a i t h  as a g round f o r  i n v a l i d a t ­
in g  an e x e r c i s e  of power i s  d i s t i n c t  from t h a t  of u l t r a  
v i r e s  which  i s  supposed  to  co v er  on ly  th o s e  c a s e s  i n  
which  th e  power has  b e en  g e n u in e ly  p u r su e d  h o n e s t l y  f o r  
an u n a u t h o r i s e d  or  im p ro p e r  purpose-^.  I t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  
t h a t  w h e th e r  a power i s  e x e r c i s e d  h o n e s t l y  or d i s h o n e s t l y  
i s  a q u e s t i o n  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  the  q u a l i t y  of  th e  a c t  done,  
and what  m a t t e r s  i s  w h e th e r  th e  power has  b een  e x e r c i s e d  
1
See e . g . ,  B id u lp h  v .  V e s t r y  of  St  George*s (1863)  33 L . J .  
(Ch .)  h i 1 ; S h o r t  v . P o o le  C o r p o r a t i o n  11926] 1 Ch.66 ;  
W err ib ee  C o u n c i l  v .  K e r r  (1928) h2 C.L.R. 1 .
2
S h o r t  v .  P o o le  C o r p o r a t i o n , s u p r a , a t  p .  91«
3
Jon es  v .  M e t r o p o l i t a n  Meat I n d u s t r y  Board (1925) 37 
C .L .R .  252^ a t  p p .  26h,  265; W err ibee  C o u n c i l  v .  K e r r ,  
s u p r a . a t  p p .  8 - 1 0 .
228
by r e f e r e n c e  to  th e  l e g i t i m a t e  p u r p o s e .  ltBu t  bad f a i t h ” ,
i
s a i d  Dixon J .  i n  th e  V e g e ta b le  Seeds Case , Mmay tak e  
th e  form of  f a l s e l y  avowing a l e g i t i m a t e  p u rp o se  to  
c o v e r  th e  a c t u a l  p u r s u i t  of  an  o b j e c t  o u t s i d e  the  scope 
of  the  power” . I t  i s  an abuse of power so long  as  the  
p u r p o s e  p u r s u e d  i s  o t h e r  t h a n  th e  l e g i t i m a t e  one i r r e s ­
p e c t i v e  of w h e th e r  i t  i s  h o n e s t  o r  d i s h o n e s t .  I n  th e
2E a s t  E l l o e  Case , t h e r e  were i n d i c a t i o n s  i n  the  o p i n io n s
O Ll £
of Lord M ortony , Lord R e id  and Lord S o m e rv e l l  , t h a t  th e  
words *not  empowered t o  be g r a n t e d 1 o c c u r r i n g  i n  the  
. A c q u i s i t i o n  of  Land ( A u t h o r i s a t i o n  P ro c e d u re )  A c t ,  1946, 
s c t . 1 ,  P a r t  4 ,  p a r a . 1 5 s sh o u ld  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as e x c l u d ­
in g  the  abuse  of  power i n  bad f a i t h .  However, the  
o p i n i o n  of  Lord R a d c l i f f e  sounds more s e n s i b l e  i n  t h i s  
r e s p e c t .  His L o rd sh ip  s a i d :
I t  i s  an  abuse  of power t o  e x e r c i s e  i t  f o r  a 
p u rp o se  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h a t  f o r  which  i t  i s  
e n t r u s t e d  to  th e  h o l d e r ,  n o t  the  l e s s  b e ca u se  
he may be a c t i n g  o s t e n s i b l y  f o r  th e  a u t h o r i s e d  
p u r p o s e .  P r o b a b ly  most of  th e  r e c o g n i s e d  
g ro u n d s  of i n v a l i d i t y  c o u ld  be b ro u g h t  und e r  
t h i s  h e ad :  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  i l l e g i t i m a t e
1
(1945) 72 C .L .R. 37* a t  p .  83 .
2
Smith  v .  E a s t  E l l o e  R .D .C . [1956] 1 A l l  E.R. 855.
3
I b i d . ,  a t  pp .  862 ,  863 .
I b i d . , a t  p . 867 .
I b i d . , a t  p . 873 •
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considerations, the rejection of legitimate 
ones, manifest unreasonableness, arbitrary 
or capricious conduct, the motive of personal 
advantage or the gratification of personal 
ill-will. However that may be, an exercise of 
power in bad faith does not seem to me to 
have any special pre-eminence of its own among 
the cases that make for invalidity. It is one 
of the several instances of abuse of power 
and it may, or may not, be involved in 
several of the recognised grounds I have 
mentioned"1.
Yet there is a difference in approach between an 
ultra vires act done in good faith and an ultra vires 
act done in bad faith. In the former case what is 
material is the purpose by reference to which the discre­
tion is exercised and the extraneous or ulterior motives 
do not affect the validity of the act so long as it is 
exercised for the legitimate purpose. On the other 
hand, in the latter case the position would be different 
as the question of bad faith would arise only when the 
act on the face of it is regular and within its powers, 
and the courts would require the party challenging the 
act to establish bad faith by tendering evidence as to
the extraneous or ulterior motives, so that truth and
2falsity of such an allegation could be investigated .
_
Ibid., at p. 870.
2
Refer to Demetriades v. Glasgow Corporation [1951] 1 All 
E.R. 5-57} at pp. *+60, 461; Carltona Ltd, v. Works Commis­
sioner [I943] 2 All E.R. 560; Westminster Corporation v. 
London and North Western Railway Co. [1905J A.C. 426, atP A32.
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Thus motives come into consideration only in so far as 
an act is challenged on grounds of bad faith. However, 
it is not easy to prove bad faith, because of the diffi­
culty in procuring evidence relating to ulterior motives 
which led the authority to act in that manner unless the
act was manifestly absurd or foolish, e.g., dismissal
1of a red haired teacher because she has red hair .
pIn the Vegetable Seeds Case , it was alleged that 
certain orders made by the Vegetable Seeds Committee, in 
pursuance of a regulation prohibiting the sale of seeds 
of certain description, were not made bona fide for the 
purpose for which the power was conferred, i.e., the contidL 
and regulation of the processing, treatment, distribution 
and disposal of seeds, but made for an unauthorised 
purpose, i.e., the promotion of the trading and financial 
interests of the Committee. It was held that the orders 
were open to attack on the ground alleged. However, the 
case arose on a motion to strike out pleadings. The 
substantive question was never decided, the case being
settled out of court.
_
Short v. Poole Corporation [1926] 1 Ch. 66, at p. 91«
2
(19^5) 72 C.L.R. 37* See also In re Decision of Walker 
[19^] 1 K.B. 6h^, at p. 650.
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In case of ultra vires simpliciter , therefore, it
would still be relevant to distinguish between purpose
and motive. The court looks to the purpose rather than
the motive and it does not matter if the motive is
improper provided the purpose is within the statute. For
2example, in Narma v. Bombay Municipal Commissioner , the 
question was whether the compensation to be paid for 
certain lands acquired under the provisions of the City 
of Bombay Municipal Act, 1888, was to be calculated 
according to s.301 of the Act or according to those of 
the Land Acquisition Act, 189^ +- By s.297 of the Act the 
Municipal Commissioner had power to prescribe a regular 
Ine on each side of a public street, and if the line 
was so prescribed that any landnot vesting in the cor­
poration fell within it, the Commssioner had, by s.2995 
power to take possession of it on behalf of the Corpora­
tion, the former owner receiving compensation under
1
Not including the ground of bad faith.
2
(1917) L.R. 4-5 I.A. 125. See also Co-operative Brick 
Co. Pty Ltd v. Hawthorn Corporation (1909) 9 C.L.R. 301 , 
at p . 309; Henwood v. Municipal Tramways Trust (S.A.) 
(1938) 60  C.L.R. 53^, at p. 44-5; Bowles v. Willingham 
(194-4-) 321 U.S. 503 5 at p. 515; King Emperor v. Benoari 
lal Sarma [194-5] A.C. 1k, at p .28 ; R. v. Brighton Cor­
poration. ex. p. Shoosmith (1907) L.T. 7 82. Also 
refer to Collins v. Minister of the Interior [1957(1)3 
S.A. 552 (A.D.), at p. 577.
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S.301. By s.296 the Commissioner further had power to 
acquire any land required for wideneing, extending, or 
otherwise improving any public street, subject to the 
payment of compensation under the Land .Acquisition Act 
Acting within his powers the Commissioner prescribed a 
line on one side of a public street so that land belonging 
to the appellants fell within it, and, having served with 
notice, took possession. The Commissioner wished to 
acquire the land for the purpose of widening the äreet 
in connection with a contemplated bridge carrying the 
street over certain level crossings. The appellants con­
tended that the procedure under ss. 297? 299 and 301 was 
inapplicable and the proceedings ultra vires, and that 
the land could only be acquiied subject to payment of com­
pensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The Privy Council 
held that the powers given by ss. 297 and 299 of the Act 
could be exercised although the motive of the Commissioner, 
who acted in good faith and in the discharge of his 
duties, was not to preserve the line of the street, and 
that consequently the compensation payable to the appel­
lants was to be calculated according to s.301, and not 
under the Land Acquisition Act. The Commissioner had 
power to prescribe the regular line of the street; in form
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he purported to do so, and in fact actually did so.
"Even if it were proved, as it is not, that the creation 
and preservation of a regular line was no part of the 
Commissioner1 23s object, though it certainly was an inci­
dental result of his scheme”, Lord Sumner observed that 
"their Lordships can find nothing in the Act which either 
entitles the appellants to investigate his motives or 
has the effect of invalidating his action on account of 
the purpose, with which in fact he prescribed the regular 
line of the street"^.
It is sometimes said that it is of no significance
pto distinguish between purpose and motive . It is not 
wholly true to go as far as that. Initially purpose is 
concerned with the end or result desired to be achieved 
by doing something, whereas motive inspires the doing of 
something and is distinct from the desired end or result^.
1
Ibid., at p . 129.
2
See Treves, Administrative Discretion and Judicial 
Control (1957) 10 Mod. L. Rev. 276, at p. 287; Earl 
Fitzwilliam*s Wentworth Estates Co. Ltd v . Minister of 
Town and Country Planning I 1991 I 2 K.B. 285, at pp. 307? 
308 per Denning J. Cf. Wade and Phillips, Constitutional 
Law (5th ed.) at p. 3°7$ de Smith, loc. cit., at p. 197«
3
See Salmond, Jurisprudence (10th ed.) at pp. 302-385$ 
in this context intention and purpose are identical.
23^ .
1In R. v. Brighton Corporation, ex.p. Shoosmith 3 though
the motive for the improvement of the road was to induce
an automobile club to hold races upon it, the Corporations
action could not be questioned as there was a clear need
for the roadfs improvement at that time. Similarly, in
2the Earl Fitzwilliam*s Case , it was argued that the real 
object of the action of the Central Local Board in 
acquiring land was to enforce a policy whereby all sales 
of land would have to take place at existing use values 
and it went beyond the purpose of disposing of the land 
for development; but Lord Goddard thought that that would 
not make the exercise of the powers given to the Board 
ultra vires.
However, in most cases the actor1 23s conduct is to be 
determined in terms of rwhyT. In such cases, it may not 
be possible to distinguish between purpose and motive 
Min so far as states of mind do in fact influence the 
actor1s conduct by causing him consciously to direct his 
acts towards the attainment of a specific endn8 . In
Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell .^ it was not the
1
(1907) 96 L.T. 762.2
[1952] Ä.C. 362.
3
de Smith, loc. cit.. at p. 197•
[1925] Ä.C. 338.
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the extension of the street hut a desire to resell it at 
a high price (not contemplated by the Act) that influenced 
the Council in acquiring the land. Here it did not
matter whether the desired end or result of reselling the
•1land at a high price was labelled as purpose or motive .
In the Vegetable Seeds Case it was suggested that a 
distinction might be drawn between a representative legis­
lature whose function is legislative rather than admin­
istrative 3 such as Parliament or an elective municipal 
council, and other bodies which are not directly respon­
sible to the electorate or not subject to political 
sanctions; and it was only the latter that could be 
challenged on the ground that it acted on ulterior motives. 
"It has not hitherto been held", Latham C.J. said, Mthat 
the rule excluding inquiry into the bona fides and motives 
of legislatures which applies to legislative acts is
applicable to such orders (as of the Vegetable Seeds 
oCommittee)’1 2 . Thus motives of a responsible Minister if 
not done in good faith could be controlled even if 
Parliament vests in him a discretion in wide terms, such
1
Cf. Robins & Sons v. Minister of Health [1939] 1 K.B.520, at p. 537.
2
Arthur Yates & Co. Pty Ltd v. Vegetable Seeds Committee 
(19^5) 72 C.L.R. 37, at p. 67.
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1as *if the Minister is satisfied1 . Still in the case 
of an elective municipal council the courts can inter­
fere if its decision on a competent matter is so unreas­
onable that it might almost he described as being done 
2in bad faith and to that extent "the action of its 
members must not be founded upon fraud, oppression, or 
improper motives and a by-law may be quashed if the 
council in passing it was not using its power in good 
faith in the interest of the public, but simply to 
subserve the interest of private persons"^.
If it could be established that the purpose by 
reference to which the power has been exercised is the 
sole purpose, there is not much difficulty in assessing 
the validity of an Act because if the sole purpose is one 
authorised by the statute it is valid, and if not it is 
ultra vires. But when a power is exercised for more than 
one purpose, authorised and unauthorised 1 inextricably 
1
Liversidge v. Anderson [19^+2] A.C. 206; Carltona Ltd v. 
Commissioner of Works I 19*+3] 2 All E.R. 5&0; Cf. Keir and 
Lawson, Cases in Constitutional Law (hth ed.) at p. 270.
2
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Cor­
poration M9h8l 1 K.B. 221« at p. 229.
3
Arthur Yates & Co. Pty Ltd v . Vegetable Seeds Committee 
(lQh5) 72 C.L.R. 37, at p. 83.
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mixed1 23, the problem becomes complicated. In Sadler v. 
Sheffield Corporation , a case in which a corpotation was 
empowered to dismiss teachers on educational grounds, it 
was held that the notices dismissin g teachers were bad 
as the grounds of dismissal were mixed grounds, compound­
ed as to part of financial grounds and to the rest of 
educational grounds. Lawrence J. said that Mthe 
Education Committee would never have attempted, but for 
the existence of financial reasons’1 and "if the authority 
in exercising this discretionary power takes other
2grounds into account, the power is not well exercised” .
In Earl Fitzwilliam* s Case-^ , where the board had
compulsorily acquired land partly for the authorised
purpose of facilitating the collection of development 
1+charges and partly also in order to enforce the policy
_
[192k] 1 Ch. k83.
2
Ibid., at p . 505*
3
Earl Fitzwilliam*s Wentworth Estates Co. Ltd v. Minister 
of Town and Country Planning I 19511 1 K.B. 203•
k-
Section k3 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 19k75 
provided: (1) The Central Land Board may, with the 
approval of the Minister, by agreement acquire land for 
any purpose connected with the performance of their 
functions under the following provisions of this Act, 
and in particular may so acquire any land for the purpose 
of disposing of it for development for which permission 
has been granted under Part III of this Act on terms 
inclusive of any development charge payable under those
(cont. p.238).
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of restricting the sale at existing use value, there was 
an implied suggestion in the judgment of Birkett J., 
contrary to the test applied in Saddler*s Case, that the 
presence of unauthorised purposes might not affect the 
validity of an act if one of the purposes pursued was an 
authorised purpose. However, the decision was based 
mainly on the fact that the enforcement of the policy 
that land should be sold at a price based on existing 
use value might have been one of the motives behind the 
making of the order and uit would not be material and
iwould not be a matter for the court to inquire into" .
No reference was made to this point on appeal either in
? 3the Court of Appeal , or the House of Lords .
(cont. from p. 237)•
provisions in respect of development. (2) If the Minister 
is satisfied that it is expedient in the public interest 
that the Board should acquire any land for any such 
purpose as aforesaid, and that the Board are unable to 
acquire the land by agreement on reasonable terms, he may 
authorise the Board to acquire the land compulsorily in 
accordance with the provisions of this section ... (k) Any 
land acquired by the Central Land Board under the provi­
sions of this section shall be disposed of by them in 
accordance with such directions as may be given to them 
in that behalf by the Minister, and until the land is so 
disposed of the Board may manage it in accordance with 
such directions: Provided that nothing in this section
shall be construed as authorising the Board to carry out 
any development of land acquired by them thereunder.1 
1
[1951] 1 k .b . 203.2
[1951] 2 K.B. 284.
3
[1952] Ä.C. 362.
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I n  the  C o u r t  of Appeal  the  m a j o r i t y  ( p e r  S o m e rv e l l  
and S i n g l e t o n  L . J J . ) h e l d  the  o r d e r  v a l i d  on th e  g round  
t h a t  the  e x e r c i s e  by th e  b o a rd  o f  t h e i r  powers or com­
p u l s o r y  p u r c h a s e  was i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e i r  f u n c t i o n s  
a s  th e  a u t h o r i t y  o p e r a t i n g  the  deve lopm en t  ch a rg e  scheme. 
Denning L . J .  i n  h i s  d i s s e n t ,  d e te r m in e d  the  l e g a l i t y  of  
th e  a c t  by r e f e r e n c e  to  the  r dom inan t  p u r p o s e 1 . " I f  
P a r l i a m e n t  g r a n t s  a power t o  a governm ent  d e p a r tm e n t  t o  
be u se d  f o r  an  a u t h o r i s e d  p u r p o s e ,  t h e n  the  power i s  o n ly  
v a l i d l y  e x e r c i s e d  when i t  i s  u se d  by the  d e p a r tm e n t  
g e n u i n e l y  f o r  t h a t  p u rp o se  as  i t s  dom inant  p u r p o s e .  I f  
t h a t  p u rp o se  i s  n o t  the  main  p u r p o s e ,  b u t  i s  s u b o r d i n a t e d  
t o  some o t h e r  p u rp o se  which i s  n o t  a u t h o r i s e d  by law ,  t h e n  
th e  d e p a r tm e n t  e x ce ed s  i t s  powers  and the  a c t i o n  i s  
i n v a l i d ” ^ . H is  L o rd sh ip  d i d  n o t  d i s p u t e  t h a t  f a c i l i t a t i n g  
th e  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  c h a r g e s  was one of i t s  p u r p o s e s ,  b u t  
h e l d  t h a t  the  b o a rd  had a n o t h e r  p u rp o se  a l s o  i n  o r d e r  
t o  e n f o r c e  th e  s a l e  a t  e x i s t i n g  use  v a l u e ,  and as  the  
l a t t e r  p u rp o se  was dom inant  and a t  the  same time n o t  
a u t h o r i s e d  by th e  e n a b l in g  A c t ,  the  a c t i o n  was i n v a l i d .  
There  seem to  be c e r t a i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  t e s t  of  1dom inant  purpose*
[195U 2 K.B. 284, a t  p .  307.
1
2k0
(i) The determination of 1 dominant purpose1 is 
mainly subjective and the courts would be reluctant to 
recognise a purpose which is unauthorised or improper as 
dominant unless it is so conspicuous as to be picked out 
without any doubt.
(ii) Denning L. J. saw no distinction between purpose
iand motive: "They are one and the same thing“ . His
Lordship, therefore, applied the test of dominant
purpose1 to a case not involving mixed purposes, but an
exercise of power for an authorised purpose mixed with
the motive of enforcing their policy of restricting the
2price at existing use value . It is submitted that 
courts do maintain the distinction between purpose and 
motive and their attitude has been to disregard extran­
eous motives so long as power is exercised for an author­
ised purpose, unless there is bad faith. Lord MacDermott 
explained:
In these circumstances it is, in my opinion, 
beside the point that, in seeking to acquire 
land for the prupose thus stated, the members 
of the Board, or some of them, may have been 
moved by considerations of policy which, in 
themselves, would not (as I shall assume without 
deciding) constitute a purpose within the
[1951]  2 K.B. 28^ ,  a t  p .  308 .
Cf. Birkett J. i n  [1951]  1 K.B. 203.
2
meaning of any part of section 43(1). The 
short answer to all the submissions as to 
motive is that, on the facts here, the 
Board have brought their case within the 
express terms of the second of that sub­
section" .
(iii) There is some difficulty in reconciling the 
test of dominant purpose* with the one applied in 
Sadlerts Case. If one of the purposes pursued is unauth­
orised but not dominant, then according to Sadler*s Case 
the order would be invalid because of the extraneous 
considerations being taken into account, while Denning 
L.J. would hold the other way.
An approach similar to that of ^dominant* purpose was 
pursued by the High Court of Australia in Thompson v.
pRandwick Corporation . where it was held that in order to 
establish that a public authority is acting ultra vires 
or not, it is not necessary to show that it is activated 
solely by some unauthorised or improper purpose as was 
the case in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell^ but 
1
[1952] A.C. 362, at p. 385.
2
(1950) 81 C.L.R. 87; see also Minister of Public Works 
v. Duggan (1951) 83 C.L.R. 424.
3
[1925] A.C. 338.
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it is sufficient that it is motivated substantially by 
such a purpose. In attempting to resume more land than 
was required to construct the road, Randwick Corporation 
was actuated substantially by the purpose of profit 
making by the sale of land not so required. MIt is still 
an abuse of Councilrs power", the Court pointed out, "if 
such a purpose is a substantial purpose in the sense 
that no attempt would have been made to resume this land 
if it had not been desired to reduce the cost of the new 
road by the profit arising from its resale" . However, 
Substantial1 is as vague and uncertain as dominant1, as 
its determination is subjective. Hence the test of 
1 substantial purpose1 too is not much help in solving the 
problem of mixed purposes.
However, the problem is not so complicated as it 
looks provided the distinction between purpose and motive 
is kept in mind. Once it is realised that it is only the 
purpose, not the motive, that is relevant in determining 
the validity of an act or action (except in the case of 
bad faith), the question is reduced to the relevancy of 
purpose or purposes only. A purpose pursued becomes an 
unauthorised purpose not only because it is not authorised
i
(1950) 81 C.L.R. 87, at p.106.(Italics supplied).
"but also because it influenced the actor1 s conduct. If 
there is only one purpose in question, it does not matter 
as to what extent it influenced the actor1s conduct so 
long as the conduct is influenced by it. Thus the 
relevancy of purpose does not depend upon the degree of 
influence caused by it. Similarly if there are two or 
more purposes, one of them being unauthorised, it seems 
to be immaterial as to which one of them is Mominant1 
or Substantial1 so long as each one of them has 
influenced the actorJs conduct. The presence of an . 
unauthorised purpose would be sufficient for an exercise 
of power to be invalid, and it should not be affected by 
the presence of other authorised purposes even though 
the latter may be 1 dominant1 or 1 substantial1. The same 
logic may also be applied to the suggestion of Birkett J. 
which brushes aside the presence of an unauthorised 
purpose completely if one of the purposes pursued is an 
authorised one.
Ill
Extraneous or Irrelevant Consideration
Another limiting principle in relation to the 
exercise of discretionary powers by local authorities is
t h a t  " i f ,  i n  the s t a t u t e  c o n f e r r i n g  th e  d i s c r e t i o n ,  t h e r e  
i s  t o  be found  e x p r e s s l y  or  by i m p l i c a t i o n  m a t t e r s  which  
the  a u t h o r i t y  e x e r c i s i n g  the  d i s c r e t i o n  ough t  to  have 
r e g a r d  t o ,  t h e n  i n  e x e r c i s i n g  the  d i s c r e t i o n  i t  must  have 
r e g a r d  t o  t h e s e  m a t t e r s .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  i f  th e  n a t u r e  of 
th e  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  and the  g e n e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  the  
A c t  make i t  c l e a r  t h a t  c e r t a i n  mat te 's  would n o t  be germane 
t o  th e  m a t t e r  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  the  a u t h o r i t y  must  d i s r e g a r d  
t h e s e  i r r e l e v a n t  c o l l a t e r a l  m a t t e r s ’1^  , Thus an e x e r c i s e  
of  d i s c r e t i o n  on g rounds  which  a r e  e x t r a n e o u s  or i r r e l ­
e v a n t  to  i t s  p u rp o se  would be u l t r a  v i r e s . The c o n c e p t  
o f  r e l e v a n c y  or i r r e l e v a n c y  i s  w e l l  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n
p
M a r s h a l l  v .  B l a c k p o o l  C o r p o r a t i o n  . S .62  of  the  B la c k p o o l
Improvement A c t ,  18795 p r o v i d e d  t h a t  e v e r y  p e r s o n  must  
t a k e  p e r m i s s i o n  from the  c o r p o r a t i o n  b e f o r e  he c o u ld  
c o n s t r u c t  a com m unica t ion  f o r  h o r s e s  o r  v e h i c l e s  a c r o s s
1
A s s o c i a t e d  P r o v i n c i a l  P i c t u r e  Houses L t d , v • Wednesbury 
C o r p o r a t i o n  I I9k81 1 K.B. 223,  a t  p .  228: see  a l s o  R. v .  
V e s t r y  of St  P a n c ra s  (1890) 2b Q.B.D. 3 7 ‘ 5 a t  p p . 3 75j 
3 7 6 ; R o b e r t s  v .  Hopwood [1925]  A.C. 578,  a t  p .  6 0 0 ; R. v .  
War P e n s io n s  E n t i t l e m e n t  Appeal  T r i b u n a l ; Ex p a r t e  B o t t  
(1933) 50 C.L.R.  228,  a t  p p . 243, 245: S h o r t  v .  Poo le  
C o r p o r a t i o n  [1926]  1 Ch. 0 6 , a t  p .  9 1 ; R. v .  T r e b i l c o ; 
ex  p a r t e  F . S .  FaUdner & Sons L td  (193o) 56 C .L .R .  20,  
a t  p p .  27? 29,  32 ;  Andrews v .  D ip r o s e  (1937) 58 C.L.R. 
299? a t  p p .  3 0 8 ,  309;  Water C o n s e r v a t i o n  and I r r i g a t i o n  
Commission (N .S .W ,) v .  Browning (1957) 7b  C .L.R.  k 9 2 , 
a t  p . 50k.
2
[1933]  2 K.B. 3 3 9 ,  [1935]  A.C. 1 6 .
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any footpath so as to afford access to his premises from 
a street. On an application hy a person to construct 
such a communication, the question arose whether the 
corporation was limited to considering the matters specif­
ied in the section - the particular place where, and the 
details how, the work would be carried out, or whether it 
could consider other matters such as the safety of the 
public, and the nature of the user. It was held by the 
Court of Appeal that the corporation was entitled to 
consider the safety of the public and the convenience of 
pedestrians and vehicular traffic, but at the same time
it should not have regard to the powers which it hoped to
1obtain under tbe proposed Town Planning Scheme . Here 
public safety and convenience of traffic were regarded as 
relevant considerations, while any reference to the Town 
Planning Scheme was irrelevant.
If the nature of the power conferred on an author­
ity is misconceived and the discretion thereupon is 
exercised by taking into account considerations not con­
templated by the statute, the act would be ultra vires 
even though the authority acted with complete good faith. 
In Estate and Trust Agencies (1917) Ltd v. Singapore
i
Ibid., at pp. 353, 35k.
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Improvement Trust , the action taken by a Board consti­
tuted by the Singapore Improvement Ordinance 1927? and 
entrusted with the duty of carrying out the provisions of 
the Ordinance, was held ultra vires because it misinter­
preted s.57 of the Ordinance under which it made a declara­
tion that particuhr buildings were unfit for human habita­
tion, S.57 of the Ordinance provided: "Whenever it
appears to the Board that within its administrative area 
any building which is used or is intended or is likely to 
be used as a dwelling place is of such a construction or 
is in such a condition as to be unfit for human habita­
tion, the Board may by resolution declare such building 
to be insanitary". The Privy Council said that the Board 
adopted a wrong and inadmissible test in applying standards 
as to light or ventilation or conveniences, and in not 
making "a single reference to those matters which generally 
render a house unfit for human habitation, such as a 
structure which is unsafe, a verminous condition of the 
materials, a pestiferous atmosphere, a state of things 
dangerous to health, or such a rotten or decayed condition 
of the building that rebuilding will be cheaper than
extensive repair"2. It was, therefore, said that the
_
[1937] A.C. 898.
Ibid., at p. 9*18.
2
2 U-7
grounds on which the Board made the declaration were 
grounds which did not justify the declaration, A similar 
problem arose in R. v. Connell: ex parte the Hetton 
Bellbird Collieries Ltd , as to the meaning of the word 
"anomalous1 2* occurring in the National Security (Economic 
Organization) Regulations, Reg, I7(i)(b) provided that 
an Industrial Authority might alter any rate of remunera­
tion "with the approval of the Minister, if the Industrial 
Authority is satisfied that the rates of remuneration ... 
are anomalous’*. It was held that an Industrial Authority 
was not "satisfied" within the meaning of that regulation, 
so as to found its authority to alter existing rates 
upon a misconstruction of the regulation. The desirability 
of having a new and uniform provision was not sufficiot
to justify an anomaly; it must be shown that the rates in
2question were incongruous with an existing rule .
If a statute conferring a discretionary power 
expressly states the considerations to be taken into
1
(1944) 69 C.L.R. 407.
2
McTiernan J, disagreed with other members of the High 
Court in that "where the Industrial Authority is duly 
satisfied that a rate of remuneration is anomalous it is 
not for this Court in prohibition proceedings to hold 
that the condition necessary to jurisdiction was fulfilled, 
even if the Court thought there was no anomaly, but the 
Industrial Authority was satisfied that there was": ibid, 
at p. k^O.
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account, there is not much difficulty in examining the 
validity of an act on grounds of extraneous or irrelevant 
considerations. However, it is not usually the case, and 
the task of courts is then to identify relevant consid­
erations implied in the terms of the statute, and to 
distinguish them from the extraneous or irrelevant ones.
So far it has not been possible to formulate any principle 
or criterion because Mthe questions, what are, and what
are not, legitimate considerations .,, must always be
“1disputable and open to wide differences of opinion'* •
In Theatre de Luxe (Halifax) Ltd v, Gledhill «^ a 
condition was imposed by a licensing authority having 
power to grant licenses for cinematograph performances 
under the Cinematograph Act, 1909? to the effect:
"Children under fourteen years of age shall not be allowed 
to enter into or be in the licensed premises after the 
hour of 9 P*m, unaccompanied by parent or guardian. No 
children under the age of ten years shall be allowed in 
the licensed premises under any circumstances after 
9 p.m." The majority held that the condition was ultra
T
R, V. Trebilco; ex carte F,S, Falkiner & Sons Ltd (1936) 
5^ C.L.R. 20, at p, 32, per Dixon J.
2
[1915] 2 K.B. 49.
2^9
v i r e s  i n  as  much as  t h e r e  was no c o n n e c t i o n  b e tw ee n  the  
ground upon which  the  c o n d i t i o n  was im posed ,  n am ely ,  
r e g a r d  f o r t h e  h e a l t h  and w e l f a r e  o f  young c h i l d r e n  
g e n e r a l l y ,  and th e  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  o f  the  l i c e n s e ,  nam ely ,  
the  use  of p r e m i s e s  f o r  th e  g i v i n g  of  c in e m a to g r a p h  
e x h i b i t i o n s .  A t h i n  J .  d i s s e n t i n g ,  w as  of  the  o p i n i o n  
t h a t  one of th e  c o n d i t i o n s  imposed on the  g r a n t  o f  
l i c e n s e s  must  be i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t ,  and 
i n  so f a r  a s  c h i l d r e n  were a f f e c t e d ,  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s  
were j u s t i f i e d  i n  im pos ing  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n .  However, i t  
i s  A t k i n  J . 1s o p i n i o n  t h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  have p r e v a i l e d
( th o u g h  n o t  m en t io n ed )  i n  R. v .  London County C o u n c i l ;
■1
ex p a r t e  London and P r o v i n c i a l  E l e c t r i c  T h e a t r e s  L t d 1•
There i t  was h e l d  t h a t  a c o u n c i l  a c t i n g  u n d e r  th e  D i s o r ­
d e r l y  A c t ,  175*1 j and the  C inem atograph  A c t ,  1909s c o u ld  
r e f u s e  to  g r a n t  th e  r e n e w a l  of  music  and c in e m a to g r a p h  
l i c e n s e s  on th e  g round  t h a t  the  l a r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  i t s  
s h a r e s  were h e l d  by a l i e n  e n e m ie s .  Lord R ead ing  C . J .  s a i d :
The C o u n c i l  i n  t h e s e  m a t t e r s  a r e  th e  g u a r d i a n s  
of p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  and w e l f a r e .  I f  th e  C o u n c i l  
a r e  of th e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  the  e x h i b i t i o n  of  
c in e m a to g r a p h  f i l m s  accompanied  by m usic  s h o u ld  
n o t  be e n t r u s t e d  to  a company so l a r g e l y  
composed of  p e r s o n s  whose i n t e i e s t  and whose 
d e s i r e  a t  th e  p r e s e n t  t ime i s  o r  may be to
1
[1915]  2 K.B. *+66; see  a l s o  R,  v .  B u r n l e y  J u s t i c e s  (1916) 
115 L.T.  525s a t  p p .  528-9 , 530.
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inflict injury upon this country, can it be held 
as a matter of law that the Council have tra­
velled beyond the limits allowed to them. I 
think not. I cannot hold that such considerations 
are extraneous or extra-judicial"‘.
This attitude entitling authorities to consider matters 
of public interest, was also adopted in Harman v. Butt . 
Acting under the Sunday Entertainments Act, 1932, an 
authority having power to grant licenses under the 
Cinematograph Act, 1909> allowed a cinematograph theatre 
to be opened and used on Sundays subject to the condi­
tion that no child under the age of sixteen should be 
admitted. It was held that the condition was not ultra 
vireso Atkinson J. said: "I am satisfied that the 
defendants were entitled to consider matters relating 
to the welfare, including the spiritual well-being, of 
the community and any section of it, and I hold that this 
condition ... is not ultra vires on the ground that it 
is not confined to the user of the premises by the licensee, 
but relates to the interest of a section of the community"^. 
Thus, though the Halifax Case was not overruled, the scope 
of its application was considerably narrowed down 
1
Ibid., at pp. ^75? 5-76.2
[195-5-] 1 K.B. 5-91.
Ibid., at pp. 5-99} 500.
3
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by p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  th e  Act of 1932 gave an u n l i m i t e d  
d i s c r e t i o n  a s  the  l i c e n s e  co u ld  be g r a n t e d  " s u b j e c t  t o  
such  c o n d i t i o n s  as  th e  a u t h o r i t y  t h i n k  f i t  to  impose?1, a 
ground a d d i t i o n a l  t o  t h a t  g r a n t e d  i n  th e  A c t  of 1909*
This  v iew  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  Harman v .  B u t t  
was r e f e r r e d  t o  w i t h  a p p r o v a l  i n  A s s o c i a t e d  P r o v i n c i a l
A
P i c t u r e  Houses L t d , v .  Wednesbury C o r p o r a t i o n 1, where  
" t h e  w e l l - b e i n g  and th e  p h y s i c a l  and  m o ra l  h e a l t h  o f  
c h i l d r e n "  was c o n s i d e r e d  as  a m a t t e r  which  the  a u t h o r i t y  
was com pe ten t  t o  c o n s i d e r .  "No-body,  a t  t h i s  t ime of  d a y " ,  
s a i d  Lord Green  M .R . , " c o u ld  say  t h a t  the  w e l l - b e i n g  and 
the  p h y s i c a l  and m o ra l  h e a l t h  o f  ch i ld ren  i s  n o t  a m a t t e r  
which  a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  i n  e x e r c i s i n g  t h e i r  p o w e rs ,  c an  
p r o p e r l y  have i n  mind when th o se  q u e s t i o n s  a re  germane to
pwhat th e y  have t o  c o n s i d e r "  .
The w id e r  the  d i s c r e t i o n ,  th e  l e s s  p o s s i b l e  i t  
becomes t o  i d e n t i f y  r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  The t e n d e n ­
cy h as  b e en  to  c o n f e r  d i s c r e t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  te rm s  su ch  as  
r i f  the  a u t h o r i t y  t h i n k s  f i t * ,  and the  j u d i c i a l  a t t i t u d e  
h as  n o t  been  u n i f o r m  i n  i n d i c a t i n g  th e  g rounds  upon w hich
1
[1948]  1 K.B. 223 .
2
I b i d . , a t  p .  230 .
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*1the discretion is exercisable. In Roberts v. Hopwood ,
Lord Sumner was of the view that a local authority acted
for a collateral purpose, if it fixed by standards of its
own on social grounds a minimum wage for all adults, and
was not in so doing acting for the benefit of the whole
community. Whereas a reference to social or economic
2policy was discouraged in Re Decision of Walker , a 
case in which payment of certain wages was again the 
question. Goddard C.J. said that so long as a particular 
result arrived at was prima facie reasonable, it was 
irrelevant how and why that result was arrived at. But 
he thought that the courts could disallow an exercise of 
power by reference to *some policy of social reform* if 
the limit of reasonableness was exceeded as in Roberts v. 
Hopwood. However, in Associated Provincial Picture Houses 
Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation^, it was clearly said that 
the Court was not to act Mas an appellate authority to 
override a decision of the local authority which is con­
cerned, and concerned only, to see whether the local
authority have contravened the law by acting in excess of
_____ .
[1925] A.C. 578; see also Attorney-General v. Tynemouth 
Union [1930] 1 Ch. 616, 625.
2
[194-4] K.B. 64h-.
[194-8] 1 K.B. 223.
3
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1
t h e  powers which  P a r l i a m e n t  has  c o n f i d e d  i n  them’1 . Thus 
i t  was t h o u g h t  u n n e c e s s a r y  t o  d e f i n e  th e  l i m i t s  of  
r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s  so long  as the  l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  was
2a c t i n g  " w i t h i n  th e  f o u r  c o r n e r s  of t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n "  .
As t o  the  d e c i s i o n  i n  R o b e r t s  v .  Hopwood« i t  was e x p l a i n e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  th e  wages were f i x e d  " n o t  by r e f e r e n c e  to  any 
o f  the  f a c t o r s  which  go t o  d e te r m in e  a s c a l e  of  wages ,  
b u t  by r e f e r e n c e  to  some o t h e r  p r i n c i p l e  a l t o g e t h e r " ^ .
U.
But  P r e s c o t t  v .  Birmingham C o r p o r a t i o n  seems to  
have r e v i v e d  the  s p i r i t  o f  R o b e r t s  v .  Hopwood. I n  t h a t  
c a s e  a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  empowered t o  c h a rg e  f a r e s  on i t s  
b u s e s  1 as i t  sh o u ld  t h i n k  f i t 1 a r r a n g e d  f o r  f r e e  t r a n s p o r t  
f o r  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  of aged p e r s o n s ,  the  c o r p o r a t i o n  
p a y in g  to  th e  t r a n s p o r t  fu n d  e ach  y e a r  a sum e q u i v a l e n t  
t o  th e  e s t i m a t e d  c o s t  of the  scheme t o  the  t r a n s p o r t  
u n d e r t a k i n g .  The C o u r t  of  Appeal  h e l d  t h a t  th e  scheme 
went  beyond a n y th i n g  which  c o u ld  r e a s o n a b l y  be r e g a r d e d  
as  a u t h o r i s e d  by th e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power of  f i x i n g  f a r e s
7
I b i d . , a t  p . 23^ .
2
I b i d . , a t  p .  231.
3
I b i d . , a t  p . 2 3 2 .
[^955]  Ch. 210.  F o r  i t s  d i s c u s s i o n  see  G r i f f i t h ,
(1956) 18 Mod. L. Rev. 159*
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and was accordingly ultra vires the corporation. The 
local authority was regarded as owing a fiduciary duty to 
ratepayers and as such it might not make free gifts to 
a favoured class of persons at the expense of ratepayers 
"on benevolent or philanthropic grounds'1. The Court 
took notice of the fact that the undertaking was a 
business venture but said that it should not be guided 
by considerations of profit only to the exclusion of all 
other considerations. This sort of reasoning, if not 
understood as merely applicable to a corporation owing
i"an analogous fiduciary duty" could pave a way for a 
fairly wide judicial discretion to overrule the judgment 
of local authorities.
It has been a matter of construction depending upon 
the nature and character of the terms of the power confer­
ring discretion upon an authority and also the scope and 
general operation of the legislation. In R. v. Australian
Stevedoring Industry Board: ex carte Melbourne Stevedoring 
2Co, Pty Ltd , in spite of the evident discretion given to
_
Ibid., at p. 235* A similar reasoning was applied in 
Attorney-General v. Tynemouth Union [1930] 1 Ch. 616, at 
P.637  ^ in which Eve J. said that the position of the Guar­
dians, under the Relief Regulation Order, I9H 5 in rela­
tion to the rate-payers was of a fiduciary character, and 
they certainly could not make a present of the outstand­
ing debts to the borrowers at the expense of the rate­
payers.
2
[1953] A.L.R. 1+61.
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the Stevedoring Industry Board to act nas it thinks fit" 
the High Court did not accept the Board1 s ’’attitude'1 or 
policy in invoking the section as a means of enforcing 
upon employers a duty to prevent workers from leaving 
work prematurely and to report their absence to the Board, 
Under s.23(1) of the Stevedoring Industry Act, the Board 
had power to cancel or suspend registration if, after 
such inquiry as it thought fit, it was satisfied that an 
employer (a) was unfit to continue to be registered as an 
employer, (b) had acted in a manner whereby the proper 
performance of stevedoring operations had been interfered 
with, or (c) had committed an offence against the Act,
The Court recognised that in such cases no legal ground 
for attacking the exercise of power arose merely because 
the authority might come to an erroneous conclusion of 
fact or proceed on the meagre or unconvincing evidence. 
But as a matter of law the authority must understand 
correctly the test laid down in the relevant legislation 
and correctly apply it. "It is only when the Board or 
its Delegate is satisfied of the existence of facts which 
do amount in point of law to what the section means by 
unfitness or by acting in a manner whereby the proper 
performance of stevedoring operations is interfered with 
that the Board or its Delegate reaches a position where
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one or  o t h e r  of them may l a w f u l l y  e x e r c i s e  the  a u t h o r i t y  
which  3 .2 3 ( 1 )  p u r p o r t s  to  h e s to w ” • The C o u r t  was of  the  
v iew  t h a t  u n d e r  th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  f i t n e s s  c o n n o ted  s u i t a ­
b i l i t y ,  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of  an  employer  
and a s  such  " t h e  scope  of s . 2 3 ( 1) (a)  h a s  b e en  m isco n ­
c e i v e d  and s u s p e n s i o n  or  c a n c e l l a t i o n  of r e g i s t r a t i o n  
i s  i n  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  n o t  by r e a s o n  o f  u n f i t n e s s  b u t  as  a 
s a n c t i o n  to  e n f o r c e  the o b l i g a t i o n  l a i d  upon s t e v e d o r e s  
r e g i s t e r e d  as e m p lo y e r s ,  th e  o b l i g a t i o n  of  c l o s e l y  s u p e r -
p
v i s i n g  and d i s c i p l i n i n g  the  member of the  gangs"  •
At th e  same t im e ,  th e  c o r r e c t n e s s  or i n c o r r e c t n e s s  d* 
th e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  by an  a u t h o r i t y  c a n n o t  be 
q u e s t i o n e d  i n  a c o u r t  u n l e s s  t h e y  have  i n  t r u t h  been  
a c t u a t e d  by e x t r a n e o u s  or i r r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  In  
R. v .  T r e b i l c o ;  ex  p a r t e  F . S .  F a l k i n e r  & Sons Ltd^ , upon 
an a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  r e l i e f  f o r  t a x a t i o n  under  the  Land 
Tax A ssessm en t  Act  i n  r e s p e c t  of  the  y e a r s  en d in g  June 
1932 and 1933 on th e  g ro u n d s  t h a t  the  r e t u r n  from the  
t a x p a y e r * s  l a n d  had b e e n  s e r i o u s l y  i m p a i r e d  and the  
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 5-66.
2
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  5-69, p e r  Dixon C . J .  , W i l l i a m s , Webb and 
F u l l a g a r  J J .
3
(1936) 56 C.L.R.  20 .
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exaction of the full amount of tax would entail serious 
hardships, the Board took into consideration the fact 
that in 1935- there had been a substantial profit and in 
1935 only a small loss, and on that basis refused the 
application. It was urged that the board, in making its 
decision, considered extraneous matters, namely the 
financial position of the taxpayer in 1935- and 1935*
Latham C.J. said that as the board was entitled to take 
into account any facts affecting the financial position 
of the applicant at the time when the application was 
considered, there was no ground for limiting the relevant 
considerations by reference to the year in which the 
facts occurred upon which the applicant relied. However, 
the board would have taken into account extraneous 
considerations if the circumstances had no relation 
whatever to the position of the applicant as a taxpayer 
or to his financial capacity or to land taxation - such 
as, for example, the fact that the applicant was engaged 
in some occupation of which the board disapproved.
If a local authority or a board do not state 
reasons for their decision, it is well nigh impossible for 
the aggrieved party to bring a case before the court on
258
g rounds  of  e x t r a n e o u s  or  i r r e l e v a n t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  •
F o r  exam ple ,  i n  Land R e a l i s a t i o n  Co» L td  v .  P o s t  O f f i c e ^ ,  
a c t i n g  un d e r  th e  A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Land ( A u t h o r i s a t i o n  
P r o c e d u r e )  A c t ,  1946, and the  Town and Country  P l a n n in g  
A c t ,  1947, the  p o s t  O f f i c e  i n  p u r s u a n c e  of  c e r t a i n  o r d e r s  
th e  v a l i d i t y  of  which  the  p l a i n t i f f s  im peached ,  s i g n e d  
an a u t h o r i s a t i o n  to  a c q u i r e  l a n d  which  the  p l a i n t i f f s  
owned, and e n t e r e d  i n t o  p o s s e s s i o n .  The a u t h o r i s a t i o n  
was h e l d  v a l i d  hy the  c o u r t  even  though  no r e a s o n s  were 
g i v e n  f o r  th e  d e c i s i o n .  " I t  i s  w e l l  s e t t l e d " ,  Römer J .  
re m a rk e d ,  " t h a t  where a s t a t u t o r y  p r o v i s i o n  empowers a 
m i n i s t e r  t o  do som eth ing  which  he i s  s a t i s f i e d  i s  n e c e s s ­
a ry  h a v in g  r e g a r d  to  a c e r t a i n  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  a s t a t e ­
ment by him t h a t  he i s  so s a t i s f i e d  w i l l  be a c c e p t e d  i n  
t h e s e  c o u r t s " ^ .  I n  P i l l i n g  v .  A b e rg e le  U.D.C. ^ ,  Lord 
Goddard C . J .  s a i d  t h a t  he c o u ld  examine t h e  v a l i d i t y  of  
th e  d i s c r e t i o n  e x e r c i s e d  by a l o c a l  a u t h o r i t y  o n ly  b eca u se  
t h e y  s t a t e d  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n .
1
However, the  a l l e g a t i o n  of  bad  f a i t h  c o u ld  s t i l l  be i n ­
v e s t i g a t e d :  e . g . ,  C a r l t o n a  L td  v .  Commissioner of Works 
[ 1943] 2 A l l  E.R. 560,  a t  p p .  5 6 3 , 564.
2
[1950]  1 A l l  E.R. 1062.  See a l s o  th e  d ic tu m  of  Lord 
Sumner i n  R. v .  Nat B e l l  L iq u o r s  L td  [1922]  2 A.C. 128,  
a t  p .  159 .
3
I b i d . , a t  p .  I0 6 7 .
4
[1950]  1 K.B. 6 3 6 .
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B a t  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  th e  c o u r t s  would make i n q u i r i e s  
w h e th e r  th e  o p i n i o n  r e q u i r e d  by th e  r e l e v a n t  l e g i s l a t i v e  
p r o v i s i o n  h as  r e a l l y  b e en  fo rm ed ,  and would n o t  l e a v e  i t  
t o  th e  s a t i s f a c t i o n  of  the  a u t h o r i t i e s .  Latham C . J .  
once e x p l a i n e d :  "Where th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  
o p i n io n  i s  made a c o n d i t i o n  of  th e  e x e r c i s e  of power,  
l e g i s l a t i o n  c o n f e r r i n g  th e  power i s  t r e a t e d  as  r e f e r r i n g  
to  an o p i n i o n  w hich  i s  such  t h a t  i t  c an  be formed by a 
r e a s o n a b l e  man who c o r r e c t l y  u n d e r s t a n d s  th e  meaning of 
the  law under  w hich  he a c t s .  I f  i t  i s  shown t h a t  the  
o p i n i o n  a c t u a l l y  fo rm ed i s  n o t  an o p i n i o n  of t h i s  c h a r a c ­
t e r ,  t h e n  the  n e c e s s a r y  o p i n i o n  does n o t  e x i s t .  A p e r s o n  
a c t i n g  und e r  a s t a t u t o r y  power c a n n o t  c o n f e r  upon h i m s e l f
by m i s c o n s t r u i n g  the  s t a t u t e  which  i s  the  so u rc e  of h i s
1 2power" . I n  C a r b in e s  v .  P o w el l  , Reg.  92  of  th e  W i r e l e s s  
T e le g ra p h y  R e g u l a t i o n s ,  which  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  "No p e r s o n  
or  f i r m  s h a l l  m a n u f a c tu r e  . . .  equ ip m en t  f o r  use  as  b r o a d ­
c a s t  r e c e i v e r s ,  o r  f o r  u se  i n  t h o s e  r e c e i v e r s ,  u n t i l  he 
has  b e en  g r a n t e d  a d e a l e r * s  l i c e n s e " ,  e t c . ,  was h e ld  
beyond th e  power c o n f e r r e d  by s . 1 0  of  th e  W i r e l e s s  
T e le g ra p h y  A c t ,  1905-1919 (Cl w l t h ) , upon the  G o v e rn o r -  
1
R. v . C o n n e l l ;  ex  p a r t e  th e  H e t t o n  B e l l b i r d  C o l l i e r i e s  
Ltd  (195k) 69  C .L .R .  407,  a t  p .  k30.
2
(1925) 36 C .L .R .  88 .
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G e n e r a l  to  make r e g u l a t i o n s  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  the  
Act ’’p r e s c r i b i n g  a l l  m a t t e r s  which  by the  Act  a r e  r e q u i r e d  
or p e r m i t t e d  to  be p r e s e n t e d  f o r  c a r r y i n g  o u t  or  g i v in g  
e f f e c t  t o  th e  A c t " ,  as  th e  Act  r e l a t e d  o n ly  to  c o n d u c t  
i n v o l v e d  i n  t r a n s m i t t i n g  and r e c e i v i n g  m essages  and n o t  
the  m a n u f a c tu r e  of such  e q u ip m e n t .  An a u t h o r i t y  ’’c a n n o t  
und e r  the  g u i s e  o f  g i v i n g  b e t t e r  e f f e c t  t o  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  
of a s t a t u t e  e x te n d  th e  s t a t u t e  t o  th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  or  
r e s t r a i n t  o f  t r a d e s  which  a r e  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  the  
s t a t u t e ”^ .
S i m i l a r l y  a power e x p r e s s e d  i n  te rm s  of  n e c e s s a r y  
a n d / o r  c o n v e n i e n t  or e x p e d i e n t ,  i s  n o t  u n l i m i t e d  i n  i t s  
o p e r a t i o n  b u t  i s  c o n f i n e d  to  th e  making of  r e g u l a t i o n s  
i n c i d e n t a l  t o  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  s t a t u t e .  I t  
would n o t  s u p p o r t  a t t e m p t s  t o  w iden  the  p u r p o s e s  o f  the  
A c t ,  t o  add new and d i f f e r e n t  means o f  c a r r y i n g  them o u t  
or  to  d e p a r t  from o r  v a r y  th e  p l a n  which the  l e g i s l a t u r e
1
I b i d . , a t  p .  92 ,  q u o ted  from R o s s i  v .  E d in b u rg h  Cor­
p o r a t i o n  [1905] A.C. 21,  a t  p .  29j  p e r  Lord D avey .
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1
has  a d o p te d  to  a t t a i n  i t s  e n d s .  I n  Shanahan v .  S c o t t  , 
the  v a l i d i t y  of  a r e g u l a t i o n ,  made i n  p u r su a n c e  of such  
a power ,  f o r b i d d i n g  the  p l a c i n g  o r  c a u s in g  to be p l a c e d  
a l l  e g g s ,  w h e th e r  v e s t e d  i n  th e  b o a rd  and a l r e a d y  
frarketed* or  n o t ,  e x c e p t  w i t h  the  c o n s e n t  of the  b o a r d ,  
was h e l d  u l t r a  v i r e s  t h e  Act  a s  i t  was n o t  w i t h i n  the  
scope and g e n e r a l  o p e r a t i o n  of  the  l e g i s l a t i o n  which  was 
t o  g iv e  th e  b o a rd  c o n t r o l  of eggs  w i t h  a v iew to m a r k e t in g  
them. I t  was an a t t e m p t  n o t  to  complement  b u t  to  s u p p l e ­
ment  the p l a n  of  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  by e x t e n d in g  i t  to  the  
u s e ,  h a n d l i n g  or  d i s p o s i t i o n  o f  e g g s ,  which  was in d e p e n ­
d e n t  of the  b o a rd * s  m a r k e t in g  o f  the  eggs v e s t e d  i n  or
p
o t h e r w i s e  a c q u i r e d  by the  b o a rd  .
1
(1957) 96 C.L.R.  2 45 .  See a l s o  Ches te rm an  v .  F e d e r a l  
Commissioner of T a x a t i o n  (1923) 32 C .L .R .  3^2 ;  C a r b in e s  
v .  P o w el l  (1926) 36 C .L .R .  88; B r o a d c a s t i n g  Co. of  Aus­
t r a l i a  P ty  Ltd v .  Commonwealth (1935) 52 C.L.R.  52;
Grech v .  B i r d  (19375 5^ > C .L .R .  228; Morton v . Union Steam­
s h ip  Co. o f  New Z e a la n d  Ltd (1951) 83 C .L .R .  402j  
A u s t r a l a s i a n  Jam Co. P t y  L td  v . Commissioner of T a x a t i o n  
(C*wlth)  (1953) 88 C .L .R .  23 .
But  Mi n  an  Act  o f  P a r l i a m e n t  which  l a y s  down on ly  
the  main  o u t l i n e s  o f  p o l i c y  and i n d i c a t e s  an I n t e n t i o n  
of  l e a v i n g  i t  to  th e  G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l  to  work o u t  t h a t  
p o l i c y  by s p e c i f i c  r e g u l a t i o n ,  a power to  make r e g u l a ­
t i o n s  may have a wide a m b i t .  I t s  am bi t  may be v e ry  
d i f f e r e n t  i n  an Act  of  P a r l i a m e n t  which  d e a l s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  
and i n  d e t a i l  w i t h  th e  s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  to  which  the  
s t a t u t e  i s  a d d r e s s e d . u : M orton  v .  Union S team ship  Co. 
of  Hew Z e a la n d  L t d . (1951") 83 C.L.R" 4-02, a t  p .  410.
2
I b i d . , a t  p . 254.
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However, i n  Morton v .  Union S team ship  Co. , the  
High Cour t  p o i n t e d  ou t  t h a t  the  scope o f  such  r e g u l a t i o n -  
making powers ( e . g . ,  i n  p u r s u a n c e  of *n e c e s s a r y  and con­
v e n i e n t *  c l a u s e )  v a r i e d  f rom  s t a t u t e  t o  s t a t u t e .  I f  the  
s t a t u t e  i s  i n  1 s k e l e to n *  fo rm ,  l a y i n g  down o n ly  a few g e n ­
e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h e n  reg u la t io n -m ak in g  power und e r  such  a 
c l a u s e  would he c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  w id e .  But  when the  Act 
c o n t a i n s  d e t a i l e d  s e r i e s  o f  p r o v i s i o n s ,  the  1i n c i d e n t a l *  
r e g u l a t i o n - m a k i n g  power w i l l  be c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y  n a r ro w .
IV
1
U n r e a s o n a b le n e s s 2
Though a b y - l a w  may be l i t e r a l l y  w i t h i n  i t s  p ow ers ,  
i t  c o u ld  s t i l l  p o s s i b l y  be d e c l a r e d  u l t r a  v i r e s  i f  i t  i s  
u n r e a s o n a b l e  i n  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  . However, i t  must  be
1 (1951) 83 C.L.R. 402.
2
See g e n e r a l l y  de Smith, l o c .  c i t . ,  a t  pp. 214-221;  
G r i f f i t h  and S t r e e t ,  P r i n c i p l e s  o f  A d m in is t r a t iv e  Law 
(2nd e d . ) , a t  pp. 112- 1 1 5 *
3
I t  has  b e en  a s s e r t e d  as  w a r r a n t i n g  t h a t  anyone e x e r c i s i n g  
a d i s c r e t i o n  "must by use  o f  h i s  r e a s o n ,  a s c e r t a i n  and 
f o l l o w  th e  c o u r s e  which  r e a s o n  d i r e c t s " :  p e r  Lord Wren- 
b u ry  i n  R o b e r t s  v .  Hopwood [1925]  A.C. 57o, a t  p.  6135 see  
also A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  v .  Tynemouth Union G u a rd ia n s  [1930]
1 Ch. 6 1 6 ; P r e s c o t t  v .  Birmingham C o r p o r a t i o n  L1955] Oh.
2 1 0 .
In c o n t r a s t  to  a by- law  made by m un ic ipa l  b o d i e s ,  m i n i s ­
t e r i a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  would not  be d e c la r e d  i n v a l i d  on the 
ground of  * unreasonableness*: Sparks v .  Edmund Ash Ltd 
[ 1943 ] K.B. 223, a t  p p .2 2 8 ,  230; see  a l s o  Taylor v .  
Birmingham Borough Council  [1947]  K.B. 736; Attorney-Gen­
e r a l  f o r  Canada v .  H a l l e t  and Carey Ltd [1952] A.C.  427*
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unreasonable in the sense that the authority “have never­
theless come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no
1reasonable authority could ever have come to it” • The 
courts ought not to be astute to find possible difficul­
ties or grievances to which the administration of a by­
law might give rise and it ought to be supported unless 
it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation 
between different classes, or unjust, or made in bad 
faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference 
with the liberty of those subject to it. Thus in Kruse 
v. Johnson* 2 3, a law forbidding a person from playing any 
musical instrument or singing in any public place or high­
way within fifty yards of any dwelling house was held 
reasonable. “A by-law is not unreasonable", said Lord 
Russell. "merely because particular judges may think that 
it goes further than is prudent or necessary or conven­
ient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification 
or an exception which some judges may think ought to be
there" . It was further observed that the court ought
_
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Cor­
poration I 19481 1 K.B. 223, at p. 23^.
2
[1898] 2 Q.B. 91» See also Twickenham Corporation v. 
Solosigns Ltd [1939] 3 All E.r ! 2k6, at p. 250. Cf. 
Slattery v. Naylor [1888] 13 App. Cas. M+6, at pp.k52, *+53*
3
Kruse v. Johnson, supra, at p.100.
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t o  be s low t o  condemn as  i n v a l i d  any b y - la w  on th e  ground 
of supposed  u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s  and a p p ly  t o  i t  a b e n e v o l e n t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  an  a p p ro a c h  d i f f e r e n t  f rom the  one a p p l i e d  
t o  the  powers  of " r a i l w a y  c o m p an ie s ,  or  o t h e r  l i k e  com­
p a n i e s  w hich  c a r r y  on t h e i r  b u s i n e s s  f o r  t h e i r  b e n e f i t "  
and the  c o u r t s  "g u a rd  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  u n n e c e s s a r y  or u n r e a s -  
o n a b le  e x e r c i s e  to  the  p u b l i c  d i s a d v a n t a g e "  • Thus the
ground  of U n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 1 2 h a s  v i r t u a l l y  b een  r e d u c e d  t o
2the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  e x t r a n e o u s  or i r r e l e v a n t  f a c t o r s  .
I n  A u s t r a l i a ,  1u n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 1 i s  n o t  r e g a r d e d  as 
an i n d e p e n d e n t  ground  f o r  i n v a l i d a t i n g  a b y - l a w .  There 
was a s u g g e s t i o n  o f  t r e a t i n g  i t  t h a t  way i n  an e a r l y  V ic -
t o r i a n  c a se  b u t  t h i s  was o v e r r u l e d  s u b s e q u e n t l y  by the
1+ q
High C o u r t  . I n  W il l ia m s  v .  Melbourne C o r p o r a t i o n ^ ,
1
I b i d . ,  a t  p .  99« See a l s o  R. v .  R o b e r t s ;  ex c a r t e  S c u r r  
and O th e r s  [1924-] 2 K.B. 695,  a t  p p .  719,  721 , 7 2 6 -7 .
2
See a l s o  Lord A tk i n s o n  i n  R o b e r t s  v .  Hopwood, s u p r a , a t  
p p .  594- and 600 ,  and Lord Green  L . J .  i n  A s s o c i a t e d  P r o v i n ­
c i a l  P i c t u r e  Houses v .  Wednesbury C o r p o r a t i o n , s u p r a , a t  
p p . 232,  233- C a n a d ia n  c o u r t s  have t a k e n  th e  same v iew;
P i one v .  M o n t r e a l  [1956]  3 D .L .R .  ( 2 d . )  727; T o ro n to  v .  
Forres t  H i l l s  I 1957J 9 D .L .R .  ( 2 d . )  113; R. v .  Thomson 
LI9 5 7 J 9 D .L .R .  ( 2 d . )  107.
^ Gunner v .  H e ld in g  (1902) 28 V .L .R .  3 03 ,  a t  p .  3 2 1 .
Ll
See e . g . ,  Widgee S h i r e  C o u n c i l  v .  Bonney (1907) 4- C.L.R.  
977,  a t  p .  9Ö2; Jo n es  v .  M e t r o p o l i t a n  Meat I n d u s t r y  Board 
(1925) 37 C .L .R .  252; W il l ia m s  v .  Melbourne C o r p o r a t i o n  
(1933) 4-9 C .L .R .  14-2, a t  p .  154-5 King Gee C l o th i n g  Co.
P ty  L td  v .  Commonwealth (194-5) 71 C .L .R .  184-, a t  p .  195*
4 1 9 3 3 ) ^9 C .L .R .  142.
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acting under the Local Government Act 1928 (Vic.), a 
local authority made a by-law preventing cattle from 
being driven in certain streets of the city except during 
certain hours. The by-law being challenged on the ground 
of unreasonableness, the High Court remarked that it was 
not a separate and distinct ground of invalidity; the 
material question raised by such a submission was whether, 
nothwithstanding that on its face it related to traffic, 
the operation of the by-law was such that it could have 
no reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the 
power to make by-laws was granted. If it could not 
reasonably have been alopted as a means attaining the end 
of the power, it would be invalid not because it was 
expedient or misguided, but because it was not a real 
exercise of the power*! # The by-law being within the 
powers conferred upon the corporation, was, therefore, 
held to be valid.
pIn Footscray v. Maize Products Ltd , and Brunswick 
Corporation v. Stewart^, there were indications that the 
power to hold a by-law void on grounds of Unreasonableness1
7
Ibid., at p. 155*2
(19^3) 67 C.L.R. 301, at pp. 309-311.
(19^1) 65 C.L.R. 88, at pp. 97, 99.
3
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still existed, though the by-law should be "so oppressive 
or capricious that no reasonable mind can justify it”.
But such a case would invariably embrace other grounds of 
invalidity, particularly bad faith, covered by ultra 
vires. The present law may thus be stated in the words
iof Stanley J. in Englart v. Walker; ex parte Englart : 
nThe court should not hold a regulation invalid on the 
ground of unreasonableness if ex facie it is within the 
scope of the power to make regulations, unless it is so 
oppressive or capricious that no reasonable mind could 
justify it as an exercise of those powers. It would then 
become a mere abuse, and not a real exercise of power".
However, in the United States Unreasonableness* is
a much broader ground for invalidating a by-law, or a 
2 1regulation , than in England . For example, in Yick Wo
1
[1951] St.R.Qd. *+7, at pp. 51 5 52. Also refer to Proud v. 
Box Hill Corporation [ 19^ +9J V.L.R. 208 .
2
In the United States both by-laws and regulations (unlike 
in England) may be declared as ultra vires on the ground 
of *unreasonableness1 23; e.g. Manhattan General Equipment Co. 
v. Commissioner (1936) 297 U.S. 129. In an appeal from New Zealand the Privy Council also held departmental by­
laws invalid for Unreasonableness1: R. v. Broad [1915]
A.C. 1110.
3See Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative 
Law 01958), at pp. 72-75- The same is true about New 
Zealand; Craig v. Hutt Valley Etc. Board [1956] N.Z.L.R. 
168; Berry v. Palmerston Milk Board I 1959.1 N.Z.L.R. 2h0.
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v ,  H o p k in s^ , t h e  Supreme C our t  i n v a l i d a t e d  a m u n i c i p a l  
l i c e n s i n g  o r d i n a n c e  w h ic h ,  th o u g h  v a l i d  i n  fo rm ,  a p p l i e d  
i n  an u n r e a s o n a b l e  and a r b i t r a r y  manner so as  t o  d i s c r i m ­
i n a t e  a g a i n s t  A s i a t i c s .  "Though th e  law i t s e l f  be f a i r  
on i t s  f a c e  and i m p a r t i a l  i n  a p p e a r a n c e ’1, s a i d  J u s t i c e  
Mathews, " y e t ,  i f  i t  i s  a p p l i e d  and a d m i n i s t e r e d  by 
p u b l i c  a u t h o r i t y  w i t h  an  e v i l  eye and an u n e q u a l  han d ,  so 
as  p r a c t i c a l l y  to  make u n j u s t  and i l l e g a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s  
be tw een  p e r s o n s  i n  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  m a t e r i a l  to
t h e i r  r i g h t s ,  the  d e n i a l  o f  e q u a l  j u s t i c e  i s  s t i l l
2w i t h i n  the  p r o h i b i t i o n s  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n "  . Thus even  
i n  ju d g in g  of the  U n r e a s o n a b l e n e s s 1 , w h e rev e r  t h a t  i s  
r e l e v a n t ,  th e  c o u r t  may lo o k  n o t  m ere ly  t o  th e  w o rd in g s  
of  a b y - l a w  or r e g u l a t i o n ,  b u t  i t s  a c t u a l  e f f e c t  i n  
p r a c t i c e .
1
(1886) 118 u.S. 356.
I b i d . , a t  p .  3 7 3 .
2
CHAPTER Y I I
S u p e r v i s o r y J u r i s d i c t i o n 1
The d o c t r i n e  of  u l t r a  v i r e s ,, as  n o t i c e d  e a r l i e r ,  
e n a b l e s  the  c o u r t s  t o  keep th e  e x e r c i s e  of  powers con ­
f e r r e d  on a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s  w i t h i n  the  bounds of
the  law ,  and th u s  e x e r c i s e  s u p e r v i s o r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  over
2them a g a i n s t  e x c e s s i v e  or a b u s iv e  e x e r c i s e  of power .
T h is  j u r i s d i c t i o n  i s  n o r m a l ly  e x e r c i s e d  th r o u g h  the  
i s s u i n g  of  p r e r o g a t i v e  w r i t s ,  mandamus, p r o h i b i t i o n  or  
c e r t i o r a r i , or  th e  g r a n t i n g  of  i n j u n c t i o n s  or d e c l a r a ­
t o r y  judgments  a g a i n s t  th e  a u t h o r i t i e s ^ .
1
See g e n e r a l l y  A n d e rso n ,  ^P a r l i a m e n t  v .  C o u r t 1 23 ( 1 9 5 0 ) 1  
U n i .  o f  Q . L . J .  39 ;  Y a r d l e y ,  S t a t u t o r y  L i m i t a t i o n s  of the  
Power of th e  P r e r o g a t i v e  O rd e rs  i n  England (1957) 3 U n i . 
of  Q . L . J .  103; de Sm i th ,  S t a t u t o r y  R e s t r i c t i o n  of 
J u d i c i a l  Review (1955) 18 Mod. L. Rev.  575*
2
Under s u p e r v i s o r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  an e x e r c i s e  of d i s c r e ­
t i o n a r y  power c a n n o t  be impugned on t h e  ground t h a t  i t  
was e r r o n e o u s  i n  law or  i n  f a c t  u n l e s s  th e  e r r o r  goes  to  
i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n ,  or  i s  a p p a r e n t  on th e  f a c e  of  i t ,  or  
i s  so f l a g r a n t  a s  t o  j u s t i f y  a f i n d i n g  t h a t  th e  a u t h o r i t y  
must  have m is c o n c e iv e d  or m is u se d  i t s  pow ers :  H ea ley  v .  
M i n i s t e r  of H e a l t h  [1955]  1 Q.B. 221, a t  p p .  2 2 7 -8 .  A lso  
th e  r i g h t  of  a p p e a l  i s  n o t  i n c l u d e d ;  c o u r t s  a r e  e n t i t l e d  
t o  e x e r c i s e  a p p e l l a t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o n ly  when a u t h o r i s e d  
by th e  s t a t u t e :  s e e  de Sm ith ,  J u d i c i a l  Review of  Adm inis­
t r a t i v e  A c t io n  (1 9 5 9 ) )  a t  p .  170.
3
A lso  r e f e r  t o  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  o f  J u s t i c e  ( M i s c e l l a n e o u s  
P r o v i s i o n s )  A c t ,  1938 ( B r i t i s h ) .
2 6 8
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I f  a l e g i s l a t u r e  t a k e s  away th e  s u p e r v i s o r y  
j u r i s d i c t i o n  a l t o g e t h e r  i n  c l e a r  and unambiguous t e r m s ,  
c o u r t s  would become h e l p l e s s  i n  e x e r c i s i n g  any c o n t r o l  
over  the  a c t i o n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s .  But the  
te n d e n c y  has  b e en  t o  b a r  j u d i c i a l  c o n t r o l  by th e  i n s e r ­
t i o n  of  e x p e r e s s i o n s  such  as p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e s  or 
a n a lo g o u s  p r o v i s i o n s ,  so t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  e a sy  to  draw 
any c o n c l u s i o n  w h e th e r  th e  e x e r c i s e  of  the  d i s c r e t i o n a r y
power i s  j u s t i c i a b l e  or r e v i e w a b l e ,  an d ,  i f  so ,  to  what
j
e x t e n t  and on what g ro u n d s  . However,  l e g i s l a t u r e s  do 
n o t  i n t e n d  t h a t  th e  powers so c o n f e r r e d  sh o u ld  be  e x c e e d ­
ed or  a b u s e d ,  and i n  th e  absence  of  a n y th i n g  c o n t r a r y  to
2t h a t  e f f e c t  c o u r t s  do r e t a i n  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n  . I t  i s ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  p r i m a r i l y  a m a t t e r  o f  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  and i t  i s  
f o r  th e  c o u r t s  t o  say  w h e th e r  t h e y  have b een  d e p r i v e d  of 
t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  To th e  e x t e n t  t h a t  j u d i c i a l  c o n t r o l  
i s  o u s t e d ,  t h e  o p e r a t i o n  of  our  maxim i s  r e s t r i c t e d .
But  t o  the  e x t e n t  t h a t  C o u r t s  r e s i s t  or  r e s t r i c t  the  
o p e r a t i o n  of p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e s ,  t h e y  may be s a i d  to  be 
p u t t i n g  our maxim i n t o  e f f e c t .
1
See M a r s h a l l  and Moodie,  Some Problems of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  a t  p p .  8 8 - 9 5 .
2
See de Sm ith ,  J u d i c i a l  Review of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A c t io n  
0  9 5 9 ) ,  a t  pp .  222 ,  2 2 3 .
P r i v a t i v e  C la u s e s
I n  C o l o n i a l  Bank of  A u s t r a l a s i a  v .  W i l l a n  . the  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l  h e l d  t h a t  a p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e  to  th e  e f f e c t  
t h a t  no p r o c e e d i n g s  b e f o r e  th e  C o u r t  of  Mines sh o u ld  be 
removed i n t o  the  Supreme C o u r t ,  was i n e f f e c t i v e  to  t ak e  
away c e r t i o r a r i  i n  th e  c a s e  of "a  m a n i f e s t  d e f e c t  of 
j u r i s d i c t i o n "  or " m a n i f e s t  f r a u d " .  Review on th e  ground 
of Tf r a u d 1 i s  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e d  by th e  d e c i s i o n  i n
pL a z a ru s  E s t a t e s  L td  v .  B e a s l e y  . where i t  was h e l d  t h a t  
th e  t ime of  c h a l l e n g i n g  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  d e c l a r e d  
v a l u e  of r e p a i r s  i n  th e  County C o u r t  w i t h i n  t w e n t y - e i g h t  
days  of r e c e i v i n g  th e  n o t i c e  of i n c r e a s e  of r e n t  as p r o ­
v i d e d  i n  th e  Housing R e p a i r s  and R en t  A c t ,  1954^, was
1---------------------------------
( 1 8 7 h) L.R. 5 P.C. 41 7 .
2
[ 1956] 1 Q.B. 702 .
3
S c h . I I ,  p a r a . 4 :  " (1 )  W i t h i n  t w e n t y - e i g h t  days a f t e r  the  
r e l e v a n t  d a t e  th e  t e n a n t  may a p p ly  to  the  co u n ty  c o u r t  to  
d e te r m in e  w h e th e r  work of  r e p a i r  h a s  b e en  c a r r i e d  o u t  on 
the  d w e l l i n g - h o u s e  d u r i n g  the  p e r i o d  s p e c i f i e d  i n  the  
d e c l a r a t i o n  to  a v a lu e  n o t  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  so s p e c i f i e d . . . "
P a ra  5:  " S u b j e c t  to  th e  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the  l a s t  f o r e ­
go in g  p a r a g r a p h ,  th e  s e r v i c e  w i t h  a n o t i c e  of i n c r e a s e  of 
su ch  a d e c l a r a t i o n  as  i s  r e q u i r e d  by t h i s  Schedule  s h a l l  
be t r e a t e d  . . .  a s  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  of  s a t i s f a c t o r y  e v id e n c e  
t h a t  work has  b e e n  c a r r i e d  o u t  . . . ;  and s u b j e c t  as  a f o r e ­
s a i d  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  a d e c l a r a t i o n  s h a l l  n o t  be q u e s t i o n e d  
on th e  ground t h a t  th e  v a l u e  of  th e  work of  r e p a i r  s t a t e d  
i n  th e  d e c l a r a t i o n  to  have  b een  c a r r i e d  ou t  on the  
d w e l l i n g - h o u s e  i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h a t  r e q u i r e d  by th e  f o r e ­
go ing  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  t h i s  S c h e d u le . "
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n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  to  f r a u d u l e n t  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  f o r  ® f r a u d n  
v i t i a t e d  a l l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  known t o  law and th e  l a n d l o r d  
c o u ld  n o t  r e c o v e r  i n c r e a s e d  r e n t  by r e a s o n  of  “f r a u d 11 •
i
But i n  Smith v .  E a s t  E l l o e  R.D.C. , t h e  House o f  Lords
by e x c l u d in g  c h a l l e n g e  d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  bona f i d e s  p u t
th e  g e a r  i n  th e  r e v e r s e  d i r e c t i o n ,  s u r p r i s i n g l y  a t  a t ime
when the  t e n d e n cy  of  c o u r t s  was to  r e t a i n  or e v e n  e x te n d
2r a t h e r  t h a n  s u r r e n d e r  t h e i r  s u p e r v i s o r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  .
S . 1 5 and s . 1 6  of  the  A c q u i s i t i o n  o f  Land ( A u t h o r i s a t i o n  
P r o c e d u r e )  Act  19*+6 p r o v i d e d  t h a t  o r d e r s  f o r  th e  compul­
s o r y  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  l a n d  s h a l l  be open to  c h a l l e n g e  on ly  
w i t h i n  s i x  weeks of  t h e i r  c o n f i r m a t i o n  and t h e r e a f t e r  
“ s h a l l  n o t  . . .  be q u e s t i o n e d  i n  any l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  
w h a t s o e v e r " .  I n  an  a p p e a l  by th e  owner of th e  land f rom 
an o r d e r  of th e  C o u r t  o fA ppea l  a f f i r m i n g  an o r d e r  of the  
lower  c o u r t  whereby i t  was o r d e r e d  t h a t  th e  w r i t  i n  an 
a c t i o n  by th e  a p p e l l a n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s ,  E a s t  
E l l o e  U .D .C . ,  e t c . ,  and a l l  s u b s e q u e n t  p r o c e e d i n g s  be s e t  
a s i d e ,  the  m a j o r i t y  (L o rd  R e id  and Lord S o m e rv e l l  d i s s e n t ­
in g )  h e l d  t h a t  para .  16 o u s t e d  th e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  of  the
c o u r t s  t o  t r y  i s s u e s  whereby th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  com pulsory
_
[1956] 1 A l l  E.R. 8 55 .
2
de Sm ith ,  J u d i c i a l  Review of A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A c t i o n  
( 1959) a t  p p .  2 2 7 , 228 .
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purchase orders was brought into question after the 
period of limitation had expired,notwithstanding earlier 
dicta (applied by the dissentients) that recovery for 
fraud could be barred only by express words. The words 
used in the privative clause were given literal interpre­
tation. Viscount Simonds said:
They do not override the first of all 
principles of construction that plain words 
must be given their plain meaning. There is 
nothing ambiguous about para.16; there is 
no alternative construction that can be given 
to it; there is, in fact, no justification 
for the introduction of limiting words such as 
1 if made in good faith1', and there is the 
less reason for doing so when those words 
would have the effect of depriving the express 
words "in any legal proceedings whatsoever" of 
their full meaning and content.'
This type of clause, then, seems even more effective in 
ousting judicial control than the more explicit priva­
tive clauses, which are less commonly used in England 
than in Australia.
In Australia it is a common practice to insert 
piivative clauses in most of the statutes conferring 
powers on administrative authorities and the High Court
1
Ibid., at p. 859- These remarks may also be extended 
to an analogous expression "shall not be questioned in 
any Court of law", e.g., s.26 of the British Nationality 
Act, 19^8.
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has  f o l l o w e d  a f a i r l y  c o n s i s t e n t  a p p ro a c h  t o  t h e i r
i
c o n s t r u c t i o n  . F o r  exam ple ,  i n  R. v .  Hickman: ex p a r t e  
2Fox and C l i n t o n  , t h e r e  were two o r d e r s  n i s i  f o r  p r e r o g ­
a t i v e  w r i t s  of p r o h i b i t i o n  d i r e c t e d  to  th e  c h a i rm a n  and 
members of a L o c a l  R e f e r e n c e  Board  e s t a b l i s h e d  und e r  the  
N a t i o n a l  S e c u r i t y  (C o a l  Mining I n d u s t r y  Employment) 
R e g u l a t i o n s ,  The w r i t s  were so u g h t  t o  p r o h i b i t  the  Board 
from p r o c e e d i n g  f u r t h e r  upon c e r t a i n  o r d e r s  made by i t .
The q u e s t i o n  had a r i s e n  w h e th e r  awards g o v e rn in g  c e r t a i n  
em p lo y ees ,  i n c l u d i n g  l o r r y  d r i v e r s ,  i n  the  c o a l  mining  
i n d u s t r y ,  a p p l i e d  t o  th e  employees  of  th e  p r o s e c u t o r s  who 
were engaged i n  c a r r y i n g  c o a l  f rom one p l a c e  t o  a n o t h e r .  
The C o u r t  was of th e  o p i n i o n  t h a t  t h e y  d i d  n o t  f a l l  w i t h i n  
th e  meaning of  th e  e x p r e s s i o n  l,c o a l  m in ing  i n d u s t r y " .
But  i t  was f u r t h e r  a rg u e d  t h a t  Reg. 17 p r o t e c t e d  th e  
d e c i s i o n  of  th e  Board  from  i n v a l i d a t i o n .  Reg.  17 
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  th e  d e c i s i o n  of  a L o ca l  R e f e r e n c e  Board 
" s h a l l  n o t  be c h a l l e n g e d ,  a p p e a le d  a g a i n s t ,  quashed  or
T
See e . g . ,  B a x t e r  v .  New Sou th  Wales C l i c k e r t s A s s o c i a t i o n  
(1909) 10 C.L .R .  114-, a t  pp .  148 and 162: Morgan v .
R y lands  B r o s .  ( A u s t r a l i a )  L td  ( 1927) 39 C.L.R. 517? a t  
P .5'24; A u s t r a l i a n  Coal  and Sha le  Employees F e d e r a t i o n  v . 
A b e r f i e l d  C o a l m i n i n g  Co, Ltd  (1942) 66 C.L.R.  161, a t  
p . 1 77; R. v .  Hickman; ex p a r t e  Fox and C l i n t o n  (1945)
70 C .L .R .  598, a t  pp .  615 ,  6 1 6 ; R» v .  Murray 7~ex p a r t e  
P r o c t o r  (19495 77 C .L .R .  3 8 7 , a t  p p .  3 9 8 ,  399;  R. v .
M e ta l  Trades* E m p l o y e e s  A s s o c i a t i o n  (1951) 82 C.L.R.  208, 
a t  p .  249.
2
(1945) 70 C .L .R .  598.
2 7h.
c a l l e d  i n t o  q u e s t i o n ,  or be s u b j e c t  t o  p r o h i b i t i o n ,
mandamus or  i n j u n c t i o n ,  i n  any c o u r t  of  any a c c o u n t
w h a t s o e v e r ” . I t  was h e l d  t h a t  a w r i t  of  p r o h i b i t i o n  l a y
i n  r e s p e c t  of a d e c i s i o n  of  the  Board  b a se d  on an
e r r o n e o u s  f i n d i n g  t h a t  th e  m a t t e r  was w i t h i n  the  am bi t
1
of t h a t  i n d u s t r y  . "An a u t h o r i t y  w i t h  a l i m i t e d  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n " ,  s a i d  Latham C . J . ,  " c a n n o t  g iv e  i t s e l f  j u r i s d i c ­
t i o n  by a wrong d e t e r m i n a t i o n  as  t o  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of a 
f a c t  upon w hich  i t s  j u r i s d i c t i o n  d e p e n d s ,  or  by p l a c i n g  
a wrong c o n s t r u c t i o n  upon a s t a t u t e  upon which  i t s  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  d e p e n d s ,  u n l e s s  by a v a l i d  p r o v i s i o n  the  
a u t h o r i t y  i s  g i v e n  power t o  a c t  upon i t s  own o p i n i o n  i n  r e l a ­
t i o n  to  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of the  f a c t  or i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e
2c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  the  s t a t u t e "  . Thus where a l e g i s l a t u r e  
c o n f e r s  a u t h o r i t y  s u b j e c t  t o  l i m i t a t i o n  and a t  the  same 
t ime p r o v i d e s  f o r  a p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e ,  i t  becomes a p rob lem  
of s t a t u t o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  th e  p ro b lem  b e in g  t h a t  of 
r e c o n c i l i n g  the  i n t e n t i o n  d i s c l o s e d  i n  th e  p r i v a t i v e
c l a u s e  w i t h  th e  i n t e n t i o n  c l e a r l y  a p p e a r i n g  from the
_
Though i n  th e  f e d e r a l  s p h e re  t h e r e  i s  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
l i m i t a t i o n  on P a r l i a m e n t * s  power,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  s . 7 5 ( v )  of 
the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  i t  i s  a g e n e r a l  l i m i t a t i o n  a p p l i c a b l e  
to  p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e s  even  i n  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  where a law i s  
immune from th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  l i m i t a t i o n ,  e . g . ,  S t a t e  
l e g i s l a t i o n .
2
( 19^5) 70 C .L .R .  598, a t  p. 6o6.
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rest of the provisions that the body so authorised shall 
he of limited powers.
Dixon J. was the only one who took a view which is 
a sort of compromise between two possible views of 
privative clauses: the extreme 11 logical11 view which would
in effect deny any effect to privative clauses; and the 
extreme "policy’1 view which would exclude any judicial 
interference on any ground whatever. 1 Such a clause is 
interpreted as meaning11, he said, ’’that no decision which 
is in fact given by the body concerned shall be invalida­
ted on the ground that it has not conformed to the 
requirements governing its proceedings or the exercise 
of its authority or has not confined its acts within the 
limits laid down by the instrument giving it authority, 
provided always that its decision is a bona fide attempt 
to exercise its power, that it relates to the subject 
matter of the legislation, and that it is reasonably 
capable of reference to the power given to the body” •
This view of Dixon J. was adopted by the High Court
pin R. v. Central Sugar Cane Prices Board . There the 
matter came before the High Court upon an application
T
Ibid., at p. 615.(Italics supplied)
[1959] A.L.R. 1092.
2
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for special leave to appeal from an order of the Full 
Court of Queensland, whereby an order nisi was made 
absolute for the issue of a writ of prohibition directed 
to the members of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board 
restraining them from proceeding further in a certain 
application pending before the Central Board to vary an 
award previously made by it on an appeal from a Local 
Board. The Court by a majority held that the Central
Board in any event acted within power as to the matter
a±1 dispute. But as to the privative clause which was
sought to protect the awards and proceedings from challenge,
Dixon C.J., Kitto and Windeyer JJ., said that since the
purported award was reasonably capable of reference to a
power belonging to the Central Board, and related wholly
to a subject-matter of that power, and was made in a
bona fide attempt by the Central Board to exercise the
authority given by the Act, its validity was not open to
2challenge in the present proceedings •_
S.17 of the Regulation of Sugar Cane Prices Acts of 
Queensland; para, (a) makes every such award of the Cen­
tral Board final and conclusive, and provides that it 
shall not be impeachable for any informality or want of 
form, or be appealed against, reviewed, quashed or in any 
way called in question in any court on any account what­
soever; para, (c) provides in quite general terms that the 
validity of, inter alia, any award or proceedings of the 
Central Board shall not be challenged.
2
[1959] A.L.R. 1092, at p. 1097.
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However, prohibition or certiorari will issue where 
the objection to the proceedings is based on some defect 
in the constitution of the board or tribunal. For exam­
ple, regulations 12 and 13 of the National Security 
(Coal Mining Industry Employment) Regulations provided 
for the constitution of Local Reference Boards and
required the presence of a certain quorum at the Board1s
1meetings. In R. v. Murray; ex parte Proctor , an order 
made by such a Board was challenged on the ground that the 
Board at the time of making the order was not validly 
constituted as the required quorum was not present. It 
was held that the presence of a quorum was a necessary 
condition of the valid exercise by the Board of its 
functions, and where a Board purported to act in the 
absence of a quorum, prohibition would lie notwithstand­
ing regulation 1 7 which provided that "a decision of a 
Local Reference Board shall not be challenged appealed 
against quashed or called into action or by subject to 
prohibition ... in any court on any account whatsoevern. 
'‘Regulation 17 is," said McTiernan J., "not effective to 
bar prohibition against a body which pretends to exercise
1
(19^ +9) 77 C.L.R. 3Ö7; see also Magrath v. Goldsbrough 
Mort Co. Ltd (1932) k7 C.L.R. 121.
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t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  which  i s  g iv e n  t o  a n o t h e r  and d i f f e r e n t  
b o d y " 1 .
A p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e  may a l s o  be c o n s t r u e d  r e s t r i c t i v e -  
l y  i f  an  Act  p u r p o r t s  to  t a k e  away the  a u t h o r i t y  o f  c o u r t s  
t o  d e te r m in e  c i t i z e n s 1 r i g h t s .  Downs T r a n s p o r t  P ty  Ltd  v .
p
Kropp^ i s  a r e c e n t  exam ple .  There  a l i c e n s e  i s s u e d  t o  the  
a p p e l l a n t  u n d e r  th e  S t a t e  T r a n s p o r t  F a c i l i t i e s  A c t ,  1946 
to  1955) was c a n c e l l e d  by th e  Deputy Commissioner of 
T r a n s p o r t  on the  ground  t h a t  he was s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  the  
a p p e l l a n t  had c o n t r a v e n e d  a c o n d i t i o n  o f  h i s  l i c e n s e .  A 
Judge of  th e  Q ueens land  Supreme Cour t  r e f u s e d  t o  g r a n t  
i n t e r l o c u t o r y  i n j u n c t i o n s  to  r e s t r a i n  e n fo r c e m e n t  of the  
c a n c e l l a t i o n  u n t i l  t r i a l  o f  an  a c t i o n ;  on a p p e a l ,  the  
F u l l  C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  the  p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e  i n  s . 2 0  of  the  Actß
T
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 4 02 .
2 r
[1959] Qd.R. 402 .  See a l s o  R o b in so n  & Co, Ltd  v .  King 
(1921) 3 K.B. 183, a t  p .  204; G o ld sa ck  v .  Shore  [ 19 5 ^ J  1 
K.B. 708,  a t  p .  7 1 2 . A lso  r e f e r  t o  de Sm i th ,  S u b - d e l e g a t i o n  
and C i r c u l a r s  0 9 4 9 )  12 Mod. L. Rev.  37*
3
I t  p r o v i d e s :  "No a c t i o n  or  l e g a l  p r o c e e d i n g s  w h a t so e v e r  
s h a l l  be b r o u g h t  by any p e r s o n  a g a i n s t  the  Crown, the  Min­
i s t e r ,  the  C om m iss ioner ,  the  Deputy  Com m iss ioner ,  the  s e c ­
r e t a r y ,  o r  any o f f i c e r  or employee of  the  Commissioner on 
a c c o u n t  o f  th e  Commissioner i s s u i n g  or  g r a n t i n g  or  r e f u s i n g  
t o  i s s u e  or  g r a n t  o r  c a n c e l l i n g  or  s u s p e n d i n g ,  o r  renew ing  
or  r e f u s i n g  t o  ren ew ,  or  c o n s e n t i n g  or  r e f u s i n g  to  c o n s e n t  to  
the  t r a n s f e r  o f  any l i c e n s e ,  a p p r o v a l ,  p e r m i t ,  a u t h o r i t y ,  or 
c e r t i f i c a t e  w h a t s o e v e r  und e r  any p r o v i s i o n  of  t h i s  Act  or  on 
a c c o u n t  of  the  Commissioner im pos ing  any te rm  or c o n d i t i o n  
i n  r e s p e c t  o f  th e  i s s u e  or  r e n e w a l  o f  any su ch  document or  
v a r y i n g  any te rm  or  c o n d i t i o n  o f  any such  document upon i t s  
r e n e w a l  or  a t  any t ime d u r in g  i t s  c u r r e n c y ;  and any c o u r t  
i n  w hich  such  p r o c e e d i n g s  may be commenced s h a l l  have no 
power or  a u t h o r i t y  t o  h e a r  or  d e te r m in e  any such  m a t t e r ,  
and s h a l l  f o r t h w i t h  d i s m i s s  such  p r o c e e d i n g s . ”
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d i d  n o t  d e b a r  the  c o u r t  from d e t e r m i n i n g  th e  v a l i d i t y  of  
th e  a l l e g e d  c a n c e l l a t i o n ,  P h i lP  J .  s a i d  t h a t  s . 2 0  was 
d e s i g n e d  t o  p r e v e n t  a c t i o n s  when th e  b a s i s  o f  th e  c o m p la in t  
was th e  v a l i d  c a n c e l l a t i o n ;  b u t  h e r e  the  a c t i o n  was one 
f o r  a d e c l a r a t i o n  t h a t  th e  c a n c e l l a t i o n  was i n v a l i d .
But  th e  c o u r t s  have r e c o g n i s e d  fo rm u la e  such  as  " s h a l l  
be j u d i c i a l l y  n o t i c e d  and s h a l l  n o t  be q u e s t i o n e d "  as  
more e f f e c t i v e ,  and t h e r e b y  p r a c t i c a l l y  s u r r e n d e r e d  t h e i r  
s u p e r v i s o r y  j u r i s d i c t i o n  • A n o t a b l e  r e c e n t  example 
r e c o g n i s i n g  t h i s  f a c t  i s  found  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  of  the
2South  A u s t r a l i a n  Supreme C o u r t  i n  Ross Chenoweth v .  Hayes . 
Under s . 8 l ( 1 ) ( f )  o f  th e  B u i l d i n g  A c t ,  1923-53 ( S . A . ) , 
Mitchem C o u n c i l  made a b y - l a w  p r o h i b i t i n g  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n
and a l t e r a t i o n  o f  any b u i l d i n g  u se d  as  a f a c t o r y  i n
c e r t a i n  l o c a l i t i e s ,  and f u r t h e r  p r o h i b i t e d  the  use  of
any b u i l d i n g  as  a f a c t o r y  i n  t h o s e  l o c a l i t i e s .  The by­
law was c e r t i f i e d  by th e  Crown S o l i c i t o r  p u r s u a n t  to  s . 6 7 4
1
See e . g . ,  A nderson  v .  Wass; ex  p a r t e  Mass (1935) S t .R .Q d .  
269; S t e w a r t  v .  G re ac en  (1936) Q.W.N. 19: In  Re a S o l i c ­
i t o r  (1953) S t .R .Q d .  1*+9; Ross Chenoweth v .  Hayes C1955T 
S .A .S .R .  66 . T h is  fo r m u la  a l s o  a p p e a re d  i n  s e v e r a l  
i m p o r t a n t  s t a t u t e s  i n  E n g la n d ,  b u t  i t  h a s  n o t  y e t  b een  
t e s t e d  i n  c o u r t s :  s e e  de Sm ith ,  S t a t u t o r y  R e s t r i c t i o n  of  
J u d i c i a l  Review (1955) 18 Mod. L. Rev.  5755 a t  p .  585«
2
(1955) S .A .S .R .  6 6 . A lso  r e f e r  t o  Z e l l i n g .  The South  
A u s t r a l i a n  L o c a l  Government A c t ,  S e c t i o n  6 7 o < (1959) 
P u b l i c  Law, 3 5 0 .
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of the Local Government Act, 193^-52, and was confirmed 
by the Governor, It was provided by s.676 of the Act 
that no by-law in respect of which a certificate of the 
Crown Solicitor is given pursuant to 3.67^ "shall be held 
to be invalid by any court on the ground that it is not a 
by-law which is within the competence of the Council to 
make, or that the by-law is contrary to or inconsistent 
with any provision in force at the date of the said 
certificate", A company which had erected a workshop 
and continued to do its business after the by-law was 
passed, was charged with the breach of the by-law and 
convicted. On appeal to the Full Bench of the Supreme 
Court, the question arose whether, on the true meaning 
and intent of the by-law, it prohibited a use for which 
the building was erected and used prior to the making of 
the by-law. The Court was of the view that the Act was 
clearly prospective in its operation so as not to author­
ise interference with the use of existing buildings.
Yet it was held that as the by-law was certified by the 
Crown Solicitor, the Court could not, by reason of s.676 
of the Local Government Act, declare it invalid. Napier 
C.J., who delivered the judgment on behalf of the Court 
said: "But in this case our hands are tied, and we are
obliged to stand by, while the process of our Court is
281
used for the purpose of oppression under the colour of a 
legal judgment” . After a good deal of press ard political 
discussion s.676 was repealed in 1957»
In the Australian federal sphere the High Court is
p
given specific jurisdiction by s.75(v) of the Constitu­
tion to issue mandamus or prohibition to federal tribunals, 
and a privative clause would be of no effect (a) where 
the tribunal purports to exercise powers which it is 
beyond the constitutional power of the Federal Parliament 
to confer on it^, (b) where the tribunal, although 
acting within the field of potential Commonwealth power,
1
(1955) S.A.S.R. 66, at p.7i+.
2
It provides: "In all matters ... (v) in which a writ of
Mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against 
the officer of the Commonwealth: the High Court shall hve 
original jurisdiction". For its detailed discussion refer 
to Anderson, The Application of Privative Clauses to Pro­
ceedings of Commonwealth Tribunals (1996) I Uni, of Q.L.J. 
(No. 1 ) at p . 35$ refer also to Wynes, Legislative Executive 
and Judicial Powers in Australia (2nd. ed.) at pp. 82-86; 
Cowen, Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (1959) at pp.
5-5-51 •
3
E.g., conferring of something on the tribunal not covered 
by ss.51 and 52, or vesting of power of conclusive deci­
sion as to questions of law in a tribunal not satisfying 
s.72 of the Constitution. See also R. v. Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Jones 
(1915-) 18 C.L.R. 22k; R. v. Kirby; ex parte Transport 
Workers1 Union (1955-) 91 C.L.R. 159j R. v. Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Whvbrow & 
Co .(1910) 11 C.L.R. 1: R. V. Kelly; ex parte Victoria 
T1950) 81 C.L.R. 64.
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ipurports to exceed the scope of its statutory authority ;
(c) where the clear intention of Parliament was that
2excess of jurisdiction should result in invalidity ;
(d) where authority to issue mandamus or prohibition is 
conferred on some other court . On the other hand a 
privative clause prevents the issue of prohibition for
merely procedural defects when a tribunal is dealing with
4a matter within its jurisdiction .
1
See R. v. Murray; ex parte Proctor (19^ +9) 77 C.L.R. 3Ö7*
2
See R. v. Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitra­
tion; ex parte The Brisbane Tramways Co. (No.l) (191M 
18 C. L.R. 5^ +j at pp. 65j 66; cf. Dixon J. in R. v. Hickman; 
ex parte Fox^and Clinton (19^ +5) 70 C.L.R. 590j at p. 616.
In case Parliament does not otherwise indicate so as to 
delimit or regulate the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the 
privative clause ought to prevent the issue of mandamus or 
prohibition, but a *wrong* decision might still be valid; 
see Anderson, loc. cit. at p. b5•
3See the analogy provided by the decision in Bank of New 
South Wales v. Commonwealth 76 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.) .
See Latham C.J. in R. v. Murray; ex parte Proctor 09*+9)
77 C.L.R. 307} at p. 39^; R. v. Drake-Brockman; ex parte 
Northern Colliery Proprietors* Association (1946) A. L.R.
106 at p. 110; Latham C.J. and Dixon J. in R. v . 
Commonwealth Rent Controller; ex parte National Mutual 
Life Association of Australasia Ltd (19^ -7) 75 C.L.R. 361 , 
at p. 370; Fullagar J. in R. v. Commonwealth Court of Con­
ciliation and Arbitration; ex parte Grant (1950^ 81 C.L.R.
275 at p. 61; Williams J. in R. v. Murray; ex parte Proctor. 
supra, at p.402. But the distinction between procedural 
matters and matters affecting jurisdiction is rather vague; 
see Anderson, op.cit. at p.49*
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According to Dixon J. the operation of a Commonwealth 
privative clause, apart from the limitations mentioned 
above, should be taken to have the same effect as a priva­
tive clause in State legislation. Thus in order to give 
full effect to a privative clause, the process of inter­
pretation would be to examine firstly whether "there has 
been an honest attempt to deal with a subject-matter con­
fided to the tribunal and to act in pursuance of the powers 
of the tribunal in relation to something that might
ireasonably be regarded as falling within its province" ,
and secondly whether "particular limitations on power
and specific requirements as to the manner in which
the tribunal shall be constituted or shall exercise its
power are so expressed that they must be taken to mean
that observance of the limitations and compliance with
2the requirements are essential to valid action" . The 
first proposition is not yet endorsed by the High Court
as a whole-3, though the second proposition is more
_
R. v. Murray; ex parte Proctor (19^9) 77 C.L.R. 307j at p . Mdo .
2Ibid., at p. 1+00.
3It is supported by Webb J. and Kitto J.; R. v. Metal 
Trades Employers1 23Association; ex parte A.E.U. (1953) 82 
C.L.R. 208. at p. 259 per Webb J., and at p. 262 per Kitto 
J.; R. v. Kelly; ex parte Berman 0953 ) 89 C.L.R. 6o8, at p.630 per Kitto J. McTiernan J. also concurred with Dixon 
J.*s opinion in R. v. Drake-Brockman; ex parte Northern 
Colliery Proprietors Association [19I+8J A. L.R. 106, at p.118.
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“1
a c c e p t a b l e  • F u r t h e r ,  i n  v iew of th e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  scope 
f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  o p i n i o n s ,  i t  may be s a i d  t h a t  th e  law 
r e l a t i n g  to  p r i v a t i v e  c l a u s e s  i s  somewhat o b sc u re  and 
need s  f u r t h e r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n .
*As i f  e n a c t e d  i n  th e  A c t1 ^
One of  th e  d e v i c e s  employed t o  o u s t  the  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
of c o u r t s  f rom i n t e r f e r i n g  w i t h  th e  d e c i s i o n s  of  admin­
i s t r a t i v e  a u t h o r i t i e s  has  b een  to  p r o v i d e  i n  t h e  e n a b l in g  
Act t h a t  th e  r e g u l a t i o n s  made u n d e r  the  Act us h a l l  have 
e f f e c t  as  i f  e n a c t e d  i n  the  A c t ” . The e x a c t  scope of 
t h i s  fo rm u la  i s  n o t  v e r y  c l e a r  due t o  the  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
d i c t a  o c c u r r i n g  i n  j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n s ^ .  M oreover ,  t h e r e  
i s  a l s o  a sh a rp  d i f f e r e n c e  of  o p i n i o n  among v a r i o u s
Ll
w r i t e r s  . One v iew  f a v o u r s  the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  of  the  c l a u s e
1
Those who s u p p o r t  t h e  f i r s t  p r o p o s i t i o n  a l s o  s u p p o r t  th e  
second  p r o p o s i t i o n .  I t  i s  f u r t h e r  s u p p o r t e d  by Latham 
C . J . , w i t h  whom Dixon J .  j o i n e d ,  i n  R. v .  Commonwealth 
R en t  C o n t r o l l e r ;  ex  p a r t e  N a t i o n a l  M utua l  L i f e  A s s o c i a t i o n  
of  A u s t r a l a s i a  L td  ( I9 k 7 )  75 C .L .R .  861.  a t  p .  869.  See 
a l s o  S t a r k e  J .  i n  t h e  same c ase  a t  p .  376;  and W il l i a m s  J .  
i n  R. v .  Drake-Brockman;  ex p a r t e  N o r t h e r n  C o l l i e r y  P ro p ­
r i e t o r s 8 A s s o c i a t i o n  I I9k6]  A.L.R. 106, a t  p .  118.
2
See de Smith ,  J u d i c i a l  Review o f  A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  A c t io n  
( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  a t  pp .  23k,  235 .
3
See p a r t i c u l a r l y  I n s t i t u t e  of  P a t e n t  Agen ts  v .  Lockwood 
,189k]  A.C. 3k7;  R. v .  M i n i s t e r  of  H e a l t h :  ex p a r t e  Y a f fe
1931J A.C. k9k .  See a l s o  I n  r e  Bowman I 1932] 2 K.B. 21 .  
k
See de Sm ith ,  l o c .  c i t . ,  a t  p . 2 3 k ,  n . 69 .
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as co m p le te  ex em p t io n  of  s u b o r d i n a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  from 
ju d ic i a l  r e v i e w ,  w h e reas  th e  o t h e r  i s  i n  f a v o u r  of l i m i ­
t i n g  i t s  scope and th u s  p r e s e r v i n g  some j u d i c i a l  r e v ie w  
of v i r e s . But  i t s  d i s c u s s i o n  i s  more academic  t h a n  of  
any p r a c t i c a l  im p o r t a n c e  as  i t  h a s  f a l l e n  i n t o  d i s u s e  i n  
E n g la n d .
I n  A u s t r a l i a ,  t h i s  fo rm u la  d id  n o t  f i n d  f a v o u r  w i t h  
th e  l e g i s l a t u r e s  and t h e r e  a r e  n o t  many c a s e s  i n  which 
i t s  scope  came up f o r  d i s c u s s i o n .  I n  ex c a r t e  H e f f r o n ^ ,
the  New South  Wales Supreme C o u r t ,  f o l l o w i n g  Lockwood1s
2Case , h e ld  t h a t  t h e  c o u r t  had no power to  i n q u i r e  i n t o  
th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  made und e r  th e  Coal  
Mines R e g u l a t i o n  A c t ,  1902 (N .S .W .) ,  as  t h e y  were t o  be 
o b s e rv e d  Hi n  th e  same manner a s  i f  t h e y  were e n a c t e d  i n  
t h i s  A c t“ . However, i t  was o b s e r v e d  t h a t  the  r u l e s  were 
i n t e n d e d  beyond d o u b t  f o r  the  p u rp o se  a u t h o r i s e d  by the  
A c t .  Thus i t  i s  n o t  c l e a r  w h e th e r  the  c o u r t  would have 
h e l d  th e  same way i f  th e  s p e c i a l  r u l e s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  
f o r  a p u rp o se  n o t  c o n te m p la te d  by th e  A c t .  T h is  m a t t e r  
was more f u l l y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  F o s t e r  v .  A lon i^  and the  
1
(1907) 7 S.R. (N.S.W.) 77*+.
2
I n s t i t u t e  of  P a t e n t  A gen ts  v .  Lockwood [1895-] A.C. 35-7. 
3
[1951] V.L.R.  5-81.
formula was given a restrictive interpretation to the 
effect that not every purported exercise of the power to 
make regulations under the Act could pass unchallenged in 
the courts. S.28(2) of the State Electricity Commission 
Act, 1928 (Vic.) provided that “all regulations should be 
published in the Government Gazette and should be laid 
before both Houses of Parliament and should have like force 
and effect as if they were enacted in the Act“. Upon 
information the defendant was charged with an offence for 
having failed to comply with a regulation made under the 
Act restricting the use of electricity by consumers in 
accordance with the provisions of an advertisement in tie 
daily Press. The Victorian Supreme Court held that if 
regulations genuinely purported, without patent irrelevance 
or absurdity, to be an exercise of one or more of the 
heads of power granted by the Act upon a matter or matters 
connected with the purposes for which the Commission as a 
statutory authority was created to achieve, the court 
was not called upon to examine whether in any respect 
the purported exercise of power was too broad, or whether 
cases might not be imagined falling within the regulations 
which go beyond the necessity of the occasion.
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YConc.lusive evidence1 2 clausei
The 1conclusive evidence® clause may he the most
effective device for ousting the supervisory jurisdiction
2of courts. In ex parte Ringer , it was held that a clause
providing that an order made by the Board of Agriculture
"shall be conclusive evidence that the requirement of
this Act have been complied with and that the order has
been duly made and is within the powers of this Act",
completely excluded any examination by the courts of the
validity of the compulsory purchase order. "The section
gave to an order made by a public department the absolute
finality and effect of an Act of Parliament. The Court
of King*s Bench had no power to set aside an Act of
Parliament, and it was provided by the section that it
should have no more power to set aside an order made by
3the Board of Agriculture" . Thus the courts may be barred 
from inquiring even when preliminary statutory requirements
1
See generally Schwartz, Law and the Executive in Britain 
(19^9) at pp. 189-193; Alien, Law and Orders (2nd ed.) at 
pp. 300-301; de Smith, Statutory Restriction of Judicial 
Review (1955) 18 Mod.L.Rev. 575, at pp. 5^3-50^.
2
. (1909) 25 T.L.R. 718 .  See also Minister of Health v .  R; 
ex parte Yaffe [1931]  A .C. at p p .  520,  532-3 ;
Trustees of the London Parochial Charities v . Attorney- 
General |19551 1 All E.R. 1 .
Ibid., at p. 719•
3
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have been flouted, once an order or scheme is confirmed
■iby the Minister or some public authority . Such a wide
interpretation has not been favourably received and it
has been suggested that despite such a clause, the courts
could still probe into validity on the ground that an
order or a by-law or a scheme did not come within the
2purposes prescribed by the Act • This suggestion is,
i.moreover, not without support from the courts . But 
any conclusion as regards the scope of this clause is 
highly tentative in the absence of authoritative judicial 
pr onouncements.
Thus privative clauses and other analogous formulae 
that have been devised to oust or exempt the actions of 
administrative authorities from judicial control have not 
met with complete success. Such clauses do in some 
degree restrict the scope of judicial control, but there
1
E.g., the London Traffic Act, 1924; the Judicature Act, 
1925.
2
See Committee on Ministers1 Powers; Cmd. 4060 (1932); 
Hewart, The New Despotism (1929)« at p. 735 Kier and 
Lawson, Cases on Constitutional Law (2nd ed.) at p.14-3 5 
cf. Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Govern­
ment Departments (1933) at p.103.
3
See Attorney-General v. Hanwell U.D.C. [1900] 1 Ch. 51? 
affxd I 1900J 2 Ch.377. See also Corporation of Waterford 
v. Murphy [1920] 2 I.R. 165; Damodhar Gordhan v. Deoram 
Kanju 118791 1 A.C. 332.
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is a strong tendency for the Courts to find a way around 
privative clauses in what they regard as gross cases of 
abuse of power.
PART THREE
Some Special Problems 
of
Constitutional Law
CHAPTER V I I I
S e c t i o n  92 of  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
C o n s t i t u t i o n
i
S e c t i o n  92 h as  become one of  the  most  l i t i g a t e d  
and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  p ro b lem s  of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n ,  m a in ly  b e c a u s e  of i t s  p h r a s e o l o g y  and a l s o  
p e r h a p s  b e ca u se  o f  i t s  scope b e in g  e x te n d e d  to  l e g i s l a ­
t i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  s o c i a l  and economic p rob lem s  n o t  
a n t i c i p a t e d  by th e  f r a m e r s  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ^ .
The p r e s e n t  a p p ro a c h  t o  s . 9 2  g i v e s  a l i m i t e d ,  though  
more p o t e n t i a l  t h a n  a c t u a l ,  scope  to  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
th e  p r i n c i p l e  *what c a n n o t  be done d i r e c t l y  c a n n o t  be 
done i n d i r e c t l y 1 , f o r  a law u n d e r  th e  g u i s e  o f  r e g u l a t ­
in g  som eth ing  n o t  fo rm in g  p a r t  of  t r a d e ,  commerce and
1
The f i r s t  p a r a g r a p h  of  th e  s e c t i o n  r u n s  a s :  M0n the
i m p o s i t i o n  of  u n i f o r m  d u t i e s  o f  cu s to m s ,  t r a d e ,  commerce, 
and i n t e r c o u r s e  among th e  S t a t e s  • • •  s h a l l  be a b s o l u t e l y  
f r e e . M 
2
F o r  an  h i s t o r i c a l  s u r v e y  of  s . 9 2 ,  see  B e a s l e y ,  The 
Commonwealth C o n s t i t u t i o n  : S e c t i o n  9 2 . 1 Univ .  of W.A. 
.Annual L .Rev.  (19 ^8 -5 0 )  , a t  p p .  97 j 273? 522; c f .  
Sharwood, S e c t i o n  92 i n  th e  F e d e r a l  C o n v e n t i o n s . Melb.  
U n iv .  L.Rev^ ( 1 9 5 8 ; ,  a t  p .  331•
3
See g e n e r a l l y  A n d e rso n ,  E s s e n c e .  I n c i d e n c e  and Device
u n d e r  S e c t i o n  92 of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n . (1959-80)  33 A u s t ._ _ _ T_
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i n t e r c o u r s e  among th e  S t a t e s  or  s u p p ly in g  no e le m e n t  or 
a t t r i b u t e  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t h a t  c o n c e p t i o n ,  may u n d e r  c e r t a i n  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i m p a i r  th e  f reed o m  of t r a d e ,  commerce and 
i n t e r c o u r s e  among th e  S t a t e s  i n  th e  same sen se  a s  i f  " t h e
•j
im p a i rm e n t  were a c h i e v e d  by o v e r t  or d i r e c t  means" •
The p r o t e c t i o n  e x te n d e d  by s . 9 2  i s  c o n f i n e d  to
1 t r a d e ,  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e  among th e  S t a t e s 1  23•
S i m i l a r  words a l s o  o c c u r  i n  s . 5 1 ( i )  which  c o n f e r s  power
on P a r l i a m e n t s  of  the  Commonwealth and the  S t a t e s  t o  make
laws w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  1 t r a d e  and commerce w i t h  o t h e r
2
c o u n t r i e s ,  and among the  S t a t e s 1 . Does i t  mean t h a t  the  
two e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  s .92  and s . 5 1 ( i )  r e s p e c t i v e l y  c a r r y  
the  same meaning and have i d e n t i c a l  scope?  I n  McArthur v .  
Q u e e n s la n d ^ . Knox C . J .  , I s a a c s  and S t a r k e  J J . , were of 
the  o p i n i o n  t h a t  b o t h  must  mean th e  same and t h a t  " i n  
b o t h  must  embrace a l l  t h a t  i s  o r d i n a r y  com pr ised  w i t h i n  
the  te rm  1 t r a d e  and commerce1 when t a k i n g  p l a c e  1among
1
G ra n n a l  v .  M a r r i c k v i l l e  M a rg a r in e  P ty  Ltd  (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
5 5 j a t  p .  7 8 5  Hughes and V a le  P ty  L td  v .  New South  Wales 
(N o .2) (1955) 93 C.L.R.  1 2 7 , a t  p .  162.
2
The word i n t e r c o u r s e 1 i s  n o t  of  much s i g n i f i c a n c e :  Dixon 
J .  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  Airways v .  Commonwealth (1955)
71 C .L .R .  29,  a t  p .  8 2 . C f .  R. v .  S m i th e r s ;  ex  p a r t e  
Benson (1912) 16 C .L .R .  99* a t  p .  1 1 3 5 and H o s p i t a l  P ro v ­
i d e n t  Fund P ty  L td  v .  V i c t o r i a  (1952) 87 C.L.R.  1, a t  p .  18.
3
(1920) 28 C .L .R .  530, a t  p .  559.
292.
the States1.” This view was rejected by the High Court 
later on for two reasons: "In the first place, the power
is to legislate with respect to trade and commerce. The 
words *with respect to1 ought never be neglected in 
considering the extent of a legislative power conferred 
by s.51 or s.52. For what they require is a relevance to 
or connection with the subject assigned to the Commonwealth 
Parliament, a conception very different from those which 
have been employed in the exposition of s.92. In the 
next place, every legislative power carries with it 
authority to legislate in relation to acts, matters and 
things the control of which is found necessary to effec­
tuate its main purpose, and thus carries with it power to 
make laws governing or affecting many matters that are 
incidental or ancillary to the subject matter. But this 
principle is entirely foreign to such a provision as
s.92
Another question arose as to the meaning of the words
2"absolutely free". In McArthur v. Queensland , these
1
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
55? at p.77* See also Wilcox Mofflin v. New South Wales
(1952) 85 C.L.R. *+88, at p. 519; Wragg v. New South Wales
(1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at pp. 385,'386.
2
(1920) 28 C.L.R. 530, at p. 5h9. Also refer to Duncan v. 
Queensland (1916) 22 C.L.R. 558, at p. 573*
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words were supposed to mean as Mfree from all government­
al control by every governmental authority", but even 
such a freedom was qualified as not amounting to a
"privilege to break all other laws". Such a wide meaning
■1has, however, been rejected , and these words have been 
interpreted as not free from every law or regulation.
"All trade and commerce must be conducted subject to law 
and this means compliance with a multitude of regulatory 
directions" because s.92 "supposes an ordered society 
where the mutual relations of man and man and man and 
government are regulated by law" •
There are certain other matters which may be taken 
as settled after the decision of the Privy Council in the 
Bank Nationalization CaseJ , as summarised by Dixon C.J. in
Llhis dissenting judgment in McCarter v. Brodie , and quoted 
with approval by the Privy Council in Hughes and Vale Pty
1
James v. Commonwealth (193&) 55 C.L.R. 1(P.C.), at p .56.
2
Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (19k8) 7& C.L.R.
1 (H.C.), at p . 389• See also Commonwealth v. Bank of 
New South Wales (19*+9) 79 C.L.R. k97 (P.C.), at p. 639; 
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955")
93 C. L.R. 127 (the Second Hughes and Vale Case), at pp.159, 
160, I7I5 Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 
93 C.L.R. 55, at p. 72.
3
Commonwealth v. Bank of New South Wales (19^9) 79 C.L.R. 
k97 (P.C.).
b
(1950) 80 C.L.R. k32, at p. k65.
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1
Ltd  v .  New South Wales (No.1) : MI  do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t
t h e r e  i s  any room f o r  d o u b t in g  t h a t  t h e i r  L o r d s h ip s  have 
r e j e c t e d  as  e r r o n e o u s  t h r e e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  have o f t e n  
b e en  p u t  f o r w a r d .  The f i r s t  i s  1 t h a t  s . 9 2  of  th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n  does not  g u a r a n t e e  the  f ree d o m  of i n d i v i d u a l s 1 . 
The second  i s  * t h a t  i f  th e  same volume of  t r a d e  f lo w ed  
from S t a t e  to  S t a t e  b e f o r e  as  a f t e r  the  i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  
the  i n d i v i d u a l  t r a d e r  . . .  t h e n  th e  f reed o m  of  t r a d e  among 
th e  S t a t e s  r em a in e d  u n i m p a i r e d 1 . The t h i r d  r e l a t e s  to  the  
a b sen c e  of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  As I  u n d e r s t a n d  i t  t h e i r  
L o r d s h i p s  have r e j e c t e d  th e  t h e o r y  t h a t  b e c a u se  a law 
a p p l i e s  a l i k e  t o  i n t e r - S t a t e  commerce and t o  the  d o m e s t ic  
commerce of a S t a t e ,  i t  may e s c a p e  o b j e c t i o n  n o t w i t h s t a n d ­
in g  t h a t  i t  p r o h i b i t s ,  r e s t r i c t s  o r  b u rd e n s  i n t e r - S t a t e  
commerce"•
A p a r t  from th e  g e n e r a l  g u id a n c e  as m en t io n ed  above ,
i n  a s c e r t a i n i n g  the  v a l i d i t y  o f  a law on g rounds  of  s . 9 2 ,
2the  p r e s e n t  t e s t  may be s t a t e d  as  f o l l o w s  : -
( i )  A law w hich  imposes  a r e s t r i c t i o n  or  b u rd e n  or  
l i a b i l i t y  by r e f e r e n c e  to  o r  i n  consequence  of  a f a c t  or an
1
(1955)  93 C.L.R.  1 ( P . C . ) ( F i r s t  Hughes and Y a le  C a s e ) , 
a t  p p .  21, 22.
2
See H o s p i t a l  P r o v i d e n t  Fund P ty  L td  v .  V i c t o r i a  (1953)
87 C .L .R .  1, a t  p p . 1 7 j 18; Hughes and Vale  P ty  L td  v .
New Sou th  Wales (No . 2 ){ 1 9 5 5 )  93 C.L .R.  127,  a t  p p .  162,
163; M a n s e l l  vT Beck (1958) 95 C.L.R.  550? a t  p.565*
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event or a thing itself forming part of trade, commerce 
and intercourse among the States, or forming an essential 
attribute of that conception, essential in the sense that 
without it you cannot bring into being the trade commerce 
and intercourse among the States, contravenes s.92, if it 
creates a real prejudice or impairment to inter-State 
transactions.
(ii) A law which imposes a restriction or burden or 
liability by reference to or in consequence of a fact or 
an event or a thing forming in itself no part of trade, 
commerce and intercourse among the States and supplying 
no element or attribute essential to that conception, does 
not contravene s.92.
(iii) Notwithstanding proposition (ii) mentioned above, 
a law under the guise of dealing with something which in 
itself is no part of trade, commerce and intercourse among 
the States and supplies no element or attribute essential 
to that conception, may in imposing a restriction or 
burden or liability contravene s.92.
Looking at these propositions, the first consideration 
that arises in the ascertainment of the validity of a law 
is whether the burden imposed by the law is by reference 
to or in consequence of something which itself forms no
296.
part of trade, commerce and intercourse among the States 
or forms an attribute essential to that conception. It 
is, therefore, necessary uto distinguish between on the 
one hand the features of the transaction or activity in 
virtue of which it falls within the category of trade, 
commerce and intercourse among the States and on the other 
hand those features which are not essential to the con­
ception even if in some form or other they are found 
invariably to occur in such a transaction or activity""'. 
For example, in the Second Hughes and Yale Case, what was 
prohibited by the New South Wales law was the driving of 
a vehicle on the highways by a person unless licensed.
The driving of a vehicle from one State to another is an 
essential characteristic of inter-State trade commerce and
pintercourse . Thus the law imposed a restriction by
1
Hughes and Yale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955) 
93 C.L.R. 127, at p. 162.
2
See Australian National Airways v. Commonwealth (195-5)
71 C.L.R. 29, at p. 89. In Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v.
New South Wales (No.1) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 1, at p. 23, their 
Lordships quoted with approval from Dixon J.xs dissent in 
McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 5-32, at p. 5-66, thus: 
"There are tendencies in the Transport Cases to thrust 
the carriage of goods and persons towards the circumfer­
ence of the conception of commerce, but in the Airlines 
Case, 71 C.L.R. 29 3 it was shown that it must lie at or 
near the centre."
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reference to or in consequence of something which was
essential to the concept of inter-State trade etc. . On
the other hand matters such as ’’the hours during which a
journey is made, what equipment should be carried for
emergency or for handling or securing the goods, the axle
weight or the wheel weight of the laden vehicle, the
relief on a long journey the driver should have, the
height or width of the load, the number and position of
lights to show the width or the overhang, the crowding of
vehicles upon a given route incapable of carrying somany
and the means and method of limiting the traffic, the
relations within New South Wales of the carrier to the
consignor and consignee, the m cords to be kept and
documents to be used, the receipt, safe carriage and
2delivery of goods" are only incidents of inter-State 
transportation and not essential to inter-State trade or 
commerce. Thus a restriction or burden by reference to 
or in consequence of something which is an incident to 
the actual trading or commercial activity does not 
1
Also refer to Russell v. Walter (1957) 9& C.L.R. 177* in 
which the activity restricted was the inter-State movement 
of goods; cf. Hughes v. Tasmania (1955) 93 C.L.R. 113•
2
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2)(1955)
93 C.L.R. 127* at p. 16 3; also refer to Fullagar J. in 
the same case at pp. 205* 206, and in McCarter v. Brodie 
(1950) 80 C.L.R. R32, at pp. k95, ^96.
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infringe s.92. Similarly a restriction or burden by
reference to or in consequence of an intra-State activity,
e.g., a sale , or manufacture of production of a commod- 
2ity , in itself forming no part of inter-State trade etc., 
does not infringe s.92. It may be that a law under the 
guise of dealing with such activities, might impair the 
freedom guaranteed by s.92, but such a consideration 
arises only after the features of a transaction which 
involve an element or attribute essential to the concept 
of inter-State trade etc., and those not involving such 
an element or attribute have been recognised or charac­
terised.
In order to ascertain whether a certain activity is 
within the protection of s.92, it should further be 
examined whether a law has created a real or unreasonable 
prejudice or impediment to inter-State transactions^.
1
Grannal v. Geo. Kellaway & Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
3 ^  at p . 51. Also refer to Wragg v. New South Wales 
(1953) 88 C.L.R. 353? at p. 385j and Fish Board v.
Paradiso (1956) 95 C.L.R. 5-5-3, at p. WT.
2
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
55.
3
McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. *+32, at p. 5-96$
Hughes and Yale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.1) (1955)
93 C.L.R. 1 , at pp. 25-, 29$ Hughes and Yale Pty Ltd v.
New South Wales (No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127, at p.160.
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F o r  ex am ple ,  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  e x e r c i s e  of  a d i s c r e t i o n  
v e s t e d  i n  an  a u t h o r i t y  would depend upon th e  r e a s o n a b i l i t y  
of  i t s  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and a wide and u n c o n t r o l l e d  d i s c r e ­
t i o n  to  i s s u e  a l i c e n s e  f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a n s p o r t  would 
amount t o  an  u n r e a s o n a b l e  or  r e a l  r e s t r i c t i o n  on i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  and commerce b e c a u se  of  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and 
u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  r e a d i n g  any l i m i t a t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  the  
g round  of  the  r e f u s a l  o f  th e  l i c e n s e  • A s i m i l a r  p rob lem  
may a r i s e  by way of  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a c h a rg e  or t a x  on the  
use  of  th e  r o a d s  by owners of  motor  v e h i c l e s  b e f o r e  th ey  
c o u ld  be d r i v e n  on r o a d s  i n t e r - S t a t e 1 2 , The t e s t  of r e a s o n ­
a b l e n e s s  or  e x c e s s i v e n e s s  i n  such  a c a se  i s  t h a t  nno 
p e c u n i a r y  b u rd e n  s h o u ld  be p l a c e d  upon i t  ( i n t e r - S t a t e
1
A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  Airways v .  Commonwealth (19^5) 71 
C .L .R .  29j Hughes and V a le  P ty  L td  v .  New South  Wales 
(No.1)  (1955) 93 C .L .R .  1; Hughes and Y a le  P ty  L td  v .  New 
South  Wales (N o .2 ) (1 9 5 5 )  93 C.L .R .  127; C o l l i e r  G a r lan d  
C o .v .  H o tc h k i s s  '[1957 ] A .L .R .  6 75* T o t a l  p r o h i b i t i o n  of  
th e  c a r r y i n g  on o f  an  a c t i v i t y  by r e f e r e n c e  to  o r  i n  con­
se q u en ce  of  som eth ing  e s s e n t i a l  t o  the  c o n c e p t  o f  t r a d e ,  
commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e  among th e  S t a t e s ,  would be an 
ex t rem e  c ase  of u n r e a s o n a b l e  or  r e a l  r e s t r i c t i o n :  
Commonwealth v .  Bank of  New South  Wales (19^+9) 79 C.L.R.  
597 ( P . C . ) .
2
Hughes and Y ale  P ty  L td  v .  New South  Wales ( n o . 2) ( 1955) 
93 C.L.R. 127; Arm strong  v .  V i c t o r i a  (N o .27 [1957] A.L.R. 
889; Commonwealth F r e i g h t e r s  v .  Sneddon [1959 ] A.±j .R.
550. But Mno t a x  or  im p o s t  w h a te v e r  can oe l a i d  upon the  
e n t r y  of  goods or p e o p le  i n t o  a S t a t e  f rom  a n o t h e r  S t a t e  
or  upon th e  p a s s i n g  of  goods or  p e o p le  o u t  of  a S t a t e  
i n t o  a n o t h e r  S t a t e 11: Hughes and V a le s  P t y  L td  v .  New 
S o u th  Wales ( N o .2) ( 1955; 93 C .L .R .  127, a t  p p .  1 1 7 7 ;  
Commonwealth F r e i g h t e r s  v .  Sneddon [1959] A.L.R. 550, 
a t  p .  553*
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transportation) which goes beyond a proper recompense to
the State for the actual use made of the physical
■\facilities provided in the shape of a highway” ♦ At the 
same time such a law should have uniform application 
irrespective of the fact whether the journey is inter­
state or intra-State, and an unfavourable or discriminat­
ory treatment of inter-State trade and commerce as
against intra-State would be regarded as unreasonable
2irrespective of other considerations •
Even though the true solution in solving problems 
relating to s.92 woul d be to distinguish between the 
features of a transaction or activity which are essential 
to the concept of inter-State trade, commerce and inter­
course and those features which are not essential to that 
conception so that a restriction or burden imposed upon 
the former might be an infringement of s.92, it does not 
mean that any imposition of a restriction or burden upon 
the latter would never be invalid. It would be an
1
Commonwealth Freighters v. Sneddon [1959] A.L.R. 550, at
p. 553.2
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v.New South Wales (no.2)(1955)
93 C.L.R. 127- at p. 207; Commonwealth Freighters v. 
Sneddon [1959] A.L.R. 550« at p. 55*+; Armstrong v. Vic­
toria (No.2) [1957] A.L.R. 889, at p. 898: Edmund T.
Lenon Pty Ltd v. South Australia [1957] A.L.R. 985, at 
p. 991; Mansell v. Beck (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550, at p.581.
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infringement of s.92 "if upon examination of the facts 
and scrutiny of its intended operation it appears that 
in spite of the prima facie absence of any but an acci­
dental interference with inter-State trade, commerce and 
intercourse the law is but a circuitous means of burdening, 
restricting or impeding operations of a kind which s.92 
protects" • Thus if a law imposing a restriction or 
burden upon incidents of inter-State transportation such 
as the hours during which an inter-State journey is 
made, the axle weight of the vehicle, etc., creates a real 
obstruction or impediment to the operation of the inter­
state transportation itself, it would be an impairment 
of the freedom guaranteed by s.92. "For example, a regu­
lation of the hours during which certain goods may be 
carried upon the Hume Highway or be brought into Sydney 
or Melbourne may fix times and periods that make the use 
of motor vehicles for the purpose practically impossible.
Such absurdly low limits might be prescribed for an axle
2load or wheel load that no heavy lifts be permissible" .
1
Mansell v. Beck (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550 (the Lottery Case) , 
at p. 565 (Italics supplied)5 see also 0*Gilnin Ltd v. 
Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (N.S.W.)
(1915) 52 C.L.R. 189. at pp. 211. 212: Commonwealth Oil 
Refineries Ltd v. South Australia (1926) 38 C.L.R, k08, 
at p. 523.
2
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955)
93 C.L.R. 1275 at p. 163. Also refer to examples mentioned 
in McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 5-32, at p. 5-96; and 
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.1) (1955)
93 C.L.R. 1 , at pp. 25-, 25*
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The Circuitous means1 or Concealed design1 
principle is not confined to incidents or accidents of an 
inter-State activity or transaction hut extends as well 
to matters which are wholly intra-State in themselves, aid 
a prohibition or restriction imposed upon them may, in 
certain circumstances amount to an impairment or inter-
iState trade etc* In Wilcox Mofflin v. New South Wales , 
dealing with the contention that the compulsory acquisi­
tion of hides upon submission for appraisement, or in 
the case of hides in meatworks upon salting and treating, 
deprived the owners of their freedom to sell or otherwise 
deal with the hides in inter-State commerce, it was 
explained that what was protected from legislative or 
executive impairment by s.92 was not the ownership of 
goods or the right to dispose of them but the activities 
or transactions taking place across State boundaries 
because of their inter-State character^. It is the 
inter-State dealing, movement, interchange, passage etc. 
that is the essence of inter-State trade, commerce and
1
(1952) 85 C.L.R. ^88 (the Hides ad Leather Case).
Ibid., at p. 5^8.
II
2
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intercourse • Thus the use of expropriation may validly 
he made for controlling the marketing of goods because 
any interference with the ownership is not by reference 
to or in consequence of something which possesses the 
characteristics essential to the concept of inter-State 
trade etc., and therefore, prima facie, not an unconsti­
tutional interference with inter-State trade in these 
goods. But a law under the guise of expropriation, i.e., 
dealing with ownership, may in certain circumstances 
impair that freedom indirectly as "the whole device of 
expropriating a commodity and vesting it in a marketing
board is to intercept commerce and stop domestic or inter-
2State or foreign trade, as the case may be, or all three" .
Thus "there may be many situations where to take a
1
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
55j at p. 72. The dealing, movement, interchange, passage, 
etc., may be of persons or goods and include their trans­
port: R. v. Smithers; ex parte Benson (1912) 16 C.L.R. 995 
Foggitt Jones & Co. v. New South Wales (1916) 21 C.L.R.
357> James v. South Australia (1927) 5-0 C.L.R. 1; James v. 
Commonwealth (1933) 55 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.); Australian Nation­
al Airways v. Commonwealth (19^ +5) 7^  C.L.R. 29; Hughes and 
Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R.127; moreover, these are not confined to tangibles but 
include intangibles as well: Commonwealth v. Bank of New
South Wales (19^9) 79 C.L.R. 5-97 (P.C.).
2
Field Peas Marketing Board (Tas.) v . Clements and Marshall 
Pty Ltd (195-8) 76 C.L.R. 5-15-, at p. 5-29; see also Peanut 
Board v. Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 5-8 C.L.rT 266, 
at pp. 287, 288. ~
trader1s goods is inconsistent with s.92. But that 
depends on some closer connection with inter-State trade 
than the two facts that to engage in inter-State trade 
is open to him if he chooses and that the goods are his 
p r o p e r t y " T h e  1closer connection1 or circumstances in 
which the use of expropriation would he inconsistent with 
s,92, are that the goods must have been either placed in 
a course of inter-State movement or actually required or
pintended to he placed in that way . The Court is not 
concerned with imaginary cases or mere speculative 
possibilities of inter-State trading occurring and will 
treat a course of transactions as being intra-State and 
not protected by s.92 until evidenced by some overt act 
showing the requirement or intention to carry on inter­
state traded.
It would be pertinent "to consider the commercial 
significance of transactions and whether they form an 
integral part of a continuous flow or course of trade,
T
Wilcox Mofflin v. New South Wales (1952) 85 C.L.R. M38, 
at p. 519.
2
Ibid., at p. 520.
3
Ibid., at p. 520. See also Grannal v. Marrlckville 
Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55, at pp. 795 BO; 
Carter v. Potato Marketing Board (195<) 8h C.L.R. 460, 
at p. 485.
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which apart from theoretical legal possibilities, must
commercially involve transfer from one State to another"'' .
pThus in James v. Cowan it was held that the compulsory 
acquisition of dried fruits produced in South Australia 
imposed a restriction or burden upon the trade that James 
was actually carrying on in selling dried fruits in other 
States. Similarly in Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour 
Board , it was the Rockhampton Harbour Board which 
alleged that all the peanuts in question were conveyed 
to and delivered at the wharf by the growers and owners 
thereof for exportation and carriage to Sydney and were 
within the protection of s.92 from the operation of a 
Queensland law purporting to establish a complete control 
of disposal of peanuts grown in Queensland by expropriat­
ing them. For the same reason Dixon J. in Field Peas 
4Case thought that the plaintiff had an interest in inter­
state trade in field peas and therefore had locus standi 
to complain against the operation of the Tasmanian law
Vield Peas Marketing Board (Tas.) v. Clements and Marshall 
Pty Ltd (195-8) 76 C.L.R. 5-14 at p.429. See also Wilcox 
Mofflin v. New South Wales (1952) 85 C.L.R. 5-88, at p.516.
2(1932) GXi.R. 386 (P.C.).
(1933) 5-8 C.L.R. 266: see also Carter v. Potato Market- 
ing Board (1951) 85- C.L.R. 460, at p. 5-80.
4 ^
Field Peas Marketing Board (Tas.) v . Clements and Marshall 
Pty Ltd (1948) 76 C.L.R. 415.
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providing for the acquisition and marketing of field 
peas in Tasmania.
A law providing for expropriation of goods may, 
therefore, be inconsistent or ineffectual only to the 
extent it prevents an owner from disposing of his goods 
in inter-State trade. Still to make sure of the validity 
of a law, one of the ways of satisfying s.92 has been to 
introduce an exception or severability clause to save as 
much of the operation of the law as is with respect to 
acts or transactions which are not in the course of inter-
iState trade and commerce . In such a case the relevant 
provisions have to be treated as divisible or distrib­
utable as their operation so far as they do not apply to 
inter-State acts or transactions but are otherwise valid. 
Generally the presumption is in favour of the validity 
of a law unless it is found that s.92 protects some 
transaction or some situation which is not capable of 
being covered by the exception or severability clause, 
but such a result again could not be reached on the 
basis of general reasoning and hypothetical cases. Their
Honours in the Hides and Leather Case, referring to the
_
See Anderson, The Main Frustrations of the Economic 
Functions of Government Caused by Section 92 and Possible 
Escapes Therefrom (1993) 26 Aust. L.J. J1Ö, at p. 5^9»
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exception, the evident purpose of which was to prevent 
acquisition itself operating to impair the freedom to 
engage in inter-State commerce by means of his right of 
disposition in the hides, said: MThe plaintiffs have
not proved in evidence any actual transaction which falls 
outside sub-s. 2(the exception) and within s.92 and is 
interfered with by acquisition” • Of course, if the law 
is so framed that the inter-State as well as intra-State 
transactions are so wrapped up together that they cannot
pbe separated from each other, it is wholly invalid .
A restriction on sale may provide another illustra­
tion to impair the freedom of inter-State trade etc, by 
*circuitous means1 23 or Concealed design*. A sale by it­
self is not an inter-State transaction^ unless it assumes 
an inter-State character by stipulating the movement of 
goods to or from some other State in the contract. A 
sale pursuant to which goods have moved or are required 
or intended to be moved inter-State, will be within the
^Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v. New South Wales (1952) 85 C.L.R. 
488, at p. 518.
2
See Vacuum Oil Co. Pty Ltd v. Queensland (No.2) (193*+)
51 C.L.R. 677; cf. Matthews v• Chicory Markethg Board 
(1938) 60 C.L.R. 263.
3
Grannal v. C, Geo Kellaway & Sons (1955) 93 C.L.R. 36, 
at p.515 Fish Board v. Paradiso (1956) 95 C.L.R. *+43, 
at p. 451.
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p r o t e c t i o n  of s . 9 2 , b e c a u se  a p r o h i b i t i o n  or  r e s t r i c t i o n  
imposed upon i t  would ( l i k e  e x p r o p r i a t i o n )  r e s u l t  i n  an 
i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  the  r i g h t  of  an owner to  d i s p o s e  of 
h i s  goods i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  . F o r  example ,  i n  Cam &
p
Sons P ty  L td  v .  C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  of New South  Wales , the  
C o u r t  g r a n t e d  an  i n j u n c t i o n  o n ly  i n  th o se  c a s e s  i n  which  
i t  c o u ld  be p ro v ed  t h a t  th e  s a l e  was i n t e n d e d  to form 
p a r t  or  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  of s e l l i n g  f i s h  to  someone i n  
a n o t h e r  S t a t e .  Thus th e  * c l o s e r  c o n n e c t i o n 1 or  c i r c u m ­
s t a n c e  i n  t h i s  c a se  too  i s  th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  or i n t e n t i o n  
of  the  owner to  move h i s  goods i n  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
( e v i d e n c e d  by o v e r t  a c t s ) .
Even a f t e r  th e  goods have c r o s s e d  the  f r o n t i e r s  of 
a S t a t e  or b e en  im p o r te d  i n t o  a S t a t e ,  a l l  s a l e s  t h a t  
t a k e  p l a c e  i n  th e  c o u r s e  of  d i s t r i b u t i o n  to  the  consumer 
a r e  s t i l l  when c o n s i d e r e d  by th e m s e lv e s  i n t r a - S t a t e  
t r a n s a c t i o n s  , b u t  a p r o h i b i t i o n  or r e s t r i c t i o n  imposed
1
McArthur v .  Q u eens land  (1920) 28 C.L.R. 530, a t  pp.559j 
560; W il l ia m s  v . M e t r o p o l i t a n  and E x p o r t  A b a t t o i r s  Board 
(1953) 89 C.L.R. 66, a t  p p .  75, 75; Wragg v .  New South  
Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R.  353j a t  p .  385 5 Cam & Sons Pty  Ltd  
v . C h ie f  S e c r e t a r y  of  New S o u th  Wales ( c7l~."rT~  
kk2 ,  a t  p p .  k5k,  5 5 5 .
2
(1951) 8k C.L.R.  kk2.
3
Wragg v . New South  Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R.  353 ( Wragg1s 
C a se ) , a t  p .  385»
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upon them may result in the impairment of the freedom of 
inter-State trade etc. Referring to Commonwealth Oil 
Refineries Ltd v. South Australia 3 and Vacuum Oil Co.
pPty Ltd v. Queensland , Taylor J. said in Wragg*s Case:
The destruction of the legislation ... may well 
he said to have resulted, not because the 
affected transactions were themselves necessarily 
part of inter-State trade and commerce, but 
because the particular burdens imposed were, in 
the circumstances, considered to be burdens 
directly imposed upon inter-State trade as such.3
What then are the circumstances? Mere economic inter­
dependence of trade and commerce among the States with 
the domestic trade of a State is not sufficient to jus­
tify the application of s.92. "Some closer connection11, 
Dixon C.J. pointed out, "must appear than the interde­
pendence of domestic transactions within a State with 
the importation which itself amounts to inter-State 
trade in the commodity"^.
The circumstances which may ordinarily create a 
situation so as to impair the freedom of inter-State 
trade etc., is a prohibition on the first sale of goods
V
(1926) 38 C.L.R. h08 (the Commonwealth Oil Refineries 
Case) .
2
093^) 51 C.L.R. 108 (the Vacuum Oil Case) .
3
(1953) 88 C.L.R. 353 5 at p. 397.(italics supplied).
4-
Ibid., at p. 386.
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after their importation. If the goods are imported into 
one State from another with the intention of selling 
them, utheir first sale within the second State con­
stitutes so typical and necessary an element that, in its
1absence, there could never exist any inter-State trade" .
2In Fish Board v. Paradiso , the defendant was charged 
with selling fish contrary to a law which required such 
fish first to be brought to a market and there sold at 
a sale conducted by the board. Here the restriction or 
burden was imposed upon a person importing fish for 
purposes of sale, and therefore the law in effect opera­
ted upon the first sales of fish from the moment of their 
entry into the State. Thus it was held that the law, in 
so far as it purported to prevent a purchaser of fish in 
the course of inter-State trade from dealing with it 
upon its delivery to him otherwise than by placing it at 
the disposal of the board, had an immediate and direct 
impact upon inter-State trade.
Similarly the Act held invalid in the Vacuum Oil Case^
_
(1 93 *0 51 C.L.R. 108, at p. 13k.
2
(1956) 95 C.L.R. ¥+3 .q
Vacuum Oil Go, Pty Ltd v. Queensland (193*0 51 C.L.R.
1085 also refer to the discussion of the case in Wragg v.
New South Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R. 353? at p. 3975 Williams 
v. Metropolitan and Export Abattoirs Board (1953) 89 
C.L.R. 66, at pp. 75? 78.
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c o u ld  be r e g a r d e d  as  c o n t r a v e n i n g  s .92  by C i r c u i t o u s  
means* or C o n c e a l e d  d e s i g n 1 . I t  p r o h i b i t e d  t h e  s a l e  of 
p e t r o l  i n  Q ueens land  by any p e r s o n  u n l e s s  l i c e n s e d ,  and 
made th e  p u r c h a s e  of  a c e r t a i n  q u a n t i t y  o f  l o c a l l y  
p ro d u ced  power a l c o h o l  a c o n d i t i o n  of  l i c e n s e ,  b u t  i t  
e x c lu d e d  from th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  of a l i c e n s e  a l l  s e l l e r s
b u t  th e  f i r s t .  As a t  t h a t  t im e t h e r e  was no p r o d u c t i o n
■1
of p e t r o l  i n  Q ueens land  and i t  was a l l  im p o r te d  , th e
b u r d e n  was p l a c e d  n o t  on eve iy  s e l l e r  of  p e t r o l ,  b u t
p r i m a r i l y  upon t h a t  p e r s o n  who i n t r o d u c e d  p e t r o l  i n t o
Q u e en s la n d ,  Dixon J .  s a i d :
The i n c i d e n c e  of th e  o b l i g a t i o n  i s  upon the  p e r s o n  
i m p o r t i n g  p e t r o l  f o r  s a l e ,  and t h a t  th e  b u rd e n  i s  
p l a c e d  upon him by r e a s o n  of  a consequence  i n s e p ­
a r a b l e  from h i s  c h a r a c t e r  of  i m p o r t e r ,  namely ,  
t h a t  he i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  the  f i r s t  p e r s o n  who i n  
Q ueens land  h as  th e  commodity i n  h i s  hands f o r  
s a l e .  Inasmuch as  he i s  s e l e c t e d  b e c a u se  of 
t h i s  c i r c u m s t a n c e ,  he i s ,  i n  s u b s t a n c e  bu rd en ed  
i n  h i s  c h a r a c t e r  of  i m p o r t e r ,  t h a t  i s ,  b e c a u s e  i t  
i s  he who i n t r o d u c e s  th e  goods i n t o  Q ueens land  
f o r  s a l e .
I t  may be n o te d  t h a t  th e  Act was n o t  f ram ed  i n  such  a 
way as  e x p l i c i t l y  t o  d e a l  w i t h  s a l e s  by th e  i m p o r t e r  as  
s u c h ,  b u t  b e c a u se  of  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  
d e a l t  w i t h  th e  f i r s t  s a l e  by th e  i m p o r t e r  of  p e t r o l .  In  
t h i s  r e s p e c t  th e  f a c t s  of  the  Commonwealth O i l  R e f i n e r i e s
1
I b i d . , a t  p .  123.
I b i d . , a t  p .  128.
2
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Case were simpler in that the tax was levied straight 
away upon the introduction of petrol into South Austral­
ia from other States, and the burden attracted by the 
first sale of petrol in South Australia or by its use in 
that State was regarded as a tax on the goods in the 
importer*s hands.
iIn the Margarine Case , though the operation of 
production or manufacture of a commodity was said as 
not in itself tobe part of inter-State trade etc., it 
was not denied that it might, under certain circumstances, 
be used to interfere with the freedom of inter-State 
commerce. Such circumstances were recognised by the 
Victorian Supreme Court in McNee v. Barrow Bros. Commis­
sion Agency Pty Ltd^. In that case a company was charged 
with a contravention of a regulation which provided that 
no person shall, without the consent of the Board, 
convert eggs into whole egg pulp. The company carried 
on the business in Melbourne of wholesale dairy produce 
merchant and in the course of that business imported 
eggs, both sound and cracked, from New South Wales. The 
1
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 
C.L.R. 55, at p. 79$ also refer to the arguments of the 
defendants: ibid., at p. 62.
2
[195*+] V.L.R. 1 (the Egg Puln Case).
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c r a c k e d  e g g s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  th o s e  c r a c k e d  i n  t r a n s p o r t  
or  i n  r e - g r a d i n g  on a r r i v a l  i n  M e lbourne ,  were i n t e n d e d  f o r  
p u l p i n g  and r e s a l e  a s  egg p u l p ,  w h i le  th e  sound eggs were 
r e s o l d  a s  e g g s ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  i n  the  “ f l u s h "  s e a s o n  c e r t a i n  
of  t h e s e  were a l s o  p u l p e d .  The c r a c k e d  eggs were u n f i t  
f o r  s t o r i n g  and c o u ld  be used  o n ly  f o r  p u l p i n g .  The 
C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  as  t o  t h e  c r a c k e d  eggs im p o r t e d  a s  such  
f o r  th e  p u rp o se  of p u l p i n g ,  the  r e g u l a t i o n  was i n v a l i d  
a s  i t  c o n t r a v e n e d  s . 9 2  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n .  I t  was so 
b e c a u s e  of  the  p r e s e n c e  of  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  t h a t  
th e  " c r a c k s "  were im p o r te d  on ly  f o r  th e  p u r p o s e  of 
p u l p i n g ,  and a r e s t r i c t i o n  o r  p r o h i b i t i o n  upon p u l p in g  
would have  co n seq u e n ce s  upon the  i m p o r t a t i o n  of  " c r a c k s " .
There  a r e  c e r t a i n  o p e r a t i o n s  such  as  xr e c e i p t r and 
d e l i v e r y *  of a commodity which  when c o n s i d e r e d  by them­
s e l v e s ,  do n o t  p o s s e s s  any c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e s s e n t i a l  t o  
th e  c o n c e p t  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c . ,  b u t  b e c a u se  of 
t h e i r  n a t u r e  th ey  n o r m a l ly  a r e  an  1 e s s e n t i a l  and i n t e g r a l 1 
s t e p  i n  th e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of  goods i n t e r - S t a t e ,  t h e r e b y  
fo rm in g  p a r t  of the  a c t i v i t y ,  and th u s  t a k i n g  on them­
s e l v e s  an i n t e r - S t a t e  c h a r a c t e r .  The High C o u r t  
p r e f e r r e d  to  a d o p t  th e  l a t t e r  v iew i n  d e c l a r i n g  p r o h i b ­
i t i o n s  or  r e s t r i c t i o n s  imposed upon su ch  o p e r a t i o n s
o c c u r r i n g  i n  the  c o u rs e  of  an i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a n s i t  of
1
goods a s  i m p a i r i n g  th e  f reedom  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  trade e t c .  • 
However, i t  c o u ld  a l s o  he s a i d  t h a t  u n d e r  the  g u i s e  of 
p r o h i b i t i n g  or  r e g u l a t i n g  som eth ing  which  was n o t  an 
i n t e r - S t a t e  a c t i v i t y ,  i t  was an  a t t e m p t  t o  i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  
an  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c .  Thus i n  such  c a s e s  t h e r e  
a p p e a r s  t o  be a p o s s i b i l i t y  of  h a v in g  an o v e r l a p p in g  
be tw een  p r o p o s i t i o n  ( i )  and p r o p o s i t i o n  ( i i j )  e n u n c i a t e d  
a b o v e .
pF e r g u s s o n  v .  S te v e n s o n  i s  a n o t h e r  example where the  
r e a s o n i n g  of ’’i n s e p a r a b l e  or i n d i s p e n s a b l e  c o n c o m i ta n t  or 
co n sequence"  of  an  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a n s a c t i o n  was a p p l i e d .
I n  t h a t  c a se  a company which  t r a n s p o r t e d  k angaroo  s k i n s  
p u r c h a s e d  on i t s  b e h a l f  i n  B r i s b a n e  to  Sydney, was 
c h a rg e d  w i t h  b e in g  i n  p o s s e s s i o n 1 of any kan g aro o  s k i n  
i n  New South  W ales .  The High C our t  h e l d  the  law i n f r i n g ­
ed s . 9 2  b e c a u s e :  "The t r a n s a c t i o n  i n  which  the  d e f e n d a n t 1s 
company engaged was e s s e n t i a l l y  one of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
and the  p o s s e s s i o n  which  th e  i n f o r m a n t  makes th e  ground
of  th e  p r o s e c u t i o n  was an i n s e p a r a b l e  c o n c o m i ta n t  and
_
R. v .  W i lk in so n ;  ex p a r t e  B r a z e l l ,  G a r l i c k  and Coy.
(1952) 85 C .L .E .  467,  a t  p .  480 .
2
(1951)  84 C.L.R. 421 .
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c o n seq u en ce  of t h a t  t r a n s a c t i o n "  . But  i t  may a l s o  he 
n o t e d  t h a t  " p o s s e s s i o n "  i t s e l f  formed no p a r t  of i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  e t c . ,  and s u p p l i e d  no e le m e n t  or a t t r i b u t e  
e s s e n t i a l  to  t h a t  c o n c e p t i o n .  Moreover ,  i t  was f o r b i d d e n  
n o t  i n  the  c o u rs e  of th e  i n t e r - S t a t e  j o u r n e y  b u t  a t  the  
t im e  of  d e l i v e r y  im m e d ia te ly  a f t e r  the  j o u r n e y  had come 
t o  an en d .  Under t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i t  was i m p o s s i b l e  
t o  im ag ine  how anyone c o u ld  c a r r y  on i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  
w i t h o u t  b e in g  i n  p o s s e s s i o n 1 of  th e  s k i n s .  Thus t h e r e  
were  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  where  i t  c o u ld  be s a i d  t h a t  a p r o h i b i ­
t i o n  or  r e s t r i c t i o n  upon  p o s s e s s i o n 1 had c o n seq u e n ce s  
upon th e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  s k i n s  i n to  New S o u th  W ales ,  and 
t h e r e b y  i n f r i n g i n g  s . 9 2 .  ^ t  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s u b m i t t e d  
t h a t  th e  case  i s  more s u i t a b l y  governed  by the  1 c i r c u i t ­
ous m eans1 o r  r c o n c e a l e d  d es ig n *  p r i n c i p l e .
T h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  o n ly  i n  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h a t  a 
p r o h i b i t i o n  or  r e s t r i c t i o n  or  b u rd e n  imposed upon an  
i n t r a - S t a t e  a c t i v i t y  may r e s u l t  i n  th e  im p a i rm en t  o f  the  
f reed o m  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c .  There must  be l e g a l ,  
n o t  econom ic ,  c o n n e c t i o n  be W ee n  an i n t r a - S t a t e  a c t  
p r o h i b i t e d  or r e s t r i c t e d  or bu rd en ed  and an i n t e r - S t a t e  
a c t i v i t y  supposed  to  be p r o t e c t e d  so t h a t  th e  fo rm e r  must
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 4-35»
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have been used, or required or intended to he used, for 
the purpose of carrying on the latter. In Wragg*s Case 
the plaintiffs sought declarations as to the validity of 
a law which in effect provided for the fixation of 
maximum prices in respect of the sale of potatoes in New 
South Wales, whether imported or not, at every stage of 
the trade, until they reached the consumer, claiming that 
it infringed the provisions of s.92. It was held that 
the plaintiffs were not entitled to any part of the 
relief claimed.
Then how does Wragg*s Case differ from the Vacuum Oil 
Case or Fish Board v. Paradiso? In all these cases the 
burden or liability was imposed upon the first sale after 
importation of the goods. But before s.92 could be 
invoked, it had to be proved specifically that the goods 
were imported for purposes of sale and the trader was 
prohibited or restricted from selling them in his charac­
ter as an importer. In the Vacuum Oil Case, and Fish 
Board v. Paradiso, it was proved beyond doubt that such 
was the case. On the other hand, in WraggTs Case, "the 
prescription generally of a maximum selling price does 
not subject any person to a burden or impost or other 
disability because he is the importer of particular
317.
goods; he is subject to the restrictions in his dealings in
1the commodity whether he is an importer or not” • Retail
sales were clearly not part of inter-State trade, as the
prescription of a maximum price for them could have only an
economic effect upon the importing business, but there might
be a possibility of the sales by "primary wholesalers" who
were importers, being made in the course of inter-State
trade. Denying such a possibility, Taylor J. said:
It is true that, except in the case of the small 
proportion sold by primary wholesalers otherwise 
than to secondary wholesalers, the primary 
wholesaler does not take the imported potatoes 
into store but sells them ex-wharf and delivery 
is taken by the purchaser at the wharf, but such 
sales are not necessarily part of inter-State 
trade. Possibly, upon examination, some may be 
found to fall within this category, but this is 
not sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to any 
declaration based on the assumption that all or 
any one of them constitute a part of trade, 
commerce and intercourse between the States even 
if, by reason of s.92 such sales are not subject 
to the provisions of the legislation - a point 
which the views above expressed leave completelyopen.2
On several occasions Dixon C.J. put emphasis on the
necessary legal effect rather than ulterior effect
socially or economically^. It is submitted that in the 
1(1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at p. 298.
2Ibid., at p. 399« Also refer to Grannal v. C. Geo Kellaway 
& Sons Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 36, at p. 51.3McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 4-32, at p. 465;
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 C.L.R. 
55, at pp. 70, 79; R. v. Connare; ex.p. Wawn (1939) 61 C.L.R. 596, at p. 618. See also Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd 
v. New South Wales (No.1) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.), atp .22.
318
application of the Tcircuitous means1 or Iconcealed
design1 principle this distinction is relevant only in
so far as some legal connection must be found between the
inter-State transactions and intra-State activities.
The relevance or economic consequences was discussed in
some detail by Dixon C.J. in Wragg;ts Case. In that case
the law providing for the fixation of maximum prices
was valid because there was no legal connection, as
distinct from economic interdependence, between the
fixation of maximum prices of goods to be sold in the
State and the importation into the State of those goods.
Thus there was no necessity of discussing the nature of
the restriction or burden imposed upon the sales.
On the other hand if the operation of the law is 
upon acts, matters or things which in themselves 
for part of inter-State trade I do not suppose 
that it matters that it is done by circuitous or 
devious means. It is a time-honoured principle 
that you cannot do indirectly what you are 
forbidden to do directly. It would be strange if 
the principle did not apply to the effectuation 
of a constitutional limitation or restriction like S.92. But no such question arises in the present 
case.1
Once some legal connection between inter-State and 
intra-State activities is established, the courts are 
not limited to the necessary legal effect of the law in 
their enquiry into the nature of the restriction or
0953) 88 c.L.R. 353, at pp. 387, 388.
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b u r d e n  imposed,  b u t  c an  examine economic or  p r a c t i c a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o  But  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  law may i m p a i r  the  
f ree d o m  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c , ,  u n d e r  th e  C i r c u i t o u s  
m eans1 or  1 c o n c e a l e d  d e s i g n 1 p r i n c i p l e ,  the  p r o h i b i t i o n  
or  r e s t r i c t i o n  or  b u r d e n  must  be so s e v e r e  a s  t o  make th e  
c a r r y i n g  on of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c . ,  a l t o g e t h e r  or 
p r a c t i c a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e .  I n  F i s h  Board  v .  P a r a d i s o , i t  
was s a i d :
Of c o u r s e ,  i f  th e  s u b - s e c t i o n  had p r o v i d e d  t h a t  
a l l  f i s h  i n  o r  coming i n t o  Q u e en s la n d ,  w h e th e r  
i n  th e  c o u rs e  of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  or n o t ,  s h o u ld  
be d e l i v e r e d  t o  the  b o a rd  f o r  s a l e  t h e r e  c o u ld  be 
no do u b t  t h a t  i t  would c o l l i d e  w i t h  s . 9 2 .  Indeed  
we do n o t  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  p r o p o s i t i o n  to  be i n  
d i s p u t e .  But  what  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h e r e  be tw een  
such  a p r o v i s i o n  and t h a t  now u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n ?
I n  e a c h  c ase  th e  p l a i n  o b j e c t  i s  t o  compel the  
p u r c h a s e r  to  p l a c e  h i s  p r o p e r t y  i n  th e  d i s p o s i t i o n  
of  th e  b o a rd ;  t h e  o n ly  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  i n  th e  
s a n c t i o n  p r o v i d e d .  I n  th e  one c a se  a f a i l u r e  t o  
d e l i v e r  t o  the  b o a rd  goods i n  th e  c o u r s e  of  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  would be p u n i s h a b l e  by such  p e n a l t y  
as  m igh t  be p r o v i d e d  w h i l s t ,  i n  th e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  
of  th e  p r e s e n t  c a s e ,  the  p r o h i b i t i o n  a g a i n s t  r e ­
s e l l i n g  goods p u r c h a s e d  f o r  r e - s a l e  s e r v e s  
p r e c i s e l y  th e  same p u r p o s e .  I n  th e  fo rm e r  c a s e ,  of  
c o u r s e ,  no o p t i o n  i s  g i v e n  t o  th e  t r a d e r ;  he m u s t ,  
u n d e r  p e n a l t y ,  comply w i t h  th e  s t a t u t o r y  r e q u i r e m e n t .  
I n  th e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  however ,  th e  A c ts  do n o t  
d i r e c t l y  and i m p e r a t i v e l y  r e q u i r e  f i s h  t o  be 
d e l i v e r e d  to  th e  b o a r d ;  the  t r a d e r  i s  f r e e  so t o  
d e l i v e r  i t  or  n o t  a s  he p l e a s e s .  But  he i s  t o l d  
t h a t  u n l e s s  he does  he s h a l l  n o t  be a t  l i b e r t y  t o  
d e a l  w i t h  i t .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  i s ,  however ,  b u t  a 
m a t t e r  of w o rd s ,  and ,  i n  t r u t h ,  s . 27 ( 1) ,  a s  th e  
r e s p o n d e n t  s e e k s  t o  c o n s t r u e  i t ,  does  n o t  g iv e  any
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1practical option to the trader .
In the second Hughes and Vale Case, Dixon C.J., McTiernan 
and Wehh JJ., gave examples of the imposition of a restric­
tion or burden on incidents or accidents of inter-State 
transportation so as to impair the freedom of inter-State 
trade etc., e.g., a regulation of the hours during which 
certain goods might be carried from one State to another 
by fixing timings or periods so as to make the purpose of 
the journey practically impossible, or prescribing absurdly 
low limits for an axle load or wheel load so that no heavy
plifts would be permissible .
The words 1 altogether1 or ^practically1 do suggest 
that even if the operation of an inter-State activity is 
legally free but rendered economically impossible, it 
would constitute an infringement of s.92. "It is in each 
case a question of ascertaining the actual effect of the 
legislation or the executive act on the inter-State trade 
of the person or persons complaining of it. A total 
prohibition of the trade itself need not be found; 
as Fullagar J. pointed out in McCarter v. Brodie a
T
0956) 95 C.L.R. ¥+3 , at pp. 452, 453» (Italics supplied). 
S. 27 (1) of the Fish Supply Management Acts 1935 to 1951 
(Q•), provides: "No person shall in any district sell or 
purchase any fish unless such fish have first been brought 
to a market in that district and there sold at a sale 
conducted by the board ...".
2
0  955) 93 C.L.R. 127, at p. 163.
3C1950) 80 C.L.R. >+32, at p. >+96.
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restriction making the trade economically impossible to 
maintain could in some cases suffice. When Dixon J. said 
that the Privy Council had rejected the test of ulterior 
social or economic effect, he was by no means denying 
that an enactment according to the necessary effect of 
its language might purport to impose a burden in the 
economic sense, which burden s.92 would invalidate because 
of its very economic effect. The section does not oper­
ate merely to enable a trader to disregard fines or 
imprisonment5 if it were so limited, expropriations and 
seizures of goods would be outside its operation and 
might speedily circumvent it*'”. Thus in the Egg Pulp 
Case it was held that the law prohibiting the production 
of egg pulp from "cracks" operated directly and immediate­
ly to render economically purposeless the defendant®s 
importation of "cracks".
The use of expropriation is an obvious case of
pstopping inter-State trade or preventing it altogether .
Of course it would not be so if the commodity is not
1
McNee v. Barrow Bros. Commission Agency Pty Ltd [195*+]
V.L.R. 1, at pp. TTJ 12.
2
See Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour Board (1933) 
h8 C.L.R. 266; Field Peas Marketing Board v. Clements 
and Marshall Pt~Ltd (19V7) 76 C.L.R. k1k.
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committed to inter-State trade by some overt act .
There seems to he some difficulty in fitting the
Vacuum Oil Case within the notion of "altogether11 or
"practically" impossible. In that case the factor which
mainly influenced the High C0urt to invalidate the law
in question was the promotion of sale of locally produced
power alcohol at the expense of petrol imported from
outside the State. "But, for the advantage of another
commodity which is produced within the State, a commodity
contributing to the same purpose", Dixon J. said, "it
burdens an imported commodity in the hands of the 
2importer" . It may be doubted whether the burden made 
inter-State trade "altogether" or "practically" impossi­
ble. However, it is a matter of opinion and individual 
assessment of the circumstances in each case .
The Vacuum Oil Case indicated that the object or 
purpose of an activity by reference to which burden was
1
See Wilcox Mofflin v. New South Wales (1952) 85 C.L.R. 
588.
2
(1935) 51 C.L.R. 108, at p. 128.
3
See James v. Commonwealth (1936) 55 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.), 
at p.595 their Lordships said: "In every case it must
be a question of fact, whether there is an interference 
with this freedom of passage."
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imposed might he relevant in ascertaining the severity 
of the burden. If an inter-State activity is carried 
on for a certain purpose and that very purpose is frus­
trated by the operation of a law, it would amount to an 
interference with inter-State trade etc. In Wragg*s 
Case, Taylor J. said: "The conclusion might well be
different if it were established in any particular case 
that a Prices Regulation Order relating to intra-State 
sales had been promulgated for the purpose of preventing 
or impeding or otherwise burdening the business of 
operating such goods into New South Wales from another 
State1'"* .
One way of frustrating the purpose of an inter-State 
activity is to impose so severe a restriction or burden 
on an inter-State act as to make that purpose economically 
purposeless or practically impossible, e.g., the Egg 
Pulp Case or Fish Board v. Paradiso. The other is by 
creating certain conditions such as in the Vacuum Oil 
Case; there were two commodities contributing to the 
same purpose, but the purpose of imposing the condition 
of buying a certain quantity of power alcohol was to 
support home production of power alcohol. The same
T
0953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at p. 399.
result could also be achieved through economic sanctions, 
say by imposing a tax on the goods in importers* hands as 
in the Commonwealth Oil Refineries Case. Thus purpose is 
an important factor in determining the nature of the res­
triction or burden imposed and if it is frustrated, 
whatever the reasons may be, it is an impairment of the 
freedom of inter-State trade etc.
Ill
It has been recognised that a law discriminating 
against inter-State trade and commerce as compared with
intra-State was invalid as interfering with the freedom
1of inter-State trade and commerce . Even though such a 
law did not impose a restriction or burden upon an inter­
state activity and proceed by reference to or in conse­
quence of some feature essential to the concept of inter-
1
Fox v. Robbins (1909) 8 C.L.R. 115; Hughes and Vale Pty 
Ltd v. New South Wales (No.2) (1955; 93 C.L.R. 127, at 
p.203; Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. Queensland (1955)
93 C.L.R. 247. at p. 256; McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 
C.L.R. 4-32, at p. m-99- Hat if a law applies uniformly 
to both inter-State as well as intra-State trade etc., 
it does not mean that it has escaped the objections on 
grounds of s.92: Hughes ah1-Vale Pty Ltd v. New South 
Wales (No.1) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at pp. 21, 22; 
Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1948) 78 C.L.R. 
1 (H.C.)j at pp. 3863 387; Commonwealth v. Bank of New 
South Wales (1949) 79 C.L.R. 497 (P.C.) at pp. 64o, 6415 
McCarter v. Brodie (1950) 80 C.L.R. 432, at p. 465*
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State trade and commerce, it does have a consequence 
directly upon the inter-State movement of something so 
as to prevent the operation of inter-State trade or 
commerce altogether. It would, therefore, under the 
guise of dealing with something else, amount to an attempt 
to impair the freedom assured by s.92. In Fox v. Robbins 
it was held that a Western Australian law requiring 
payment of a higher license fee for selling wine manufac­
tured from fruit grown in another Sth;e than for selling 
wine manufactured from fruit grown locally, was invalid 
as being inconsistent with s.92. The activity involved 
was the sale of wine, an intra-State transaction, but 
the imposition of a restriction or burden upon the sale 
of wine along with discrimination by way of requiring 
different license fees for two hinds of wine had as an 
indirect economic consequence a discouragement to the 
importation of wine from other States which was the 
essence of inter-State trade etc. “This provision 
(s.92)n, said Griffith C.J., “would be quite illusory 
if a State could impose disabilities upon the sale of 
products of other States which are not imposed upon the 
1
(1909) 8 C.L.R. 115.
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sale of home products" .
IV
toother circuitous way of impairing the freedom 
assured by s.92 was recognised by the High Court when 
under the guise of removing all the legal remedies, a 
State might validate its own legislative acts which were 
beyond its competence or validate administrative acts 
done in pursuance of such invalid legislation. Such an 
attempt was made by the New South Wales government to 
protect itself against claims arising from the invalida­
tion of the relevant Acts (in respect of their execution, 
such as seizure of motor vehicles and exaction of license 
fees) in the First Hughes and Vale Case; the State 
Transport Co-ordination (Barring of Claims and Remedies) 
Act 195k purported to bar any action, suit, claim or 
demand against the State in respect to any of the matters
referred to in those invalidated Acts. In Antill Ranger
2& Co. Pty Ltd v. Commissioner for Motor Transport , this
T
Ibid., at pp. 119* 120. Note that on a different (his­
torically possible) interpretation of s.92, it is aimed 
specifically at discriminatory laws. It is only on the 
present very artificial construction of s.92 that legisla­
tion like that held invalid in Fox v. Robbins« supra, must 
be brought within the "circuitous means" doctrine.
2
(1955) 93 C.L.R. 83. Also refer to Deakin v. Grimshaw 
(1955) 93 C.L.R. 10k.
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Act was held invalid as being inconsistent with s.92.
The barring of the remedy did not itself render the act, 
i.e., seizure of motor vehicle or exaction of license 
fees, lawful, but the provisions of the Act (barring the 
remedy) assumed the validity of those Acts which the 
State legislature had no authority to authorise under the 
Constitution. It was de facto legalising the exaction 
of the license fee and leaving the inter-State trader 
"with no means of reparation and in exactly the same 
condition as he would occupy had there been an antecedent 
valid legal authority for the exaction". Dixon C.J., 
McTiernan, Williams, Webb, Kitto and Taylor JJ., in their 
joint opinion said:
It seems implicit in the declaration of freedom of 
inter-State trade that the protection shall 
endure, that is to say, that if a governmental 
interference could not possess the justification 
of the anterior authority of the law because it 
invaded the freedom guaranteed, then it could not, 
as such, be given a complete ex post facto 
justification.
1
Ibid., at p.101. In a similar case, Deakin v. Grimshaw, 
supra, at p,108, Fullagar J., referring to the argument 
of the defendant that the Act of !951+ had no relation to 
inter-State commerce and could not be said to restrict, 
impede or burden any activity possessing the character 
of inter-State commerce, said: "But it is none the less, 
in my opinion, inconsistent with s.92. For its direct 
effect is seen, when the position is analysed, to be to 
deprive persons, who were in the past engaged in inter­
state commerce, of the protection of s.92, which they 
would otherwise be entitled to invoke for their inter­
state commercial activities."
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A similar question was involved in Barton v. Commis-
isioner for Motor Transport . This time the defendant. 
Commissioner for Motor Transport, relied upon a later 
Act, the Transport (Division of Functions) Act 1932-1958 
(N.S.W.), the outcome of which was to fix a time limit of 
one year for bringing an action on a claim for the 
recovery of moneys collected by the Commissioner under 
any Act conferring the relevant powers upon him. These 
provisions in effect barred the remedy in a case in which 
one year had elapsed from the time money was paid or 
collected in pursuance of a law declared invalid subse­
quently. It could be noticed that at the time cf enacting 
the law, it was assumed that the moneys were paid or 
collected under some Act which was declared invalid sub­
sequently and that the moneys would be recoverable under 
the existing law. Thus it was an attempt distinguishable 
only in form from that of the State Transport Co-ordination 
(Barring of Claims and Remedies) Act 195*+ and in substance 
being the same. Dixon C.J. said: “It attempts to bar
absolutely the legal remedy to recover money already exact-
2ed in violation of the freedom assured by s.92n •
1
[1957] A.L.R. 729-.2Ibid.« at p.726; Fullagar J. dissented from the majority 
and based his opinion on the observation made in Antill 
Ranger & Co. Pty Ltd v • Commissioner for Motor Transport, 
supra, at p.103. There he thought that if the Act did no 
more than limit the remedy, while leaving practically 
effective redress open to the plaintiff, it would not be 
inconsistent with s.92.
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V
The doctrine of 1 essence® and * accidents® as enun­
ciated by Dixon C.J. along with the application of the 
1 circuitous means® and ®concealed design® principle, as 
applied in testing the constitutionality of an enactment, 
has become a major obstacle in the implementation of 
various government programmes and policies, particularly 
in the field of social and economic activities involving
movement of something inter-State, e.g., nationalisation
1 2of air transport and the business of banking , the contid
of road transport^, schemes of organised marketing^, but 
"there are still important areas of the doctrine which 
leave considerable scope for individual judgment and 
therefore for further systematic refinement and pragmatic 
adjustment, notably in the concept of ®real prejudice or 
impairment® to inter-State transactions, in the identifica­
tion of particular features of a transaction which a law
1
Australian National Airways v. Commonwealth (19*+6) 71 
C.L.R. 29 (the Airlines Case) .
2
Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth (19^8) 78 C.L.R.
1 (H.C.)5 (1949) 79 C.L.R. 597 (P.C.).
3
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.1) (1955)
93 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.); Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South 
Wales (No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127.5
James v. South Australia (1927) *+0 C.L.R. 1; James v. Cowan 
(1932) 57 C.L.R. 386 (P.C.) ; James v. Commonwealth (1938)
55 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.); Peanut Board v. Rockhampton Harbour 
Board (1933) 58 C.L.R. 266.
330
selects as the basis of its operation and in the concept 
of a 1 device1 or Circuitous means1 of impeding inter­
state transactions"^. Some of the obstacles to the 
performance of economic functions may perhaps be surmount­
ed through the use of extra-legal methods such as making 
compliance with government policy more attractive or
pseeking co-operation between public and private interests . 
Constitutionally or legally there does not seem much hope 
of overcoming these obstacles at the moment^.
4In the Bank Nationalization Case , Lord Porter, 
after laying down the distinction between regulatory and 
prohibitory laws so that the latter would be an impairment 
of the freedom of inter-State trade etc,, made a reser­
vation:
1
See Anderson, Essence,Incidence and Device under Section 
92 of the Constitution, (1959-60) 33 Aust, L.J.,294, atp.306.
2
See Anderson, The Main Frustrations of the Economic Func­
tions of Government caused by Section 92 and Possible 
Escapes Therefrom (1953) 26 Aust, L.J. 518« 5^6,
3
Several writers have suggested the amendment of s.92: 
Garran, Prosper the Commonwealth (1958) at p. 212; follow­
ing the hint in James v. Commonwealth (1936) 55 C.L.R. 1 
(P.C.)j at p.61, an attempt was made to amend it but was 
not approved by the electorate: Knowles, The Australian 
Constitution (1936) at p.272B. One writer even suggested 
it be repealed altogether: Holman, “S.92 - Should it be 
Retained" (1933) 7 Aust. L.J. 1MD.
Commonwealth v. Bank of New South Wales (19*+9) 79 C.L.R. 
*+97 (P.C.),
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For their Lordships do not intend to lay it 
down that in no circumstances could the ex­
clusion of competition so as to create a 
monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth 
agency or in some other body be justified.
Every case must be judged on its own facts 
and in its own setting of time and circumstance, 
and it may be that in regard to some economic 
activities and at some stage of social devel­
opment it might be maintained that prohibition 
with a view to State monopoly was the only 
practical and reasonable manner of regulation 
and that inter-State trade commerce and inter­
course thus prohibited and thus monopolised 
remained absolutely free.1 2
In the absence of any further explanation appended to 
this passage, it is rather difficult to estimate its 
potentialities. One possible explanation may be that 
whenever a doctrine or test is propounded it is thought 
desirable to soften down its rigours by making some kind 
of general reservation in anticipation of a situation 
justified in certain circumstances as the "only practical 
and reasonable" solution. At the same time, it is 
suggested that following Dixon C.J.ls approach to s.92 
as enunciated in the Second Hughes and Yale Case and the 
Lotteries Case , the only situation in which nationalisa­
tion of banks could be imagined as valid (and perhaps 
could have been justified in 1950) in the face of s.92,
1
Ibid.. at p. 65-1. Cf. Lord Wright, Section 92 - A Problem 
Piece (1955-) 1 Sydney L.Rev. 1k5, at p. 166.
2
Mansell v. Beck (1956) 95 C.L.R. 550; see also Hospital 
Provident Fund Pty Ltd v. Victoria (1952) 87 C.L.R. 1.
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is at a time of grave economic crisis in a Commonwealth, 
and it appears to be the "only practical aid reasonable” 
solution. The law would be supposed to proceed by refer­
ence to or in consequence of the * control of economy* as 
being the essential character of the business of banking 
which itself forms no part of inter-State trade etc., 
and supplies no element or attribute essential to that 
occupation.
Suppose that instead of prohibiting the business of 
banking straightaway, the same result is sought to be 
achieved by prohibiting the deposit of money by customers 
with private banks providing an exception for deposits 
carried out across the border of a State • *Deposit of 
money* itself is not inter-State trade etc., and its 
prohibition prima facie would not constitute an infringe­
ment of s.92. Can the 1 circuitous means* or *concealed 
design* principle be extended to such a case where an 
activity, i.e., banking including interstate banking, 
is prohibited under the guise of prohibiting depositing* 
a prohibition which could not be achieved directly by
1
See Sawer, Some Legal Assumptions of Constitutional 
Change, (19571 IV Uni. of W.A. Annual L. Rev. 1, at p.17; 
Australian Constitutional Cases (2nd ed.) at p.327(n)•
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prohibiting the business in private banks? Now the 
business of banking consists in the "creation and transfer 
of credit, the making of loans, the purchase and disposal 
of investments and other kindred activities" and is a 
part of inter-State trade etc., "in so far as it is carried 
on by means of inter-State transactions" . But in order 
to create credit or make loans etc., it is necessary to 
raise funds through customers asking them to deposit money 
with the banks. Thus there are circumstances in which 
the Circuitous means* or * concealed design* principle 
could be applied. If the prohibition or restriction 
imposed on ^deposit of money1 is so severe as to leave no 
funds available for transacting the business of banking 
and thus making it altogether or practically impossible 
to carry on that business, it is submitted, it wuld be an 
impairment of the freedom of inter-State trade etc.
Perhaps it would be a different matter if the business is 
conducted only within the borders of a State.
Similar problems may arise where the use of acquisi­
tion is made in depriving private companies of all their
aircraft with the purpose of creating government monopoly 
2in air traffic . Suppose in the Airlines Case the
1
Commonwealth v. Bank of New South Wales (19^ +9) 79 C.L.R. 
k97 (P.C.), at p. 632.2See Sawer, op. cit., at p. 16.
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Commonwealth had  l e g i s l a t e d  t o  a c q u i r e  a i r c r a f t  owned 
by p r i v a t e  c o m p an ie s ,  i n d i v i d u a l l y  by name, on j u s t  
t e r m s ,  f o r  th e  p u rp o se  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  a i r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
of  p a s s e n g e r s  and g o o d s .  Here a c q u i s i t i o n  of  som eth ing  
s t r i k e s  a t  i t s  o w n e r sh ip ,  which  i n  i t s e l f  i s  n o t  i n t e r ­
s t a t e  t r a d e  e t c . ,  and t h e r e f o r e  does n o t  o r d i n a r i l y  
i m p a i r  th e  f reed o m  a s s u r e d  by s . 9 2 .  But  a i r c r a f t  i s  a 
p r o p e r t y  of  which  t h e r e  c o u ld  be on ly  one use  and t h a t  
i s  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  of  p a s s e n g e r s  and g oods ,  and i t s
1
a c q u i s i t i o n  i n  e f f e c t  amounts to  d e p r i v a t i o n  o f  i t s  use  • 
There  i s  to o  the  a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t o r  t h a t  th e  p r i v a t e  
company c o u ld  t r u l y  say t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e d  the  a i r c r a f t  
f o r  i n t e r - S t a t e  o p e r a t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  c o u ld ,  i n  the  
c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  be s a i d  t o  be an im p a i rm en t  of  the  f reedom  
of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  e t c . ,  u n d e r  th e  g u i s e  of  a c q u i r i n g  
an a i r c r a f t  as  an  o b j e c t  of o w n e r sh ip .
As t h e r e  a r e  n o t  v e r y  many c a s e s  where the  s c u r c u i t -  
ous m eans1 or  * c o n c e a l e d  d e s ig n *  p r i n c i p l e  h as  been  
a p p l i e d ,  i t  c o u ld  be s a i d  t h a t  the  i m p l i c a t i o n s  i n  th e  
a p p l i c a t i o n  of  th e  p r i n c i p l e  a r e  n o t  y e t  f u l l y  r e a l i s e d .
1
S i m i l a r  r e a s o n i n g  was f o l l o w e d  i n  Hughes and V ale  P ty  L td  
v .  New South  Wales ( N o .2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127, a t  p .  182.
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B ut  t h e  c a se  law a v a i l a b l e  and th e  j u d i c i a l  d i c t a  q uo ted  
above s u g g e s t  i t s  im p o r ta n c e  a s  a component of  Dixon 
C . J .  *s t e s t  of  ^ e s s e n c e *  and O c c i d e n t * .  Had th e  t e s t  
b e e n  c o n f i n e d  o n ly  t o  th e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  ( i )  and ( i i )  
m e n t io n e d  above ,  many l o o p h o l e s  would have b e en  l e f t ,  
w h e reas  g i v e n  ( i i i ) ,  we have an  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  f l e x i b l e  
j u d i c i a l  d e v ic e  f o r  s t r i k i n g  down l e g i s l a t i o n  obnox ious  
to  th e  j u d i c i a l  g o a l  o f  " c o n t r o l l e d  l a i s s e z - f a i r e "  i n  
i n t e r s t a t e  t r a d e .
CHAPTER IX
P r e f e r e n c e  and D i s c r i m i n a t i o n  o r  Lack of  U n i f o r m i t y  
i n  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n
At th e  t ime of  th e  making of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  t h e r e  
was a g en u in e  f e a r  t h a t  the  F e d e r a l  Government  m ig h t  e x ­
ercise i t s  powers hy making laws w h ich  p r e s s e d  more h e a v i l y  
on p e o p le  or t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  i n  some S t a t e s  t h a n  on p e o p le  
or  t h e i r  p r o p e r t y  i n  o t h e r  S t a t e s  and so h i n d e r  the  
p r o g r e s s  of  th e  Commonwealth. Thus i n  o r d e r  t o  m a i n t a i n  
e q u a l i t y  among th e  S t a t e s  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  p r e v e n t  
f a v o u r i t i s m  and p a r t i a l i t y  i n  co m m erc ia l  and k i n d r e d
•j
r e g u l a t i o n s ,  c e r t a i n  s a f e g u a r d s ,  i . e . ,  s . 51( i i )  > 
s . 5 K ü i )  , s .8 8 ^  and s . 9 v  were p r o v i d e d  i n  the  
C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  o p e r a t i n g  as p r o h i b i t i o n s  on th e  law-making
1
I t  p r o v i d e s :  " T a x a t i o n ;  h u t  so a s  n o t  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t e  
b e tw ee n  S t a t e s  or p a r t s  of S t a t e s " .
2
I t  p r o v i d e s :  " B o u n t i e s  on th e  p r o d u c t i o n  or  e x p o r t  of 
g o o d s ,  b u t  so t h a t  such  b o u n t i e s  s h a l l  be u n i f o r m  t h r o u g h ­
o u t  th e  Commonwealth".
3
I t  p r o v i d e s :  "Uniform d u t i e s  of  cus tom s s h a l l  b e  imposed 
w i t h i n  two y e a r s  a f t e r  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of  th e  Common­
w e a l t h "  • 
b
I t  p r o v i d e s :  "The Commonwealth s h a l l  n o t ,  by any law or 
r e g u l a t i o n  of  t r a d e ,  commerce, or r e v e n u e  g iv e  p r e f e r ­
ence  t o  one S t a t e  or p a r t  t h e r e o f  o v e r  a n o t h e r  S t a t e  or 
any p a r t  t h e r e o f " .
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powers of the Commonwealth Parliament from giving prefer­
ence to a State or part thereof over another State or 
part thereof, and creating discrimination or lack of 
uniformity between States or parts thereof • Obviously 
the States were not and could not become "equal” in any 
material sense; the point of prohibitions was to prevent 
Commonwealth action from exacerbating inequalities, or, 
putting it another way, to preserve formal equality in 
the operation of federal law, (S.96, per c o n t r a enables 
the Commonwealth to reduce material inequalities - or to 
add to them, if it thinks fit). The idea of ss.51(ii) 
and (iii), 88 and 99 restrain the Commonwealth Parliament 
from giving preference or creating discrimination - a 
negative function. But having regard to the number and 
potentially broad scope of these prohibitions, and remem­
bering the central place which "circuitous" evasion of a 
prohibition has come to occupy in relation to s.92, one 
might reasonably have expected the Courts likewise to be 
astute in recognising evasions of the spirit or substan­
tial purpose cf these sections. In fact this has not 
happened, because interpretations established by Judges 
not much given to looking for evasions have remained 
1
See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth (1901) at pp. 550, 877*
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dominant; occasional dissents from differently minded 
Judges, including Sir Owen Dixon, indicate the lines along 
which this part of the law might have developed,
II
Discrimination and lack of uniformity appear to be 
synonymous and in effect carry the same meaning; and a 
law creating discrimination between two States also creates 
lack of uniformity between them aid vice versa.
But preference has a narrower scope in operation 
than discrimination or lack of uniformity. Mere differ­
entiation between two situations involving persons, things 
or places would only create discrimination or lack of 
uniformity, but in order to constitute preference the 
differentiation should further be so designed as to 
produce some tangible advantage. Thus preference
necessarily involves discrimination or lack of uniform-
1ity, but not vice versa • For example, in Crowe v.
2Commonwealth , a Commonwealth law providing for the 
constitution of the Dried Fruits Control Board, inter 
alia, consisting of (among others) two representatives to
1
See Elliott v. Commonwealth and Another (1935) 5^ C.L.R. 657? at pp. 668, 683.
2
(1935) 5>+ C.L.R. 69.
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be elected by the growers in each of the States of New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Western 
Australia (the States of Tasmania and Queensland having 
no representation), was held as not constituting prefer­
ence because in selecting the members of the Board no 
tangible or material advantage was given to trade and
commerce of one State over another, even though it did
“1discriminate between the States . On the other hand,
pin James v. Commonwealth , a regulation made under the 
Dried Fruits Act, 1928, the effect of which was to 
prevent the transport of dried fruits if held only in
1
The views expressed by the members of the High Court 
were summarised by Latham C.J. in Elliott v. Commonwealth 
and Another (supra) at p.669: MIn the case Rich J.
said that s.99 referred to 1 tangible advantage of a 
commercial character* (at p.83). Starke J. said; *The 
preferences prohibited by s.99 are advantages or imped­
iments in connection with commercial dealings* (at p.86). 
Similarly Dixon J. said; *The preference referred to by 
s.99 is evidently some tangible advantage obtainable in 
the course of trading or commercial operations, or, at 
least, some material or sensible benefit of a commercial 
or trading character* (at p.92). Evatt and McTiernan 
JJ. pointed out that the provision which was then 
challenged *neither puts any State in possession of 
trading advantages over another State nor gives it the 
power to obtain any such advantages* (at pp. 98, 97)
1 and for that reason it was not obnoxious to s.99 of 
the Constitution.*"
2
(1928) C.L.R. bb2. It may be noted that in this 
case the preference was purely in the drafting of the 
legislation; there was no preference in economic fact.
3^0
Queensland or Tasmania, was held to constitute preference 
prohibited by s.99*
There seems to be an overlapping between s.99 and 
s.5*l(ii)j as the word 1 23revenue1 occurring in s.99 includes 
® taxation*. A preference in relation to 1 taxation® 
infringing s.99 would as well create discrimination in­
fringing s.51(ii)* At the same time, a discrimination 
in relation to 1 taxation* would also confer a tangible 
advantage in respect of those who are favourably situated, 
and, therefore, necessarily involve preference which 
infringes s.99"** Further, as the subject matter of 
Revenue1 is practically exhausted by 1 taxation* , the 
porhibition of preference provided in s.99 is virtually 
confined in its operation to laws of trade and commerce 
not falling within the scope of s.5 1( ü ) 5 s.5 1(iü) or 
s.88.
The meaning of the word preference® was discussed
3in detail in Elliott v. Commonwealth and Another . In ttet
case a law providing for a system for licensing seamen was
1
Cf. Latham C.J. in Elliott v. Commonwealth and Another
(1935) 55- c.L.R. 657, at p. 668.2
Except few matters such as fees for use of air fields, 
shipping services, post-office etc.
3
(1935) 5^ C.L.R. 657 (Elliott*s Case).
3 VI.
applicable only at ports in the Commonwealth specified 
in the regulations made thereunder; the regulations 
specified only, inter alia, six ports in four States, 
excluding Tasmania and Western Australia. This was held 
by the High Court, Dixon and Evatt JJ. dissenting, as 
not constituting preference within the meaning of s.99-
All the members of the Court were agreed that in 
order to constitute preference1 there must be some 
tangible advantage obtainable in the course of trading 
or commercial operation, but differed as to the nature 
of the advantage. Latham C.J., with whom McTiernan J. 
substantially agreed, said that the prohibited prefer­
ence must amount to an advantage definitely given to one 
State or part thereof over another State or part thereof, 
and that it was more a question of opinion rather than to 
be settled upon legal grounds. He, therefore, concluded 
that because of the vagueness as to the nature of pref­
erence and its recipients, it was difficult to ascertain
satisfactorily what the alleged preference was and what
1State or part thereof received it . On the other hand, 
Dixon J. dissenting, argued that because of the use of
the phrase "give preference", and not "give a pieference",
T
Ibid., at pp. 6693 670.
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what was forbidden was some material or sensible benefit 
of a commercial or trading character generally, and thus 
the Court was not required to estimate the total amount
of economic or commercial advantage resulting from the
1operation of the law *
The basic difficulty lies in the fact that the
expression “State or part thereof" has been supposed to
2denote a geographical unit . A State can, therefore, be 
identified as a geographic area having a certain number 
of persons involved in different occupations. In such 
a case it would not be difficult to recognise discrim­
ination, but in assessing a tangible advantage so as to 
constitute preference, different considerations crop up 
making the problem more complex.
In James v. Commonwealth^, a State or a locality was 
identified with persons and their property, "Discrimina­
tion between localities means", Knox C.J. and Powers J, 
explained, "that because one man or his property is in 
one locality, then,regardless of any other circumstance,
T
Ibid,, at pp. 683 j 68*+.
2
See Anderson in Essays on the Australian Constitution 
(R. Else-Mitchell ed.) at p . 110.
3
(1928) 41 C.L.R. 442.
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he or it is to he treated differently from the man or 
similar property in another locality"^  . This proposition 
looks simple at its face hat creates practical difficul­
ties in its application. What persons are to he selected 
for identification? Suppose a law purports to operate 
upon a certain class of persons, does it mean that it 
also includes within its operation (for purposes of 
ascertaining preference) persons other than those men­
tioned? In a society there is always an inter-action of 
various social and economic forces and an impact of one 
class of persons upon another. Then, to put it as a 
hroad proposition, does it include social and economic 
or trading consequences ensuing ultimately from its 
operation at a particular place and at a particular time? 
If it is so, then it could he argued that as the States 
of Queensland and Tasmania did not produce any fruits, 
such a discrimination did not make any real difference
to them. But Higgins J. replied that no judicial notice
2could he taken of such facts •
D ixon J. tried to approach the problem on a broader 
basis. He said that the preference might consist in a
T~
Ibid., at pp. 455? 456.
Ibid., at p. 461.
2
greater tendency to promote trade, in furnishing some 
incentive or facility, or in relieving from some burden 
or impediment . This view seems to include more considera­
tions than the persons and their property within a State 
or a locality. But he issued a caution that the Court 
was not concerned with the trading or economic consequenc­
es of a law. It may be noted that in spite of the fact 
that his approach is not as clear as that of Knox C.J., 
and Powers J., in James v. Commonwealth^, it is more 
realistic and leaves some scope for other factors for 
consideration, e.g., particular evil or inconveniences 
found at one place and not at another.
It may be noticed that the expression "give prefer- 
ence" is as vague and imprecise in its operation as the 
expression "absolutely free1* occurring in s.92. But, 
curiously enough, in contrast to s.92, the majority of 
the High Court in ElliottIs Case, particularly Latham 
C.J., by giving a narrow interpretation to preference1 
has considerably reduced the importance of s.99-
Dixon J.ss approach to s.99? however, appears to be
T
Elliott V. Commonwealth and Another (1935) 54 C.L.R.
657j at p. 683.
2
(1928) 41 C.L.R. 442.
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in conformity with the current interpretation of s.92 in 
establishing Ma standard of validity which is concerned 
with the character of the law or regulation of commerce 
and not with the particular trading or economic conse­
quences which may or may not in fact ensue from it at a 
particular place and time"^. It has been repeatedly said 
that in ascertaining the validity of a law on grounds of 
s.92, the court was not concerned with the social or 
economic consequences arising due to the imposition of 
a burden or restriction upon a certain activity . "The 
economic consequences which it may have upon inter-State 
trade may well be serious, but that is a different thing 
from interference by law or government action with the 
freedom which s.92 confers"-^. Similarly, if a law gives 
preference to something which has its economic conse­
quences upon trade and commerce, there would not be any 
violation of the constitutional prohibition provided in 
S.99.
T
Ibid., at p . 68^.
2
E.g., Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (No.1) 
(1955; 93 C.L.R. 1 (P.C.), at p.22; Wragg v. New South 
Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at pp. 387 and 3 9 ^
3
Wragg v. New South Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, at 
p. 387, per Dixon C.J.
3^ 6
Another difficult problem of interpretation has 
arisen due to the use of the expression "between States 
or parts of States" and "one State or any part thereof 
over another State or any part thereof" in s.51(ii) and 
s.99 respectively. Reference has been made to both 
these expressions simultaneously as they were supposed 
to be identical in purport and effect and convey the same 
idea j and, therefore, similar considerations apply to 
both of them. However, an apparent distinction between 
the two could be noticed in that the former expression, 
in addition to the discrimination between States or parts 
of different States, also includes discrimination between 
parts of the same State, but in practice "it would be 
difficult if not impossible to devise such a preference 
which would not also involve a preference to part of a
pState over another State or over a part of another State" .
There had been two views about the interpretation of 
these expressions and the matter is not yet authoritatively
1
R. v .  Barger (1908)  6 C.L.R. VI, at p .  107; James v .  
Commonwealth (1929) *+1 C.L.R. V+2, at p .  V??; Elliott v .  
Commonwealth and Another, supra, at p p .  672, 673»
2
Elliott v. Commonwealth and Another, supra, at p. 667 
per Latham C.J.5 also refer to Evatt J. at p. 690.
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settled. One view was propounded by the majority con­
sisting of Griffith C.J. , Barton and 0TConnor JJ., in R.
iv. Barger , that the words "State or parts of States"
must be read as synonymous with "parts of the Common-
2wealth" • The other view was propounded by Isaacs J. in 
the same case. He said: "The treatment that is forbidden,
discrimination or preference, is in relation to localit­
ies considered as carts of States, and not as mere 
Australian localities, or parts of the Commonwealth 
considered as a single country"^.
Isaacs J.1s reasoning was referred to with approval 
in Cameron v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation^.
In that case a regulation directed that for the purpose 
of determining the income of graziers, the values of live­
stock at the beginning and end of the year had to be 
brought into account at stated figures which varied 
according to the States in which the stock was situated. 
The only discrimen adopted was the State in which the 
stock was situated and there could hardly be any 
1
(1908) 6 C.L.R. .
2
Ibid., at p . 78.
3
Ibid., at p. 107. (Italics supplied).
4
(1923) 32 C.L.R. 685 see also James v. Commonwealth 
(1928) 41 C.L.R. 442, at pp. 455 and 456.
3^ 8
difference of opinion in the outcome of the decision.
There was no question of discrimination between "parts of
States". Still Isaacs J.1 2s definition of "States or parts
•1of States" was cited with approval . Yet it could also 
he said that the other view was not disapproved or 
negatived, and the same result could have been reached by 
reference to the reasoning of the majority in Barger1s 
Case, as there was no conflict between the two views as 
to the general understanding of discrimination between 
States.
The matter came up for discussion again in Elliott*s 
Case. Latham C.J., though considering it not necessary 
for the decision (so his opinion may be considered as an 
obiter dicta) preferred Isaacs J. *s reasoning and referred 
to its earlier approval in Cameron1s Case. He thus con­
cluded that the application of the regulations depended 
upon the selection of ports as ports and not of States 
or parts of States as such, as a State could not be iden­
tified with its capital city or its principal port or 
ports, and so there was no discrimination forbidden by
s.51(ii) or s.99^. McTiernan J. was also of the same
1
Ibid., at p.72; also refer to Isaacs J. at p.78, Higgins 
J. at pp. 78, 79, and Rich J. at p. 79»
2
(1935) 5^ C.L.R. 657, at p. 674.
opinion that the ports had been specified without any
regard to the fact whether any such port was in State 
uA,f or State MBM .^ Starke J. did not express any 
opinion on this issue. It is rather doubtful about 
Rich J.1s opinion, but from what he said in Cameron1s 
Case2, it could be inferred that he impliedly favoured 
Isaacs J.*s reasoning, Dixon J. did not think it nec­
essary to explain "part of a State1', as the case, in his 
opinion, did not depend upon this issue. But the other 
view was fully supported and further explained by Evatt 
J. who saw in the licensing system giving a tangible 
advantage and furnishing an incentive or facility solely 
by reference to the locality of the place of engagement 
as a result of a deliberate selection only of six ports 
±1 four States^. In such a state of affairs it could
hardly be said that Isaacs J.Ts reasoning received an
Li-express approval of the High Court •
1
Ibid., at p. 70^.
2
(1923) 32 C.L.R. 68, at p. 79.
3
(1935) 5^ C.L.R. 657, at pp. 700, 701. Cf. Evatt J. in 
Moran v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1939) 
61 C.L.R. 735,(H.C.), at p. 7Ö1.
Perhaps the better opinion is that the majority view in 
R. V. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. ^1, is still good law.
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If Latham C.J.1 s reasoning based upon the thesis 
propounded by Isaacs J. is accepted, then the scope of 
avoiding the prohibition is enlarged by giving preferenc­
es or creating discriminations on the basis of electoral 
divisions or municipal areas or such other demarcations, 
and the whole purpose of providing such prohibitions could 
be frustrated. In reply, Latham C.J. argued that the
opposite view was also open to substantially the same
1objection . But that is true in every case without 
caring for what interpretation is given to a particular 
prohibitions. The question is which interpretation 
carries further the purpose and fulfils substantially 
the role to be played by the prohibition in the wider 
context. Certainly Latham C.J.xs reasoning, as compared 
to the other view, makes the protection of s.99 and s.5*1 (if) 
largely illusory.
Dixon J. in his dissent said that in specifying the 
chief ports in each of the four States a course was 
taken which must be considered as affecting each of those 
States as a whole and in doing so, those States were 
preferred over others. This conclusion was based upon 
the fact that for the most part, that trade was done from
T
Elliott v. Commonwealth and Another (1935) 55 C.L.R.657, at p. 675.
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th e  p o r t s  p r e s c r i b e d  i n  e ach  of  th e  f o u r  S t a t e s  m e n t io n e d ,  
e . g . ,  i n  New South  Wales f rom Sydney and N e w c a s t l e ”' .
Such r e a s o n i n g  i s  b a s e d  l a r g e l y  on q u e s t i o n s  of  f a c t .
So i t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  i f  Latham C . J .  r e a c h e d  the  oppos­
i t e  c o n c l u s i o n .  F o r  exam ple ,  i n  New South  W ales ,  he 
o b s e r v e d  t h a t  some t r a d e  to  and from s o u t h e r n  New South  
Wales p a s s e d  th r o u g h  M elbourne ,  and t h a t  some t r a d e  from 
n o r t h e r n  New S o u th  Wales p a s s e d  th r o u g h  B r i s b a n e  and ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  the  S t a t e  of  New South  Wales c o u ld  n o t  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  Sydney or N e w c a s t l e .  T h is  a p p ro a ch  l e a d s  
t o  a n o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n  as  to  th e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  e v id e n c e  to  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  such  an i n q u i r y .
IV
As m en t io n ed  e a r l i e r ,  the  word 1 r e v e n u e 3 i n  s . 9 9  
h as  become i n s i g n i f i c a n t  b e c a u se  of the  o v e r l a p p i n g  b e t ­
ween s . 5 1 ( i i )  and s .9 9 ?  and th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e  
i s  v i r t u a l l y  c o n f i n e d  to  laws or  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t r a d e  
and commerce. But  does i t  mean t h a t  the  o p e r a t i o n  of  
s . 9 9  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  laws or  r e g u l a t i o n s  a u t h o r i s e d  o n ly  by
s . 5 H i )  j or  a p p l i e s  t o  o t h e r  laws or r e g u l a t i o n s  which
_
I b i d . ,  a t  p . 6 8 2 .  T h is  o b s e r v a t i o n  may n o t  be c o n fu s e d  
w i t h  what  he s a i d  a b o u t  * p r e f e r e n c e * . A s s o c i a t i n g  th e  
p o r t s  a s  a f f e c t i n g  e ac h  of  th e  S t a t e s  a s  a whole i s  a 
d i f f e r e n t  i s s u e  a l t o g e t h e r .
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can be supported under other legislative powers having 
an effect upon or in relation to trade and commerce? In 
Morgan v. Commonwealth  ^, it was decided that the section 
should be read as applying to laws which could be made 
only under the power conferred by s.51(i). Certain 
regulations made under the National Security Act were 
challenged on the ground that they infringed the prohi­
bition contained ins.99« As the regulations were made 
under the defence power, i.e, s.51(vi) and could not be 
justified under s.51(i) as trade and commerce legisla­
tion, it was contended by the defendants that s.99 had no 
application to laws made under the defence powr or any 
power other than contained in s.51(i). The High Court 
accepted the contention and held in favour of the 
defendants.
It was argued that the circumstance that the Common­
wealth Parliament had no power to make laws with respect 
to trade and commerce between parts of the same State 
and also that the prohibition of preference did not 
purport to deal with preferences between parts of the 
same State, shows a connection between s.51(i) and s.99;
i
(I9V7) 7*+ C.L.R. 1+21.
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and t h a t  such  a c o n n e c t i o n  was a b s e n t  be tw een  s . 9 9  and 
o t h e r  powers r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  s .51 u n d e r  which  law s m igh t  
be p a s s e d  a f f e c t i n g  t r a d e  and commerce n o t  on ly  i n t e r ­
s t a t e ,  b u t  a l s o  i n t r a - S t a t e .  T h e i r  Honours. Latham C . J .  , 
D ix o n , McTiernan and W i l l i a m s  J J . , e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  " i f  
s . 9 9  were c o n s t r u e d  as  a p p ly i n g  to  a l l  law s  a f f e c t i n g  
t r a d e  and commerce p a s s e d  und e r  any of  th e  powers  con­
t a i n e d  i n  S . 51 ) i n c l u d i n g  the  d e fe n c e  power,  t h e r e  would
1
be an u n e x p l a i n e d  gap as  t o  i n t r a - S t a t e  p r e f e r e n c e s ' 1 •
Such an a rgum ent  i s  e q u a l l y  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  th e  p r o h i b i t i o n  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  s * 92 , o r  p e r h a p s  w i t h  g r e a t e r  f o r c e ,  as  the  
words "among th e  S t a t e s "  which  a r e  sb sen t  i n  s . 9 9 j  occu r
p
i n  b o t h  s .92  and s , 5 1 ( i )  • Ye t  th e  U n e x p l a i n e d  g a p 1 as  
t o  i n t r a - S t a t e  t r a d e  and commerce was n e v e r  t h o u g h t  of 
i n  th e  c ase  of  s . 92 .
F u r t h e r  t h e i r  Honours  t h o u g h t  i t  r e m a r k a b le  to  
e x te n d  the  o p e r a t i o n  of  s . 9 9  to  s . 51( v i )  " a t  a t ime 
p o s s i b l y  of  th e  most  c r i t i c a l  t h r e a t  to  n a t i o n a l  e x i s t e n c e " 3 ,
T
I b i d . , a t  p .  h 5 3 «
2
The word i n t e r c o u r s e *  o c c u r r i n g  i n  s . 9 2  may be an ob­
s t a c l e  i n  such  a r e a s o n i n g ,  b u t ,  as  Dixon C . J .  e x p l a i n e d  
i n  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  Airways v .  Commonwealth (195-5)
71 C.L.R.  2 9 5 a t  p .  83 ) i t  i s  of  no s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  i t  may 
be o v e r lo o k e d  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  b r o a d e r  i s s u e s .
3
(195-7) 75- C .L.R.  5-21, a t  p .  5-53.
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but no such danger or threat was envisaged in the appli- 
cation of s.92 . It is hard to explain this distinction, 
leaving aside the question of the desirability of such 
considerations, in spite of the fact that in both cases 
the approach is that of formal construction of the words 
or expressions provided therein.
If s.99 applies only to laws made with respect to 
the subject matter contained in s.5*1(1) , trade and 
commerce with other countries and among the States, it 
becomes necessary, before s.99 could be applied, to de­
termine whether the law is such a law. Moreover the words
“with respect to“ include the authority to make laws which
2are also incidental or ancillary to the subject-matter , 
and therefore the scope of the prohibition contained in 
s«99 is extended to all matters that are incidental or 
ancillary to trade and commerce with other countries and 
among the States. In contrast, such an idea has been 
rejected as fallacious in the case of s.92, whose opera­
tion is confined to an IessentialI of inter-State trade, 
commerce and intercourse^. Thus what matters in the
T
See Gratwich v. Johnson (1945) 70 C.L.R. 1.2
See Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955)
93 C.L.R. 55, at p. 77.
3See e.g., Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd, 
supra.
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application of s.99 is the *substance* of the legislation^,
while in the case of s.92, it is the *essence* of inter-
2State activity to which the legislation applies • For 
example, a law prohibits the manufacture or production 
of a commodity. Its 1 substance1 falls within the legis­
lative power conferred by s.51(i)j and therefore, it is 
within the scope of the prohibition provided in s.99- On 
the other hand, it would escape the prohibition of s.92 
unless it is 1 circuitous means* or *concealed design* 
legislation, because it operates by reference to or in 
consequence of something not forming part of trade, 
commerce and intercourse among the States, and having no 
element or attribute essential to that conception.
Further our maxim finds its application in both 
cases, s.99 and s.92. But if a law, under the guise of 
preferring something which is not trade and commerce, 
gives preference to what is prohibited by s.99? it is the 
rule in Barger*s Case that would operate. On the other 
hand, if a law impairs the freedom of inter-State trade,
commerce and intercourse by *circuitous means* or
_
Morgan v. Commonwealth (l9*+7) 7^ C.L.R. k2l, at p. k53 •
2
Grannal v. Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd, supra, at 
pp. 78j 79; Hughes and Yale Pty Ltd v. New South Wales 
(No.2) (1955) 93 C.L.R. 127, at p. 161.
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Tconcealed design1, there must be certain circumstances 
to show a connection between the activity, intra-State 
or an incident of inter-State activity, restricted or 
burdened by the law and the inter-State activity sought
ito be protected by s.92 • It further depends upon the
2nature of the restriction or burden imposed . Yet 
purpose is relevant in both the cases, though in case of 
s092 in a much restricted sense.
1
See Wragg v. New South Wales (1953 ) 88 C.L.R. 353•
See e.g., Fish Board v. Paradiso (1956) 95 C.L.R. M+3.
2
CHAPTER X
Section 116 of the Australian Constitution
•1S•116 is provided in the form of a *fundamental 
right1 *3 * guaranteed to a citizen, and operates as a pro­
hibition on the Commonwealth and not on any State, It 
is concerned in general with the policy of religious 
toleration and non-intervention in religious affairs, 
and restrains the Commonwealth from establishing any 
religion, or imposing any religious observance, or pro­
hibiting the free exercise of any religion, or requiring 
the religious test as a qualification for any office or 
public trust.
Although the Commonwealth has no express power under 
the Constitution to make laws with respect to the subject
1
The section runs thus: MThe Commonwealth shall not make
any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing
any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office or public
trust under the Commonwealth,11
For general discussion of s.116, refer to Cumbrae-Stewart,
Section 116 of the Constitution,20 Aust. L. J. (l9*+6) 207;
Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in
Australia, (2nd ed.), at pp. 176-102.
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of religion, it was thought necessary to prevent such an 
implication arising out of the recognition of Almighty 
God in the Preamble by specifically providing s.116^. 
''Accordingly no law can escape the application of s.116 
simply because it is a law which can be justified under 
ss.51 or 52, or under some other legislative power. All 
the legislative powers of the Commonwealth are subject to
pthe condition which s.116 imposes” •
In order to determine whether there has been a
violation of the religious freedom. Latham C.J., in the
Jehovahfs Witnesses Case^ observed that the purpose of the
legislation might properly be taken into account. That
case involved the constitutional validity of the
National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations
and an Order in Council made thereunder, declaring that
the existence, inter alia, of the organisation known as
JehovahTs Witnesses was prejudicial to the defence of the
Commonwealth and the efficient prosecution of the war.
_
Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth. C"l 901) at p. 951 •2
.Adelaide Company of Jehovah*s Witnesses Inc, v• Common­
wealth (I9k3) 67 C.L.R. 116. at p. 123. p e r Latham C.J.
3
(1953) 67 C.L.R. 116, at p. 132.
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The Association of JehovahTs Witnesses was a religious 
sect professing primitive Christian beliefs and 
preaching to overthrow all the satanic governments 
including the British Commonwealth of Nations, but not 
engaging in overt hostile acts. One of the contentions 
put forward by the plaintiff Association was that the 
Regulations infringed s.116. But the High Court did 
not accept that contention.
Referring to the history of mankind and different 
ideologies propounded by various religions, Latham C.J. 
emphasised the fact that the religious belief and prac­
tice could not absolutely be separated either from 
politics or from ethics and there might appear incon­
sistency between political purposes and religious 
principles. However, if a law provides a measure 
necessary to preserve the very existence of the State, 
say during wartime, it would not be unconstitutional 
as interfering with the individual religious freedom, 
because the very existence of a State presupposes an 
ordered society and ’‘assumes that citizens of all 
religions can be good citizens” otherwise the protection 
of liberty as a social right within a State at the cost 
of the existence of that State would be meaningless and
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ineffective . in the same vein, Williams J. explained:
If the Regulations only conferred such powers 
as were reasonably required to prevent bodies 
disseminating principles and doctrines prejudicial 
to the defence of the Commonwealth during the war, 
they could not be impeached under s.116, even if 
they interfered incidentally with activities that 
some persons in the community considered to be 
the free exercise of religion, because in its 
popular sense such principles and doctrines would 
not be considered to be religion, but subversive 
activities carried on under the cloak of 
religion2 3.
For the same reason in Krygger v. Williams « it was held
that a person who was forbidden by the doctrines of his
religion to bear arms was not thereby exempted or excused
from undergoing the military training and rendering the
personal service required by the provisions of the Defence
Act I903-I9IO. ’’To require a man to do a thing which
has nothing at aH to do with religion is not prohibiting
him from a free exercise of religion. It may be that a
law requiring a man to do an act which his religion
forbids would be objectionable on moral grounds, but it
.4does not come within the prohibition of s.116 .
1
Ibid., at pp. 126, 131.
2
Ibid., at pp. 160, 161.
3
(1912) 15 C.L.R. 366.
4-
Ibid., at p. 369* See also Adelaide Company of Jehovah1s 
Witnesses Inc, v. Commonwealth, supra, at p. 161, Cf.
Judd v. Mckeon (1926) 38 C.L.R. 380, at p. 387 per 
Higgins J.
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I n  1956 th e  M enz ie s -F ad d en  government  d e c i d e d  t o  
g iv e  f i n a n c i a l  a s i s t a n c e  to  p r i v a t e  s c h o o l s  i n  the  Aus­
t r a l i a n  C a p i t a l  T e r r i t o r y ,  most of which  were c o n d u c te d  
hy or i n  a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h  r e l i g i o u s  d e n o m i n a t i o n s .  The 
a s s i s t a n c e  was i n  t h e  form of r e im b u rse m e n t  o f  i n t e r e s t  
on c a p i t a l  borrow ed  f o r  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and e x t e n s i o n  o f  
s c h o o l  buildings'^ . Though the  a s s i s t a n c e  was r e c e i v e d  by 
Roman C a t h o l i c s  and A n g l i c a n  s c h o o l s  i n  t h a t  way, no 
l e g a l  a c t i o n  f o l l o w e d  from o t h e r  s e c t i o n s ,  such  as  P r o t -
p
e s t a n t  r e l i g i o u s  i n t e r e s t s  opposed t o  such  p o l i c i e s .
1
R e f e r  to  the  E s t i m a t e s  i n  th e  Budge t  g a b le d  on 3 S e p t ­
ember 1957} a t  p . 1 5 2 ,  und e r  d i v i s i o n  N0.28O, p a r a g r a p h  
D, i t e m  11.
2
A p a r t  f rom  th e  n e c e s s i t y  of  s t r e t c h i n g  th e  i n t e r p r e t a t ­
i o n  of  uany laws f o r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  any r e l i g i o n 11 i n  s .1 1 6  
t o  the  r e l e v a n t  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  Act  i n  i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  fo rm ,  
t h e r e  i s  some c o n f l i c t  of  o p i n i o n  i n  d e c i s i o n s  and d i c t a  
as  t o  w h e th e r  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  C a p i t a l  T e r r i t o r y  i s  g o v e rn ­
ed u n d e r  s . 5 1 ( i )  o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  ( r e l a t i n g  to  th e  s e a t  
of  governm ent)  or  u n d e r  s . 1 2 2  ( r e l a t i n g  to  F e d e r a l  T e r r ­
i t o r i e s ) ,  or  p e r h a p s  und e r  b o t h :  see  Ewens, MWhere i s
th e  S e a t  o f  Governm ent?1 2* (1951) 25 A u s t .  L . J .  532.
B e f o r e  the  d e c i s i o n  i n  Lamshed v .  Lake [1958] A .L .R .3 8 8 , 
th e  p r e p o n d e r a n t  a u t h o r i t y  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  und e r  s .122  
and p o s s i b l y  und e r  s . 5 1 ( i ) j  P a r l i a m e n t  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  
su c h  t e r r i t o r i e s  was c o m p le t e ly  s o v e r e i g n  and untram el led  
by th e  v a r i o u s  p r o h i b i t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  i n  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  
su ch  as s . 1 1 6 .  B u t  i n  Lamshed v .  Lake ,  s u p r a , t h o u g h  the  
C o u r t  was c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  th e  g e n e r a l  r e l a t i o n  of  F e d e r a l  
T e r r i t o r i e s  to  th e  F e d e r a l  sys tem  and n o t  w i t h  s . 1 1 6 , 
t h e  m a j o r i t y  h e l d  t h a t  g e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  s .122  s h o u ld  
be r e g a r d e d  as  an  i n t e g r a l  p a r t  of  th e  sys tem  and n o t  as  
som eth ing  s t a n d i n g  o u t s i d e  i t .  Dixon C . J .  e x p r e s s l y  
s a i d  t h a t  s . 1 2 2  was s u b j e c t  t o  s . 1 1 6 ,  a t  p . 3 9 2 .
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But such an aid to religious schools raises an important 
issue similar to one which Became a matter of controversy 
in the United States, in whose Constitution religious
freedom is guaranteed to the citizens in the First
■1Amendment1 as a restriction upon the Federal government, 
and later extended to the States hy reason of its inclu­
sion in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
pment .
In the United States it has Become a practice to 
provide various services and Benefits in the form of 
free text-books, free medical service, or free lunches to 
children attending public schools where no religious 
education is given, and this is corstitutional so long as 
the attendance of children at such schools is not made 
compulsory^. But can these services and Benefits be
1
It runs: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer­
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech; or of 
the Press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances".
2
Just as the freedom of speech and of press have come to 
be regarded as a part of the liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, so too has the freedom of religion: 
Cantwell v. Connecticut (194-0) 310 U. S. 296. Also refer 
to Lovell v. Griffin (1938) 303 U. S. 4-4-4-; Schnieder v. 
Irvington (State) (1939) 308 U. S. 14-7.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510.
3
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extended to children attending private and parochial
schools? It was held in Cochran v. Louisiana State Board
•1of Education1 2 that the State could validly provide free 
text-hooks to all children attending schools including 
private and parochial schools It was explained that in 
doing so it was not the schools which were the beneficiar­
ies of these appropriations, but the school children and
pthe State alone .
A more difficult problem arise in Everson v. Board 
of Education^ where the appellant as a taxpayer challeng­
ed the action of a local school board in reimbursing 
parents the cost of transporting their children by bus 
to schools, including parochial schools, on the ground 
that it was an infringement of the Hrst Amendment 
against establishment of religion made applicable to the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, It was held by a 
majority of five to four that the reimbursement of the 
bus fares to the children going to parochial schools was
1
(1930)  281 U.S. 370  (Cochran*s Case).
2
Ibid., at p. 375* However, the plaintiff objected as a 
taxpayer whose money was being taken away for a private 
purpose, i.e., other than a public use, but did not 
raise the point of establishment of religion. The freedom 
of religion as a limitation upon the States was not 
established till then.
(194-7) 330  U .S .  1 ( E v e r s o n * s  C a s e ) .
3
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valid and did not constitute an infringement of the 
First Amendment. The majority opinion was based mainly 
on the principle enunciated in Cochranes Case that the 
reimbursement was an aid to the school-going children and 
not to the religion.
There was no difference of opinion in that the 
States were forbidden to extend aid to religion directly 
or indirectly, and all the members of the Supreme Court 
spoke of the erection of a wall be tween church and State, 
but disagreed whether in this particular case religion 
was being aided. Mr Justice Black, speaking for the 
majority said: "The State contributes no money to the 
schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as 
applied, does no more than provide a general program to 
help parents get their children, regardless of their 
religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited 
schools" . On the other hand, the minority opinion 
appeared to be very forceful and equally convincing. Mr 
Justice Jackson dissenting referred to the historic 
conflict in temporal policy between the Catholic church 
and non-Catholics and its relativ importance in the field 
of education, and pointed out that the basic fallacy in 
1
Ibid, at p. 18.
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the Court*s reasoning was in ignoring the essentially 
religious test by which beneficiaries of that expenditure 
were selected. He said that ltthe effect of the religious 
freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every 
form of propagation of religion out of the realm of 
things which could directly or indirectly be made public
business and thereby be supported in whole or in part
■1at taxpayers expense” . Once these religious schools
have receive! aid directly or indirectly, it is likely
that at some stage they might find that it carried
political strings with it, while l#it was intended not
only to keep the States* hands out of religion, but to
keep religion*s hands off the state, and, above all, to
keep bitter religious controversy out of public life by
denying to every denomination any advantage from getting
2control of public policy or the public purse” • Mr 
Justice Rutledge, with whom Mr Justice Frankfurter, Mr 
Justice Jackson and Mr Justice Burton agreed, said that 
what mattered was that funds taken from one through taxa­
tion were not to be used or given to support, in fact and 
1
Ibid., at p.26. By directly or indirectly, he meant 
whether the beneficiary of that expenditure of tax-raised 
funds was primarily the parochial school and incidentally 
the pupil, or whether the aid was directly bestowed on 
the pupil with indirect benefits to the school: at p.24-.
2
Ibid., at pp. 26, 27.
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not as a legal conclusion. anotherIs religious training 
or belief5 and for that matter their use did in fact 
give aid and encouragement to religious instruction - an 
aid to the children in a substantial way to get the very 
thing which they were sent to the particular school to 
secure, namely, religious training and teaching.
Though the dissent in Everson*s Case is strong, it 
is likely that it may not be accepted in Australia. But 
financial assistance to schools for their building 
programme appears to be more obviously inconsistent 
with non-establishment of religion than the facts involved 
in Eversonts Case, because the assistance in the former 
case is given directly to the schools and the 1 child 
benefit theory1 would be hard to apply.
Although in English history "establishment” has been 
associated mainly with the policy of giving a particular 
church some sort of monopoly as against other churches, 
it was the aspect of aiding a particular church at the 
expense of taxes levied on adherent and non-adherent 
alike that seemed most odious to the members of the 
United States Supreme Court. At the same time this 
aspect has not been neglected in the English history of 
disestablishment. Hence at first sight it might seem
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s t r e t c h i n g  the  meaning of  " e s t a b l i s h i n g "  to  m one ta ry  
a s s i s t a n c e ,  h u t  i t  h a s  s u b s t a n t i a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  from 
th e  s o c i a l  h i s t o r y  of  th e  m a t t e r .
i
Mr J u s t i c e  F r a n k f u r t e r  i n  Murdock v .  P e n n s y l v a n ia  
s a i d  t h a t  "A t a x  c an  be a means f o r  r a i s i n g  r e v e n u e ,  or 
a d e v i c e  f o r  reg u la t in g  c o n d u c t ,  o r  b o t h '1. S i m i l a r l y ,  an  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  t a x  l e v i e d  and c o l l e c t e d  from p e r s o n s  
g e n e r a l l y  may be u se d  as  an  a i d  t o  r e l i g i o u s  s c h o o l s ,  
b u t  " i f  the  s t a t e  may a i d  t h e s e  r e l i g i o u s  s c h o o l s ,  i t  
may t h e r e f o r e  r e g u l a t e  them "^.  Thus th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i l y  
o f  a s t a t u t e  p r o v i d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  s c h o o l s  
o r  p r i v a t e  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  i n  w h a te v e r  fo rm ,  would depend 
upon i t s  r e a l  p u r p o s e  and i f  i t  i s  som eth ing  o t h e r  t h a n  
*e s t a b l i s h i n g  any r e l i g i o n 1 or *im pos ing  any r e l i g i o u s  
o b s e r v a n c e 1 or  1p r o h i b i t i n g  th e  f r e e  e x e r c i s e  of any 
r e l i g i o n * ,  s .1 1 6  of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  may be a p p l i c a b l e  i n  
A u s t r a l i a .
However, a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  e a r l i e r ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t i o n  power t h e r e  i s  a l s o  the  p ro b lem  of  l o c u s  
s t a n d i , i . e . ,  how th e  e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  t o  be c h a l l e n g e d  i n
T~
(1953)  319 U.S. 105, a t  p .  135.
E v e r s o n  v .  Board  of  E d u c a t i o n , s u p r a . a t  p .  27 .
2
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judicial proceedings. The High Court has adopted a 
somewhat restrictive attitude towards permitting private 
persons to challenge government activities; it requires 
those activities to impinge in a direct and immediate 
sense on legal rights or privileges of the person object­
ing,, It is a well-settled doctrine that merely being a
taxpayer does not supply a sufficient interest to enable
1a person to challenge a federal appropriation law .
Ill
S.116 is a prohibition against the Commonwealth 
legislating with respect to religion. In other words, it 
expressly negatives the conferring of a power with res­
pect to religion on the Commonwealth Parliament. Thus 
it is not a constitutional prohibition in the sense that 
like s.92 it restricts or limits the exercise of a legis­
lative power. This factor explains the difference in 
approaches to s.116 and s.92 in their construction.
If the law is not with respect to religion there is 
no question of an infringement of s.116. On the other 
hand, s.92 does not deal with the conferring 
1
Anderson v. Commonwealth (1932) V7 C.L.R. 50»
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of  o r  t a k i n g  away of  a l e g i s l a t i v e  power,  b u t  p u t s  a 
l i m i t a t i o n  upon th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power of the  Commonwealth 
and th e  S t a t e s ,  so t h a t  th e y  m ig h t  n o t  i m p a i r  the  f reedom  
of i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e , commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e .  Hence,  
i n  d e t e r m i n i n g  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a law on g rounds  of  s .92  
i t  i s  th e  a s c e r t a i n m e n t  o f  l e s s e n c e 1 and O c c i d e n t '  o f  the  
a c t i v i t y  i n v o l v e d ,  n o t  th e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  of th e  law ,  
t h a t  becomes r e l e v a n t .
However,  i t  may be n o t i c e d  t h a t  though  t h e r e  i s  a 
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p h r a s e o l o g y  of  th e  two s e c t i o n s ,  t h e  f r e e ­
doms g u a r a n t e e d  t h e r e i n  have  b e e n  i n t e r p r e t e d  s u b j e c t  to  
th e  c o n c e p t  of o r d e r e d  s o c i e t y  i n v o l v i n g  t h e i r  r e g u l a t i o n  
w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  l i m i t a t i o n s .  S .116 d e n i e s  the  e x e r c i s e  
of  power w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r e l i g i o n ,  b u t  i t  does n o t  mean 
a c o m p le te  d e n i a l  so t h a t  a law c a n n o t  to u c h  upon 
r e l i g i o u s  m a t t e r s  a t  a l l .  I f  a law i s  made w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  any o t h e r  l e g i t i m a t e  power and y e t  i n t e r f e r e s  w i t h  
r e l i g i o n  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  i t  would n o t  be an  i n f r i n g e m e n t  
o f  s . 1 1 6 .  S i m i l a r l y  a law im pos ing  a r e s t r i c t i o n  or  
b u r d e n  or  l i a b i l i t y  by r e f e r e n c e  to  an  1i n c i d e n t 1 , n o t  
E s s e n c e ® ,  of  an i n t e r - S t a t e  a c t i v i t y  would n o t  be an  
i n f r i n g e m e n t  of  s . 9 2 .  However,  i n  b o t h  c a s e s  a law would 
be s u b j e c t  t o  th e  o p e r a t i o n  of ou r  maxim.
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It is true that our maxim is applicable in so far 
as a law under the guise of dealing with respect to some 
legitimate power does not deal with respect to religion, 
and thereby infringe s.116. But normally proper charac­
terisation of a law would take care of the maxim because 
what matters is the purpose with respect to which the 
inquiry is to be made. For example, in the Jehovah1s 
Witnesses Case. Latham C.J. said: uThe court will
therefore have the responsibility of determining whether 
a particular law can fairly be regarded as a law to 
protect the existence of the community, or whether, on 
the other hand, it is a law xfor prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion®. The word *for® shows that 
the purpose of the legislation in question may properly 
be taken into account in determining whether or not it 
is a law of the prohibited character"^.
(19+3) 67 C.L.R. 116, at p. 132.
1
CHAPTER XI
Section 117 of the Australian Constitution
S.117 is a limitation imposed upon the legislative
2power of the Commonwealth and the States, forbidding 
them to discriminate between persons on the ground of 
residence in another State. Its object is "to secure 
equality of treatment, in all the States, for subjects of 
the Queen resident in any State of the Commonwealth"^, aid 
to create a status for subjects to "occupy a broader and 
more dignified relationship in his membership of the 
great federated community"1*. Thus "whatever privileges 
are conferred upon residents of a State by its laws are 
to be taken to be equally conferred upon residents of 
other States, and that every enactment conferring such
1
It runs: "A subject of the Queen, resident in any State,
shall not be subject in any other State to any other 
disability or discrimination which would not be equally 
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen 
resident in such other State".
2
See Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in 
Australia (2nd ed.), at p. 1A9.
3
Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth, (1901) at p. 960.
Ibid., at p. 955•
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privileges is to be construed as including residents of
iother States" .
The basis of prevention of discrimination by s.117
is Residence1 and a person can invoke the section only
2on grounds of Residence1 in another State . If there is 
discrimination between a resident of a State and those not 
resident in that State but resident in some other State, 
it would be a valid ground for avoidance of the law 
unless they are put on the same footing as the resident 
in that State. This is a provision capable of evasion 
by tdevices1 and capable of protection by the ready 
application of our maxim.
The word Residence1 may be used in many senses, and 
the difficulty might arise as to which type is to be 
assumed as the basis of discrimination. Griffith C.J. 
in Davies and Jones v. Western Australia^, said: "I think 
it must be used distributively, as applying to any kind 
of residence which a State may attempt to make a basis 
of discrimination, so that, whatever that kind may be,
1
Davies and Jones v. Western Australia (1904) 2 C.L.R.
29, at p. 38.
2
See Lee Fay v.Vincent (1909) 7 C.L.R. 389, at p. 392.
(1904) 2 C.L.R. 29, at p. 39.
3
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the fact of residence of the same kind in another State 
entitles the person of whom it can he predicted to claim 
the privilege attempted to he conferred hy the State law 
upon its own residents of that class1'. It suggests that 
there are different kinds of 1 residence1 depending, of 
course, upon the duration of stay or degree of permanency 
in a State, but in the absence of any reference to it 
in the section, it might be inferred that all kinds of 
Residence1 except mere casual presence, could become 
the basis of discrimination.
Can a discrimination on grounds of ldomicilel be a 
discrimination on grounds of *residence*? In Davies and 
Jones v. Western Australia, it was held in the negative. 
That case involved the Western Australian Administration 
Act 19035 which provided for the payment of succession 
duty according to certain rules, but provided further 
that in respect of beneficial interest passing to persons 
bona fide residents of and domiciled in Western Australia 
and occupying towards the deceased person a certain 
relationship, duty should be payable at half the usual 
rates. One Mr A.E. Davies, one (f the executors of Mr 
E.W. Davies, deceased, who was a bona fide resident of
and domiciled in Queensland and occupied towards the
37*+.
d e c e a s e d  the  r e q u i s i t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  when c a l l e d  upon to  
pay the  d u ty  a t  t h e  u s u a l  r a t e s ,  the  p l a i n t i f f s  
( e x e c u t o r s )  c l a im e d  the  same c o n c e s s i o n  as  th e  one a v a i l ­
a b le  to  a p e r s o n  bona f i d e  r e s i d e n t  of and d o m ic i l e d  i n  
W es te rn  A u s t r a l i a  w i t h i n  the  meaning of  s .117•  The 
c l a im  was r e j e c t e d  on th e  ground  t h a t  th e  b a s i s  o f  d i s c r i m ­
i n a t i o n  p r e s c r i b e d  by the  Act  was ^ d o m i c i l e 1 , and n o t  
R e s i d e n c e 1 , and c o n s e q u e n t l y  i t  was n o t  a d i s c r i m i r h : i o n  
as  be tw een  r e s i d e n t s  of  W es te rn  A u s t r a l i a  and o t h e r s ,  b u t  
as  be tw een  p e r s o n s  h a v in g  t h e i r  l e g a l  d o m ic i l e  i n  W e s te rn  
A u s t r a l i a  and o t h e r s .
The 1 d o m i c i l e 1 of a p e r s o n ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  i s  the  c o u n t r y  
which  i s ,  i n  f a c t  or  c o n s i d e r e d  by law, to  be h i s  perm an­
e n t  home, and th e  c o n c e p t  of home h as  a d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p  w i t h  xr e s i d e n c e t • D o m ic i le  would o r d i n a r i l y ,  b u t  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  im ply  R e s i d e n c e 1 , and any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  
on the  ground of  1 d o m ic i le *  c o u ld  imply  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on 
th e  ground of  R e s i d e n c e 1 . Thus th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  
xd o m i c i l e x and xr e s i d e n c e x f o r  p u r p o s e s  o f  s .117 a p p e a r s  
to  be s u p e r f i c i a l ,  or  r a t h e r  a r t i f i c i a l ,  and th e  d e c i s i o n  
i n  D av ies  and Jo n e s  v .  W es te rn  A u s t r a l i a  m ig h t  w e l l  have
1
See C h e s h i r e ,  C o n f l i c t  of  Laws ( 6 t h  e d . )  a t  p .  77»
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been  o th e w is e  .
The p u rp o se  of  s . 1 1 7  was t o  p r o t e c t  an i m p o r t a n t  
a s p e c t  of f e d e r a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  i . e . ,  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e  S t a t e s  
f rom fo m en t in g  d i s u n i t y  by d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  laws t e n d i n g  to
Up
pro d u ce  a c o n g e r i e s  of  " S t a t e  c i t i z e n s  , However, by 
g i v i n g  a na r row  and t e c h n i c a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  to  1 2r e s i d e n c e 1 
t h i s  p u rp o se  a p p e a r s  t o  have b e en  f r u s t r a t e d ,  as  und e r  
th e  g u i s e  of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  a g a i n s t  a p e r s o n  on the  
b a s i s  of h i s  d o m i c i l e 1 a law c o u ld  a c h i e v e  what was 
supposed  to  be p r o h i b i t e d  by t h a t  s e c t i o n .
This  a p p ro a ch  to  s .1 1 7  i s  s i m i l a r  to  t h a t  of  1e s s e n c e l 
and 1 i n c i d e n t s 1 a p p l i c a b l e  to  t h e  f r e e d o m  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  
t r a d e ,  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e  g u a r a n t e e d  i n  s . 9 2 , f o r  
a law to  be i n v a l i d  on g ro u n d s  of  s .117 i t  must  be by 
r e f e r e n c e  to  R e s i d e n c e 1 i n  the  t e c h n i c a l  s e n s e ,  i . e . ,
1 e s s e n c e 1 of  R e s i d e n c e 1 , and must n o t  be c o n fu s e d  w i t h  
d o m i c i l e 1 o r  any o t h e r  c o n c e p t  w i t h  which  i t  o v e r l a p s  or  
has  som eth ing  i n  common. But  i t  i s  th e  s . 9 2  a p p ro a c h  
s h o r n  of  th e  f l e x i b i l i t y  p ro d u c e d  by r e a d i n e s s  t o
1
F o r  f u l l e r  d i s c u s s i o n  see  Stow, S .117 of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
(1905)  3 Commonwealth L. R e v . ,  a t  p .  97*
2
Quick and G a r r a n ,  The A n n o ta te d  C o n s t i t u t i o n  of  the  
A u s t r a l i a n  Commonwealth (1901)% a t  p .  955*
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recognise * disguised evasion*. However, with only one 
decision the doctrine cannot he regarded as finally 
settled. It is a tribute to the *friendly federal 
behaviour* of the Australian States that they appear to 
have made little use of the possibilities of abuse 
inherent in a narrow literal interpretation of s.117«
CHAPTER XII
Legislative Schemes
One of the devices used to by-pass federal con­
stitutional provisions, that has been a matter for 
discussion before the courts, is the "legislative scheme" 
consisting of two or more Acts enacted by one Parliament 
alone, or by two Parliaments or more (usually the 
federal Parliament and two or more State or Provincial 
ones). Such schemes raise controversial questions of 
substance and form because the enactments when consider­
ed by themselves are usually within the powers of the 
legislature concerned, but when the scheme as a whole is 
examined - by reference to its purpose disclosed by the 
inter-connection of the enactments or otherwise - it is 
seen to achieve something which could not be achieved 
in a single Act (if one Parliament is concerned), or 
by one Parliament acting alone (if two or more Parliaments 
are concerned). Thus the problem is posed whether the 
validity of the scheme is to be examined as a whole by 
reference to its purpose, without caring for the validity
377
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of the scheme examined as a whole hy reference to its 
purpose, or whether the validity of the enactments is to 
be examined individually but by reference to the purpose 
of the scheme. If the purpose of the scheme is relevant 
either in the examination of the scheme as a whole or of 
the enactments individually, the further question arises 
whether the courts could call for evidence in order to 
form an opinion as to the validity of the purpose itself. 
If the validity of the enactments is not tested by 
reference to the scheme, it becomes apparent that 
"legislative schemes" could be so devised as to achieve 
a purpose which could not be achieved directly by 
legislatures acting within their constitutional powers. 
These are the questions which came up for discussion 
before the courts.
II
Moran1s Case
In 1938 pursuant to a conference attended by rep­
resentatives of the Commonwealth and all the States, a 
scheme was evolved to ensure to wheat growers a payable
1
Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (N.S.W.) v.
Moran (1939) SI C.L.R. 735j on appeal to the Privy Council 
Moran v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (19^ +0)
63 C. L.R. 338 (P.C.), LI9HOJ A.C. 838.
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price for wheat throughout Australia; special treatment 
was given to Tasmania due to the special circumstance 
that it was the only State importing most of its wheat 
from other States. The scheme as a whole was contained 
in six Commonwealth Acts which imposed taxes on wheat 
and flour, provided for their assessment and collection, 
and directed the payment of the proceeds to the States, 
and in State Acts which provided for payment of these 
grants to wheatgrowers by way of subsidy or assistance.
In the case of Tasmania, however, the Commonwealth grant 
included an additional amount substantially the same as 
the amount of tax raised in Tasmania, and a Tasmanian 
Act provided for the distribution of this additional 
grant amongst payers of the tax on flour consumed in that 
State. The result of the scheme was explained by Latham 
C.J., thus:
A Federal excise duty is imposed upon flour which 
is paid upon the same basis by persons in all 
the States. The proceeds of the duty go into 
the Federal Consolidated Revenue. An equivalent 
sum is then taken from the consolidated revenue 
and is paid by the Commonwealth by way of finan­
cial assistance to the States of the Commonwealth, 
upon condition that the States apply the moneys in 
the assistance and relief of wheat growers. In 
the case of Taarania, however, a special grant is 
made by the Commonwealth which is not subject to 
any Federal statutory conditions, but which, in 
fact, is applied, and which it was known would 
be applied, by the Government of Tasmania in
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p a y in g  b a ck  to  Tasmanian m i l l e r s  and o t h e r s  
n e a r l y  th e  whole  of  the  f l o u r  t a x  p a i d  by 
them i n  r e s p e c t  of f l o u r  consumed i n  
T a s m a n ia .1
I n  an a c t i o n  b r o u g h t  i n  a D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  a company, on 
b e in g  sued f o r  th e  amount of th e  t a x ,  r a i s e d  th e  d e fe n c e  
t h a t  the  t a x  was u l t r a  v i r e s  o f  th e  Commonwealth, The 
c a se  was removed t o  th e  High C o u r t  und e r  s.kO of  the  
J u d i c i a r y  Act  1903-1937} and E v a t t  J ,  r e f e r r e d  it  to  th e  
F u l l  C o u r t ,
p
The main o b j e c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  th e  scheme were  f i r s t l y  
t h a t  i t  i n v o lv e d  an i m p o s i t i o n  o f  a t a x  which i n f r i n g e d  
s . 5 1 ( i i )  o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  by d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  a g a i n s t  
th e  S t a t e s  o t h e r  t h a n  Tasmania ,  and s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  the  
payments  made to  th e  S t a t e s  were b o u n t i e s  on th e  p r o d u c ­
t i o n  or  e x p o r t  of  goods and t h e y  were n o t  u n i f o r m ,  
t h e r e b y  i n f r i n g i n g  s . 5 1 ( i ü )  o f  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  The 
High C o u r t ,  E v a t t  J ,  d i s s e n t i n g ,  h e l d  t h a t  th e  scheme 
was n o t  i n v a l i d  on any of  t h e s e  g r o u n d s .  An a p p e a l  to  
th e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  f a i l e d .
The c o n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  d e f e n d a n t s  was b a s e d  on the
1
(1939) 61 C.L.R.  735} a t  p p .  756} 757} per Latham C . J .
2
There were o t h e r  o b j e c t i o n s  b u t  th ey  a r e  n o t  i m p o r t a n t  
i n  th e  p r e s e n t  c o n t e x t .
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fact that a statute apparently valid when considered by 
itself, might nevertheless be held to be invalid if it 
were part of a scheme for achieving a prohibited purpose. 
Thus it was argued that if Tasmania1s potential taxpayers 
had simply been excluded from the payment of the tax, the 
taxing Acts would have clearly been bad because s.51(ii) 
of the Constitution prohibited such discrimination, but 
the same result was produced by collecting the tax from 
Tasmania and then paying it, or most of it, back to 
Tasmania. The majority in the High Court did not accept 
this contention. Their Honours were of the view that 
the proper way was to examine the Acts one by one and if 
each appeared not to contravene any provision of the 
Constitution, the scheme as such was valid because the 
Court was not concerned with the motives of the legislat­
ure. As Starke J. said:
The legislative bodies of the Commonwealth and 
the States were each entitled to use to the full 
the powers vested in them for the purpose of 
carrying out the scheme. Co-operation on the 
part of the Commonwealth and the States may well 
achieve objects that neither alone could achieve*, 
that is often the end and the advantage of co­
operation. The court can and ought to do no more 
than inquire whether anything has been done that -j 
is beyond power or is foibidden by the Constitution.
Thus the special treatment which was given to
(1939) 61 C.L.E. 735, at p. 775.
1
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Tasmania did not arise from any discrimination in any 
law passed by the Federal Parliament with respect to 
taxation. As regards the argument relating to the 
appropriation of money towards the desired objects by 
the Federal Parliament, it was observed that it was an 
Act appropriating money and was not with respect to 
taxation, and there was no provision in the Constitution 
to the effect that appropriation Acts must not discrimin­
ate between States, Further it was admitted that if any 
discrimination was caused, it was under the Tasmanian 
legislation which provided for payment of relief to 
Tasmanian taxpayers out of the sum paid to the government 
of Tasmania by the Commonwealth; but again it could not 
be an infringement of s.51(ii) as that section did not 
apply to the Tasmanian Parliament. "Such a law," said 
the Chief Justice, "might be open to political objection,
but no remedy could be obtained by any objection in the
•1courts" ,
Following the same logic, objections on the ground of
2s.51(iii) also failed, as the Chief Justice pointed out ,
for several reasons: (1) payments made by the Commonwealth
_
Ibid., at p. 758.
Ibid., at p. 781 .
2
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were not bounties upon the production or oqoort of goods, 
(2) a wheat grower who received payment from a State did 
not receive it in respect of wheat produced or exported 
but only in respect of wheat which he sold or delivered 
for sale, (3) every wheat grower in all the States was 
treated in the same way, as he was to receive moneys in 
proportion to the quantity of wheat sold or delivered 
for sale by him.
The Commonwealth Appropriation Acts were held to be
justified by virtue of s.96 of the Constitution which, it
was thought, enabled the Commonwealth Parlament to grant
financial assistance in a manner discriminating between
States. Starke J. said:
The Constitution in sec. 96 explicitly enacts 
that financial assistance may be granted to 
any State, which makes plain that a grant under 
this section to one or more States and not to 
others is no infringement of sec. 99 of the 
Constitution.‘
Evatt J. differed from other members of the Court and was 
of the opinion that "there has been a very thinly dis­
guised, almost a patent, breach of the provision against 
discrimination; and the especial significance of the 
present case lies in its result, which practically
Ibid., at p. 775.
i
38>+.
nullifies a great constitutional safeguard inserted to 
prevent differential treatment of Commonwealth taxpayers
solely by reference to their connection or relationship
•1with a particular State" . Agreeing with the contention 
of the defendants he said that the unconstitutional dis­
crimination would have been plainly evident if the tax­
payer, though not granted a formal exemption, was entitled 
to a refund of the tax already paid by him, the Common­
wealth providing the necessary funds from the proceeds 
of the flour tax and payment being made to the taxpayer 
by some person designated by the Commonwealth government. 
But it would amount to the same effect even though follow­
ing "the less direct but very convenient method", i.e., 
by selecting "the State of Tasmania itself as the proper 
and convenient Authority1 for the purpose of acting as 
the Commonwealth1s conduit pipe for the refund of Common­
wealth tax"2. Thus "in substance and reality", he contin­
ued, "the Commonwealth saw to it that a special section cf 
its taxpayers were granted an exemption, that exemption 
proceeding solely by reference to the benefiting of 
Tasmanian taxpayers and Tasmanian consumers'^.
1
Ibid., at p. 778.
2
Ibid.« at p. 785.
Ibid., at p. 787»3
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Evatt J. pointed out that the principle applied in 
the characterisation of a legislation, that legislation 
which at first appeared to conform to constitutional 
requirements might be void of colourable or disguised,
was equally applicable to a "legislative scheme" such as
1the one under consideration . Thus the main task was to 
pick out the purpose of the scheme, and the validity of 
enactments comprising the scheme would depend upon the 
validity of that purpose. Looking at the facts, the 
additional payment to Tasmania could not be dissociated 
"from the purpose which has been stamped upon it by the 
Commonwealth1s adherence to the scheme"^, and the taxa­
tion discrimination was not merely the result of the 
Tasmanian Act. Thus "it is the result of the combined 
operation of the Commonwealth*s imposition of flour taxes 
and the Commonwealth1s special grant to one State for the 
purpose of refunding the tax to Commonwealth taxpayers 
who are associated with that one State"3. As to s.96, 
it was said that it could not be employed for the very 
purpose of nullifying guarantees provided elsewhere in 
the Constitution^.
T
Ibid., at p. 79^-
2Ibid., at p. 80l.3Ibid., at p. 803• k
Ibid., at p. 802.
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1
On a p p e a l  , t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  r e c o g n i s e d  i n  p r i n c i p l e  
th e  v iew  a d o p te d  by E v a t t  J .  b u t  d i s a g r e e d  w i th h L s  a p p l i c a ­
t i o n  of  t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  i n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e .  T h e i r  L o r d s h ip s  
a p p ro v in g  the  p r i n c i p l e  l a i d  down i n  th e  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n
p
i n  R, v .  B a rg e r  , t h o u g h t  t h a t  where t h e r e  ms  a d m i t t e d l y  
a scheme of  p ro p o s e d  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  to  
examine the  A c ts  c o n s t i t u t i n g  the  scheme t o g e t h e r .  "The 
s e p a r a t e  p a r t s  of a m a c h in e ” } added t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s ,  "have  
l i t t l e  meaning i f  examined w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
f u n c t i o n  th ey  w i l l  d i s c h a r g e  i n  th e  m ach ine11^ .  Fo r  
exam ple ,  though  th e  Commonwealth P a r l i a m e n t  f e l t  o b l i g e d  
by s .55  of th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  to  p r o v i d e  s e p a r a t e  t a x  and 
t a x - a s s e s s m e n t  A c t s ,  a t a x a t i o n  Act  had t o  be examined 
a lo n g  w i t h  an a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o r  t a x - a s s e s s m e n t  Act a u t h o r ­
i s i n g  e x em p t io n ,  a b a t e m e n t s  o r  r e f u n d s  of  t a x  to  t a x p a y e r s  
i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  S t a t e  f o r  the  p u rp o se  of  s . 5 1 ( i i ) 5 s , 5 1 ( i i i )
or s . 9 9 )  o t h e r w i s e  i t  would be t u r n i n g  ”a b l i n d  eye to
4
the  r e a l  s u b s t a n c e  and e f f e c t  of th e  A c ts "  • But  t h e i r  
L o r d s h i p s ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  w i t h  E v a t t  J . ,  came t o  th e  c o n c l u ­
s i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  was n o t h i n g  o b j e c t i o n a b l e  i n  the  scheme
T
c l 9^0) 63 c . l . r . 338 ( P . C . ) .
2
( 1908) 6 C.L.R.  VI, a t  pp.  7^,  7 5 .
3
( 19V0) 63 C.L.R. 3 3 8 , a t  p .  3VI .
H"
I b i d . , a t  p .  3VS.
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as th e  p u rp o se  of  p r o v i d i n g  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  to  
Tasmania  was to  p r e v e n t  ’' u n f a i r n e s s  or i n j u s t i c e ” to  t h a t  
S t a t e  by h av in g  a f a i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  th e  t a x  imposed 
by the  Commonwea 1 t h  T a x a t i o n  A c t s .
F u r t h e r ,  t h e  c o n t e n t i o n  o f  th e  a p p e l l a n t s  t h a t  no 
g r a n t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  c o u ld  be made to  any S t a t e  
which  c r e a t e d  any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,  d i r e c t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y ,  
be tw een  S t a t e s ,  so a s  to  i n f r i n g e  s . 5 1 ( i i ) ,  was r e j e c t e d  
on th e  ground t h a t  such  a c o n t e n t i o n  would be beyond the  
scope  of  the  p r o h i b i t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  s . 51( i i )  and i t  
would be a m is t a k e  to  r e g a r d  t h a t  p r o h i b i t i o n  as  p r o v i d i n g
i
f o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  b u rd e n  as r e g a r d s  t a x a t i o n  . T h e i r  
L o r d s h ip s  s a i d :
The p e r v a d in g  i d e a  i s  th e  p r e f e r e n c e  of l o c a l i t y  
m ere ly  because i t  i s  l o c a l i t y ,  and b eca u se  i t  i s  
a p a r t i c u l a r  p a r t  of  a p a r t i c u l a r  S t a t e .  I t  
does n o t  i n c l u d e  a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  b a se d  on o t h e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  which  a r e  d e p e n d e n t  on n a t u r a l  
or b u s i n e s s  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  and may o p e r a t e  w i t h  
more or  l e s s  f o r c e  i n  d i f f e r e n t  l o c a l i t i e s . ^
As r e g a r d s  s . 96 , t h e i r  L o r d s h i p s  t r i e d  to  r e a c h  a 
s o r t  o f  compromise be tw een  t h a t  s e c t i o n  and s . 5 1 ( i i )  and 
s .51 ( i i i )  i n  th e  s e n se  t h a t  s . 96 , a p a r t  from th e  p r o h i b i ­
t i o n s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  s . 5H i i )  and s . 5K i i i ) } d id  n o t  
1
The p r o h i b i t i o n  c o n t a i n e d  i n  s . 5 1 ( i i i )  was a l s o  r e g a r d e d  
as  n o t  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  b e n e f i t  as r e g a r d s  
b o u n t i e s .
2
(19^+0) 63 C.L.R.  3385 a t  p .  3^85 q u o ted  from R. v .  B a rg e r  
(1908) 6 C.L.R.  1+1 , a t  p .  108.
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prohibit discrimination between States or parts of States 
in the matter of financial assistance to one or more 
States. Thus it would be a permissible discrimination 
if the Commonwealth Parliament passes a law uin concert 
with any State or States with a view to a fair distribu­
tion of the burden of the taxation proposed, provided 
always that the Act imposing taxes does not itself 
discriminate in any way between States or parts of States, 
and that the Act granting pecuniary assistance to a
particular State is in its purpose and substance unob-
1jectionable" .
The difference of opinion that arose between Evatt 
J. and their Lordships was primarily due to the fact 
that they adopted different criteria in order to apply 
the prohibition contained in s.51(ii) and s.99* Evatt J. 
emphasised the formal consideration that the Tasmania^ 
millers were given a preferential treatment by receiving 
a certain percentage of the money paid by them as tax. 
"True1 1, said he, Mthe Commonwealth would collect from 
all taxpayers alike; but it would refund the tax solely
because of considerations applicable to a single State11^ ,
1
Ibid., at p. 3k9. (Italics supplies).
(1939) 61 C.L.R. 735j at p. 783.
2
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However, their Lordships looked into the material 
justification for the scheme: "Those powers are plainly 
being used for the purpose of preventing an unfairness
or injustice to the State of Tasmania or indirectly to
1some or all of its population" . It is submitted that 
the latter approach does not appear to be the right one 
as it would involve undefined social, economic and 
political considerations which create uncertainty in 
results, and such considerations have usually been dis­
couraged in constitutional inquiries. The prohibitions 
contained in s.51(ii) and s.99 were intended by the 
framers of the Constitution to establish formal and not
pmaterial equality , and this scheme achieved formal 
inequality.
Their Lordships visualised that prima facie there 
was no limitation upon the exercise of the power conferred 
on the Commonwealth by s.96, but a tax-assessment Act 
(granting money to the States) passed in conjunction 
with a tax Act which does not itself discriminate in any 
way between the States, may still be held invalid under
1
(19^0) 63 C.L.R. 338, at p. 3>+9.
2
See Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the 
Australian Commonwealth-^ 9011. at p. b^-9.
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the prohibition contained in s.5Hii) or s.99* Their 
Lordships issued a warning: ’'Cases may be imagined in
which a purported exercise of the power to grant 
financial assistance under s.9& would be merely colourable* 
Under the guise or pretence of assisting a State with 
money, the real substance and purpose of the Act might 
simply be to effect discrimination in regard to taxation"'”. 
But then could it not be said that the scheme in the 
present case was a colourable exercise of s.96 so as to 
nullify the constitutional safeguard provided in s*5Kii) 
or s.99? According to Evatt J. it was; but their Lord- 
ships justified it by saying that it was for the purpose 
of equalising the burden in the incidence of taxation by 
way of providing financial assistance to hard cases.
However, it would be difficult to prove any scheme as 
a colourable exercise as it could always be justified 
for one reason or another, based on material considerations. 
Their Lordships also realised that such a case might never 
be proved. In this respect, this warning becomes almost 
illusory.
However, the importance of this warning lies in the
recognition of our maxim, and the readiness on the part
_
(1940) 63 C.L.R. 338, at p. 350.
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of the Courts to call for evidence to determine the 
purpose of legislative schemes. In a way it is the 
affirmation of the principle explained and applied by 
Evatt J. in his dissent.
Ill
1Land Settlement Cases
These cases illustrate that if two or more Acts 
are clearly inter-connected through an agrsment reached 
between two or more governments, the Acts would be con­
sidered as constituting a scheme and their validity would 
be examined by reference to the purpose of the scheme as 
a whole. Also an Act approving and ratifying an agree­
ment reached between the Commonwealth and a State is 
inoperative if the agreement turns out to be invalid even 
though the legislatures have the constitutional power to 
act to the same effect without referring to the agreement 
at all.
In Magennis1 Case, an agreement was made between the 
Commonwealth and the State of New South Wales with a view
1
P.J.Magennis Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1949) 80 C.L.R.
3^2 (Magennis* Case); Tunnock v. Victoria (1951) 84 C.L.R 
42; Pye v. Renshaw (1951) 84 C.L.R^ 58•
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to the settlement on land in the State of discharged 
members of the Forces and other eligible persons; the 
agreement was ratified and provision made for its execu­
tion in the case of the Commonwealth by the War Service 
Land Settlement Agreements Act, 19^ +5j and in the case of 
New South Wales by the War Service Land Settlement 
Agreement Act, 19^5* Under the agreement both parties 
assumed financial and other obligations, but the State 
was to acquire the land required for the purpose, com­
pulsorily or by agreement, at a value not exceeding that 
ruling in 19^2. A similar term was contained in a 
proviso to s.4-(1) of the Closer Settlement (Amendment)
Act (N.S.W.) with respect to land acquired for
the purpose of the scheme contained in the agreement.
Under s.4 of the Closer Settlement Acts, the government 
of New South Wales made a proclamation notifying that it 
proposed to consider acquiring the plaintiff*s land for 
purposes of closer settlement. The plaintiff then brought 
an action in the High Court against the Commonwealth and 
the State of New South Wales alleging that the State of 
New South Wales threatened and intended to resume the 
plaintiffss land for the purposes of the agreement, and 
that the Commonwealth threatened and intended to pay 
moneys for such resumption; the plaintiff claimed a
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declaration that the agreement was void and inoperative, 
that the Commonwealth Act authorising it was ultra vires, 
and that the provisions of the Closer Settlement (Amend­
ment) Act, and in particular s.5? were invalid; he claimed 
an injunction restraining the State from resuming the land 
and the Commonwealth from paying moneys for such 
resumption.
It was held by Latham C.J., Rich. Williams and Webb 
JJ. (Dixon and McTiernan JJ. dissenting) , that tie acquisi­
tion of the land would be unconstitutional on the ground 
that the Commonwealth Act was an Act with respect to the 
acquisition of property upon terms which were not just
-i
and was invalid under s.5Kxxxi) of the Constitution; 
that the agreement authorised by the Act was accordingly 
invalid; and that as the purpose of the agreement failed, 
the State Acts were inoperative so far as they related 
to and purported to give powers to resume land for the 
purposes of the agreement.
This legislative scheme was designed to enable the 
Commonwealth to escape from the constitutional limitation
1
It provides: "The acquisition of property on just terms
from any State or person for any purpose in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws.M
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contained in s.51(xxxi) of the Constitution by using 
State legislative powers5 the States are not subject to 
any constitutional guarantee requiring the payment of 
* just* or indeed any compensation for property they 
acquire from the subject. The land was to be acquired 
for the settlement of ex-servicemen, which could clearly 
be regarded as a Commonwealth purpose under the defence 
power (s.51(vi) of the Constitution) though probably not 
within the portion of the defence power exclusive to the 
Commonwealth. However, it should be mentioned that the 
practice of using State power for land settlement of 
veterans was established after the first world war and 
there were administrative and economic justifications for 
the practice apart from the question of terms of 
acquisition.
The question then posed was whether the Parliaments 
of the Commonwealth and the State of New South Wales had 
by joint action succeeded in evading the constitutional 
obligation of the Commonwealth Parliament to provide just 
terms when it made a law with respect to the acquisition 
of property for a purpose for which the Commonwealth 
Parliament had power to make laws. The majority answered 
in the negative.
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Latham C . J .  s a i d  t h a t  a law made un d e r  s . 5 K x x x i )  
must  p r o v i d e  j u s t  te rm s  f o r  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  p r o p e r t y
" w h e th e r  the a c q u i s i t i o n  t e  by th e  Commonwealth o r  by a
1
S t a t e  o r  by any o t h e r  p e r s o n "  . There  was n o t h i n g  i n  
s . 51( x x x i )  l i m i t i n g  i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  e i t h e r  a law which  
d i r e c t l y  a c q u i r e d  p r o p e r t y  by f o r c e  of i t s  own term s or 
c r e a t e d  a p r e v i o u s l y  n o n - e x i s t i n g  power i n  some p e r s o n  
t o  a c q u i r e  p r o p e r t y  or  which  came i n t o  o p e r a t i o n  upon 
th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  p r o p e r t y ,  W i l l i a m s  J .  added t h a t  "any 
l e g a l  i n t e r e s t  i n c l u d i n g  a c o n t r a c t u a l  i n t e r e s t  would be 
s u f f i c i e n t  i f  i t  made th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  one f o r  such  a 
p u r p o s e "  . I n  th e  same tone  Webb J ,  s a i d  t h a t  s . 5 K x x x i )  
p r o v i d e d  f o r  a law w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
p r o p e r t y ,  and t h e s e  words sh o u ld  be g i v e n  t h e i r  f u l l e s t  
meaning c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o t h e r  p r o v i s i o n s  of th e  C o n s t i t u ­
t i o n ^ .  A pply ing  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  the  Commonwealth Act was, 
u n d e r  the  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  judged  as an  Act w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  
th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p r o p e r t y .  R e f e r r i n g  to  the  a g re e m e n t ,  
t h e  C h ie f  J u s t i c e  e x p l a i n e d :
I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the  Act  i s  a law a u t h o r i z i n g  
on ly  the  e x e c u t i o n  o f  th e  a g re e m e n t ,  b u t  the
1
(19^9)  80 C.L.R.  3 8 2 ,  a t  p .  4 02 .
2
I b i d , ,  a t  pp .  423 ,  424 .
I b i d . ,  a t  p p .  429 ,  430 .
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whole s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  of  the  ag reem en t  i s  the  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  p r o p e r t y  upon c e r t a i n  te rm s 
and c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  c e r t a i n  p u r p o s e s .  The 
p r o v i s i o n s  o f  th e  ag reem en t  a r e  d i r e c t e d  to  th e  
a c q u i s i t i o n  of  p r o p e r t y  and th e  ag reem en t  b e ­
comes e f f e c t i v e  i n  a c h i e v i n g  i t s  o b j e c t i v e  of 
th e  s e t t l e m e n t  o f  d i s c h a r g e d  s e r v ic e m e n  on ly  
when p r o p e r t y  h as  b e en  a c q u i r e d .  I  c an  see  no 
r e a s o n  w h a te v e r  f o r  h o l d in g  t h a t  a law a p p ro v in g  
an  a g reem en t  o f  such  a c h a r a c t e r  as  t h i s  i s  n o t  
a law w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of 
p r o p e r t y . ^
Dixon and M cT iernan  J J .  t h o u g h t  t h a t  the  Common­
w e a l t h  Act  was n o t  a law w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  the  a c q u i s i t i o n  
of  p r o p e r t y  t h a t  must  be j u s t i f i e d  by s . 5 1 ( x x x i ) .  The
A ct  s im p ly  a u t h o r i s e d  the  e x e c u t i o n  of  the  ag reem en t
and s e c u r e d  i t s  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  a p p r o v a l .  Dixon J .  s a i d :
But  i t  goes no f u r t h e r .  I t  does  n o t  o t h e r w i s e  
change the  l e g a l  c h a r a c t e r  of th e  i n s t r u m e n t  or 
of  th e  t r a n s a c t i o n  i t  em b o d ies .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  
does n o t  c o n v e r t  th e  te rm s  of  the  ag reem en t  i n t o  
th e  p r o v i s i o n s  of a law .  The s t a t u t e  does n o t  
a u t h o r i z e  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  of  p r o p e r t y .  I t  
c o n t a i n s  no p r o v i s i o n  w h a te v e r  a b o u t  p r o p e r t y .
I t  i s  e n t i r e l y  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  the  e x e c u t i o n  
of  an  a g re e m e n t .  I  sh o u ld  say  t h a t  i t  was a 
law w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  a m a t t e r  i n c i d e n t a l  to  the  
e x e c u t i o n  of  a power v e s t e d  by th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
i n  th e  Government o f  th e  Commonwealth and was an 
e x e r c i s e  of  th e  l e g i s l a t i v e  power c o n f e r r e d  on 
the  P a r l i a m e n t  by p a r .  (x x x ix )  of s .5 1 « ^
C o - o p e r a t i o n  be tw een  th e  Commonwealth and th e  S t a t e s  
i s  one of th e  d e v i c e s  t o  a c h i e v e  a c e r t a i n  o b j e c t  t h a t
1
I b i d . , a t  p . 4-02.
I b i d . , a t  p p .  4 10 ,  411 .
2
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neither could achieve. The object may often be the end 
or ultimate indirect consequence, and in such a case the 
Acts constituting the scheme would be valid provided 
each legislature acted within its constitutional power. 
However, if the Acts are interconnected, or there are 
circumstances so as to raise a strong presumption to 
that effect, the validity of the Acts might be examined 
by reference to the object of the scheme. In the present 
case, though the Commonwealth Act was not directly 
connected with the State Acts, the circumstance that it 
made a specific reference to the agreement which also 
formed the basis of the State Acts, might have swayed the 
majority opinion in characterising the Act with respect 
to the acquisition of property.
However, the State Acts, according to the majority, 
became inoperative simply because they were made in 
furtherance of an invalid agreement, even though the 
State legislature was acting within its powers. Latham 
C.J. argued thus^:
But that which the State Act approves is an 
agreement made between the State and the 
Commonwealth. If the agreement cannot validly 
be made by the Commonwealth then it cannot be
Ibid., at pp. 4-03, 4-04-.
1
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valid as an agreement between the State and 
the Commonwealth, The agreement cannot be valid 
as an agreement in the case of the State and 
invalid as an agreement in the case of the 
Commonwealth. The operation of the agreement 
depends at all points upon action by the 
Commonwealth in pursuance of the agreement and 
upon the undertaking and performance by the 
Commonwealth of definite pecuniary obligations 
under the agreement. The State Parliament has 
not enacted the terms of the agreement as 
provisions of a statute, but has only approved 
the making of the agreement as an agreement.
If the agreement completely fails on the side 
of the Commonwealth it also completely fails as 
an agreement on the side of the State. The 
result therefore is that as the State legislation 
only approved that which was treated by the 
legislation as amounting to an agreement if 
executed by both the Commonwealth and the State, 
and as that agreement is not valid, the State 
also is not bound by the agreement and the 
State Act approving the execution of the agree­
ment therefore did not come into operation.
The result is not that the State Act is invalid, 
but simply that it has no effect.
Or to put it in the words of Williams J., who used
similar reasoning:
Its true meaning is that the State is intending 
to resume the land for the purposes of the 
agreement and therefore to pay compensation on 
the semi-confiscatory basis provided for in the 
amending Closer Settlement (Amendment) Acts of 
1946 and 1948.1
These statements raise the important question in the
construction of statutes, whether a term such as the
validity of an agreement could be implied so as to make
Ibid., at p. 420.
1
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such validity a necessary condition for the enforcement 
of the statute. It is submitted that the operation of a 
statute should not depend upon such questions unless an 
intention to that effect is clearly expressed. As 
remarked by Dixon J., the majority view has "no warrant 
either in principle or in precedent" . Referring to the 
relevance of the agreement in this context, he said that 
the State legislation implied nothing as to the agreement*s 
legal status or enforceability5 still less did it imply 
that its provisions would have no application if it was 
found that the agreement was not a binding obligation of 
the Commonwealth, legally enforceable in the Courts. It 
may be added that the Court*s concern is to examine the 
validity of a statute and not the desirability of cir­
cumstances which led to the passing of the statute. But 
the majority first examined the validity of the agreement 
which was "in the nature of a political arrangement 
between the Commonwealth and the State" by reference to 
the Commonwealth Act, and then implied its validity as a 
necessary condition for the enforcement of the State 
legislation. There is nothing wrong in referring to the
agreement; such reference has to be made since the State
_
Ibid.. at p. 408.
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legislation takes the form of authorising or approving it. 
But what is objectionable is to make the legal status or 
enforceability of the agreement a relevant factor. Can a 
State restrict its legislative power defined in the 
Constitution by making such an agreement? "It would be 
surprising”j observed McTiernan J., "if by making this 
agreement with the Commonwealth the State restricted its 
legislative power, including its power to resume land 
within the State by importing into its Constitution a 
condition in the Commonwealth Constitution restricting 
Commonwealth power only”"'.
The subsequent decisions of the High Court limited 
the scope of Magennis* Case to a situation where a 
legislature exercises its power by making specific 
reference to an agreement or a law which is not valid.
If the Commonwealth and the States agree to enforce a 
scheme through joint co-operation, they can do so by 
making no reference to such agreement or law, at the same 
time embodying its terms within the framework of the 
statutes constituting the scheme, thereby making the 
operation of the statutes legally independent of the 
agreement and independent of each other1s relevant laws.
Ibid., at p. 416.
1
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This was what actually happened in Pye v.Renshavr, and
Palso in Tunnock v. Victoria .
After the decision in Magennis* Case, the War Service 
Land Settlement Agreement Act 19^5 (N.S.W.) was repealed 
and a new law was passed by the State legislature. This 
amended the new sub-section which had been added in 19^6 
to s.k of the Closer Settlement (Amendment) Act 1907? by 
deleting all reference to any agreement with the Common­
wealth and by inserting in lieu thereof a reference to 
land resumed for the purposes of s.3 of the War Service 
Land Settlement Act 19V1 (Cwth.). S.3 of the Act author­
ised the Minister to set apart any area of Crown land, 
or land acquired by the Crown, to be disposed of exclus­
ively to discharged members of the forces and certain 
other classes of persons. In Pye v. Renshaw, it was 
held unanimously that the State legislation was not 
rendered void by the existence of an agreement between 
the Commonwealth and the State of New South Wales 
relating, inter alia, to the identity of the lands 
resumed, the class of persons who might be settled there­
on or the terms upon which such persons might be settled.
T
(1951) 84- C.L.R. 58.
(1951) 84 C.L.R. 42.
2
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It was said that the Commonwealth Act of 19V1 did not 
relate to the acquisition or resumption of land and the 
State legislation was intended to take effect unconditioned 
by any Commonwealth legislation and irrespective of the 
existence of any agreement between the Commonwealth and 
the State»
It would have made no difference even if the Common­
wealth law had not been valid. In Tunnock v. Victoria, 
Magennis1 Case was distinguished on the ground that the 
Soldier Settlement Acts 19^5-’!9^9 (Vic.) did not depend 
for their operation upon the existence of an agreement 
between the Commonwealth and the State and were, therfore, 
not affected by the invalidity of the War Service Land 
Settlement Act 19^5 (Cwth.).
It may be noted that the State legislation involved 
in Magennis* Case differed only in form from that in­
volved in Tunnock v. Victoria and Pye v. Renshaw, The 
Acts were substantially the same except that in one case 
the agreement was specifically mentioned, while in the 
other, it could be inferred from the circumstances that 
the agreement was the basis of the State Acts in fact. 
Further, in both cases the purpose of the scheme as a 
whole was the same, i.e., acquisition of land on terms
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which  were n o t  j u s t  under  s . 51 ( x x x i )  f o r  c l o s e r  s e t t l e ­
ment of  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  of  p e r s o n s  on t h a t  l a n d .  I f  th e  
d e c i s i o n  i n  th e  l a t e r  c a s e s  i s  c o r r e c t  ( i t  i s  s u b m i t t e d  
t h a t  i t  was s o ) , Magennis* Case may be s a i d  t o  have  b e en  
v i r t u a l l y  o v e r r u l e d .
The w eakness  i n  the  m a j o r i t y  judgment  of M a g en n is1 2
Case became more a p p a r e n t  f rom th e  f a c t  t h a t  no r e f e r e n c e  
to  i t  was made i n  Brown v .  G reen^ , a c a se  i n  w hich  the  
o p e r a t i o n  of a S t a t e  Act i n c o r p o r a t i n g  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  
made und e r  Commonwealth r e g u l a t i o n s  which  had c e a s e d  t o  
o p e r a t e  was q u e s t i o n e d .  S .4 ( 1 )  of th e  L a n d lo rd  and 
Tenan t  (Amendment) A c t  1948-1949 (N .S .W .) ,  which r e l a t e d  
t o  th e  c o n t r o l  of  th e  r e l a t i o n  of  l a n d l o r d  and t e n a n t ,  
p r o v i d e d  t h a t  a l l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  of  f a i r  r e n t s  made 
b e f o r e  th e  commencement o f  th e  Act  u n d e r  the  N a t i o n a l  
S e c u r i t y  (L a n d lo r d  and Tenan t)  R e g u l a t i o n s  , and h av in g  
f o r c e  or  e f f e c t  i n  th e  S t a t e  im m e d ia te ly  b e f o r e  such  
commencement s h o u ld  be deemed to  have b e en  made under  
t h e  Act  and ,  s u b j e c t  to  the  A c t ,  s h o u ld  c o n t i n u e  t o  have 
f o r c e  and e f f e c t  a c c o r d i n g l y .  The d e f e n d a n t  f i r s t
1
(1951) 84 C.L.R.  285.
2
As i n  f o r c e  im m e d ia te ly  b e f o r e  th e  commencement of the  
Act  u n d e r  the  D efence  ( T r a n s i t i o n a l  P r o v i s i o n s )  A c t  1946- 
1947 ( C w t h . ) •
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questioned the continued validity of the regulations and 
then argued that the State Act also became inoperative 
because the determinations could not have any force or 
effect in the States unless the regulations themselves 
were valid. But the High Court held that the constitu­
tional validity of the regulations was not an essential 
condition of the application of the State legislation to 
determinations of fair rent made under these regulations. 
Dixon, McTiernan, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ., in their 
joint judgment said: llThe language of the Act does not
require that it shall be supposed that their constitu­
tional operation was an essential condition of its 
application to existing determinations and there is not 
sufficient reason why it should be so construed as 
importing such a condition"^. This is, in a way, a 
vindication of the minority judgments in Magennis1 Case.
But Brown v. Green may be distinguished from the 
Land Settlement Cases on a much broader issue, based on 
the fact that in the former the operation of the scheme 
hinged only on the operation of the State legislation and 
the constitutional validity or invalidity of the Common­
wealth regulations did not matter, whereas in the latter,
T
(1951) 8h C.L.R. 285, at p. 292.
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as the scheme consisted of the State as well as the 
Commonwealth legislation, it was necessary for both to 
have continued operation for the successful operation of 
the scheme as a whole. Suppose if one limb of the 
scheme, say the Commonwealth legislation, turns out to 
be invalid, as was the case in Magennis1 Case, does it 
mean that the other limb, the State legislation, also 
falls down accordingly as the very purpose of the scheme 
is frustrated? This question has not yet been discussed 
squarely by the courts. Latham C.J. would, as is 
indicated in his opinion in Moran1s Case, prefer to 
treat each Act individually on its own merit and the 
chances are that he might not have invalidated the State 
legislation on this particular ground. Perhaps the 
same conclusion may also be inferred from the opinion of 
the Privy Council in the same case. Though their Lord- 
ships suggested that the taxation Act and the tax- 
assessment Act - it is implied that both Acts were passed 
by the same legislature - be treated together, no 
reference was made to the Tasmanian Act which also formed 
part of the legislative scheme. Thus even on this 
ground it is rather doubtful if the majority opinion in 
Magennis1 Case can be supported.
However, Magennis* Case has not yet been overruled,
hut, as explained earlier, its application could be 
avoided by making no reference to an agreement made 
between the Commonwealth and the States, It was through 
this device that the Commonwealth Air Navigation Act,
1920-1950j has been extended to intra-State navigation, 
which is beyond Commonwealth powers. The Victorian Air 
Navigation Act, 1958? made no reference to the conference
of representatives of the Commonwealth and of the States
•1held in 1937 (except in the Preamble) or the Commonwealth 
Act; on the other hand, it referred to the regulations 
applicable to and in relation to air-navigation within 
the Territories and applied them, mutatis mutandis, to 
and in relation to air navigation within Victoria. By 
doing so the State Act also avoided all doctrinal 
difficulties in the way of the Commonwealth Parliament 
acting in pursuance of an International Convention1 2.
1
At the conference it was resolved that there should be 
uniform rules throughout the Commonwealth applying to 
air-navigation and aircraft, and it was agreed that 
legislation should be introduced in the Parliament of 
each State to make provision for the application of the 
Commonwealth Air Navigation Regulations, as in force 
from time to time, to air navigation and aircraft within 
the jurisdiction of the State.
2
See R. v. Burgess; ex p, Henry (1938) 55 C.L.R. 608.
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1Uniform Taxation Cases
These cases illustrate a situation in which a 
result which could not have been achieved by a single 
Act could be achieved through a combination of several 
Acts enacted by a legislature acting under different 
powers and thus displaying a limitation upon our maxim 
in its application to legislative schemes. The High 
Court was reluctant to treat a legislative scheme as 
a whole and preferred to examine the validity of the Acts 
comprising the scheme individually.
pIn South Australia v. Commonwealth , the legislative 
scheme consisted of four Commonwealth Acts: (1) the
Taxation Act 1942 imposing tax on income at a very high 
rate so as to make it practically impossible for the 
States to impose any tax on income; (2) the States Grants 
(Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942 making annual grants 
to each State upon condition of that State not imposing ary 
income tax in each relevant year - the grants being 
1
South Australia v. Commonwealth (1942) 65 C.L.R. 373; 
Victoria v. Commonwealth (1958) 99 C.L.R. 575•
2
(1942) 65 C.L.R. 373 (the First Uniform Tax Case).
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reimbursements in respect of income tax revenue lost by 
the State; (3) the Income Tax Assessment Act 1942, giving 
priority to the Commonwealth over the States in respect 
of payment of income tax; (4) the Income Tax (War-time 
Arrangements) Act 1942 providing for the temporary trans­
fer to the Public Service of the Commonwealth of officers 
of the State service. The main object of these Acts 
"was to introduce into Australia a uniform income tax 
having priority over State taxes upon income, paying to 
the States, which retired from the field of income 
taxation, compensation substantially equal to the average 
of the amounts raised by that State by means of income 
tax in the financial years ended June 191 2+0 and 1941" •
The first two Acts were challenged by the plaintiffs 
on the ground that they operated to destroy the con­
stitutional power and function of the States to legislate 
for the imposition of income tax; that taxation was an 
essential activity of government; that the Commonwealth 
Parliament had no power to impede, weaken or destroy
pthat activity; and that the Acts were therefore invalid •
1
Ibid., at pp. 447, 448.
2
The Acts were also objected on grounds of s.51(ii) 
and s.99 of the Constitution.
The two latter Acts were explained as carrying out the 
scheme contained in the first two Acts and they were 
therefore also challenged on the same ground. But in 
the High Court the scheme was held valid by varying 
majorities as to the different Acts. The Income Tax Act 
and the Grants Act were held valid by Latham C.J. , Rich, 
McTiernan and Williams JJ., Starke J. agreeing as to 
the validity of the Income Tax Act but dissenting as to 
the validity of the Grants Act. Williams J. held the 
Grants Act valid on the ground that the condition of 
State abstention from imposing income tax was incidental 
to the defence power. The Assessment Act was unanimously 
held valid, McTiernan J. being of the view that the 
priority given to the Commonwealth tax was incidental to 
the defence power. The War-time Arrangements Act was 
held valid by Rich. McTiernan and Williams JJ., with 
Latham C.J. and Starke J. dissenting, solely under the 
defence power.
It is true that the Grants Act, when examined in 
isolation, might be valid, but what was sought to be 
achieved in effect was that the States should vacate the 
field of taxation, and in so far as that aim was to be 
achieved, it was inevitable that the Tax Act should levy
a high rate of tax. To this extent the Tax Act was also 
involved so that one could obtain a clear picture of 
what was being contemplated by the Commonwealth. Thus 
it was contended that an Act which did not refer to or 
incorporate any other Act, and which when considered by 
itself was not invalid, might be held to be invalid by 
reason of the enactment of other Acts. But Latham C.J. 
visualised many difficulties in accepting that contention. 
The Chief Justice said: "Parliament, when it passes an 
Act, either has power to pass that Act or has not power 
to pass that Act. In the former case it is plain that 
the enactment of other valid legislation cannot affect 
the validity of the first-mentioned Act if that Act is 
left unchanged. The enactment of other legislation which 
is shown to be invalid equally cannot have any effect 
upon the first-mentioned valid Act, because the other 
legislative action is completely nugatory and the valid 
Act simply remains valid"'." These observations are only 
an addendum to what was already expressed in Moran1s Case .^
However, Latham C.J. did not think it necessary in
1
(19*+2) 65 C.L.R. 373, at p. 1.
2
(1939) 61 C.L.R. 735, at pp. 761, per Latham C.J.
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the present case to examine the Acts as parts of a 
legislative scheme. He said: "The intention to get 
rid of State income tax and of State income tax depart­
ments is clear in the case of the three first-mentioned 
Acts*' , and if such an intention is fatal to the validity 
of Commonwealth legislation it is not necessary to
pallege or prove any * scheme1n . But the very fact that 
the intention or purpose may he fatal is precisely the 
reason why it is necessary to allege or prove any scheme.
It is by reference to that intention or purpose that 
the validity of Acts constituting the scheme is to be 
determined. Of course, purpose may not be confused 
with motive or ultimate indirect consequences which are 
irrelevant in law.
Starke J. joined hands with the Chief Justice in deal­
ing with the Acts separately, but on a different ground. 
nBut the scheme of legislation is”, he thought, "unimpor- 
tant unless the legislation is connected together and the 
provision of the legislative Acts are dependent the one
1
The Income Tax Act, l9*+2, the States Grant (Income Tax 
Reimbursement) Act, 19^2, and the Income Tax (War-time 
Arrangements) Act, 19^ +2.
2
(19^2) 65 C.L.R. 373, at p. >+11.
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upon the other"^. It was found that such was not the 
case here. This approach seems to he not inappropriate, 
as what the Commonwealth Parliament intended to do could 
only be legitimately ascertained from that which it had 
enacted, either in express words or by reasonable or 
necessary implication.
However, as suggested by their Lordships in Moran1s 
Case£, though two or more Acts might not be expressly 
inter-connected, it might be impossible to separate one 
.Act from another when examined in their context or 
setting, e.g., a taxation Act and an appropriation or 
tax-assessment Act. In such a case it would be necessary 
to examine the Acts constituting a scheme as a whole. 
Williams J. seemed to have noticed such a connection in 
the present case. He said: "Where there are several 
Acts having, as in the present case, a clear interaction, 
the Court is entitled to investigate the substance and 
purpose of each Act in the light of the knowledge dis­
closed by them all"8. However, to notice a clear 
connection or interaction in between the Acts so as to 
1
Ibid., at p. 4 4 8 .
2
(1940)  63 C .L .R .  338 ( P . C . ) ,  a t  p p .  3 4 1 ,  345 and  3 4 6 .
(1939)  61 C .L .R .  735 ,  a t  p .  4 6 2 .
3
constitute a scheme in a certain context or setting may 
be a matter of opinion.
The legislative scheme was originally introduced 
during the war-crisis in 1942, but it was continued in 
substantially the same form even after the war was over. 
The Income Tax Act, 1942, had been succeeded by a series 
of annual taxing Acts. Provisional Tax1 was also 
introduced in 1944 by the Income Tax Assessment Act, 
whose title was later changed to the Income Tax and 
Social Services Contribution Assessment Act in 1950*
S.221 of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1942, which was 
introduced into that Act as an amendment to s.31 of the 
Assessment Acts 1935-41 , was amended by s.20 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act, 1946, so as to be “for the 
better securing to the Commonwealth of the revenue 
required for the purposes of the Commonwealth", whereas 
formerly it was "for the better securing to the Common­
wealth of the revenue required for the efficient prose­
cution of the present war". This provision was thus 
meant to operate permanently. The States Grants (Income 
Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942 was repealed by the States 
Grants (Tax Reimbursement) Act 1946, which was amended in 
1947 and 1948; the States Grants (Special Financial
A s s i s t a n c e )  A c ts  were  e n a c t e d  f o r  e ach  y e a r  f rom  1951 to  
1955 j s u p p le m e n t in g  th e  g r a n t s  a l r e a d y  made u n d e r  the  
1946-48 A c t .  The Income Tax (W ar- t im e  A rrangem ents )  Act 
1942 was d i s c o n t i n u e d  as  i t  had done i t s  work.
1
I n  th e  F i r s t  Uniform Tax Case 3 i t  was t h e  d e fe n c e
2power t h a t  loomed l a r g e  } i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the  f a c t  t h a t  
most  o f  th e  r e a s o n i n g  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  was n o t  
b a s e d  o n - i t .  The c i r c u m s t a n c e s  changed  a f t e r  "the war 
and i t  c o u ld  n o t  he s a i d  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  w h e th e r  th e  
scheme c o u ld  he v a l i d l y  c o n t i n u e d  i n  p e a c e - t i m e .  F u r t h e r ­
more,  d o u h t s  a r o s e  as  to  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  scheme a f t e r
3
th e  d e c i s i o n  i n  Melbourne  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  Commonwealth 3 
i n  w hich  th e  d o c t r i n e  of  f e d e r a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  was r e v i v e d  
i n  a m o d i f i e d  fo rm .
Thus th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  Ads c o n s t i t u t i n g  th e  l e g ­
i s l a t i v e  scheme was c h a l l e n g e d  f o r  th e  second  t ime i n
4V i c t o r i a  v .  Commonwealth . T h is  t ime the  p l a i n t i f f
1
0  942) 65 C .L .R .  3 7 3 .
2
The Income Tax (W ar- t im e  A r ra n g em en ts )  Act  was h e l d  v a l i d  
s o l e l y  u n d e r  th e  d e fe n c e  power and i t  was t h a t  A c t  which  
e n a b l e d  th e  Commonwealth t o  t a k e  ove r  the  s t a f f ,  r e c o r d s  
and o f f i c e s  of th e  S t a t e  d e p a r t m e n t s .  See a l s o  (1942)
65 C .L .R .  373 5 a t  p p .  5-63 3 46k ,  p e r  W il l ia m s  J .
3
(1947) 74 C.L .R .  3 1 .
4
(1958) 99 C .L .R .  575 ( t h e  Second Uniform Tax C ase ) .
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States, Victoria and New South Wales, did not make an 
attack on the validity of all the relevant Acts as 
constituting a legislative scheme for an unconstitutional 
purpose. Instead they claimed declarations (i) that the 
Grants Act was invalid because it did not grant financial 
assistance within the meaning of s.96, and further it 
interfered with the States in the exercise of their 
power to impose income tax and so interfered with their 
independence; (ii) that s.221 of the Assessment Act 
1936“1956, which gave Commonwealth tax priority over 
State tax, was invalid mainly on the ground that it was 
not authorised by any provision of the Constitution;
(iii) that the Grants Act and the Assessment Act, s.221, 
taken together, having regard to the Tax Act, were intend­
ed to have and had had the direct effect and operation 
of preventing the States from imposing and collecting 
income tax. No attack was made upon the Act imposing 
tax.
The High Court held unanimously that the Grants Act 
was valid, finding its basis in s.96 of the Constitution, 
and by a majority of four to three (Dixon C.J., McTiernan, 
Kitto and Taylor JJ., Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. 
dissenting) held s.221 (1)(a) of the Assessment Act
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i n v a l i d ,  i n  t h a t  i t  was n o t  a p r o v i s i o n  i n c i d e n t a l  t o  the  
power to  make laws w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t a x a t i o n  c o n f e r r e d  on 
P a r l i a m e n t  by s .  51 ( i i )  o f  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
S . 2 2 1 ( 1 ) ( a )  o f  th e  A ssessm en t  A c t  was so u g h t  to  be
1 2j u s t i f i e d  u n d e r  s . 5 1 ( i i )  and s . 5 1 ( x x x i x )  of th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  C our t  d id  n o t  a c c e p t  i t  and on t h i s  
p o i n t  d i s a p p r o v e d ^  th e  F i r s t  Uniform Tax C a s e . I n  f a c t ,  
Dixon C . J .  t h o u g h t  i t  t o  be a c o l o u r a b l e  use  of  the  
f e d e r a l  power of  t a x a t i o n :  " T h is  a p p e a r s  t o  me to go
beyond any t r u e  c o n c e p t i o n  of  what  i s  i n c i d e n t a l  t o  a 
l e g i s l a t i v e  power a n d ,  under  c o l o u r  of  r e c o u r s e  t o  th e  
i n c i d e n t s  of a power e x p r e s s l y  g r a n t e d ,  t o  a t t e m p t  to  
advance  or  e x t e n d  the  s u b s t a n t i v e  power a c t u a l l y  g r a n t e d
to  the  Commonwealth u n t i l  i t  r e a c h e d  i n t o  the  e x e r c i s e
u
of  the  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  powers of th e  S t a t e s "  •
1
The power w i t h  r e s p e c t  to  "taxation.
2
The power w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  m a t t e r s  i n c i d e n t a l  t o  the  
e x e c u t i o n  of any power v e s t e d  by the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
3
T a y lo r  J . , though  a g r e e i n g  w i t h  the  m a j o r i t y ,  was of  the  
v iew  t h a t  i n  th e  F i r s t  Uniform Tax C a s e , s u p r a , t h a t  
p r o v i s i o n  was j u s t i f i e d  a s  b e in g  a t em p o ra ry  measure  
d e s i g n e d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  a s p e c i a l  s i t u a t i o n ,  i n t e r  a l i a , a 
w a r - c r i s i s ,  b u t  i t  c o u ld  n o t  be g i v e n  a pe rm an en t  
o p e r a t i o n  so as  t o  be v a l i d  i n  p e a c e - t i m e .
b
( 1958) 99 C .L .R .  575,  a t  p .
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I t  may be n o t e d  t h a t  though  th e  p l a i n t i f f  S t a t e s  
d i s c l a i m e d  r e l i a n c e  on any l e g i s l a t i v e  p l a n ,  i t  was s t i l l  
so u g h t  to  r e l y  upon  th e  p u r p o s e  d i s c l o s e d  by th e  p l a n n e d  
i n t e r - c o n n e c t i o n  o f  the  Tax A c t ,  t h e  G r a n ts  Ac t  and th e  
A ssessm en t  A c t ,  namely  th e  p u rp o se  of  o c cupy ing  the  f i e l d  
of income t a x  to  th e  e x c l u s i o n  of  th e  S t a t e s ,  i n  c o n s i d e r ­
in g  th e  v a l i d i t y  o f  the  impugned p r o v i s i o n ,  Dixon C . J ,  
a p p e a re d  to  have  a g r e e d  when he r e f e r r e d  t o  b o t h  the  
n a t u r e  and h i s t o r y  of  p a r , ( a )  of  s . 2 2 l ( 1 ) .  He s a i d :
"No d o u b t  s , 2 2 1 ( 1 ) ( a )  s t a n d s  or  f a l l s  a s  a s e p a r a t e  
l e g i s l a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n  b u t  i t  would be a b s u r d  to  i g n o r e  
the  p l a c e  th e  s e c t i o n  t a k e s  i n  the  p l a n  f o r  u n i f o r m  
t a x a t i o n  and examine i t  as  i f  i t  were appurtenant  to  
n o t h i n g  and p o s s e s s e d  no c o n t e x t " .
However, t h e  " a b s o l u t e "  p r i o r i t y  g i v e n  to  the  
Commonwealth by s . 2 2 l ( 1 ) ( a )  was n o t  e s s e n t i a l  t o  the  
scheme as  a whole ;  th e  Commonwealth r e t a i n e d  i t s  p r i o r i t y  
i n  " s h o r t a g e "  s i t u a t i o n s ,  such  as  b a n k r u p t c y ,  and a l l  
the  o t h e r  e s s e n t i a l  f e a t u r e s  of  th e  Uniform Tax Scheme 
and th e  Scheme i t s e l f  rem a in e d  and s t i l l  r e m a in  i n  f u l l  
o p e r a t i o n ,
I b i d . , a t  p ,  614-,
1
Commonwealth-State Co-operation in Other Cases
It has often been found desirable and necessary in 
Australia to provide for organised marketing of certain 
primary products in order to keep a balance between 
demand and supply in those products, nationally and 
internationally, and thereby sustain the economy of the 
Commonwealth. Such a measure would obviously require an 
overall control and regulation of trade and commerce in 
the commodity and therefore necessitate the formulation 
of a uniform policy for the Commonwealth. But any such 
scheme would have to be administered so as not to come 
into conflict with s.92. By virtue of s.92, any market­
ing scheme, Commonwealth or State, which interferes with 
inter-State trade commerce and intercourse would be 
unconstitutional and therefore inoperative.
Constitutionally a State could provide for an 
organised marketing scheme, but its operation would be 
confined within that State, whereas the Commonwealth 
could control and regulate only the interstate, and the 
export and import trade in a commodity, and that would 
not be very effective in achieving the desired aim.
Under these circumstances a device was evolved through
the co-operation of the Commonwealth and the States by
fully exploiting their respective constitutional powers
to achieve a result which could not be achieved by the
Commonwealth or the States acting individually. Such
a scheme providing for the marketing of hides and leather
was considered by the High Court in the Hides and Leather 
■\Case . In that case the States acting in co-operation
with the Commonwealth agreed upon concerted measures
for the control of hide and leather industries in order
to carry on the scheme which the Commonwealth alone had
operated during the second world war. The purpose of
providing the scheme during the war and the necessity
for continuing it after the war were in each case "to
conserve hides for domestic requirements, keep down the
home consumption price and at the same time equalize the
returns to the producers or suppliers of hides and
distribute the supplies retained in Australia among
2tanners according to a just proportion" ; the overseas
price of hides remained very high during the war and
_
Wilcox Mofflin Ltd v. New South Wales (1952) 85 C.L.R. 
588 o For general discussion of this case in this context 
refer to Anderson, The Main Frustrations of the Economic 
Functions of Government Caused by Section 92 and Possible 
Escapes Therefrom. (1953) 26 Aust. L.J. 5^8, at pp. 5^9- 
523.
2
Ibid., at p. 506.
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t h e r e a f t e r  a s  compared w i t h  the  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e .  Accord­
in g  t o  th e  scheme,  th e  F e d e r a l  Act  e s t a b l i s h e d  a Board 
and p r o v i d e d  th e  m ac h in e ry  f o r  a p p r a i s e m e n t  and f o r  
making th e  paym ents  or d i s t r i b u t i o n s  to  the  s u p p l i e r s ,  
w h i l e  th e  S t a t e  A c t s  , b e in g  com plem enta ry  to  th e  F e d e r a l  
A c t ,  u n d e r t o o k  t o  v e s t  the  h i d e s  i n  th e  Commonwealth 
Board  w i t h  an  e x c e p t i o n  where th e  h i d e s  were a l r e a d y  i n  
th e  c o u r s e  of  i n t e r - S t a t e  t r a d e  commerce and i n t e r c o u r s e ,  
or  r e q u i r e d  or i n t e n d e d  by th e  owners f o r  such  t r a d e
commerce or  i n t e r c o u r s e .  Though th e  p l a i n t i f f s
2c h a l l e n g e d  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  of th e  S t a t e  Act a s  i n ­
f r i n g i n g  s . 9 2  of  th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  no a t t a c k  was made as  
t o  th e  p r o v i s i o n  v e s t i n g  the  h i d e s  i n  the  Commonwealth 
B o a rd ,  P e rh a p s  th e  C o u r t  m ig h t  have examined th e  
v a l i d i t y  of t h a t  p r o v i s i o n  had the  p l a i n t i f f s  c h a l l e n g e d  
i t s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ^ . However, i t  would n o t  be 
i l l e g i t i m a t e  to  i n f e r  t h a t  th e  v e s t i n g  of a commodity 
i n  a Commonwealth i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  by S t a t e  l e g i s l a t i o n  
i s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
1
A l l  th e  s i x  S t a t e s  a d o p te d  u n i f o r m  l e g i s l a t i o n .  As 
r e g a r d s  the  F e d e r a l  T e r r i t o r i e s ,  th e  F e d e r a l  Act c o n t a i n e d  
th e  l i k e  c o m p u ls iv e  p r o v i s i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  them.
°  2
I t  was th e  Hide and L e a th e r  I n d u s t r i e s  Act 1948-49 
(N .S .W .) which  was r e f e r r e d  to  i n  d e t a i l .
3
(1952) 85 C .L .R .  488 ,  a t  p p .  514,  515.
1*21
Other examples of Commonwealth-State co-operation to 
give effective control to a scheme which could not he 
enforced by the Commonwealth or the States acting 
individually, are to be found for the regulation of the 
coal mining industry, and the River Murray Scheme; and
the validity of these schemes has not been challenged in
1the courts . The wheat industry stabilisation scheme is
similar to the one involved in the Hides and Leather Case.
2The Federal Act provided for the establishment of a 
Board with powers necessary for stabilising the wheat 
industry, while the State Acts^ provided for the vesting 
of the commodity in the Board. It was further provided 
in the Federal Act that nothing therein contained prevent­
ed the Board from exercising any power or function con­
ferred upon it by any State Act. As to the regulation 
of the coal mining industry in New South Wales, the 
Federal Act as well as the New South Wales Act^ made
1
Refer to Comans, Co-oueration between Legislatures in a 
Federation. (1953) 31 Can. B. Rev. 814-; Anderson in 
Essays on the Australian Constitution (Ed. R. Else- 
Mitchell) at pp. 113? 11
2The Wheat Industry Stabilization Act 19^8; in 1953 the 
citation of the Act, as amended, became the Wheat 
Marketing Act 19^8-53»3E.g., the Wheat Industry Stabilization Act 1950 (N.S.W.). kThe Coal Industry Act 19^6-58.
^The Coal Industry Act 19^8-57 (N.S.W.).
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provision for the establishment of the Joint Coal Board 
making it responsible for the expansion of coal produc­
tion in New South Wales, and the Coal Industry Tribunal 
having power to settle certain industrial disputes. The 
Acts did not directly authorise the establishment of the 
Board or the Tribunal, but it was provided that the 
Commonwealth government might enter into an arrangement 
with the government of New South Wales for the establish- 
ment of those bodies • The River Murray Scheme provided 
for the economical use of the waters of the River Murray 
and its tributaries for irrigation and navigation 
purposes5 and in order to reconcile the interests of 
the Commonwealth and the States of New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia, an agreement was entered 
in between them and later ratified and approved by the
prespective parliaments. Under the Acts provision was 
made for the establishment of a commission charged with 
the duty of giving effect to the agreement and the Acts 
concerned in this context.
1
A similar arrangement was later on made between the 
Commonwealth and the State of Tasmania: see the Coal
Industry (Tasmania) Act 194-9*
2
The River Murray Waters Act 1915-58 (Cwth.), the River 
Murray Waters Act 1915-58 (N.S.W.).
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Conclusion as to Legislative Schemes
From the cases discussed above, it seems the better 
view that the High Court, unlike the Privy Council, is 
not prepared to examine the validity of enactments by 
reference to their joint effect as a legislative scheme 
unless the enactments are expressly inter-connected, or 
have a clear interaction so as to raise a very strong 
presumption to that effect. Otherwise it appears to be 
somewhat difficult to conceive circumstances in which a 
scheme would be held invalid even when its existence is 
patent. There were strong indications in Morands Case 
that enactments might be treated together as forming 
parts of a scheme so that the scheme as a whole either 
stands or falls, but this approach did not find favour 
with the High Court as evidenced by the Uniform Tax Cases. 
In the Second Uniform Tax Case the plaintiff States did 
not even raise an argument on those lines and took for 
granted the correctness of the course adopted by the 
majority in the First Uniform Tax Case. However, the 
object of the scheme may be looked at, as indicated in 
the Land Settlement Cases and the Second Uniform Tax Case,
VI
in understanding the real purpose of the enactments by
reference to which their validity may he individually
ascertained. It is likely that a similar attitude might
•1he taken in the United States •
The same attitude was taken in South Africa so far 
as a legislative scheme was concerned with the intrenched 
clauses1 . However, Centlivres C.J. in the Senate Case3 
regarded the object or purpose of the scheme in question 
as altogether irrelevant. It may be justifiable because 
firstly South Africa has a unitary constitution, and 
secondly the scheme was concerned with guaranteed rights 
of individuals, not merely the distribution of legislative 
powers.
In Canada, the courts may be more prone to invali­
date an Act on the ground based on the existence of a
legislative plan than the courts in the United States or
4Australia . This may be due to the double enumeration 
of legislative powers and the predominance and the 
frequent application of the rule of *pith and substance1.
1
See supra, at pp. CO 50-51
2
See supra, at pp. 192--203.
[19570)] S. A.. 552 (A.,D.) .
4
See supra, at pp. ■V] 00 V# 79.
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However, it is not certain that that ground would by 
itself be sufficient to invalidate an Act; it would 
rather be relied upon as an aid to determine the *pith 
and substance1 of the Act.
In Australia, the device of a legislative scheme* 
was not merely confined to the sphere of legislative 
powers; it has also been used to get around the prohibi­
tions of preference1 and Idiscrimirä:ionI and reduce 
their functional value in the constitutional system. Of 
course, it is only the validity of the Commonwealth Act 
that could be questioned as the State Acts do not come 
within the operation of these prohibitions.
It may also be inferred from the Uniform Tax Cases 
that the purpose of a legislative scheme, whenever 
relevant, should be ascertained by reference to formal 
considerations, even though the Privy Council in Moran1s 
Case referred to Unfairness1 or injustice1 and based 
its conclusions on material considerations. To this 
extent the Uniform Tax Cases are a vindication of Evatt 
J.*s views.
As regards legislative schemes in pursuance of an 
agreement between the Commonwealth and the States, it has
b26
become rather a matter of construction. If an Act 
operates by reference to an agreement, its operation 
would then be conditional upon the agreement being 
valid. But if it made no reference to the agreement, 
though incorporating the terms of the agreement, any 
reference to the agreement would be irrelevant. Thus by 
following the latter course, the operation of a legisla­
tive scheme could be assured even if the agreement by 
itself might not be valid, provided the legislatures 
individually have acted within the ambit of their 
legislative powers respectively.
In Magennis1 Case it was admitted that the State 
legislation was within the constitutional power of the 
State but it became inoperative because the agreement 
referred to in the legislation turned out to be invalid. 
It is true that even if a statute is constitutional, it 
need not be operative. There is the further question - 
is its operation dependent on a condition? There is no 
reason why a statute should not provide for its operation 
to be conditional upon an uncertain event which may never 
happen, and this could include the event of ascertaining 
the validity or invalidity of an agreement; or a statute 
could be expressed as intended to operate only if a
2^7.
specified Commonwealth statute is valid. The objection 
is to interpreting a statute in this way when plainly its 
operation was not so conditioned.
In Canada, though inter-delegation between Dominion 
and provinces was not permitted, delegation to an agent 
of a legislature or its instrumentality has been upheld 
as valid by the Supreme Court"! # Could the same be also 
said in Australia? In the Australian Constitution, 
s.51 ^ xxxviii) provides that at the request or with the 
concurrence of Parliaments of all the States directly 
concerned, the Commonwealth Parliament may make laws with 
respect to a matter falling within the jurisdiction of 
the States, but so that the laws shall extend only to 
States by whose Parliaments the matter is referred. 
Accordingly, as there is provision of reference only by 
States to the Commonwealth, it may be presumed that the 
reverse process, i.e, reference by the Commonwealth of 
any matter within its jurisdiction to the States, was not 
contemplated under the Constitution. If it is so, then 
a reference or delegation by the Commonwealth to the 
States would not be constitutional. Does it follow that
any reference or delegation by the Commonwealth to a
_
See supra, at pp. ß^—ßö.
h28
State instrumentality would also not be constitutional? 
It is not beyond doubt as the reference or delegation 
in both cases could ultimately achieve the same conse­
quences. However, the matter has not been tested and 
Australian governments generally have acted on the 
assumption that delegations by Commonwealth to State, 
and by State to Commonwealth instrumentality are 
constitutional. The frequency of the practice and the 
absence of challenge suggest that such devices would be 
beyond the operation of our maxim.
PART FOUR
Logical Status, Meaning and Force
of
Our Maxim
CHAPTER XIII
Logical Status of our Maxim
Our maxim, like any other legal principle, may 
involve the study of two entirely separate areas posing 
distinct and distinctive types of problems. One is in 
terms of 1 description1 dealing with facts and conse­
quences. The other is in terms of JattitudesT dealing 
with the specific role played by value judgments. The 
two areas are not completely unrelated, but a reference 
to both of them separately does provide a basis for the 
proper understanding of a legal principle"' .
•Descriptive analysis may appeal more to a lawyer 
with a practical approach then the analysis based on 
value judgments, but the importance of the latter should 
not be underestimated. Many of the controversial problems 
that confront the courts are marginal cases and they may 
often be understood properly only in the light of 
conflicts between arguments based on value judgments
i
See Stoljar, The Logical Status of a Legal Principle 
(1953) 20 Uni. of Chicago L. Rev. 181. Also refer to 
Stone, The Province and Function of Law (1946), at
pp.
429
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which are logically deduced not only from a system of 
moral or social relations hut also from the realm of 
political ideologies; this is particularly so in the 
field of constitutional law. There is a hierarchy of 
values which so far as accepted is a guide to the 
solution of a problem.
However, value judgments are the intellectual tools 
to be used for the purpose of persuasion and play a 
secondary role as an aid in arriving at a decision. 
Moreover, their usefulness is most fully appreciated 
in the sphere of unenacted law where issues involving 
concepts which have ethical or emotive content become 
predominant. For example, in the law of torts which 
is not yet codified in the common-law countries, words 
such as *goodT, lwicked*, lharm*, *duty* and many 
others, and generalisations, classifications or categor­
ies based on them could properly be understood only by 
reference to values relating to a system of moral or 
social relations. On the other hand, in the sphere of 
*writtenT or enacted law there tends to be a reasonably 
determinate set of legal principles which provide a basis 
for the making of a decision and the necessity of resort­
ing to value judgments may not be so frequent. Thus for
the purposes of our maxim in the area of written 
constitutions it is the descriptive analysis that is more 
fruitful than the analysis based on value judgments. 
Hence, in the present study emphasis is put on the 
analysis of facts and situations and the approach is 
rather analytical than evaluative.
II
The desirability of codification was felt long ago 
in order to avoid uncertainty of the unwritten law which 
might be susceptible to different interpretations result­
ing In unnecessary litigation and, therefore, much 
vexation and trouble . However, no code could possibly 
be concise or exact in words due to the very nature of 
the human language which is full of ambiguities and 
obscurities^. Thus there has been an endeavour to under­
stand the meaning of law reduced to writing and make 
sense out of it, and this process came to be known as 
interpretation (or construction). In Roman law the term 
interpretatio corresponded to interpretation (and/or
T
See Lieber, Hermeneutics (3rd ed.), at p. 30; Paton,
A Textbook of Jurisprudence (2d ed.) , at p. 5-1.
2
See Allen, Law in the Making (6th ed.) , at p. M-93 •
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construction) and Roman jurists used it in the widest 
possible sense so that a very large part of thst law was 
formed by a gradual extension of the provisions of the 
Twelve Tables. Its influence was then seen in the
discussions upon the French Code, and also in the Early
jEnglish law . Modern Practice on the Continent is to
treat statutes as the basis of the law, and the task of
the courts is to l 2fill gaps* by arguments based on
travaux pr£paratoires and analogy-3 4 (as the last
resort) so extending the basis for logical inference
of legislative intention. However, the English approach
tends to be concerned more with the verbal expression of 
kthe statute .
A law or legal rule must not be violated. But the 
question arises how the violation occurs. The simplest 
way is conduct which 1 obviously1 or *on its face1 amounts 
to disobedience of the law or legal rule. However, it
1
See Lieber, loc. cit., at pp. 260-64.
2
See Allen, loc. cit., at pp. 500-501.
3
See Lieber, loc, cit.. at p. 275 et seq.
4
See Paton, loc, cit., at ppe 187-01; Salmond, Juris­
prudence (10th ed.), at p. 169• For a penetrating 
analysis of the theory of statutory interpretation see 
Cohen, Law and Social Order (1933) j at pp. 128-315 
133-34; Radqn, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv. 
L. Rev. 863, at pp. 869-85«
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may also occur if something prohibited is done under the
guise or pretence of observance, and it would be the
duty of courts not to allow this, otherwise the law or
legal rule would become illusory. "There can be", said
Lieber, "no sound interpretation without good faith and
common sense"; and the harmony produced by good faith
and common sense, Dr Hammond commented, would "be
decisive for or against a proposed interpretation, even
though all the rules that may be formulated array them-
2selves on the opposite side" . Thus observance of good 
faith has been regarded as a cardinal principle of 
interpretation.
It is true that good faith is a notion which cannot 
be reduced to any formal rules, but it may broadly be 
stated that before any opinion is formed as to the vio­
lation of a law or legal rule one should look into its 
substance and not merely its form. This approach has 
received various specialised applications. For example, 
when the theory of the • equity of the statute*3 was 
1
Lieber, loc, cit., at p. 109. (Italics supplied).
2
Ibid.. at p. 291. See also G£ny, Judicial Freedom of 
Decision: Its Necessity and Method in Science and Legal 
Method (translations by E. Bruncken and L.B. Register, 1917) 
at p. 25.
3
See Lenhoff, Comments. Cases and Materials on Legisla­
tion (1949)5 at p. 649.
employed to mitigate the hardships flowing from rigid 
adherence to the letter of the law, Plowden (the 
greatest advocate of the theory) explained its applica­
tion in terms which criticised reliance upon the form of
1the law and advocated adherence to its substance .
2Similarly, Heydonfs Case lays down that before having 
a look at the words of a statute one should discover "the 
true reason of the remedy1 and give the words under 
interpretation the meaning "as shall suppress the 
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle 
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, 
and pro privato commodo« for to add force and life to 
the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the 
Act, pro bono publico". Here "the true reason of the 
remedy" is the purpose or policy for which the law was 
provided, and it is but one of the ways of looking into 
the substance of the law.
It has long been usual for English judges to examine 
the intention of a statute in order to find a clue to its
1
Reporters note to Eysten v. Studd 057*+) 2 Plowd. *+59) 
at p. k65.
2
(158*+) Exchequer 3 Co. 7a? at p, 7^. Also refer to 
Denning L. J. in Estates Ltd v. Asher [ 19^ +9] 2 All E.R.
155? at p. 16k; Magor and St Mellons R.D.C. v. Newport 
Corporation [1950J 2 All E.R. 1226, at p. I236 (cf.
Lord Simonds on appeal: [1952] A.C. 1895 at p. 191)#
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1
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  . I n  th e  Middle  Ages,  j u d g e s ,  a s  members 
of th e  King*s C o u n c i l ,  were g e n e r a l l y  t h e m s e lv e s  l e g i s l a ­
t o r s  and had l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  d e c i d i n g  what the  r e a l
p
1 s u b j e c t i v e 1 23 i n t e n t i o n  of  th e  s t a t u t e  was • However, 
a f t e r  the  ju d g e s  had s e p a r a t e d  from the  C o u n c i l ,  the  
i n t e n t i o n  was to  be i n f e r r e d  f rom the  words o f  the  
l e g i s l a t i v e  t e x t .  A t t e m p ts  were made t o  d e v i s e  r u l e s  as  
a g u id e  to  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  b u t  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  was 
somewhat a r b i t r a r y .  The r e a s o n  was t h a t  most  s t a t u t e s  
b e f o r e  the  19t h  c e n t u r y  l a i d  down no more t h a n  b ro ad  
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e s .  I t  was d u r i n g  t h i s  p e r i o d  t h a t  th e  
E n g l i s h  Common Law was t r a n s p l a n t e d  i n t o  th e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  -  t h e  f i r s t  f e d e r a t i o n  to  d e v e lo p  r u l e s  of  con ­
s t i t u t i o n a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  T h e r e a f t e r ,  though  the  t r e n d  
i n  E ngland  was to w ard s  de t a i l e d  s ta tu tes  to  which the  
c o u r t s  a p p l i e d  l i t e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  th e  c o u r t s  i n  the  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  were i n c l i n e d  to  c o n t i n u e  w i t h  th e  o l d ,  
b r o a d e r  a p p r o a c h .  F o r  exam ple ,  i n  England th e  t h e o r y
of th e  * e q u i t y  of  the  s t a t u t e 1 f e l l  in to  o b l i v i o n  b u t  the
c o u r t s  i n  th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had n o t  c e a s e d  t o  make use
of  th e  t h e o r y  as  f u r n i s h i n g  a g u id e  to  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n - ^ .
1
See g e n e r a l l y  P l u c k n e t t ,  A Conc ise  H i s t o r y  of  the  Common 
Law ( 4 t h  e d . )  , a t  p p .  313-323«
2
P l u c k n e t t ,  S t a t u t e s  and t h e i r  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i n  the  
F o u r t e e n t h  C en tu ry  ( 1 9 2 2 ) .  a t  a .  59.
3
See L e n h o f f ,  l o c . c i t . ,  a t  p .  950 .
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Our maxim can operate in any field of private or of 
public law, being in the broadest sense merely an 
application of principles of *good faith1. However, we 
are concerned more particularly with its application in 
public law, because here the maxim has a more precise 
significance and its possible application is most easily 
tested or illustrated.
Ill
In order to have a proper appraisal of the consti­
tutional government of a state, whether it be federal or
unitary, it is not merely the Constitution but also its
•1working that forms the basis of our study . The role 
played by courts makes a significant contribution to the 
shaping of governmental machinery, especially in a 
federation where courts have the power to review the acts 
of legislatures. However, the practice in courts is, in 
itself, guided by a set of rules of interpretation when­
ever a conflict involving constitutional principles 
arises before them. It may be that some of the rules are 
less important or more controversial than the others, 
but certain rules such as our maxim are so fundamental
T
See Wheare, Federal Government (2d ed.), at pp. 21-22.
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that they form the very basis of judicial practice,
A constitution requires the relative permanence of 
the specified governmental machinery and correspondingly 
guarantees the relative security of the subjects; while 
necessarily having a good deal of flexibility, the con­
stitution needs to be protected from abuse of powers 
conferred on a legislature, and from arbitrary changes in 
law. A-constitution, therefore, of any value, presupposes 
the existence of our maxim without which its provisions 
would be meaningless. In other words, something like 
our maxim necessarily accompanies any attempt at express­
ing the notion of a limited governmental power, because 
without some such notion the attempt at express statement 
of a limited power would, except in the very simplest and 
narrowest circumstances, be a waste of time.
Thus limitations upon a legislative power are not
only those which are expressly provided in the constitution
but also those which, though implied, are necessarily to
check any abusive or arbitrary exercise of the power.
"The mere grant of a constitution11, ovserved Cooley, "does
not make the government a constitutional government, until
the monarch is deprived of power to set it aside at will'1^ .T
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol.I, at 
P« 5(n2).
Our maxim, therefore, operates as a limitation for 
holding laws unconstitutional on the ground that the 
legislature has, under the guise or pretence of doing 
something lawful, assumed power (or acted in a manner) 
not authorised hy the constitution or acted not in good 
faith* It is so even if the maxim has no legal force in 
the sense of not heing recognised as part of positive law.
It would seem, then, to follow that our maxim is 
part of the body of logical principles whose existence is 
presupposed hy any system of law. Such principles are 
often in the English system treated simply as part of the 
Common Law - especially if, as in the case of our maxim, 
we can trace repeated statements of the principle back 
through decisions and other authoritative texts. This 
incorporation of general logical (and moral) principles 
into the body of the Common Law has made it less 
necessary for English lawyers to concern themselves with 
Inatural law1, 1extra-positive law1 and other such 
notions; what the Continental civilians find in such 
meta-legal concepts may be for English lawyers simply a 
part of their, positive law system. However, even within 
the Common Law, it is possible to distinguish between 
principles which are general guides to legal administration
*+39 .
and have a 1meta-legalI quality, and those having a more 
tpositivet character, hy the following test: how do we
regard cases in which the principle in question might 
have been applied but has not been applied? Do we tend 
to say "therefore the principle has been overruled and 
is no longer part of the law", or do we tend to say "the 
principle remains and no particular example of its not 
being applied can remove it"? From the examples given 
in this thesis, it seems probable that our maxim belongs 
to the latter class. It may be regarded as in a strict 
sense part of the Common Law, but if so, it is a part 
which also belongs to the general body of logical 
principles associated with any systematic and reasonably 
consistently enforced body of law.
IV
Suppose our maxim is formally recognised by express 
mention in the constitution. Would it make any difference 
in the attitude of courts to the constitutionality of 
legislative acts? In its unexpressed form it might be 
considered as a rule of interpretation of a subsidiary 
character - a rule of guidance not for legislatures but 
for courts. It would, therefore, be used as the last 
resort so that the constitution may not lose its identity.
But as an express provision in the constitution its 
function might become primary in character. In other 
words, it might have a more positive force; legislatures 
as well as courts would be obliged to obey it. Courts 
would treat it not merely as a rule of interpretation 
but as a part of the Constitution like any of its other 
provisions which are in themselves subject to interpreta­
tion. However, its effectiveness would be determined 
finally by courts as the process of interpretation seeks 
ultimately a determinate between a minimum and maximum 
extension. It is likely that a strict interpretation of 
the maxim (as forming part of the constitution) might 
overlap with its operation as merely a rule of constitu­
tional interpretation; but when a strict interpretation 
is to be applied and when it is not is likely to depend 
on general historical factors, not on particular maxims 
whether expressed or implied. One can imagine the maxim 
in express form having no more significance than it has 
in its present position as *unwritten* or 5extra- 
positive1 law. More probably, however, an express 
provision would encourage courts to a stricter or more 
frequent application. For example, if the maxim were in 
the Australian Constitution, possibly there would have
b e en  no d i s s e n t s  i n  B a r g e r * s  Case , p o s s i b l y  Moran1s 
2Case would have been  d e c id e d  the  o t h e r  way, b u t  p o s s i b l y  
the  Uniform  Tax Cases^ would n o t  have b een  a f f e c t e d .
1
1
R. v .  B a rg e r  (1908) 6 C.L.R.  hi .
2
Moran v .  Deputy F e d e r a l  Commissioner o f  T a x a t i o n  (1939) 
61 C.L.R. 735 ( H . c . ) j  (1940) 63 C.L.R. 338  ( P . C . ) .
3
South  A u s t r a l i a  v .  Commonwealth (19^2) 65 C.L.R. 373; 
V i c t o r i a  v .  Commonwealth (1958) 99 C.L.R. 575*
CHAPTER XIV
Meaning of our Maxim
The maxim itself contains a number of ambiguous 
terms, or terms having blurred edges. By the time these 
are analysed and their permutations and combinations 
taken into account, the resulting variation in meaning 
is sufficient in itself to explain the apparent 
conflicts between decisions. A linguistic philosopher 
could probably take this type of analysis very far,and 
the following discussion is pitched only at the "common 
sense" level. Let us take the main terms of the maxim 
seriatim.
"What"
This is the subject of our maxim and in our context 
it refers to some legal act which has to be characterised. 
In a constitutional setting, "what" must be expanded into 
a legally significant act, done pursuant to a constitu­
tion which contains positive statements laying down 
propositions as to acts or forbearances, the act being 
approved or disapproved as being consistent or
kb2.
inconsistent with those propositions
However, some vagueness or ambiguity always exists 
as to the meaning of words or phrases and to that extent 
there is likely to be a certain amount of indeterminacy 
in testing the validity of statutes. To deal with this 
1openendedness1 courts have resorted to 1supra-constitu- 
tional1 principles and sought guidance in common law or
-jnatural law or some such concepts . A practical business 
sense1 was once taken into account in finding a bill 
ultra vires2. So is the test of 1policy1 or 1 expediency1 
often resorted to under the United States Constitution.
These concepts are related to the 1ideas of the 
community1 or *public opinion1 reflecting social, 
economic or political ideologies which undergo a change 
with the times^. Accordingly the meaning of words and 
phrases which are to be understood by reference to those 
concepts also undergo a change. Thus no interpretation 
could be decisive for all times and the constitutionality 
X
See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), Vol.
I, at pp. 3^2-344.
2
Attorney-General for Alberta v . Attorney-General for 
Canada 119391 A.C. 117, at p. 132.
3See Stone, loc. cit.. at pp. 192—195 5^ 215-219»
of a law would depend upon the ideas or ideologies
-1prevailing in a community at a particular time .
Thus the characterisation of nwhatu assumes that a 
certain meaning can he given to constL tutional provisions 
and characterisation oscillates between wide and narrow 
interpretations depending upon the judicial attitude 
which, in turn, is influenced by ,extra-positive1 
concepts. For example, our maxim has more opportunities 
of its application in the United States and Australia 
when the Constitution is given a restrictive interpreta­
tion based on the concept of *dual sovereignty1 than 
when the Constitution is given an expansive interpreta­
tion based on the concept of Iplenaryt powers. If a 
case in which the maxim has found its application has 
been overruled, it does not necessarily mean that the 
maxim has fallen into disuse or become redundant; it may 
only signify a change or shift in the meaning of a 
provision or rule whose construction is a pre-requisite 
in the application of the maxim^.
1
See Levy, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (1950)« at 
pp. 41-72. Also refer to Justice Holmes in Lochner v. 
New York (1905)198 U.S. 45, at pp. 75, 76.
2
Cf. Ross, The Constitutional Law of Federalism in the 
United States and Australia (1943) 29 Virginia L. Rev.
881, at pp. 916, 9 1 7*
"Cannot"
On a simple assumption that legal acts are either 
commanded or prohibited this would raise no difficulty, 
hut in fact as HohfeldIs tables show the range of legal 
categories is much wider, and probably even Hohfeld 
over-simplified the position. In practice, legal norms 
may be said to exhibit a continuous range of "attitudes" 
towards given conduct, from outright prohibition at one 
end to specific command at the other, with positions in 
between at which one may speak of the norm having a 
"flavour of disapproval" or being "neutral". In consti­
tutional contexts, there are two distinctions of 
practical importance; there may be a constitutional 
prohibition, or there may be an area of power not granted 
to the authority in question. In the ultra vires situa­
tion, where no specific prohibition is concerned, the 
judicial attitude may be affected by the answer to the 
question - what happens in the area of power not intra 
vires the authority in question. Is it within the power 
of no authority (when the position may be considered as 
approximating that of a prohibition, with an inference 
that no law should touch that area at all), or is it 
within the competence of another legislature in the
sys tem ?  I f  the  l a t t e r ,  i s  i t  e x p r e s s l y  so (a  m u l t i - l i s t  
sys tem ) , or  r e s i d u a l l y  so ( a s  w i t h  th e  A u s t r a l i a n  
S t a t e s ) ?  Where t h e r e  i s  a d i v i s i o n  b e tw een  s e v e r a l  l e g ­
i s l a t u r e s ,  i t  may a l s o  be i m p o r t a n t  t o  c o n s i d e r  g e n e r a l  
j u d i c i a l  a s s u m p t io n s  c o n c e r n in g  th e  b a l a n c e  of  the  
sy s te m :  do the  ju d g es  t r y  to  h o ld  a b a l a n c e ,  o r  have
th e y  an a s s u m p t io n  i n  f a v o u r  of  one a u t h o r i t y  o r  the  
o t h e r ?  A H  t h e s e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  can  a f f e c t  the  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
t o  be g i v e n  the  t e rm  " c a n n o t 11.
"Be d o n e 11
The word "done" i s  n o t  e s p e c i a l l y  s u i t e d  to  l e g a l  
c o n t e x t s  5 i t  i s  more t y p i c a l  o f  n o n - l e g a l  l an g u ag e  where 
i t  r e f e r s  t o  a complex r e a l - l i f e  s i t u a t i o n .  I n  o r d i n a r y  
l a n g u a g e ,  no one would t h i n k  of  deny ing  t h a t  what th e  
A c t s  i n  th e  Uniform Tax C a s e s 1 i n  A u s t r a l i a  " d id "  was 
t o  e x p e l  the  S t a t e s  f rom th e  i n c o m e - t a x  f i e l d .  C o u r t s ,  
h o w ever ,  u s u a l l y  r e s t r i c t  t h e i r  v iew  of what  a law "does"  
t o  a r e l a t i v e l y  n a r ro w  r a n g e  of  co n seq u e n ce s  of the  law .  
They may even  t a k e  a p u e ly  K e l s e n i a n  v iew  and r e g a r d  the  
" d o in g "  as  th e  norm and n o t h i n g  e l s e ,  so t h a t  any s o c i a l ,  
economic  or  p o l i t i c a l  c o n se q u e n c e s  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t .  I n
T
Sou th  A u s t r a l i a  v .  Commonwealth (19^2) 65 C.L.R. 373$ 
V i c t o r i a  v .  Commonwealth (1956) 99 C.L.R.  575«
practice, their view is rarely as narrow as that, even 
if their language might suggest it. The difficulties 
arising from this overlap with those arising from the 
expressions ’‘directly” and “indirectly".
“Directly“
This requires the characterisation of some legal act 
which is in conformity with the provisions of a constitu­
tion, But how can one say that an act conforms to some­
thing that is commanded or prohibited? Mere intuition 
or even commonsense would not appeal to anyone as a 
criterion, even though in some cases these might appear 
to be the only possible explanation. Practical considera­
tions in terms of social, economic or political consequenc­
es may possibly supply an answer, but there would always 
be the difficulty of reconciling conflicting opinions; 
moreover, as noticed earlier, courts apparently do not 
profess to accept it. Expressions such as *pith and 
substance1 or 1 true nature and character1 have also been 
coined but they have not met with much success especially 
in a borderline case which presents the problem of 
characterisation in a difficult form. However, one thing 
appears to be certain and that is that the Kelsenian 
method in confining our attention to a formal hierarchy
of norms would not suffice, and a reference may have to 
he made to the setting or context of a legal act in 
order to characterise an ’‘achievement" as "direct". This 
problem is discussed further under "indirectly".
"Cannot be done"
This has been discussed above in parts as "Cannot" 
and "Be done", but it may be noted that in this part of 
our maxim this expression need not have the same meaning 
as in the earlier part, because of the following word 
"indirectly". What one regards as "doing" something can 
be coloured by the following adverb.
"Indirectly"
This denotes a characterisation of some legal act 
which is not in conformity with the provisions of a 
constitution. "Directly" and "indirectly" may to a 
certain extent involve similar problems of characterisa­
tion as what is "directly" is not "indirectly" and wbd: 
is "indirectly" is not "directly". However, "indirectly" 
is not exactly the opposite of "directly", because 
"indirectness" is not simple straightforward "invalida­
tion" but arises under some guise or pretext or pretence 
of doing something that gives, on the face of it, the
appearance of “validation". Thus “indirectly“ raises 
characterisation difficulties in a new form.
The problem of “indirectness“ may arise when a 
piece of legislation actually operates in two or more 
classes of subjects and it is often treated by courts as 
a problem of attributing a single classification, assum­
ing that the legislation either belongs to a class, or 
it does not. To attribute one characterisation to a law 
involves the ascertainment, in some way, of the line of 
demarcation between the legislative powers of several 
sets of governments, or between the legislative powers 
and the prohibitions imposed upon them. However, it is 
by no means an easy task to decide whether a particular 
enactment belongs to a certain class which the Constitu­
tion has specified for that enactment*s validity or 
invalidity.
In Barger*s Case , it was thought by the majority 
that the Act in question could only be passed by the State 
legislature*, it meant that the Commonwealth Parliament was 
not competent to do so. This opinion rested on the 
assumption that the purpose (as distinguished from 
1
R. v. Barger (1908) 6 C.L.R. *+1.
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motive) of the Act was regulation of the conditions of 
labour and not taxation. However, the distinction 
between purpose and motive, it must be conceded, is easier 
in theory than it may become in practice.
In an article in the Virginia Law Review, Mr G.W.C. 
Ross followed a different approach; he said that it was 
futile to say that a law belonged ‘'really11 or ‘'primarily“ 
to one “field" and only “secondarily" to the other: 
what it “really“ did was to deal with each field in 
relation to the other . To take his example, suppose the 
Constitution (of Australia) authorised the federal Parlia­
ment to legislate “with respect to parks"; the State 
legislatures have the field of “dogs", nothing being 
said in the Constitution about dogs. Is it constitution­
al for the Parliament to enact a law which forbids taking 
dogs into parks? In other words, is such a law with 
respect to “parks", or with respect to “dogs"? Mr Ross 
characterised it as dealing with “dogs" in relation to 
“parks". But why not characterise it as dealing with 
“parks" in relation to "dogs"? Perhaps Mr Ross may be 
right but why it was so was not explained. Suppose a law 
1
Ross, The Constitutional Law of Federalism in the United 
States and Australia (19^-1) 29 Virginia L. Rev. 88l ,pp. 918-921.
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forbids the entry into parks of all persons accompanied 
by dogs. Is it a law with respect to "parks”, or 
"persons", or "dogs"? Mr Rossxs formula does not, there­
fore, solve the problem.
Professor Sawer explained the problem in the
Australian context thus:
The cases that reach the higher Courts are 
almost by definition marginal cases. Sometimes 
they can be solved by reference to the ordinary 
usage of language, or the customary nomenclature 
found in British, Dominion and U.S. legislation, 
and constitutional documents. Frequently the 
Court is compelled to act on an 1intuitive1 
appreciation of the primary 1 object1 of the law, 
when its essentially political judgment has to 
be wrapped up in such question-begging phrases 
as xpith and substance1, or 1 true nature1, 
phrases depending on a fallacious identification 
of fluid man-made norms with immutable Aristo­
telian natural types or Platonic ideal forms.
As decisions multiply, types are established 
which provide precedents for future guidance.
Of course, this kind of quasi-legislation is not 
peculiar to the field of constitutional law. But 
it is in that field' that the official myth of 
mechanical * application1 of the law by the judges 
is most strongly maintained, while the political 
importance of the question makes a critical 
examination of the actual situation a particularly 
delicate operation.1
II
The above discussion suggests that the main
1
Paton (ed.), The Commonwealth of Australia (1952), at
p.61.
difficulty with understanding and applying the maxim 
arises from the words '‘directly11 and "indirectly" which 
we will now consider in more detail.
In the public law field, the maxim becomes relevant 
only in relation to a governmental authority whose com­
petence is in some degree limited. A unitary sovereign in 
the Diceyan sense of sovereignty could not be affected 
by the maxim. The maxim then assumes the following 
circumstance: a governmental authority which has power
to "do" something "directly", but which might also (but 
for the restraining effect of the maxim) employ these 
powers so as to "do" other things in a way which would 
ordinarily be described as "indirect". But this formula­
tion involves some vague and even question-begging 
expressions and it is desirable to attempt a more precise 
analysis•
A. Let us assume that governmental powers and limita­
tions on such powers are defined only by reference to 
purposes. Our governmental authority is authorised to 
achieve purposes A-Q. As to purposes R-Z, there are two 
possibilities :-
(a) The authority is expressly prohibited from 
achieving purposes R-Z. This should be the
simplest case, since a literal application of 
the constitutional restriction will necessari­
ly invalidate any action tending to achieve 
the prohibited purposes. A conflict between 
the authorisation to achieve A-Q, and the 
prohibition against achieving R-Z, can occur 
because probably particular measures adopted 
by the authority may tend to achieve both B 
(within power) and S (prohibited). Unless 
the constitutional document provided some 
rule for solving such conflicts, the courts 
woiLd be faced with a task of constructive 
interpretation so as to provide a solution. 
Such a solution need not be simple or all- 
embracing; it may sometimes give priority to 
the power to achieve B, or sometimes give 
priority to the prohibition against achieving 
S.
5^3.
Our maxim may be cited in such contexts, 
because an attempt will probably be made to 
argue that achieving B is the ‘'indirect" or 
"incidental" matter, while achieving S is the 
thing which may not be achieved "directly”.
Strictly, however, our maxim has no 
relevance, because we are assuming that 
purposes B and S are both directly achieved 
by the measure in question, and the problem 
is, therefore, simply one of interpreting 
the constitutional document to see whether 
the purpose S may never be achieved under 
any circumstances whatsoever, or is simply 
something that may not be achieved in 
isolation.
(b) Nothing is said about purposes R-Z. Then 
to achieve those purposes is simply ultra 
vires, and a measure tending solely to achieve 
S would be invalid. What of a measure tending 
to achieve both B and S? Logically, this 
is no different to the situation in (a) above; 
it should be a question of ascertaining by 
interpretation whether the constitutional 
document intends to empower only achieving A-Q 
when unmixed with any R-Zls, or extends to 
achieving anything in which there is an A-Q. 
Hence once again there is no need for our
maxim
B. Actually governmental powers and limitations on them 
are not always defined by reference to achieving a 
purpose, and even where they are difficulties can arise 
over differences between "direct" and "indirect" purposes 
or between "immediate" and "ultimate" purposes, or 
between "legal" and "social" purposes, etc. Thus a 
power may be given by reference to a class of transaction 
which is to be "regulated", with an inference that the 
purpose of the regulation is irrelevant, and with an 
assumption that the class may be recognised by attributes 
or grounds of characterisation having no connection with 
purpose. Or if distinctions are drawn between purposes, 
then those distinctions must themselves be non-purposive 
if the definition is not to be circular or productive of 
an infinite regress.
These non-purposive definitions of power and limita­
tion on power may further be sub-divided into many 
characterisation types'^  , but for our discussion it is 
sufficient to treat all non-purpose types together. Our 
governmental authority then is authorised to deal with 
non-purposive circumstances a-q. As to non-purposive
T
E.g., see Dixon J.Ts classification in Stenhouse v. 
Coleman (19^+) 69 C.L.R. ^575 at p. V7I .
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circumstances r-z, the same two possibilities exist 
as those considered under A above, and theoretically 
there is again no need for our maxim. It is a matter 
for specific constitutional provision, or failing it 
for constructive interpretation, to decide whether the 
presence of characteristic b validates a measure, not­
withstanding the concurrent presence of characteristic s 
whose presence is either prohibited or is in isolation 
insufficient to validate.
C. Now let us assume a case where some powers are 
defined by reference to purpose and others by reference 
to non-purpose characteristics, these being respectively 
A-Q, and a-q; similarly the residue of possible powers 
and circumstances are purposive R-Z, and/or non- 
purposive r-z. Then there are the following possibilities
(a) There is a prohibition against achieving
purposes R-Z. The possible clash between this 
and the power as to A-Q has been dealt with 
above. But what of a transaction dealing 
with non-purpose matter b, when the transac­
tion also tends to achieve purpose S? The 
same considerations apply. Either the con­
stitutional document or constructive
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interpretation must decide whether charac­
terisation as h or achieving S is to he 
regarded as the dominant consideration.
Our maxim has no logical place.
(h) There is a prohibition against dealing with 
non-purpose matters r-z. The case which is 
not yet dealt with is where a transaction 
having characterisation s tends to achieve 
B. Again the solution is provided by the 
considerations which have been discussed 
above.
The above discussion suggests that if the “primary11 
or "direct" characterisation attributes of an exercise 
of power include both attributes indicating validity 
and attributes indicating invalidity, the solution of 
the resulting conflict does not require our maxim or 
anything resembling it. This conclusion might have 
been reached from the maxim itself, since the maxim 
requires a circumstance which can be described as the 
"indirect" achieving of a prohibited matter or a matter 
otherwise beyond power, whereas the circumstances 
examined in A, B, and C above involved no "indirections". 
To take a convenient Australian illustration, we
assumed in those cases that the tax was imposed for a 
genuine purpose of raising revenue, and for a concurrent 
genuine purpose of discouraging an activity, e.g., sale 
of motor vehicles, which so far as intra-State was not 
otherwise within an area of Commonwealth power, and that 
so far as characterisation types are concerned, the law 
from its contents and legal operation would he classified 
both as a taxation law and as a law regulating the sale 
of motor vehicles. If in addition the law burdened 
sale as such, an essential feature of trade, then it 
would come within the prohibition of s.92 and beyond 
question under the present Australian law, that prohibi­
tion would be given primacy. But throughout our assump­
tion is that these attributes are actually present.
How then can there be any room for considerations 
of Mindirectness"? The first possible answer is that the 
maxim assumes for every law one exclusive or predominant 
characterisation attribute, and any other attributes 
actually present are then to be classified as "indirect", 
even though those attributes are actually present and no 
question of ma3a fides or "disguises" is involved. This 
principle would amount to a dogmatic direction to the 
courts that they must attribute one and only one
5^9
characterisation attribute to a law, and its validity 
or invalidity will then follow as a matter of course 
in accordance with the constitutional distribution of 
power and the constitutional prohibitions. Our maxim 
would then merely explain to those puzzled by the deci­
sions of the courts why the genuine though (as found) 
subordinate existence of a characteristic making for 
validity was disregarded. An attempt to apply such an 
approach might be represented as requiring the discovery 
of ,,primaryu as against "subsidiary", or "principal" as 
against "incident", or "essence" as against "accident", 
or "purpose" as against "motive", etc., of a measure.
Our maxim could then be rephrased thus : "Characterisa­
tion of a legal act is determined by refeimce to a 
feature characterised as primary, principal, essential, 
etc.; if that feature does not attract validity then the 
act will not be validated by the presence of a feature 
chaiacterised as subsidiary, incidental, accidental, 
etc., even though when considered alone that feature 
would attract validity."
Thus the difficulty may not be to distinguish the 
"direct" from the "indirect", but to distinguish the 
"direct" from the "less direct". For example, in
k6o
B a r g e r * s  Case 5 th e  r e g u l a t i o n  o f  th e  wages of  employees 
was r e g a r d e d  as  th e  " d i r e c t "  a c h ie v e m e n t  and t h e  i m p o s i ­
t i o n  and r e m i s s i o n  o f  an  e x c i s e  d u ty  a s  th e  " l e s s  d i r e c t " .  
I f  our  maxim i s  a p p l i e d ,  t h e n  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  f a i l e d  
b e c a u se  th e  f o rm e r  a ch iev e m e n t  was c o n s i d e r e d  by the  C o u r t  
as the  " p u r p o s e "  of  th e  Act  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  i t  b e in g  v i r ­
t u a l l y  p r o h i b i t e d  on a c c o u n t  of  th e  t h e n  a t t i t u d e  to  the
p
" r e s e r v e d "  powers  of the  S t a t e s .  Bu t  i n  O sborne1s Case , 
sh o u ld  we say  t h a t  the  maxim was n o t  a p p l i e d ,  or  s im p ly  
thd; th e  b r e a k i n g  up of  l a r g e  e s t a t e s  was n o t  even  an 
" i n d i r e c t "  a c h iev e m e n t?  P r o b a b ly  th e  l a t t e r .  The c o u r t s  
p u t  a l i m i t  on the  p u r p o s e s  or  co n seq u e n ce s  or  o t h e r  
a t t r i b u t e s  of  l e g i s l a t i o n  which  th ey  w i l l  r e g a r d  as 
l e g a l l y  r e l e v a n t  a t  a l l ,  w h e th e r  " d i r e c t l y "  or " i n d i r e c t ­
l y " ,  b u t  where th e y  draw t h i s  l i n e  v a r i e s  from sys tem  
t o  sys tem  and e v en  from c o u r t  t o  c o u r t  w i t h i n  a sy s te m .
One may o f t e n  s u s p e c t  i n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e x t s  
t h a t  i f  a c o u r t  r e l i e s  on such  an  a p p ro a c h ,  i t  has  
a c t u a l l y  come t o  the  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  bad f a i t h  -  
t h e  i n c l u s i o n  of  the  i n c i d e n t a l  v a l i d a t i n g  m a t e r i a l  i s  a
1
R. v .  B a rg e r  (1908) 8 C.L.R.  V i .
Osborne v .  Commonwealth (1911) 12 C.L.R. 321 .
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mere blind. That, however, is not necessarily the case. 
The incidental factor may be quite genuine and necessary 
to the legislative plan. If bad faith is excluded, then 
there is the obvious difficulty of deciding which feature 
of a complex legal act, such as a statute, is to be 
regarded as "primary", "principal”, etc., and which as 
"secondary", "incident", etc. Evidence from the legis­
lative process, if admissible, might help to solve such 
problems, but often it is not admissible and often it is 
not helpful. Thus we usually come back by yet another 
route to the fundamental problem of characterisation.
The next possible answer is that the maxim does not 
relate to circumstances where mixed characterisation 
attributes are objectively or genuinely present, but is 
concerned in some way with "mala fides" or "disguises".
If the measure on its face has characterisation attributes 
A-Q, or a-q, making for its validity, but a court is 
able to establish by some process of inquiry that these 
attributes are falsely asserted, and the attributes of 
the measure are actually and exclusively within R-Z, or 
r-z, then the measure may be held invalid. The "indirec­
tion" is in the dressing up. Our maxim might then be 
rephrased: "Measures will be judged by the attributes
4-62
they actually possess, not hy those which are falsely 
attributed to them1'.
The difficulty of applying conceptions such as mala 
fides varies with the kind of governmental authority 
concerned. It is relatively simple to apply the distinc­
tion between ''genuine” and "fraudulent", or "bona fide" 
and "mala fide" in private law and many administrative 
law contexts, but relatively difficult in constitutional 
contexts because in the systems with which we are con­
cerned, the Courts will not readily attribute "fraud" or 
"mala fides" to Parliaments, Monarchs, Presidents, etc., 
nor will they readily scrutinise the evidence (parliament­
ary debates, etc.) on which such findings might be based.
Suppose that in a constitutional context, a court 
will not allow allegations of bad faith against a 
parliament and rejects any identification of "directness" 
or "indirectness" with distinction between "principal" 
and "incident" etc. If a statute is with respect to 
topics A and Q, then the court regards it as a statute 
dealing with both matters and does not irqiire in what 
degree it affects them; Q may be a relatively unimportant 
feature on some standard of importance, but the court 
still says it is nevertheless a statute touching Q and
463.
this must be considered for deciding on validity.
Suppose the legislature in question has powers with 
respect to topics A-P, but topics Q-Z are not within its 
power. The system would then, it appears, gain no help 
from our maxim. It would, however, require some rule 
to solve the problem. The rule might be that the presence 
of an ultra vires factor invalidates all, or the presence 
of an intra vires factor validates all, or distinctions 
might be drawn between cases where Q-Z are prohibited, or 
are committed to another legislature in the system, or 
are higher or lower in some hierarchy of judicial values. 
We have seen that in the case of Canada, the '‘double 
aspect" rule used to solve some cases of this hind 
results in the creation of concurrent powers, although 
the system seemed designed to avoid any such powers.
CHAPTER XV
Force of our Maxim
The force of our maxim depends on a large number of 
variants, from the personal outlook of individual judges 
to the terms in which powers and prohibitions are framed, 
and its force is also likely to vary greatly as between 
different branches of public law. For the purpose of
present discussion, it is proposed to deal with the
1seventy-four constitutional cases mentioned in some 
detail above, which also show whether the maxim was applied 
or not applied. These are cases in which the maxim or a 
principle similar to it was argued or could reasonably 
have been applied - where it was in some form or another 
an important issue. It is very rarely that such an issue 
can be isolated as the only or the decisive one, so that 
in "weighing" these cases for the present purpose there is 
inevitably a subjective element. It is not a matter to 
which any simple statistical method could be applied. 
Nevertheless this listing does suggest some general
propositions about the relative force of our maxim.
_
See Appendix.
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This restriction of the field of constitutional 
cases is justified partly hy the necessity for having a 
manageable sample, and partly because the constitub.onal 
cases present the special problem previously mentioned - 
namely the limited application in such a context of 
notions of bad faith. Courts may often have their sus­
picions about the good faith of a legislature but they 
are usually unwilling to express any such suspicion and 
make it an overt ground of decision; they are much more 
likely to try to bring the case under the categoris of 
'’directness" and "indirectness" - the "substantial" and 
"true nature and character" approach. If we find that 
even with such limits on the application of the maxim, 
it has been given effect to in a considerable proportion 
of cases, then we may conclude that its force is 
appreciable.
Out of the seventy-four cases listed, it was in 
forty-eight cases^ that the legislation in question was.
1
See Appendix. It may be noted that our maxim presupposes 
that there will be no difficulty of locus standi to 
challenge the validity of legislation; where a case is 
decided on the ground of *lack of locus standi1, the Court 
does not dispose of the substantive issue, so the above 
list does not include such cases as Anderson v. Common­
wealth (1932) 47 C.L.R. 505 Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) 
262 U.S. 447. On a broader view, such cases could be 
included as examples of the failure of the maxim.
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h e l d  i n v a l i d .  There have b een  o c c a s i o n a l  c a s e s  where one
m ig h t  t h i n k  our maxim ough t  to  have been  a p p l i e d  and was
1 2n o t  , o r  oug h t  n o t  t o  have been  a p p l i e d  and was ; such
c a s e s  a r e  l i k e l y  to  o ccu r  as  beyond a c e r t a i n  s t a g e  i t  
becomes a m a t t e r  of o p i n i o n ,  b u t  we can  assume t h a t  
“e r r o n e o u s  d e c i s i o n s “ more or l e s s  b a la n c e  o u t .  These 
f i g u r e s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  the  maxim has  b e en  a b le  to  p l a y  a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  i n  e x e r c i s i n g  r e s t r a i n t  on l e g i s l a t u r e s  
w i t h  l i m i t e d  p ow ers .
L e t  us  now c o n c e n t r a t e  on th e  f o r t y - e i g h t  h o l d i n g s  
of  i n v a l i d i t y  and d i s t i n g u i s h  be tw een  “p r o h i b i t i o n “ 
s i t u a t i o n s ,  where t h e r e  i s  an e x p r e s s  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r o h i b i t i o n ,  and “u l t r a  v i r e s “ s i t u a t i o n s ,  where t h e r e  i s  
no e x p r e s s  p r o h i b i t i o n  b u t  o n ly  an a l l e g e d  l a c k  of 
a f f i r m a t i v e  power.
T h i r t e e n  c a s e s ^  i n  which  th e  l e g i s l a t i o n  was h e ld
1
E . g .  P o t a t o  M a rk e t in g  Board v .  W i l l i s  and the  A t t o r n e y - 
G e n e r a l  f o r  Canada j 1952] 4 - D.L.R"! 146; E v e rso n  v .  Board 
of  E~d^~catiori~(19^7) 330 U.S. 1.
2
E . g .  V i c t o r i a n  Chambers o f  M a n u f a c tu re s  v .  Commonwealth 
(1943) 67 C. l\R~~413~ ( the  I n d u s t r i a l  L i g h t i n g  C a s e ) ;
P . J .  Magennis  P ty  L td  v .  Commonwealth (1949) 80 C.L.R. 3Ö2; 
R a i l r o a d  R e t i r e m e n t  Board v .  A l to n  R a i l r o a d  Co. (1935)
295 u . s .  330.
See Appendix .
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invalid deal with “prohibition" situations. The prohibi­
tions, here concerned, are s.92 and s. 116 of the 
Australian Constitution. Basically the problem is to 
distinguish "direct" from "indirect" characteristics of 
a law. However, in the case of s.92, it has assumed a 
specialised form: our maxim would apply if (i) a law
under the guise of dealing with "‘'accidents" or "incidents" 
of inter-state trade, etc., or something which is not 
inter-state trade, etc., imposes a real or substantial 
restriction or burden or liability on the "essence" of 
inter-state trade, etc. (the expression "trade, commerce 
and intercourse" is given a restrictive meaning so as not 
to include anything incidental or ancillary to it), and 
some 1 closer connection1 must appear between the activity 
or transaction affected and inter-state trade, etc., than 
the economic interdependence of inter-state trade, etc., 
and domestic trade and commerce of a State; (ii) a law 
discriminates against inter-state trade, etc., as 
compared with intra-state; (iii) a legislature under the 
guise of removing legal remedies, validates its own Acts 
which are otherwise invalid, or validates administrative 
acts done in pursuance of such invalid Acts. As to s.116, 
our maxim would apply if a law is an attempt in disguise 
to deal with something that is prohibited by that section;
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it involves problems of characterisation similar to those 
arising in the ultra vires situation as the prohibition is 
defined by reference to purpose - as if a legislature is 
denied the power to legislate with respect to the subject- 
matter of the prohibition.
In the area of Uultra vires11 situations, twelve cases^ 
arose under the Canadian Constitution. The Canadian Con­
stitution provides two separate lists of legislative 
powers for the Dominion Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures, and each list is exclusive of the other.
In actual working, the listing of a subject-matter as 
within the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament has 
virtually been considered to operate as a prohibition on 
the powers of the provincial legislatures, and vice versa. 
Hence, the application of tests like "pith and substance" 
or "true nature and character" becomes inevitable in order 
to distinguish between “direct" and "indirect" charac­
teristics of a law, and the Canadian examples can there­
fore be regarded as transitional from the "prohibition" 
to the "ultra vires" situation.
2Ten ultra vires non-Canadian cases in which the
1
See Appendix.
2
See Appendix.
legislation was held invalid deal with powers defined by 
reference to purpose. These cases are concerned mainly 
with the defence and appropriation powers in Australia and 
the appropriation power in the United States, A specific 
purpose is a circumstance which provides a ready base by 
reference to which "direct" characteristics of a law may 
be distinguished from the "indirect" ones. Thus our 
maxim is more readily accessible in case of a power defined 
by reference to purpose than in case of a non-purposive 
power,
Twelve ultra vires non-Canadian cases in which the 
legislation was held invalid deal with powers defined by 
reference to non-purposive classifications. However, 
while it is true that these powers are not on their face 
purposive, purpose limitations may easily be read into 
them. For example, our maxim might apply if a tax 
imposed is of a confiscatory nature, or highly exorbit­
ant, or with the purpose of penalising some conduct, even 
if the taxing power is not framed in purposive language. 
More difficult is the case where a tax imposed is 
accompanied by an exemption from its payment if certain
i
See Appendix. Commonwealth Oil Refineries v. South 
Australia (1926) 38 C.L.R. 4o8, belongs to both the 
"prohibition" and the "ultra vires" situations.
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conditions or requirements are fulfilled; in such a case 
the distinction between "direct” and "indirect” charac­
teristics becomes more vague and undefinable. "Indirection” 
may also arise in the framing of a law, e.g., imposition 
of an excise duty under the guise of a tax imposed on 
sale.
There are two more cases, Cowburn*s Case^ and 
Magennis1 Case , in which the legislation was held invalid, 
but these may be regarded as not properly belonging to 
either the "prohibition” or the "ultra vires” situations. 
Cowburn*s Case is an example of a somewhat rhetorical 
reference to our maxim, rather than application of it. 
Magennis1 Case may, on one view, seem to belong to the 
"ultra vires” situation as the main issue involved in that 
case was the validity of the Commonwealth Act which was 
held invalid for not satisfying the requirements of 
s.5Kxxxi). But there may also be the possible view that 
the Act was invalid for not providing "just” compensation, 
a prohibition similar to the one developed in the United 
States, and it may therefore be said to belong to the 
"prohibition” situation. However, the former view appears 
to have more appeal in the Australian context because the
T
Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn (1926) 37 C.L.R. 466.
P.J. Magennis Pty Ltd v. Commonwealth (1949) 80 C.L.R.382.
2
the  c o n d i t i o n s  l a i d  down i n  s . 5 1 ( x x x i )  have b een  t r e a t e d  
as  p a r t  of  the  d e f i n i t i o n  of  the  power .
2I t  may be p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  o u t  of t e n  c a s e s  i n v o l v -
3
in g  l e g i s l a t i v e  schemes i t  was i n  two c a s e s  t h a t  the  
l e g i s l a t i o n  was h e l d  i n v a l i d ,  and one of  t h e s e  came from 
Canada.  This  may l e a d  to  a c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  our  maxim has  
l i t t l e  f o r c e  i n  th e  a r e a  of  l e g i s l a t i v e  schem es .  However, 
t o  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  way i s  to  o v e r - s i m p l i f y  the  m a t t e r .  Our 
maxim p r e s u p p o s e s  a c e r t a i n  b a s i c  a p p ro a c h  to  th e  r e l e v a n c y  
or d e s i r a b i l i t y  of  p u rp o se  i n  d i f f e r e n t  s i t u a t i o n s .
C o u r t s  i n  g e n e r a l  have  n o t  e n t e r t a i n e d  th e  i d e a  of exam­
i n i n g  l e g i s l a t i v e  schemes by r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e i r  p u rp o se  
or o b j e c t  ( a p a r t  f rom the  q u e s t i o n  of f o r m a l  o r  m a t e r i a l  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ) , u n l e s s  the  A c ts  c o m p r i s in g  a scheme a re  
i n t e r - c o n n e c t e d ,  or have a c l e a r  i n t e r - a c t i o n  so as to  
r a i s e  a s t r o n g  p r e s u m p t i o n  to  t h a t  e f f e c t .  T h is  r e l e g a ­
t i o n  of  p u rp o se  has  a c c o r d i n g l y  r e s t r i c t e d  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  our maxim i n  t h i s  a r e a .
1
N e lu n g a lo o  v .  Commonwealth [195*1] A.C. 3*+. T h is  was f o r  
th e  p u rp o se  of d e c i d i n g  w h e th e r  Uj u s t  t e r m s ” i s s u e s  r a i s e  
i n t e r  se q u e s t i o n s  u n d e r  s . 7 5  of  the  C o n s t i t u t i o n .
2
See Appendix .
3
A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  Nova S c o t i a  v .  A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  
Canada I 1950A D .L .R .  369 ( t h e  I n t e r - d e l e g a t i o n  C a s e ) ;
P . J .  Magennis P ty  L td  v .  Commonwealth (19^9) BO C.L.R. 
3^ 2^
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In a federal constitution having only one list of 
legislative powers (as in the United States and Australia) 
it is easier to permit the legislature with express 
powers to range over subjects which touch the permitted 
subjects in almost any degree, even though commonsense 
might regard the resulting characterisation as strained. 
However, there may be a tendency to treat the residual 
power as creating an implied prohibition, with an 
inference that no law should touch that area at aLl lest 
a legislature with express powers under the guise of 
acting under one of its powers such as the taxing or 
defence power might assume complete control over every 
act of every person. An assumption of this sort was 
explicitly acted on by the High Court of Australia from 
1903 until 1920, but even without an explicit "implied 
prohibition” or even after its official overthrow, the 
idea it expresses may have some influence on decisions. 
Hence, there is scope for the operation of our maxim 
even in a constitution having only one list of legislative 
powers, though to a lesser extent than in a constitution 
having two (or more) lists of legislative powers.
Finally, the list of forty-eight invalidity holdings 
have a fairly wide time spread. One might have expected
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them to he mainly from the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, when relevant Courts were less imhued with the 
presumption of validity. Actually, however, the cases 
fall into the following groups by date: before 1900, five 
cases; from 1900-1920 (Australian Engineers Case), five 
cases; from 1920-193^ (United State New Deal Cases), 
thirteen cases; since 193&, twenty-five cases.
Putting the matter at its lowest, the maxim stands 
as a warning to legislatures with restricted powers - 
that in the use of "devices'* to avoid constitutional 
restrictions, they should not go too far.
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10. Wieman v. Updegraff (1952) 344 U.S. 183.
F. List of cases which deal with powers defined by 
reference to non-purposive classifications and in 
which the legislation was held invalid.
1. Attorney-General for New South Wales v .Homehush 
Flour Mills Ltd (1937) 56 C.L.R. 390.
2. Bailey v.Drexel Furniture Co. (1922) 259 U.S.
20 (the Child Labour Tax Case).
3• Commonwealth Oil Refineries v . South Australia 
(1926) 38 C.L.R. 408.
4. Guy v. Baltimore (1879) 100 U.S. 440.
5. Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918) 247 U.S. 251.
6. Melbourne Corporation v. Commonwealth (1947)
74 C.L.R. 31 (the State Banking Case).
Minister of the Interior v. Harris [1952(4)]
S.A. 789 (A.D.) (the High Court Case).
7 .
5-85-
8 .  R. v .  B a r g e r  (1908) 6 C.L.R.  5-1.
9 .  S p e i s e r  v .  Rande 11 (1958) 357 U. S. 513*
10. U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  C o n s t a n t i n e  (1935) 296 U.S. 287
11.  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  De W it t  (1870) 9 W al l .  1+1.
12 .  Woodruff  v .  Parham ( 1 869) 8 W al l .  136 .
G. L i s t  o f  c a s e s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  l e g i s l a t i v e  schemes
1• A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l  f o r  Nova S c o t i a  v . A t t o r n e y -  
G e n e r a l  f o r  Canada |1950J  5- D .L.R.  3&9»
2 .  Brown v .  Green  (1951) 85- C.L.R.  285*
3 .  C o l l i n s  v .  M i n i s t e r  of the  I n t e r i o r  [ 1 9 5 7 ( 1 ) ]
S.A. 552 (A.D.)  ( t h e  S ena te  C a s e ) .
5-. Moran v .  Deputy F e d e r a l  Commissioner of T a x a t i o n  
(1939) 61 C.L.R.  735 ( H . C . ) ;  095-0) 63 C.L.R.
338 ( P . C . ) .
5 .  P . J .  Magennis P ty  Ltd  v .  Commonwealth (195-9)
80 C.L.R.  3 82 .
6 .  P o t a t o  M a rk e t in g  Board v .  W i l l i s  and A t t o r n e y -  
G e n e r a l  f o r  Cana.da I 1952] h D.L.R.  156.
7 .  Pye v .  Renshaw (1951) 85- C .L.R.  58 .
8 .  South  A u s t r a l i a  v .  Commonwealth (195-2) 65 C.L.R.  
373 ( th e  F i r s t  Uniform Tax C ase ) .
9 .  Tunnock v . V i c t o r i a  (1951) 85- C.L.R.  5-2.
10. V i c t o r i a  v .  Commonwealth (1958) 99 C.L.R. 575 
( t h e  Se~cond Unifo rm  Tax C ase) .
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